Farhat v The Director of Public Prosecutions

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[2017] HCATrans 092

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Hobart  No H2 of 2017

B e t w e e n -

SHADI JOSEPH FARHAT

Applicant

and

THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

Respondent

Application for stay

NETTLE J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

FROM MELBOURNE BY VIDEO LINK TO HOBART AND LAUNCESTON

ON FRIDAY, 28 APRIL 2017, AT 3.44 PM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR A.G. MELICK, SC:   If it please the Court, I appear with MR R.J. BROOMHALL for the applicant.  (instructed by Pagett & Associates)

MR J.P. RANSOM:   If it please the Court, I appear for the respondent, the Director of Public Prosecutions.  (instructed by Director of Public Prosecutions (Tas))

HIS HONOUR:   Yes, Mr Melick.

MR MELICK:   Thank you, your Honour.  This is an urgent application for an application for an injunction to stay or prevent the release of the contents of statutory declarations made by the applicant because if they become known to one of his co‑accused, namely, Mr Bechara, there is a very real risk of serious injury or death to the applicant. 

Your Honour, the brief facts are that the applicant and Mr Bechara were arrested in company with each other on 5 September 2013.  Shortly thereafter, the applicant, who had no criminal convictions at the time, as opposed to Mr Bechara who had numerous, including one for attempted murder, was approached by the police with a view to providing information - the Tasmania Police and also police from the New South Wales Middle Eastern Organised Crime squad.

Discussions were had between the police and counsel for Mr Farhat – in fact it was me at the time – and it was agreed that Mr Farhat would provide information to the police on condition, among other things, that the fact that he had spoken to the police and the information provided would not be made available to his co‑accused. 

He provided the information to the police in relation to his co‑accused, Mr Bechara, and Mr Ivey, who has subsequently become a co‑accused.  The information was provided by statutory declaration on 7 October 2013, which was taken without the knowledge of Mr Farhat’s representatives.  They were of the view at that stage it would be merely information in the form of a statement.

Mr Farhat started to receive death threats and they were set out in an affidavit when he applied for bail.  The affidavit was dated 19 September 2013.  It appears at pages 19 to 21 of your Honour’s papers.  In the meantime, on 21 November 2013, the police prepared a separate statutory declaration removing all references to Mr Bechara because they were aware of Mr Farhat’s concerns in relation to Mr Bechara, but that statutory declaration was never signed.

On 31 October last year, 2016, the DPP made Mr Farhat’s legal representatives aware that they had these statutory declarations and intended to disclose them to the defence.  Disclosure was immediately objected to.  There was an agreement by…

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Details
Case
[2017] HCATrans 92
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Mr Farhat, sought urgent interlocutory relief from the High Court of Australia to prevent the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) from disclosing the contents of statutory declarations he had made. Mr Farhat contended that disclosure to his co-accused, particularly Mr Bechara, posed a serious risk of injury or death to him, given Mr Bechara's history of violence, including an attempted murder conviction. The application followed a decision by Chief Justice Blow of the Supreme Court of Tasmania, which refused an application for a stay, effectively allowing the disclosure of the statutory declarations.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether interlocutory relief was available in a criminal jurisdiction to restrain the disclosure of documents, and whether the risk of harm to the applicant outweighed any forensic advantage the co-accused might gain from disclosure. Specifically, the court considered whether the trial judge, Justice Pearce, had erred in his assessment of public interest immunity by not giving sufficient weight to the applicant's safety and the potential for intentional harm. The applicant argued that an agreement with the police, that his statements would not be disclosed to co-accused, had been breached, and that the risk to his life was substantial and not outweighed by speculative benefits to the defence.

The High Court noted that the application was for a stay pending an application for special leave to appeal from the orders of Chief Justice Blow. The applicant's primary argument was that the risk of serious injury or death to him if the statutory declarations were disclosed to his co-accused was a critical factor that had not been adequately considered by the lower courts. He contended that the potential forensic advantage to the co-accused was speculative, particularly if he did not give evidence, whereas the risk to his life was real and immediate, evidenced by threats and an assault in custody. The DPP argued that disclosure was necessary in the interests of justice and that the situation, where one accused threatened another, was not unusual and did not warrant equitable intervention that would fragment criminal proceedings. The court also considered whether Justice Pearce had applied the correct test for public interest immunity, particularly regarding the substantial assistance disclosure might provide to the defence versus the risk of danger to the applicant.

