Fair Work Ombudsman v Trucking Services Pty Ltd
[2021] FCCA 760
•15 September 2020
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| DRUIN PTY LTD AS TRUSTEE FOR THE DRUIN NO 3 TRUST TRADING AS HARVEY NORMAN COMMERCIAL v GHASEMI & ANOR | [2020] FCCA 2456 |
| Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – Practice and Procedure – application for a review of the Registrar’s decision pursuant to s 104(2) of the Federal Circuit Court Act 1999 (Cth) – application by trustee in bankruptcy – trustee to intervene seeking various orders as to costs incurred – grant leave for the trustee to intervene – whether the respondents’ were served the bankruptcy notice prior to sequestration orders – the trustee’s application is dismissed – the parties and the trustee bear their own costs of the applications. |
| Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss, 52, 109, 153, 154 Federal Circuit Court Act 1999 (Cth), ss 104 Federal Circuit Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2016 (Cth), r 2.02, 16.05 |
| Cases cited: Barnes v Lion Finance Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 951 Flint v Richard Busuttil & Co Pty Ltd (2013) 216 FCR 375 Iosifidis v Hanson Construction Materials Pty Ltd [2016] FCCA 998 Kyriackou v Shield Mercantile Pty Ltd (No 2) [2004] FCA 1338 Pattison v Hadjimouratis (2006) 236 ALR 1 |
| Applicant: | DRUIN PTY LTD AS TRUSTEE FOR THE DRUIN NO 3 TRUST T/AS HARVEY NORMAN COMMERCIAL (ACN 003 062 379) |
| First Respondent: | ALI RAOOF GHASEMI |
| Second Respondent: | HALEH KAKHSAZ |
| File Number: | SYG 381 of 2020 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Humphreys |
| Hearing date: | 27 July 2020 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 7 August 2020 |
| Delivered at: | Parramatta |
| Delivered on: | 15 September 2020 |
REPRESENTATION
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Ms Warren, CCSG Legal Pty Ltd |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Mr Webster, Just Dispute Resolution |
| Solicitors for the Trustee: | Mr Hutchinson, Gartree Thomson Lawyers |
ORDERS
The orders set out in the Short Minutes of Order dated 15 July 2020, signed by the applicant and the respondents’ made by consent are confirmed.
The creditor’s petition is otherwise dismissed.
The Trustee is granted leave to intervene.
The Trustee’s application is otherwise dismissed.
The respondents’ pay the Trustee’s costs properly and reasonably incurred:
(a)between 23 April and 6 May 2020; and
(b)in relation to the 12 June 2020 hearing.
The respondents’ to indemnify the Trustee in respect of any disbursements properly and reasonably made for the benefit of their estates, including insurance on the respondents’ properties.
The Trustee to pay the respondents’ costs of the Trustee’s application.
The parties and the Trustee otherwise bear their own costs of the applications.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT PARRAMATTA |
SYG 381 of 2020
| DRUIN PTY LTD AS TRUSTEE FOR THE DRUIN NO 3 TRUST T/AS HARVEY NORMAN COMMERCIAL (ACN 003 062 379) |
Applicant
And
| ALI RAOOF GHASEMI |
First Respondent
| HALEH KAKHSAZ |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(As corrected)
Introduction
On 23 April 2020, Registrar Ng of this Court, on the application of Druin Pty Ltd as Trustee for the Druin No 3 Trust t/as Harvey Norman Commercial (ACN 003 062 379), ordered that the estates of Ali Raoof Ghasemi and Haleh Kakhsaz (“the respondents”), be sequestered under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (“the Act”). It was further ordered that Jason Lloyd Porter (“the Trustee”), be appointed as the Trustee in Bankruptcy for the respondents.
On 15 May 2020, the respondents filed an Application for a review of the Registrar’s decision, set out above, pursuant to s 104(2) of the Federal Circuit Court Act 1999 (Cth) (“the FCCA”). Counsel for the applicant, at the hearing on 27 July 2020, indicated that there was no opposition to the Registrar’s orders being set aside, subject to certain costs incurred by the applicant being paid in the amount of $6,375.60.
These costs were agreed to by the respondents. However, the Trustee sought to intervene, seeking various orders as to the payment of costs said to be incurred by the Trustee, during the administration of the estate. That leave was granted.
The Trustee seeks the following orders, inter alia;
1. That the Court exercise its discretion to make an order for annulment of the respondents bankrupt estate, pursuant to s 153B(1) of the Act and consequently costs paid in accordance with s 154 of the Act.
