Fair Work Ombudsman v United Petroleum Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Fair Work Ombudsman v United Petroleum Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 590

File number(s): VID 1037 of 2019
Judge(s): ANDERSON J
Date of judgment: 7 May 2020
Catchwords:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – validity of notice issued under s 712(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (Act) – inspector appointed under Act – inspector issued notice under s 712(1) requiring production of certain documents – notice stated that purpose of production of documents was to investigate notice recipient’s compliance as “responsible franchisor entity” pursuant to s 558B of the Act –  notice provided broad background to franchisee’s alleged primary contraventions, but did not particularise the primary statutory contraventions – application by Fair Work Ombudsman for declarations and orders in respect of notice recipient’s failure to provide documents – whether notice is valid – whether notice enables the recipient (and the Court) to assess whether the notice validly requires the specified documents to be produced

Held: application dismissed – notice invalid – notice failed to adequately particularise primary contraventions by the franchisee – notice recipient and Court are not able to assess whether the notice validly requires the specified documents to be produced

Legislation:

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 44, 44(1), 45, 61(2), 61(3), 62, 70, 84, 113, 119, 535, 536, 539(2), 545(1), 550, 558A, 558B, 558B(1), 558(1)(a), 558B(1)(d)(i), 558B(1)(d)(ii), 558B(7), 700, 703(1), 706(1)(a), 712, 712(1), 712(3)

Fair Work Amendment (Protecting Vulnerable Workers) Act 2017 (Cth) Pt 2 of Sch 1

Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (now the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)) s 155(1)

Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (repealed) ss 86(1A)(c), 170MN

Fair Work Regulations 2009 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Aurora Construction Materials Pty Ltd v Victorian WorkCover Authority [2018] VSCA 16

Bannerman v Mildura Fruit Juices Pty Ltd (1984) 2 FCR 581

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Alfred [2016] FCA 591; 242 FCR 35

Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Fair Work Inspector Lam [2018] FCA 1379

Donnelly v O’Donnell [2005] FCA 1412; 146 IR 434

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [1979] HCA 67; 143 CLR 499

Laing v Carroll [2005] FCAFC 202; 146 FCR 511

Rocky Holdings Pty Limited v Fair Work Ombudsman [2014] FCAFC 62; 221 FCR 153

SA Brewing Holdings Ltd v Baxt (1989) 23 FCR 357

Smethurst v Commissioner of Police [2020] HCA 14

Thorson v Pine [2004] FCA 805

Thorson v Pine [2004] FCA 1316; 139 FCR 527

Date of hearing: 9 April 2020
Registry: Victoria
Division: Fair Work Division
National Practice Area: Employment & Industrial Relations
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 68
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms C Dowsett
Solicitor for the Applicant: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr R P P Dalton QC with Mr D Ternovski
Solicitor for the Respondent: Seyfarth Shaw Australia

ORDERS

VID 1037 of 2019
BETWEEN:

FAIR WORK OMBUDSMAN

Applicant

AND:

UNITED PETROLEUM PTY LTD

Respondent

JUDGE:

ANDERSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

7…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 590
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Fair Work Ombudsman v United Petroleum Pty Ltd involved a dispute between the Fair Work Ombudsman (FWO) and United Petroleum, a company that operates a network of petrol and convenience stores. The FWO sought declarations and orders in respect of United Petroleum's failure to provide certain documents, as required by a notice issued under section 712(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). The primary issue before the court was whether the notice issued by the Fair Work Inspector was valid, specifically whether it adequately particularised the primary contraventions of the franchisee and enabled the recipient to assess whether the notice validly required the specified documents to be produced.

The court found that the notice was invalid because it failed to adequately particularise the primary contraventions of the franchisee. This failure went to the heart of the validity of the notice and did not permit any opportunity for severance. The court held that a valid notice under section 712 of the Act must specify the purpose for which it has been issued, and this purpose must be adequately disclosed to the notice recipient. The purpose must provide a point of reference by which to judge whether the notice validly requires the specified information to be furnished or the specified documents to be produced. In this case, the notice did not provide sufficient detail about the primary contraventions of the franchisee, making it impossible for United Petroleum to assess whether the notice validly required the specified documents to be produced.

