Fang v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FANG v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION & ANOR [2015] FCCA 3056

Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Migration Review Tribunal – whether the Migration Review Tribunal can send an invitation to attend a hearing to only one of two addresses provided by an applicant.

PRACTICE & PROCEDURE – Show cause hearing pursuant to r.44.12 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) – no arguable case for the relief claimed – application dismissed.

Legislation:
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.360, 362, 379A, 499
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), rr.44.12, 44.13
Cases Cited:
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Kim [2014] FCA 390
Radzi v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 626
Applicant: PEIQUN FANG
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File Number: SYG 1817 of 2015
Judgment of: Judge Emmett
Hearing dates: 27 October & 12 November 2015
Date of Last Submission: 12 November 2015
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 12 November 2015

REPRESENTATION

The Applicant appeared in person with the assistance of a Mandarin interpreter.
Solicitors for the Respondents: Ms Hervee Dejean
Ms Brooke Griffin
(Australian Government Solicitor)
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 1817 of 2015

PEIQUN FANG

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

EX TEMPORE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. On 30 June 2015, the applicant filed an application seeking judicial review of a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal dated 4 June 2015 and handed down on 5 June 2015 (“the MRT”).

  2. On 6 August 2015, the applicant attended a directions hearing before a Registrar of the Court. The applicant was given leave to file and serve an Amended Application giving complete particulars of each ground of review relied upon, together with any further evidence by way of affidavit, as well as submissions in support.

  3. At the directions hearing, the applicant was provided with the contact details of legal services providers and interpreting and translation services in documents headed in the applicant’s own language.

  4. At the request of the first respondent, the matter was listed for 27 October 2015 for a hearing pursuant to r.44.12 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (“the Rules”), a copy of which was also given to the applicant.

  5. Rule 44.12 of the Rules provides as follows:

    “(1) At a hearing of an application for an order to show cause, the Court may:

    (a) if it is not satisfied that the application has raised an arguable case for the relief claimed—dismiss the application; or

    (b) if it is satisfied that the application has raised an arguable case for the relief claimed—adjourn the proceeding and order a respondent to show cause at a final hearing why an order for the relief claimed should not be made on such of the grounds mentioned in the application as are specified by the Court; or

    (c) without making an order under paragraph (b), make final orders in…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCCA 3056
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Ms. Fang, a citizen of China, sought judicial review of a decision by the Migration Review Tribunal (MRT) affirming a delegate's refusal to grant her a Student visa. The delegate had refused the visa on the basis that Ms. Fang was not a "genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student," citing inconsistencies in her provided information, including her occupation and family circumstances. The MRT subsequently affirmed this decision after Ms. Fang failed to attend a scheduled hearing, despite receiving an invitation via email and SMS reminders.

The central legal issue before the Federal Court was whether the MRT had erred in law by sending the hearing invitation exclusively to the applicant's email address, despite her having provided both a postal and an email address. This question was framed within the broader context of whether this communication method constituted a breach of procedural fairness.

Emmett J considered the provisions of section 379A of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth), which permits the Tribunal to communicate with applicants by various methods, including email. His Honour referred to *Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v Kim* [2014] FCA 390, where it was held that the Minister retained a discretion to choose among the prescribed methods of communication. Emmett J found that the MRT also possessed such a discretion under section 379A. The Court noted that Ms. Fang had submitted her application electronically and that both the Department and the Tribunal had communicated with her via email throughout the process, including when she submitted supporting documents. Furthermore, Ms. Fang had been informed at the time of lodging her application that the Tribunal would communicate by email. In these circumstances, the Court concluded that the Tribunal's decision to send the hearing invitation solely by email did not breach procedural fairness, as Ms. Fang could not have held a reasonable expectation of communication by post.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