Background

Background to the litigation

The facts of the case revolve around Shadi Joseph Farhat, who, along with his co-accused Shane Ivey and Mickael Bechara, is scheduled to stand trial in the Supreme Court of Tasmania for multiple charges, including trafficking in a controlled substance, trafficking in firearms, and dealing with the proceeds of crime. The trial is set to begin on 8 May 2017 and is expected to last around three weeks. The case stems from their arrest on 5 September 2013. Following his arrest, Farhat, who had no prior criminal convictions, was approached by Tasmania Police and the New South Wales Middle Eastern Organised Crime squad with a view to providing information on his co-accused. After discussions with counsel, an agreement was reached that Farhat would provide information in exchange for assurances that the fact he had spoken to the police and the details of his statement would remain confidential and not be disclosed to his co-accused. On 7 October 2013, Farhat provided the information in a statutory declaration, which was taken without the knowledge of his legal representatives.

Farhat began receiving death threats, which he detailed in an affidavit when he applied for bail on 19 September 2013. In light of these threats, on 21 November 2013, the police drafted a separate statutory declaration removing all references to Bechara, though this document was never signed. On 31 October 2016, the Director of Public Prosecutions informed Farhat’s legal representatives that they intended to disclose the statutory declarations to the defence, which was immediately objected to on the basis that the documents were protected by public interest immunity. Despite objections, the trial judge, Justice Pearce, ordered disclosure of the statutory declarations' contents, a decision that was subsequently upheld by Chief Justice Blow. Farhat's application for an interlocutory injunction to prevent the disclosure was dismissed. This led to the current application for a stay pending the determination of an application for special leave to appeal.

This case involves an application for a stay of proceedings in the High Court of Australia, pursuant to rule 8.07.2 of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth), pending the determination of an application for special leave to appeal from orders of Chief Justice Blow of the Supreme Court of Tasmania. The applicant, Shadi Joseph Farhat, and his co-accused, Shane Ivey and Mickael Bechara, are scheduled to stand trial in the Supreme Court of Tasmania on various charges including drug trafficking, firearms trafficking, and dealing with the proceeds of crime. The trial is set to commence on 8 May 2017. The application for a stay concerns the refusal to grant an interlocutory injunction to prevent the Director of Public Prosecutions from disclosing the contents of a statutory declaration made by the applicant on 7 October 2013 to the applicant’s co-accused. The applicant had made the declaration under assurances that it would remain confidential, and he now claims that disclosure would place his life at risk. Despite the applicant’s objections, Justice Pearce had ordered the disclosure of the declaration's contents, which was subsequently refused by Chief Justice Blow in interlocutory proceedings. The applicant's application for special leave to appeal is premised on the argument that Justice Pearce erred in considering the public interest immunity claim and that Chief Justice Blow was incorrect in his approach to the interlocutory injunction. The applicant contends that the risk of serious injury or death to him if the declaration's contents are disclosed outweighs any potential advantage to the co-accused. The High Court assessed the application for a stay based on factors such as the prospect of success on special leave, the applicant’s efforts to obtain a stay from the lower court, potential prejudice to other parties, and the balance of convenience. The Court found that there was not a substantial prospect of success on special leave and that the lower court’s decisions were within the sound exercise of discretion. The application for a stay was therefore dismissed, and an order for costs was made against the applicant.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does the High Court have jurisdiction to grant interlocutory relief in criminal proceedings?
2. Did the trial judge apply the correct test in determining the public interest immunity claim?
3. Was the risk of substantial injury to the applicant sufficiently considered in the balancing exercise?
4. Is there a substantial prospect of success for the application for special leave to appeal?
5. Would granting the stay cause prejudice to other parties or affect the balance of convenience?

