FALCONE & NEWITT

Case

[2013] FamCA 376


FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FALCONE & NEWITT [2013] FamCA 376
FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – Best interests – interim orders – removal of requirement for supervised time
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)
APPLICANT: Mr Falcone
RESPONDENT: Ms Newitt
FILE NUMBER: MLC 6160 of 2012
DATE DELIVERED: 30 May 2013
PLACE DELIVERED: Melbourne
PLACE HEARD: Melbourne
JUDGMENT OF: Macmillan J
HEARING DATE: 6 May 2013

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: Mr Robinson
SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Nicholes Family Lawyers
COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: Dr Ingleby
SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: Gadens Lawyers

IT IS ORDERED UNTIL FURTHER ORDER THAT

  1. Paragraph 3 of the orders made 2 November 2012 be discharged subject to and conditional upon the mother:

    a)Continuing to attend appointments with and as recommended by:

    (i)Dr S;

    (ii)Dr Q; and

    (iii)her psychologist Ms T;

    b)Continuing to attend at Dr S’s clinic at his direction and within 24 hours undergo supervised drug urine tests for the presence of alcohol, as directed by Dr S. 

  2. Upon the written request of the father’s solicitors the mother undergo supervised drug urine testing, such test to take place within 24 hours of notification of such request, with the first test to occur within 21 days of this order and on no more than two occasions  in each 28 day period thereafter.

  3. The mother continue to take the child B born … October 2009 to and participate in the child’s … music lessons at Location U and swimming lessons at Location V.

  4. That the father and the mother, their servants and agents be and are hereby restrained from:

    a)Denigrating the other in the presence or hearing of the child; and

    b)Eliciting or attempting to elicit information from the child about the other party, members of their family or their household.

  5. The father provide the mother with not less than 14 days notice in writing of his intention to travel interstate and/or overseas without the child.

  6. The Mother’s Amended Application in a Case filed 24 April 2013 be dismissed.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Falcone & Newitt has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE

FILE NUMBER: MLC 6160 of 2012

Mr Falcone

Applicant

And

Ms Newitt

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This matter has been set down for final hearing before me on 23 September 2013. The matter now before me is the mother’s Amended Application in a Case filed 24 April 2013.

  2. On 2 November 2012 I made interim orders that the child of the marriage B, (“the child”), who is now 3 and a half years of age, live with the father and spend time with the mother each Sunday and Wednesday between the hours of 11.30 am and 6.30 pm, each Thursday between the hours of 10.00 am and 4.00 pm, and by telephone for no longer than 10 minutes on each evening when the child is not with the mother between 6.00 pm and 6.30 pm. I further ordered that the mother’s time with the child pursuant to the orders be supervised by an independent supervisor to be agreed by the parties. Since those orders were made, the mother has spent time with the child, supervised by W Supervisors, for a period of approximately six months, making a total period of supervision of approximately 11 months.

  3. There are three separate aspects to this further interim hearing before me. The first is the question of whether the mother’s time with the child should continue to be supervised pending the final hearing; the second is the question of how much time the child should spend with the mother, including whether that time should be overnight; and the third issue is what notice the father should be required to give the mother of his intention to travel either interstate or overseas without the child.

  4. It was submitted on behalf of the mother that it was clear from my reasons of 2 November 2012 that the heart of the case, and the reason why I ordered that the mother’s time with the child be supervised, were my concerns in relation to the allegations of the mother’s alcohol abuse and the potential risk that posed to the child’s welfare. Counsel for the father argued that, having determined that the mother’s time should be supervised, I should order that the mother’s time be supervised by an independent supervisor to protect the child from what I had found was “a sustained, albeit sometimes quite subtle, pattern of interrogation and manipulation of [the child] and denigration of the father by the mother and her parents in varying degrees.” This accords with my reasons.

  5. Although I was not then, and nor am I now, in a position to make any findings of fact, I concluded on that occasion that even if I had been satisfied that the mother had not consumed any alcohol since 10 June 2012, she would at that time have only maintained her sobriety for three to four months. Although Ms H, the single expert witness, recommended that any increase in the child’s time with the mother would in those circumstances be premature, she did, subject to certain conditions, recommend that the child’s time with the mother be unsupervised. The crux of the mother’s case in support of her current application is that she has now maintained her sobriety for almost 11 months.

  6. The father, in his case summary filed 2 May 2013, highlighted what he said were the risks to the child’s emotional and physical safety if the child spends unsupervised time with the mother in light of the following matters:

    (a)Her past attempts to abscond to Perth with the child;

    (b)Her history of alcoholism and prescription drug abuse;

    (c)Her ongoing abuse of alcohol and drugs;

    (d)Her documented history of having given untruthful accounts of her drinking;

    (e)The state of her mental health;

    (f)Her history of having coached, interrogated and emotionally abused the child;

    (g)Her history of having allowed and encouraged her parents to coach, interrogate and emotionally abuse the child;

    (h)Her failure to recognise the inappropriateness of the emotional abuse of the child or provide any assurance that such conduct would not be repeated;

    (i)The child’s young age and vulnerability;

  7. Counsel for the father submitted that these issues fit broadly into three categories, which were: the mother’s alcohol abuse; her use of prescription medication; and her emotional abuse of the child.

  8. It was the mother’s case that because there was now no evidence in support of the father’s case that she was continuing to consume alcohol and given that my concerns about her alcohol consumption were the basis for the orders I made that the child’s time with her should be supervised, the father, having run out of evidence that would support his case for ongoing supervision, was now trying to raise and rely upon other reasons as to why her time with the child should continue to be supervised.

The mother’s consumption of alcohol

  1. The father’s case was that, notwithstanding the mother’s evidence that she had not consumed any alcohol, he had ongoing concerns about her consumption of alcohol. His concerns were based upon a number of matters, including:

    a)his observations, and those of his partner, of the mother being drunk, speaking incoherently, and slurring her words when she rang to speak to the child pursuant to the orders;

    b)his concerns about the blood alcohol tests undertaken by the mother; and

    c)the fact that the mother had continued to provide untruthful information to her treating medical practitioners and Ms Y, the supervisor employed to supervise her time with the child since 10 June 2012.

  2. Although the question of whether the alcohol tests undertaken by the mother were or were not supervised was a point of some contention, ultimately it was one that was not likely to be of particular significance to the outcome of the case. It is correct, as submitted on behalf of the father, that it was not clear from the test results whether or not those tests were supervised. However, it is also clear from the report of Dr S dated 13 December 2012, which was attached to the same affidavit in which the husband voiced that complaint, that the mother had been undertaking “regular supervised Drug urine screening” and that, as at that date of that report, the mother had had some 20 specimens taken, the results of which were all negative. Whether the husband was, as submitted on behalf of the mother, being “cute” or had bona fide concerns, Ms X in her Affidavit filed 23 April 2013 deposed that she had “personally supervised each of the urine samples provided by [the mother] at the Medical Clinic.” It was not submitted on behalf of the husband that I should not accept her evidence.

  3. Another point of contention was the results of the test taken by the mother on 7 September 2012. As I referred to in paragraph 24 of my reasons for judgment dated 2 November 2012 that test returned a low but positive alcohol reading. The mother’s then psychiatrist described the mother as having vehemently denied that she had consumed any alcohol that day and she had attributed the positive test result to the fact that her arm had been cleaned using an alcohol swab when the blood sample was taken. When I delivered my reasons it was unclear whether or not that was a credible explanation. Counsel for each of the father and the mother submitted that it was for the other party to have produced evidence with respect to that test. Whether it is for the father or the mother to produce further evidence with respect to that test, it is not disputed that the results of the tests undertaken since 7 September 2012 have all been negative. This means that the mother’s test results have been negative, except for that one test, since 10 June 2012, almost 11 months, and since that positive test result for a period of eight months.

  4. The mother denies the allegations about her behaviour during her telephone calls to the child. It was submitted on behalf of the father that if I were to accede to the mother’s application I would have to find that the father and his partner had lied. I do not agree. Firstly, I cannot make a finding when the evidence is untested. Secondly, in my view, there are also other possibilities: for example, although the father and his partner genuinely believe that what they heard was the mother affected by alcohol, it is of course possible that they are mistaken. I am not making any findings at this stage and in circumstances where I cannot make findings of fact I must consider all of the evidence in order to assess both the risks and benefits to the child of the parties’ respective proposals. It is not a question of my having to determine that one or other party is or is not telling the truth or is mistaken and I must reach a decision doing the best I can on the basis of the evidence before me, notwithstanding and cognisant of the fact that that evidence has not as yet been tested.