A summary of the relevant background and a summary of the MRT’s decision are accurately reflected in the first respondent’s submissions, filed on 20 August 2015, as follows:“Background3. The applicant is a 38 year old citizen of China. She arrived in Australia on 14 September 2014 as the holder of a Visitor visa (UD 601) and applied for a Student visa on 10 October 2014. At the time of the application, the applicant was enrolled in a Certificate IV in Human Resources, with course dates from 17 November 2014 to 15 November 2015. 4. On 30 January 2015, a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the Student visa on the basis that the applicant did not satisfy the requirements of cl 572.223 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Regulations). That clause requires that, at the time of the decision, the Minister is satisfied that the applicant is a ‘genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student’. Among other matters, the delegate noted that, on her incoming passenger card, the applicant recorded her occupation as ‘housewife’, whereas she later provided evidence that she had been working full-time for a transport company. 5. On 16 February 2015, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision. 6. On 5 May 2015, the Tribunal sent the applicant an invitation to attend a hearing on 2 June 2015. The invitation was sent by email to the email address provided by the applicant in her application for review. The Tribunal did not receive any response to its invitation. On 26 May 2015 and 1 June 2015, the Tribunal sent SMS ‘hearing reminders’ to the applicant’s listed mobile number regarding the hearing. 7. The applicant did not attend the scheduled hearing and the Tribunal decided to exercise its discretion under s 362B of the Migration Act 1958 (Act) and proceed to make a decision. Tribunal decision8. On 4 June 2015, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate to refuse to grant a Student visa (RD 65-69).9. The Tribunal found that the applicant provided contradictory evidence in relation to some of her submissions, including that she had incentive to return to mainland China because she had a daughter there. When asked for further information, the applicant said she had a stepdaughter who had resided in Hong Kong for the last 7 years. The Tribunal also found that the applicant had provided contradictory evidence in relation to her employment (RD 69 [16]). 10. The Tribunal found that, on the evidence before it, it could not make a finding in the applicant’s favour as the Tribunal had concerns which had not been adequately addressed by the applicant (RD 69 [17]). It concluded that it was not satisfied that the applicant genuinely intended to stay in Australia temporarily pursuant to cl 572.223(1)(a) of Schedule 2 of the Regulations (RD 69 [18]).” On 4 November 2015, the first respondent filed submissions addressing the issue raised with them on 27 October 2015 as to whether the first respondent was entitled to send an invitation to the applicant to attend the hearing to only one of two addresses provided by the applicant. Those submissions are as follows:“1. These submissions address the issue of whether the Tribunal was entitled to send a hearing invitation exclusively to the email address provided by the applicant in her application for review in circumstances where the applicant had provided both a postal address and an email address (see CB 48 and 51). 2. The first respondent submits that the Tribunal made no error in sending the hearing invitation to the applicant exclusively by email. 3. The use of email is an authorised method of communication under s 379A(5)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Act) and the applicant has not given any evidence that she did not receive the hearing invitation. The applicant has provided the same email address for communication in these proceedings.4. In Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v Kim [2014] FCA 390 (Kim), which was an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court, Buchanan J considered the terms of s 494B of the Act (which is relevantly identical to the text of s 379A) and held that the Minister retained an effective discretion to choose any of the methods prescribed by s 494B in circumstances where the respondent had provided 2 residential addresses and an email address. In that case, the Department notified the respondent by email that a bridging visa had been granted but communicated the delegate’s decision not to grant a Student visa by sending the decision by post to the respondent’s residential address in Australia. Buchanan J rejected the submission that the Department was bound not to send the letter to her residential address, but, instead, to send it to her email address. The authority in Kim was positively referred to by Rangiah J in Radzi v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2014] FCA 626 at [34]-[35] in considering s 379A. 5. In the present case, the facts are different to those in Kim in that the Tribunal decided to write to the applicant at her email address rather than her residential address. However, this is a difference without a distinction. The same principle applies that the Tribunal retained an effective discretion to choose any of the methods prescribed by s 379A. 6. Further, the first respondent submits that the Tribunal’s decision to send the hearing invitation to the applicant by email did not amount to a breach of procedural fairness. In this regard the first respondent notes that the application for review by the Tribunal was submitted electronically and both the Department and the Tribunal communicated with the applicant exclusively by email over the course of the application and review process. The applicant also sent the Department supporting documents via the same email address (CB 33). In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the Tribunal’s actions lead the applicant to have a reasonable expectation that the Tribunal would communicate with the applicant by post. 7. In addition, the applicant was informed at the time of lodgement of her application that the Tribunal would communicate with her by email (see affidavit of Nathan William Price affirmed on 4 November 2015).”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established