The court dismissed the application and directed the parties to confer and provide minutes of proposed orders to give effect to these reasons within seven days. The ratio of the case was that a notice issued under section 712 of the Act must adequately specify the purpose for which it has been issued and the primary contraventions of the franchisee, to enable the recipient to assess whether the notice validly requires the specified documents to be produced.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application of 20 September 2019 be dismissed, with no order as to costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The key facts to this proceeding were set out in the introduction to these reasons. Those facts were derived primarily from a Statement of Agreed Facts (Agreed Facts) filed in the proceeding by the Ombudsman, on behalf of the parties. The Agreed Facts relevantly provided as follows:PART A PARTIES AND BACKGROUNDApplicant1. The Applicant (FWO) is and was at all material times:1.1. a statutory appointee of the Commonwealth pursuant to subsection 687(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act);1.2. a Fair Work Inspector pursuant to section 701 of the FW Act; and1.3. a person with standing to bring these proceedings under subsection 539(2) of the FW Act.Respondent2. The Respondent (United Petroleum) is and was at all material times:2.1.a company incorporated under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) since 7 January 1999;2.2. capable of being sued in and by its corporate name;2.3. a “constitutional corporation” within the meaning of section 12 of the FW Act.Inspector3. Melvin Joel Paul is and was at all material times a Fair Work Inspector within the meaning of section 700 of the FW Act (Inspector Paul).Parashar’s4. Parashar’s Pty Ltd (Parashar’s) is and was at all material times:4.1. party to an agreement with United Petroleum which permitted it to operate a United branded petrol and convenience store at 1006 - 1014 Beaudesert Road, Coopers Plains Queensland (the United Outlet); and4.2. a “national system employer” within the meaning of section 14 of the FW Act.PART B THE NOTICE5. On 9 November 2018 Inspector Paul issued a notice in writing to United Petroleum, which was served on United Petroleum, requiring United Petroleum to produce specified records or documents to Inspector Paul at the Applicant's office on 7 December 2018 (the Notice). A copy of the Notice is at Annexure A to this statement.6. The Notice was personally served on David Szymczak, the Chief Operating Officer of United Petroleum, at 600 Glenferrie Road in Hawthorn by Fair Work Inspectors Kathleen Hill and John Richards on 9 November 2018.7. United Petroleum did not produce any records or documents to Inspector Paul on or before 7 December 2018.… As noted in paragraph 5 of the Agreed Facts, a copy of the Notice was extracted at Annexure A to that document. The relevant terms of the Notice are likewise extracted in the Annexure to these reasons (which starts below at page 20).Application to this Court The Ombudsman commenced this proceeding on 20 September 2019. She claimed the following relief in her originating application dated 20 September 2019:1. A declaration that the Respondent contravened subsection 712(3) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) by failing to produce documents or records required to be produced by the notice in writing issued by Fair Work Inspector Melvin Joel Paul to the Respondent on 9 November 2018 (Notice).2. An order pursuant to subsection 545(1) of the FW Act that the Respondent produce the records or documents called for in the Notice to the Applicant within 14 days of this order.3. An order pursuant to subsections 546(1) and 546(3) of the FW Act that the Respondent pay a penalty for its contravention of subsection 712(3) of the FW Act to the Commonwealth within 28 days of this order.4. An order that the Applicant have liberty to apply on three days’ notice in the event that any of the preceding orders are not complied with.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In the present case, however, the failure of the Notice to adequately specify the purpose of the requests for production goes to the heart of the validity of the Notice, and does not permit any opportunity for severance.Conclusion For the reasons expressed above, the Notice is wholly invalid. I direct that the parties confer and provide minutes of proposed orders to give effect to these reasons within seven days.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

United further contends that, even if the Notice sufficiently identifies a “matter”, each of the categories of documents specified in the Notice are defective. From a broad level, the Notice, according to United, fails to disclose the relationship between the categories of documents sought and the “matter” that is the subject of the exercise of the power. In this regard, United submits that the categories of documents specified in the Notice are vague and incomprehensible, and otherwise extend far beyond any compliance purpose relating to United’s suspected secondary liability. Here, according to United, the Notice’s description of Parashar’s contraventions is so lacking in particularity such that it is not apparent how the specified categories of documents could assist Inspector Paul to determine whether United is liable under s 558B(1) of the Act.Consideration As indicated above, the relevant terms of the Notice are set out below in the annexure to these reasons (starting at page 20). My view as to the validity of the Notice is now set out.Identification of source of power For a notice issued under s 712 of the Act to be valid, it must firstly specify that it has been issued pursuant to that provision: Bannerman at 584 per Bowen CJ and Neaves J; Aurora at [79]; Lam at [27(a)]. The hearing of the Notice issued by Inspector Paul in the present case specifies that the Notice was “Pursuant to Section 712 of the Far Work Act 2009”, and accordingly satisfies this requirement.Disclosure of purpose A valid notice under s 712 of the Act must also specify the purpose for which that notice has been issued. The statutory “purpose” of a notice was considered in Thorson v Pine (No 1), Thorson v Pine (No 2), Aurora, Alfred and Lam. (Marshall J in Thorson v Pine (No 2) also referred to the “sub-purposes” of the notice in that case.) Similarly, in Bannerman and Baxt, the Full Court, borrowing from the terms of s 155(1) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (which was in question in those cases), referred to the “matter” that is said to constitute, or may constitute, a contravention of that Act. Bromberg J referred to a “matter” in the relevant test in Lam at [27(b)(ii)] (as paraphrased above at [22]), and also equated this to “the particular inquiry as to non-compliance”. Although Bromberg J’s test did not designate the identification of the statutory purpose as a separate limb of the test, to do so is necessary in order to determine whether the notice has adequately disclosed the relationship between the documents required and the statutory purpose of the notice: see Thorson v Pine (No 2) at [36]. The reason why the “purpose” of a statutory notice to produce documents must be adequately disclosed to the notice recipient was explained by Bowen CJ and Neaves J in Bannerman at 584 (in the context of a notice given by the Chairman of the Trade Practices Commission under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)): The requirement that a notice under sub-section 155(1) identify the matter that constitutes, or may constitute, a contravention of the Act has a twofold purpose. First it is necessary that the notice disclose on its face that it is an exercise of the power which the subsection confers. That power depends upon the existence, objectively determined, of a “matter”, in the sense in which that expression has been explained in earlier decisions of the court, that constitutes, or may constitute, a contravention of the Act and a belief in the person issuing the notice that the recipient is capable of furnishing information or producing documents relating to the matter so identified. Secondly, the identification of the matter that constitutes, or may constitute, a contravention of the Act provides for the recipient the point of reference by which to judge whether the notice validly requires the specified information to be furnished or the specified documents to be produced. It will only validly do so if the information and the documents specified in the notice can be seen, from the face of the notice itself, to be information or documents that relate to a matter of the kind described in the subsection and identified in the notice.See, relatedly, Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [1979] HCA 67; 143 CLR 499 at 525 per Gibbs ACJ and Aurora at [87] per Kaye JA. In a different context (the specification of a criminal offence in a warrant to search), see Smethurst v Commissioner of Police [2020] HCA 14 at [30] per Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ.