Farina & Naima (No. 4)

[2017] FamCA 1049

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FARINA & NAIMA (NO. 4) [2017] FamCA 1049

FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – Agreement reached about most of the terms of final Parenting Orders – resolution of outstanding issues

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)
Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)

APPLICANT: Ms Farina

RESPONDENT: Mr Naima

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Carter Farquar Mediation & Family Law

FILE NUMBER: BRC 9358 of 2014

DATE DELIVERED: 6 December 2017

PLACE DELIVERED: Brisbane

PLACE HEARD: Brisbane

JUDGMENT OF: Hogan J

HEARING DATE: 6 December 2017

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: Mr Galloway

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Maguire Barnes Family Lawyers

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: Mr Galloway

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: Mr Schoenmaker, Schoenmaker Legal on 5 December 2016

RESPONDENT:	In person on 6 December 2016
COUNSEL FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER:	Mr Taylor

SOLICITOR FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER Carter Farquar Mediation & Family Law

Orders

IT IS ORDERED BY CONSENT BY WAY OF FINAL ORDER THAT

Contraventions and Previous Order

1. Any contravention applications filed by the Father undetermined be dismissed. 

2. All previous parenting orders are discharged.

3. The Independent Children’s Lawyer’s appointment continues for six (6) months from the date of these Orders and thereafter the Independent Children’s Lawyer be discharged.

Parental responsibility

1. The Mother shall have sole parental responsibility for all of the major long term issues relating to the child, E born … 2009 (the Child).

2. Save in the event of genuine emergency, the Mother shall:

   (a)notify the Father via email at least fourteen (14) days prior to making a decision about a major long term issue in relation to the Child, including matters of education, health and religion, and invite the Father to indicate his views by sending an email reply to the Mother within seven (7) days;  and

   (b)give consideration to any email reply received from the Father within the said seven (7) day period prior to making a decision;  and

   (c)inform the Father via email of her decision once made.

3. In the event of genuine emergency, the Mother shall:

   (a)be at liberty to make decisions in the exercise of her sole parental responsibility without reference to the Father; and

   (b)inform the Father via email of the said emergency and the decisions made by her, within forty-eight (48) hours of such decision being made.

4. In the exercise of her sole parental responsibility, that the Mother shall inform the Father about any decision concerning the Child’s exposure to both the Christian and Muslim faiths, and shall ensure that the Father’s wishes concerning the Child’s faith are taken into account in any such decision made by the Mother.

Residence

1. The Child shall live with Mother.

Time with the Child

1. The Child shall spend time with the Father, unless otherwise agreed in writing, as follows:

   (a)on or about 24 December: for two (2) hours supervised by Mr K Farina or by Mr X, and to take place at McDonald’s Restaurant, Suburb C;  and

   (b)on 17 February 2018 for two (2) hours with such time to be supervised:

   (i)by staff at Y Contact Centre Suburb Z and occur at Y Contact Centre Suburb Z, if that service can make itself available and is available; but, in the event that Y Contact Centre Suburb Z cannot provide that service then

   (ii)time shall occur at the McDonald’s Restaurant, Suburb C under the supervision of either Mr K Farina or Mr X;  and thereafter

   (c)for two (2) hours every eight (8) weeks thereafter, commencing on the third Saturday in February (or such other date as notified by the Contact Supervision Service), with the first two (2) occasions to occur at Y Contact Centre Suburb Z and, thereafter, at McDonald’s Restaurant, Suburb C (or such other venue as is agreed between the parties) and be supervised by Y Contact Centre or such other professional supervision service, or private individual, as is agreed in writing between the parties and provided however that: 

   (d)the Father may choose, by notice in writing to the Mother, not less than two (2) weeks before the intended time, for the Child to spend time with him for Ramadan, Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha and, in such circumstances, the time shall be for two (2) hours and, in 2018, shall occur on 16 May 2018, 14 June 2018 and 21 August 2018 respectively, with:

   (i)the Mother to ensure that the Child attends at the place or location identified by the Father as being a place of celebration on those events and changeover occur at that place;  or

   (ii)in the event that a particular location is not one attended by the Father, nor intended by him to be somewhere that the Child attends on those occasions: then changeovers and the time will occur, unless agreed in writing, at McDonald’s Restaurant at Suburb C,

   and the Father shall forgo the next ‘eight (8) weekly’ visit.

2. Each party shall, within fourteen (14) days of the date hereof, make contact with Y Contact Centre Suburb Z and complete all documentation necessary to proceed with an intake by that service.

3. The cost of supervision in accordance with Order 9 shall be met equally between the parties.

4. The Child’s siblings, the Father’s partner, and children all be at liberty to join the contact set out in these Orders.

Communication

1. In addition to the contact schedule set out in Order (9) of these Orders, the Child be at liberty to communicate with the Father by Skype or face-time on:

   (a)the Father’s birthday between 4.00 pm and 5.00 pm;  and

   (b)the Child’s birthday between 4.00 pm and 5.00 pm;  and

   (c)Christmas day between 4.00 pm and 5.00 pm.

2. The Father be at liberty to send letters, cards and gifts to the Child on no more than one (1) occasion each month, and that the Mother allow those letters, cards, parcels and presents to be given to the Child unopened.

3. The Child be at liberty to telephone, skype, email and send letters, cards and gifts to the Father if she expresses a wish to do so, and the Mother shall do all she can to facilitate such communication.

4. There is otherwise no other communication to occur between the Father and the Child.

Religion

1. The Father be at liberty to discuss and facilitate exposure of the Child to his faith during his time with the Child, and also in any communication he has with the Child.

2. The Father be restrained from denigrating, or allowing others to denigrate the Mother’s faith in the presence or hearing of the Child.

3. The Mother be restrained from denigrating, or allowing others to denigrate the Father’s faith in the presence or hearing of the Child.

Exchange of Information

1. These Orders act as authority for any school attended by the Child to discuss the Child’s educational, sporting and cultural progress with the Father at his election and the school is authorised by these Orders to send the Father copies of the Child’s regular school reports and any other communications routinely sent by the school to parents as and when they are received by them from the school.

2. Each parent shall keep the other parent informed as to their current residential and postal address, any email addresses, Skype contact details, a landline and/or a mobile telephone number, and shall notify the other of any changes to any of those as soon as is practicable after such change is affected.

3. The Mother shall keep the Father informed as to any major medical treatment that the Child receives as soon as practicable after the Child has received such treatment and shall provide details of the reasons for the receipt by the Child of such treatment, and shall advise the Father as to any medication that has been prescribed to be given to the Child.

Non-denigration

1. During the time the Child is with either parent or is communicating with either parent, that parent shall:

   (a)respect the privacy of the other parent and not question the Child about the personal life of the other parent;  and

   (b)speak of the other parent respectfully; and

   (c)not denigrate or insult the other parent in the presence or hearing of the Child and use their best endeavours to ensure that others do not denigrate or insult the other parent in the hearing or presence of the Child;  and

   (d)positively encourage the Child’s relationship with the other parent; and

   (e)not speak with the Child about any allegation or any matter related to these proceedings.

Travel Overseas with the Child

1. In the event the Mother proposes to travel overseas with the Child, the Child be permitted to travel overseas with the Mother provided that:

   (a)the Mother gives the Father not less than two (2) weeks written notice, via email, of her intention to travel with the Child and provide details of the destination and the period for which it is anticipated that the Child will be out of the country;  and

   (b)during the travel, the Mother shall arrange for, facilitate and initiate one telephone call by the Child to the Father between 6.00 pm and 6:30 pm Wednesday (local time to wherever the Child is travelling);  and

   (c)if the Child’s travel is to a non Hague Convention country, the Mother provide to the Father copies of her proposed itinerary and return tickets for the Child 45 days before the date of travel.

Injunctions and restraints

1. Unless otherwise agreed between the parties in writing, the Father be restrained from entering, remaining at, or attending the following:

   (a)the Mother’s residence at B Street, Suburb C in the State of Queensland;  and

   (b)school activities and the Child’s school, being D School, in the State of Queensland, save for attending parent/teacher interviews;  and

   (c)the Child’s extra-curricular activities (including but not limited to gymnastics training and competitions).