Held
1. Does the High Court have jurisdiction to grant interlocutory relief in criminal proceedings?
The court concluded that ordinarily it would be inappropriate for the High Court to entertain an appeal from the refusal of interlocutory relief by a trial court. However, it is unsatisfactory to leave to a judge whose order is under review the exercise of appellate discretion of granting or withholding interlocutory relief. The application for interlocutory relief was dismissed.

2. Did the trial judge apply the correct test in determining the public interest immunity claim?
The court concluded that the trial judge took into account all that needed to be considered and reached a conclusion that was open to him. The contention that the trial judge's approach to the public interest immunity claim was incorrect was without relevant significance. The application for special leave to appeal on this ground was unlikely to succeed.

3. Was the risk of substantial injury to the applicant sufficiently considered in the balancing exercise?
The court concluded that the trial judge had considered the risk of substantial injury to the applicant but ultimately determined that the interests of justice in disclosure outweighed the risks to the applicant. The application for special leave to appeal on this ground was unlikely to succeed.

4. Is there a substantial prospect of success for the application for special leave to appeal?
The court concluded that there was not a substantial prospect of success for the application for special leave to appeal. The application was dismissed.

5. Would granting the stay cause prejudice to other parties or affect the balance of convenience?
The court acknowledged that granting the stay would cause prejudice to other parties as the trial was close to commencing. However, the court determined that the prejudice, although significant, was not irreparable. The balance of convenience was more finely poised, but the court concluded that the application for special leave to appeal was unlikely to succeed. The application for interlocutory relief was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The High Court in this case was presented with an application for a stay of proceedings in the Supreme Court of Tasmania pending the determination of an application for special leave to appeal from orders made by Chief Justice Blow. The application centered around the disclosure of the contents of a statutory declaration made by the applicant to the police, which the applicant sought to keep confidential. The court considered several issues in determining whether to grant the stay, including whether the High Court has jurisdiction to grant interlocutory relief in criminal proceedings, whether the trial judge applied the correct test in determining the public interest immunity claim, whether the risk of substantial injury to the applicant was sufficiently considered in the balancing exercise, whether there is a substantial prospect of success for the application for special leave to appeal, and whether granting the stay would cause prejudice to other parties or affect the balance of convenience.

In addressing the question of jurisdiction, the court noted that while ordinarily the High Court does not entertain appeals from interlocutory orders in criminal proceedings, there are exceptions where the effect of declining to grant interlocutory relief would be to render the appeal nugatory. However, in this case, the court found that the applicant had not demonstrated a substantial prospect of success on his application for special leave, and thus the exceptional circumstances did not apply.

Turning to the issue of the correct test for public interest immunity, the court found that the trial judge had applied the correct principle in balancing the public interest in disclosure against the public interest in preventing disclosure due to the risk of harm to the applicant. The court was not persuaded that the trial judge had erred in his consideration of the risk to the applicant.

The court also considered whether the risk of substantial injury to the applicant was sufficiently weighed in the balancing exercise. The applicant had argued that the trial judge had not given sufficient weight to the risk of serious injury or death to him if the contents of the declaration were disclosed to his co-accused. However, the court found that the trial judge had appropriately considered the risk to the applicant and had concluded that the interests of justice in disclosure outweighed the risks to the applicant.

Regarding the prospect of success for the application for special leave, the court found that the applicant had not established a substantial prospect of success. The court was not convinced that the trial judge's approach to the public interest immunity claim was erroneous and thus did not consider that the applicant's chances of success on appeal were sufficient to warrant the grant of interlocutory relief.

Finally, the court considered whether granting the stay would cause prejudice to other parties or affect the balance of convenience. While there would be some prejudice to the other parties in terms of the preparation for the trial, the court found that the substantial risk to the applicant if the declaration were disclosed outweighed this consideration. However, the court also found that the applicant had not demonstrated a substantial prospect of success on his application for special leave, which was ultimately the determinative factor in declining to grant the stay.

In conclusion, the ratio decidendi of this case is that while the High Court has inherent jurisdiction to grant interlocutory relief in exceptional circumstances, the court must consider various factors, including the prospect of success on appeal, in determining whether to exercise that jurisdiction. The court found that in this case, the applicant had not demonstrated a substantial prospect of success on his application for special leave, and thus the court was not disposed to grant the stay sought.