  5. The mother in support of her application relies upon the following matters:

    ·    she has continued to attend regularly upon Dr S;

    ·    she has undertaken supervised urine testing at random intervals as initiated by Dr S and the results of those tests have all been negative;

    ·    she attends upon her psychiatrist, Dr Q, about once a month and he consults with Dr S about her medical management;

    ·    she has been attending a psychologist, Ms T, on the recommendations of Dr D since about November 2012;

    ·    as deposed by Ms Y, there have been no signs during the periods of supervised time that she has consumed any alcohol; and

    ·    she continues to work three days per week.

  6. There are two reports annexed to Dr S’s Affidavit filed 5 April 2013. The first of those reports is dated 13 December 2012 and there is a follow up report dated 28 March 2013. Dr S’s evidence is that he first saw the mother on 28 March 2011 when she was undergoing psychotherapy as part of her psychiatric treatment under Dr D. He then saw her again on 15 August 2012 and continued seeing her on a regular basis thereafter. In his follow up report, he says as follows:

    As I stated in my report dated the 13th December, I continued seeing [the mother] on a regular basis since the 15th August 2012, she always appeared sober and she had no stigma of alcohol abuse or evidence of any other drug of (sic) abuse. The pathology tests, particularly the liver function tests were not abnormal and she underwent a whole series of drug urine screening tests collected under supervision which were all negative. As I stated in my previous report I have extensive experience with urine drug testing and supervision of collection of urine specimen as in my time at [I Clinic], for several years I was in charge of the laboratory which collected and tested urine on the premises. I was quite happy to continue treating [the mother] and cooperating with Dr Q, who is working at [K Clinic].

    I am in possession of correspondence from [Dr D] dated the 25th August 2012, 29th August 2012, 1st September 2012, 10th September 2012, 15th September 2012, 22nd September 2012, 27th October 2012 and 17th November 2012.

    I have also read the report by [Dr Q] date (sic) 30th August 2012, also a report from [Dr AB] from Perth, he is a psychiatrist, who treated [the mother] in Perth prior to her moving to Melbourne, this one dated 6th January 2012. All these reports are available for the court (sic) on request. [Dr AB] confirms that [the mother] gave a history of depressive symptoms, beginning as far back as September 2010; I have of course read all these files and I will also provide copies for the court (sic).

    I communicated with [Dr Q] both in writing and by telephone discussions. [The mother] was diagnosed with depression, of the reactive type, this commenced following the birth of her baby, this is not a rare occurrence during the post partum period. She did not suffer from major depression, rather as a result of the stress in the marriage and the fact that she found it difficult to cope; she consulted [AB] who commenced her on the anti depressant (sic), pristiq (sic) when the child was about one year old.

    When she moved to Melbourne, [Dr D] took over the supervision and management of her depression and other psychological problems associated with the marriage breaking up.

    From about June, July 2011, she progressively increased her intake of alcohol, this continued until about February 2012, when she underwent the impatient (sic) admissions and eventually achieved abstinence in June 2012.

    I noted that she never had any depressive episodes or alcohol problems in the past, not even during her [studies] and never before her marriage. I consider [the mother] was suffering from a reactive depression associated with post partum aggravation, her drinking appears have  (sic) been of an episodic nature and abstinence since (sic) the breakup of the marriage in June 2012.  [The mother] denies any alcoholic consumption, confirmed by my observations and the negative urine testing since that period.

    At present she seems to be in a positive frame of mind and does not show any depressive features. She is working, she has always worked since graduation, the only time she didn’t work was during her hospitalization.

    With regard to [the mother’s] eating problem, this appears to be under control, her weight has remained stable at about 51kg. I believe she has made very good progress and is not a risk to her son if she was given the opportunity of unsupervised parenting, this includes overnight and weekend stays.

    One should look at [the mother’s] prognosis with a reasonable degree of optimism, we will continue to monitor her progress.

    At present she does not require any medication as she is coping reasonably well.

    I would like to point out that with the good progress [the mother] has made, she merits being allowed not to undergo further urine drug screening. She has proven since June 2012 that she is stable, abstinent and managing well.    

Mother’s history of giving untruthful accounts of her alcohol consumption

  1. On behalf of the father it is submitted that the mother has not been truthful with the medical professionals treating her and Ms Y, who has been supervising the time the mother spends with the child, which the father says impacts upon the reliability of their evidence.  I did, in my previous reasons for judgment, refer to information which the mother provided to Dr Q which appeared on the face of the evidence before me at that time to be inaccurate. The father now deposes to numerous examples of what he says is the mother providing untruthful information. This is denied by the mother and she refers to what she says are the inaccuracies in the father’s allegations. These allegations and counter allegations are of course untested.

  2. Of more importance for the purposes of my decision now is that the evidence of these witnesses, and Dr S in particular, is not based only upon what they have been told by the mother. Although Dr S’s evidence has, like the evidence of the other witnesses, not been tested and although it is possible that he has been given incorrect information by the mother, he is an expert witness who has been a medical practitioner for over 40 years and for many of those years he has dealt with drug and alcohol abuse and rehabilitation.

Prescription medication  

  1. In addition to what the father says are his concerns about the mother’s alcohol abuse, the father also relies upon what he says is her history of abuse of prescription drugs. The father alleged that during the mother’s telephone call to the child on 19 February 2013 the mother was speaking extremely slowly, the manner in which he said she speaks when she has been taking prescription drugs. He further alleges that since filing his first affidavit on 9 April 2013 the mother does not appear to have been drunk during any of her phone calls to the child, but that her voice has sounded like it did during the marriage when he said she had been misusing prescription drugs. Notwithstanding these allegations, the father has not made any requests nor sought an order that the mother undergo any testing with respect to her use of prescription drugs.

  2. On 29 August 2012 the father issued a Subpoena to Medicare Australia for the production of the following documents:

    1.   Documents demonstrating all prescriptions written by [the mother] born … 1979 from 1 January 2004 and to present for or in the names of:

    (a)[the mother].

    (b)[the father].

    (c)[the maternal grandmother].

    (d)[a different spelling of the maternal grandmother’s name].

    (e)[the maternal grandfather].

    2.   Documents demonstrating all prescriptions written by [the mother] born … 1979 during the following periods:

    (a)6 August 2011 to 13 August 2011.

    (b)31 October 2011 to 11 November 2011.

    (c)1 February 2012 to 19 March 2012.

  3. That subpoena is extremely wide and it is perhaps not surprising that all of the documents sought were not produced. When this matter was raised by counsel for the mother, I was informed by Mr Robinson on behalf of the father that his then instructor had been advised that documents would not be produced pursuant to that subpoena unless the named person was a party to the proceedings. The mother is a party to the proceedings, as is the father, and on that basis arguably there should have at least been no objection to the production of documents with respect to any prescriptions written by the mother for either the father or herself. Whilst that might not have been sufficient to rule out the possibility of the mother writing prescriptions for drugs for her own use or obtaining prescription drugs from other sources, it would certainly have provided some clarification of this question of the mother’s use of prescription drugs, certainly insofar as it is suggested she may be self-prescribing. The father however did not pursue the production of those documents pursuant to that subpoena or seek any orders or request that the mother undertake tests for the purposes of ascertaining whether or not she was using prescription drugs and what they might be. The mother deposes that she has not consumed any prescription drugs since she stopped taking the anti-depressant medication prescribed by Dr D in or about mid-2012. The evidence before me is not such that I could conclude that the mother is abusing prescription medication or for that matter even taking any prescription medication.

  1. The father also relies upon what he says is evidence of the mother’s use of “party drugs”. This was raised by the father in his most recent Affidavit filed 1 May 2013 where he deposed that he had found messages between the mother and her friends in which she refers to “party drugs”. There is no other evidence before me of the mother using “party drugs”, other than the messages annexed to the father’s affidavit, and it would not be possible based upon those messages to conclude that the mother has been using “party drugs”.

Mother’s mental health issues

  1. The father deposes to what he says are his concerns about the mother’s mental health issues and in particular her eating disorder. It is not in dispute that the mother has had an eating disorder in the past, the question is how that should impact upon my decision now as to whether the mother should be permitted to spend unsupervised time with the child. Although this is one of the father’s many complaints about the mother and the reasons why he says her time with the child should be supervised, it is not clear how the mother having or having had an eating disorder would preclude her from spending unsupervised time with the child if I were to determine that it would be otherwise appropriate for her to do so. I have also taken into account the evidence of Dr S that the mother’s eating problems appears to be under control and that her weight has remained stable at about 51kg.

Emotional abuse of the child

  1. Finally, the father relies upon what he says is the risk that the mother will continue to emotionally abuse the child. In my previous reasons I did find, having listened to the conversations recorded by the father, that I was satisfied that there had been:

    [A] sustained, albeit sometimes quite subtle, pattern of interrogation and manipulation of [the child] and denigration of the father by the mother and her parents in varying degrees …Whilst the mother may not have been personally responsible for some of the more serious attempts to undermine [the child’s] relationship with the father or denigration of the father she has been present and allowed it to happen on a number of occasions and has herself inappropriately asked [the child] questions and commented on the time he spends with the father.

  2. I concluded at paragraph 35 that those recorded conversations gave “rise to real concerns as to the capacity of the mother and her parents to place [the child’s] needs before their negative feelings and animosity towards the father”.  The father is also critical of the mother’s failure to acknowledge that her behaviour may have been inappropriate. My criticism of the mother was primarily in relation to her inappropriately questioning the child about the time he spent with his father, and although I was critical of the mother, I was even more critical of her parents who had until that time been supervising the mother’s time with the child. This led me to conclude at that time that the mother’s time should be independently supervised rather than continuing to be supervised by her parents. Even if the mother’s behaviour is open to criticism, that behaviour is just one of the matters I must consider in reaching my decision as to what orders are in the child’s best interests.

  3. It is clear from the father’s own evidence that there may also be occasions when he has questioned the child. Whether he has or has not done so would not justify the mother doing so. In this case, the mother has engaged a private investigator and the father has bugged the mother’s conversations using the child’s bag, and whether their actions are motivated by concern for the child or otherwise, both parties should refrain from any behaviour that has the potential to impact negatively on the wellbeing of their child.  I propose, as suggested by Dr Ingleby, to make an order restraining both parties from discussing these proceedings with the child or denigrating each other in front of the child. I did not, when the matter was last before me, make orders for supervision because of what I considered to be the risk of emotional abuse and similarly on this occasion I would not in the absence of other reasons for doing so require supervision on that basis.  

The child’s best interests

  1. As with the previous application, when making my decision it is the child’s best interests that are the paramount consideration. I have, as I am required to do and consistently with the objectives of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) and the principles underlying those objectives, considered the primary and additional considerations in ss 60CC(2) and 60CC(3) of the Act.

  2. The child is still only just over three years of age and it is still the case that even if he had expressed any views as to the arrangements for his care, his wishes would be of little significance to my determination of what is in his best interests.

  3. I have previously found that the child had a close attachment to both his father and mother and the other significant adults in his life, including his grandparents. There is nothing to suggest that that has changed and certainly Ms Y’s observations would suggest that is still the case. The father’s evidence and the evidence of his partner suggests that the father’s partner has also developed a close relationship with the child.

  4. Both parties appear to have adopted somewhat extreme positions. On the one hand, it is hard to see on the basis of the father’s case what the mother could do that would satisfy him that the child is not at risk in her care. The mother’s case on the other hand, as put by her counsel, is that the last 10 months are just a “blip” in this young child’s experience of his mother as his primary carer and that he should be returned to normality as soon as possible, particularly as he submitted that there is no relationship-based constraint on the amount of time that the child should spend with his mother. Although I do not agree with that proposition, I do agree that the primary reason I made an order for supervision was my concern about the mother’s consumption of alcohol and that at the time I made those orders she had at best been abstinent for only three to four months whereas there is now evidence, albeit it is untested, that the mother may have been abstinent for eight and possibly even 11 months. I have not dismissed or for that matter disregarded the father’s evidence of his concerns however I place some weight on the fact that the evidence relied upon by the mother includes the evidence of an expert witness and not just the mother and her family and friends and is supported by the negative test results.

  5. In reaching my previous decision to make orders requiring supervision of the mother’s time with the child, I took into account the observations and recommendations of Ms H in her family report dated 13 August 2012. It was her recommendation that the mother’s time not be supervised on the condition that:

    ·She meets with her psychiatrist, [Dr D], once a week;

    ·She adheres to any anti-depressant medication prescribed by her psychiatrist;

    ·That she attends a minimum of two (2) Alcoholics Anonymous meeting each week; and

    ·That [Dr D] carry out random blood-alcohol tests and weekly breath tests.