2. For the purposes of Order 25(c), the Mother shall inform the Father of the location of any extra-curricular activities in which the Child will be participating, with such notification to occur in writing by email sent not less than 24 hours before that extra-curricular activity occurs.

3. The Mother be restrained and an injunction issue restraining her from changing the Child’s name without first obtaining an Order of the Court or the Father’s written consent to do so.

4. Mr Naima born … 1995, his servants and/or agents be and are hereby restrained by injunction, and irrespective of authenticated consent as contemplated in Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), from removing or attempting to remove or causing or permitting the removal of the Child, E born … 2009 from the Commonwealth of Australia for a period of five (5) years.

5. It is requested that the Australia Federal Police give effect to these Orders by placing the name of the Child, E born … 2009 on the Family Law Watchlist in force at all points of arrival and departure in the Commonwealth of Australia and maintain the Child’s name on the Watchlist for a period of five (5) years.

Family Reports

1. Pursuant to s 121(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) an account of the proceedings in this case, namely these Orders and the Family Report of Ms AA dated 13 November 2017 and all other preceding Family Reports be authorised for publication to any Contact Supervisor other than Mr K Farina and Mr X.

Costs

1. There be no order as to costs.

AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT

1. All outstanding applications are otherwise dismissed and removed from the list of cases requiring finalisation.

AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED

1. Pursuant to s 65DA(2) and s 62B of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), the particulars of the obligations these Orders create and the particulars of the consequences that may follow if a person contravenes these Orders and details of who can assist parties to adjust to and comply with an Order are set out in the Fact Sheet attached and these particulars are included in these Orders.

NOTATION

(A)Order 28 and Order 29 are not intended to prohibit the Mother, Ms Farina born … 1973, from travelling with the Child, E born … 2009 and should be read so as to allow and permit the Child to travel with the Mother in accordance with Order 24.

(B)The Court notes that this Order is made in the context where the most recent Family Report recommended that orders be made to remove pressure from the child.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Farina & Naima (No. 4) has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE

FILE NUMBER: BRC 9358 of 2014

Ms Farina

Applicant

And

Mr Naima

Respondent

And

The Independent Children’s Lawyer

EX TEMPORE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. I have before me a Minute of Order (which I have marked as Exhibit “A” and dated 5 December 2017) outlining the terms of orders in respect of which there is agreement –  other than as has been outlined during the course of discourse yesterday afternoon and this morning – as between the parents and the Independent Children’s Lawyer. 

2. I intend to make orders by consent by way of final order in the terms of the agreed aspects of the order. 

3. I do so having regard, in particular, to the evidence of Ms AA, a Family Consultant who undertook a process of facilitation and/or observation (as directed by an order previously made pursuant to s 65L) and who, as a consequence of that and the interview she conducted in November this year, produced a report containing her opinion and recommendations; and her evidence today that those recommendations are based, very much, upon the need at the moment to remove pressure from the child.

4. So, taking into account that most recent evidence and the opinions expressed by Ms AA and for those reasons, I am persuaded that orders in terms of Exhibit “A”, where those are agreed between the parties, are orders which are in the child’s best interests at present.

5. There remain a number of outstanding issues in respect of which the parties were not in agreement.  I intend to make orders in relation to each of those issues and now deal with them seriatim.

Timetable for time with the father in February 2018

1. The first issue is in relation to the timetabling of the child’s opportunity to spend time with her father in February 2018.  It is agreed between the parties (that is, the parents and the Independent Children’s Lawyer) that the child will have the opportunity to spend time with her father on or about 24 December for two hours, supervised by her brother or her maternal grandfather, at McDonald’s Restaurant, Suburb C. 

2. The competing proposals for time in February 2018 are these:

   a)Mr Naima proposes that the child then have the opportunity to spend time with him for two hours on 3 February 2018 – the day after her birthday;  whereas

   b)the mother proposes that the child’s time with her father commence on the third Saturday in February of 2018 (or such other date as notified by the contact supervision service) and thereafter occur every eight weeks for two hours, subject to a proviso contained in Clause 9(c) of Exhibit “A”.

3. It is apparent from recourse to a calendar that the two dates are some 14 days apart.  Taking into account Ms AA’s evidence in relation to the potential impact upon the child of spending time with her father on the Saturday immediately after her birthday and the fact that I think it more likely than not that she may well benefit from the opportunity to have a second celebration with him sometime thereafter, I have concluded that it is in her best interests that she spend time with her father on the third Saturday in February 2018: that is, 17 February 2018.

4. So the order, when it issues, will contain a clause that the child shall spend time with her father (unless otherwise agreed in writing) on 17 February 2018 for two hours, with such time to be supervised by staff at Y Contact Centre Suburb Z and occur at Y Contact Centre Suburb Z if that service can make itself available and is available and, in the event that Y cannot provide that service, time shall occur at McDonald’s Restaurant, Suburb C under the supervision of either Mr K Farina or Mr X for that second “one-off” occasion.

5. This is, in my view, necessary to ensure that the child does not think that her father does not seek to celebrate her birthday with her at a time that is relatively proximate to the same.

Supervision over the child’s time with her father into the future

1. Another issue requiring determination is the identification of the manner in which supervision over the child’s time with her father into the future is to occur. 

2. The competing proposals are these:

   a)it is proposed on behalf of the mother that there be two occasions at Y Contact Centre at Suburb Z and thereafter, there be time either at McDonald’s Restaurant Suburb C or such other venue as is agreed;  and 

   b)Mr Naima’s proposal is that there be a number of visits at venues of his choice, including – when one comes to December of next year – at a place that permits the child to visit and view Christmas lights in his company.

3. Having regard to the submissions made on behalf of the parents and the Independent Children’s Lawyer and taking into account Ms AA’s evidence, I am persuaded that it is more likely to be more in the child’s best interests that the first two occasions of supervised time in 2018 occur at the Y Contact Centre if possible (and I exclude the birthday visit, if I might term it that as this has already been specifically dealt with) and that, thereafter, the supervised time occur at McDonald’s Restaurant, Suburb C or such other venue as agreed between the parties.

4. In making that order, I record Ms AA’s evidence, which I accept, to the effect that it is highly likely to be more beneficial for the child if, into the future, agreement can be reached such that her time occur at some other place: for example, a park or attending a film or (I add) in going shopping in a shopping centre, rather than a restriction that sees attendance only at a McDonald’s Restaurant into the future. 

5. I accept the evidence of Ms AA in relation to the identity of those to provide supervision. 

6. I note that there is no evidence in relation to the availability of Mr K Farina on an ongoing basis, nor in relation to the availability and/or willingness of that person or Ms BB Farina or Ms X, in relation to the provision of ongoing supervision.

7. Having accepted Ms AA’s evidence and taking into account the absence of evidence from those people, I am persuaded that the appropriate order is one that sees supervision being provided by either a professional supervision service or private individual, as is agreed in writing between the parents. 

8. Therefore, I am persuaded that orders in relation to supervision that provide for such method and manner of supervision to occur are those which are in the child’s best interests.

Religious events and/or celebrations

1. Another issue which remains is in relation to the particular time the child will have the opportunity to spend with her father for the religious events and/or celebrations associated with Ramadan, Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha, those matters already generally being the subject of reference and agreement as particularised in Clause 9(c) of Exhibit A. 

2. I am easily persuaded in this matter that it is much more likely to provide certainty, and to lead to a less likely recurrence of disagreement, if the orders made specify now the dates on which, for 2018, the child will spend time with her father for the events of Ramadan, Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha. 

1. They are 16 May 2018 for Ramadan, 14 June 2018 for Eid al-Fitr and 21 August 2018 for Eid al-Adha.

2. The particulars that will attach to the orders that deal with each of those events will be that the time will be for two hours, with the mother to ensure that the child attends at the place or location identified by the father as being a place of celebration on those events and that collection occur from that place also at the conclusion of the time. 

3. In the event that such celebration or a particular location is not one attended by the father, nor intended by him to be somewhere that the child attends on those occasions, then the changeovers and the time will occur, unless agreed, via McDonald’s Restaurant at Suburb C. 

4. So, the orders in the terms that they will issue will put into effect my intention, as expressed inelegantly.

5. The purpose is to ensure that the child has two full hours to spend with her father and, in the event that it is his intention that they attend at a celebration (he says either at Suburb CC or Suburb DD) on those occasions, that she have the fullest opportunity to participate and observe those celebrations on that occasion.  

6. Otherwise, the time that the child shall spend with her father will be in the eight week framework commencing on the third Saturday in February that I have nominated and working through the rest of the year.

Father’s telephone numbers and Skype identification number

1. Another issue that requires determination is Mr Naima’s application that there be an order made requiring the child’s mother to ensure that his telephone number and Skype identification number be recorded and saved in an electronic device that is the child’s or electronic devices that are the child’s. 

2. His submissions in support of such an order were, as I understood them, in essence, that such an order would mean that the child would be freed from the responsibility of seeking out her mother and asking, in essence, to use her phone or her iPad, I infer, to communicate with him in accordance with the liberty afforded to her by Clause 13 of the agreed orders.

3. Such an order is opposed by the child’s mother. 

4. Mr Galloway, who appears for Ms Farina, submitted, in essence, that the control of the child’s access to communication (including access to internet) at her age – namely, eight and a half – is something that falls to her mother, being the parent with whom it is agreed she will continue to live and the parent to whom, it is agreed, will be afforded sole parental responsibility for her.

5. I am not persuaded at this stage that, at her age, and in the circumstances of this case, it is appropriate or in the child’s best interests to make an order that would require the child’s mother to insert the father’s contact number and Skype identification number in any electronic device that is the child’s. 

6. I am not persuaded that, in fact, the child has such a device but, even if she did, I accept entirely that, at her age, it is completely a matter for the parent with whom she lives to exercise appropriate supervision over her ability to access, for example, the internet, and to access and communicate with adults in her life. 

7. For those reasons, I decline to make an order in the terms sought by Mr Naima in that respect.

Islamic faith education

1. Another issue that requires determination is Mr Naima’s proposal that an order be made requiring that the child’s mother take her to attend at a service of some sort said to provide religious instruction of some kind about the Islamic faith to the child. 

2. There is no evidence before me as to the nature of the instruction, nor anything, really, about the practicalities of it, other than the assertions made by Mr Naima from the bar table to the effect that such a “service” – if I might term it in that manner – provides services three days per week and is located proximate, or relatively proximate, to the mother’s home.

3. At present, the child attends at the D School. 

4. I am not persuaded that it is in her best interests at this point in time that there be made a particular order requiring that she attend at an unknown, in an evidentiary sense, organisation to receive religious instruction and/or information in relation to the Islamic faith. 

5. In saying that, no one should conclude other than that it is my view, on the evidence before me and given the faiths of each of the child’s parents, that it is anything other than beneficial for her to be exposed to, and have an understanding of, the beliefs which underpin each of those respective faiths.

6. However, at her age, and given the other circumstances, it seems to me that it is unlikely to be in her best interests to require her necessarily, at this time, to have to deal with and conceptualise information other than that which she is being provided at school.  

7. I note also, in declining to make the order sought by Mr Naima, the assertions placed on the record – no doubt on instruction by Mr Galloway on behalf of Ms Farina – to the extent that she disavows, and was not pleased to read, the contents of paragraph 54 of Ms AA’s Family Report.  I note also the assertions from the bar table that both parents have contacted the school in relation to the same.

8. I take into account the information placed on the record by Mr Galloway about the mother’s reaction to reading those comments reported by Ms AA as having been made by the child. 

9. I also record my acceptance, in part, of Mr Naima’s submissions to the effect that he is concerned that, if the child were to continue to actually believe the things that Ms AA records her as having said at paragraph 54, it may cause her internal distress and/or discomfort into the future as she ages and, therefore, comes to appreciate that she is the product of parents who hold different religious identifications, in a formal sense at least.