  6. Ms H also recommended that “[i]f after six months [the mother] is able to demonstrate through her psychiatrist that she has remained alcohol free then the Thursday arrangement may be changed from day time alone to from 12.30 to 7.30 p.m. so that she can have one more night of the feeding and bathing routine.” She also recommended that, after six months and then when the child turns four, that there be a further review of the parenting arrangements with a view to introducing overnight time with the mother.

  7. Although I did not adopt Ms H’s recommendation as to unsupervised time at the time of hearing in November 2012, it is now almost nine months since she made that recommendation. Although as counsel for the father pointed out, the mother has not adopted the specific recommendations of Ms H as to ongoing treatment, the mother has continued her current treatment and there is no evidence to suggest that she has not accepted or not followed the recommendations of her treating medical practitioners since the orders were made in November 2012.

  8. I cannot find definitively that the mother has abstained from consuming alcohol since the orders were made in November 2012, however I must balance the concerns of the father based upon the history of the matter and what he says he has heard during his and the child’s conversations with the mother, and the evidence of the mother’s qualified and experienced medical practitioners supported by the results of regular urine testing, the result of which have all been negative.

  9. I agree with counsel for the father that the fact that the mother may be prejudiced at the final hearing of this matter if she has only spent limited supervised time with the child should not determine the outcome of this interim matter. However, although the mother may have a meaningful relationship with the child, supervised time has the potential to limit the ongoing development and enjoyment of the child’s relationship with his mother. She would no doubt feel somewhat constrained by that supervision. Supervision would not in normal circumstances be the preferred option unless it was necessary to promote the best interests of the child or to secure the child’s safety. Although I did previously determine that supervision was necessary, there is now some evidence which supports the mother’s case that she has remained alcohol free over a period of at least 8 months and I am satisfied that, subject to certain precautions, it would be in the child’s best interests to spend unsupervised time with his mother.

  10. I do not agree however, with counsel for the mother that the child should immediately be spending week and week about or for that matter overnight time with the mother at this time. To suggest that this period of supervision is just an unnecessary interruption to what was otherwise the mother’s role as the primary caregiver for the child is to minimise the issues that have been at the heart of these proceedings, even, which is disputed,  if the mother had been the child’s primary carer. Dr Ingleby submitted that the mother has stood firm despite very stressful circumstances, however the mother has had a history of abstinence and relapse. Ms H in her report recommended that the “current parenting program should remain in place so that her times with [the child] are not onerous and that she does not experience significant stress.” Ms H pointed out that the child was “likely to be a respectful child but also one that has definite views of his own.” I note that Ms Y describes the child as quite demanding, wanting “undivided attention from his mother for the full duration of access and displays fear if she is not in sight.”

  11. Although I am satisfied that it is appropriate to remove the requirement for supervision of the mother’s time, it would be premature to immediately move to a regime of equal time or for that matter overnight time. I propose to continue the child’s current regime of time with the mother, including the activities she currently participates in with the child, but to remove the requirement that that time be supervised. The mother takes the child to both swimming lessons and music lessons and I propose to order that she continue to do so. This provides some structure to the time the mother spends with the child and in my view provides some safeguards as she will be in the company of others for at least some of the time that she has the child in her care. I also propose to require the mother to continue her attendance upon Dr S, Dr Q, and her psychologist, as recommended by them, and to require the mother to continue undertaking random blood alcohol tests as she has been doing until now at the direction of both Dr S if he considers it necessary and at the request of the father.  

  12. Finally, although counsel for the father suggests that the father may be required to travel interstate at short notice, in particular to award nights, the father does not in principle oppose the order sought by the mother with respect to him notifying her not less than 14 days prior to any interstate or overseas travel. I am satisfied that even if the father does not know until the last minute whether he has won a particular prize, he is likely to know in most cases whether that is a possibility and to be able to advise the mother accordingly. On that basis, I propose to accede to the mother’s application.

I certify that the preceding thirty-six (36) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Macmillan delivered on 30 May 2013.

Associate: 

Date:  30 May 2013

Areas of Law

  • Family Law

  • Evidence

Legal Concepts

  • Expert Evidence

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