10. However, as I have said, I am not persuaded that, at this stage, it is appropriate to make an order, nor is there any evidence to support such an order. 

11. For those reasons, I decline to make an order in the terms sought by Mr Naima.

Travel to countries which are not part of the Hague Convention

1. Another issue that requires determination is about whether there should be any restriction imposed upon the child’s ability into the future to travel outside of Australia to countries which are not parties to the Hague Convention.

2. Mr Naima opposes the absence of an order restricting travel on the basis that he is concerned, is not comfortable and holds concerns that there is a risk that, if the child is removed by her mother from Australia to travel to a country that is not a party to the Hague Convention, she may not be returned to Australia and there will be no recourse available to him.

3. I am not persuaded to make an order restraining or restricting the child’s ability to travel to countries outside of Australia in the manner sought by Mr Naima. 

4. I am not persuaded on the evidence before me that there exists sufficient risk that the mother will not return to Australia with the child.  The mother has lived her entire life in this country; she has family in this country;  her house is in this country. 

5. For those very short reasons then, I decline to make an order in the terms sought by Mr Naima.

Provision of the Family Reports to supervisors

1. I turn to deal with the issue of specific orders that permit the provision of the Family Reports prepared in this matter to those persons who are to supervise the child’s time with her father into the future. 

2. I accept Ms AA’s evidence in relation to that issue. 

3. I am easily persuaded that for those persons – whoever they might be – to undertake properly the role of supervision, it will be of assistance to them to have the ability to obtain an appreciation of the matters (and the chronology and history of this matter) and the competing contentions advanced by each of the child’s parents.

4. For those reasons then, the orders will include an order in the terms of that which is Clause 30 (currently a Notation in Exhibit “A”).

5. The order will be in terms that permit the provision of the preceding Family Reports (including that prepared by Ms AA most recently) to the contact supervisors, other than Mr K Farina or Mr X, the child’s maternal grandfather.

Section 65L explanation order

1. Another issue that required consideration was whether there is a benefit to the child of an order that would require Ms AA to explain to her the terms of the orders that will be made. 

2. Mr Naima made submissions in support of such an order.  In summary, in essence, they were to the effect that such explanation provided by someone like Ms AA would, perhaps, ensure that the child receive the information in a neutral sense. 

3. Such order was supported by the Independent Children’s Lawyer.  The submissions made by Mr Taylor, on behalf of the Independent Children’s Lawyer, certainly supported the proposition advanced by Mr Naima and also contained the contentions that: the child might benefit from having Ms AA explain the terms of the orders to her; and, she might benefit in her time with her father if her father knows that the order has, in fact, been explained to her by someone (other than her mother) who might be regarded as independent.

4. I have taken into account Ms AA’s evidence.  It was very much to the effect that, whilst there may be benefits to the child, she was concerned that the effort required to facilitate the opportunity for that explanation to occur might not be worth the benefit and, also, might (in a sense) be futile because, by the time she is available to explain the effect of the orders, the child – in all likelihood – will already have learnt of the terms of them because she will be living them.

5. Whilst having Ms AA explain the orders to the child is something that I think is likely to be beneficial for the child, on balance, taking into account the realities and practicalities of the situation, I decline to make an order in those terms. 

6. In doing so, I emphasise what I consider as something that is very important for the child in her future development: namely, that she is provided with the reassurance that her parents have agreed that she will continue to live with her mother. 

7. I say this because, from the contents of the most recent report prepared by Ms AA, what seems to be an ongoing concern for the child (at eight and a half) is that she will be “stolen away” by her father and removed from the primary care of her mother. 

8. That prospect no longer exists given Mr Naima’s agreement to final orders that the child reside with her mother. 

9. It would, I think, be highly likely to be something that is not beneficial to the child and her development if she continues to think such a thing and to hold such a fear, when that is something that has been dealt with by the agreement of her parents.

I certify that the preceding sixty-three (63) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Hogan delivered on 6 December 2017.

Associate:

Date:              6 December 2017