2. In the alternative, the respondents pay the Trustees costs and disbursements of the Trustee, to the extent that they have not otherwise been recovered from the bankrupt’s estate, in priority, pursuant to s 109(1) of the Act.
The Respondent’s Submissions
The respondent firstly notes that the Trustee’s submissions filed 7 August 2020, contain an affidavit of Paul Hutchinson, affirmed 7 August 2020. The respondents object to the filing of that affidavit, as the orders of the Court made 27 July 2020, did not make provision for the filing of additional evidence. It is further submitted, that the filing of this affidavit occurred without the consent of the respondents, or their prior knowledge. In these circumstances, the Court proposes not to read the affidavit and only rely upon the written submissions filed on behalf of the Trustee.
The respondents’ contend that the appropriate orders for the disposal of the matter, are as follows:
a) The orders set out in the Short Minutes, dated 15 July 2020, signed by the applicant and the respondents made by consent.
b) The creditor’s petition is otherwise dismissed.
c) The Trustee is granted leave to intervene.
d) The Trustee’s application is otherwise dismissed.
e) The respondents pay the Trustees costs properly and reasonably incurred:
(i)between 23 April and 6 May 2020; and
(ii)in relation to the 12 June 2020 hearing.
f) The respondents to indemnify the Trustee, in respect of any disbursements properly and recently made for the benefit of their estates, including insurance on the respondents’ properties.
g) The Trustee to pay the respondents costs of the Trustee’s application.
h) The parties and the Trustee otherwise bear their own costs of the applications.
By way of summary, the respondents submit that:
a. Given the consent orders between the parties will necessarily lead to the dismissal of the creditor’s petition, any discretion with respect to annulment is not available;
b. Further, given the respondents are solvent and that the applicant holds an equitable charge over the real property of the respondents, no sequestration orders should have been made in the first place;
c. The respondents promptly notified the Trustee of a challenge to the sequestration orders, applied for review of the Registrar’s decision, made in their absence under s 104(2) of the FCCA, within time and received an undertaking from the Trustee who would keep his costs to a minimum;
d. The Trustee’s statutory reporting obligations were simply to advise creditors within three months of the date of the bankruptcy, on the likelihood of creditors receiving a dividend before the end of the bankruptcy. The Trustee was further required, by statute, to administer the estate as efficiently as possible by avoiding unnecessary expense, a duty he acknowledged he was bound by;
e. The Trustee has not complied with the Australian Financial Security Authority (“AFSA”) guidance as to the conduct of trustees as to costs;
f. The Trustee does not appear to have applied to the caution counselled by the Courts, with respect to costs in the circumstances applying here;
g. Accordingly, the orders set out above, are appropriate.
By way of a timeline, it is not in dispute that the sequestration order was made by Registrar Ng on 23 April 2020, in the absence of the respondents. The respondents received notification of the appointment of a Trustee in Bankruptcy on 6 May 2020. The following day, the Trustee was advised of the respondent’s intention to seek to review the Registrar’s decision, pursuant to s 104(2) of the FCCA. On 8 May 2020, the Trustee undertook to keep costs of administration at a minimum.
On 21 May 2020, the respondents sought the Trustee’s consent for the sale of a property at Seaforth. On 15 June 2020, the Trustee advises he will not facilitate the sale of the Seaforth property until the Court has determined whether the respondents’ application to set aside the bankruptcy or an agreement, has been reached.
On 7 July 2020, the Trustee issued a 110 page report to creditors, estimating a dividend of 100 cents on the dollar. On 15 July 2020, the applicant and the respondents’ reached agreement, as to a settlement of the dispute between them and consented to the sequestration orders being set aside. The Trustee advises that he objects to the setting aside of the sequestration orders and advises that the costs of administration to date was $49,853.63. There are additional legal costs claimed by the solicitor acting for the Trustee. On 22 July 2020, the Trustee filed an application seeking annulment of the bankruptcy, as compared to it being set aside.
It is the respondent’s position that they are not insolvent and, in particular, were not at the time of the creditor’s petition, which came before the Registrar on 23 April 2020. On settlement of the Seaforth property, the respondents submit that they will be in a position to discharge in full, all outstanding debts, other than a related party debt said to be owing to the respondent’s company, Delta Design and Construction Pty Ltd.
The power of the Court to conduct a review of a Registrar’s decision, is set out in s 104(2) of the FCCA. Once an application is brought to the Court, which is proceed de novo, a party who is entitled to a hearing, is under no obligation to demonstrate an error on the part of the Registrar who made the original order. In any case, the Court may dismiss a creditor’s petition if the respondents can pay his or her debts (see ss 52(2)(a) of the Act).
As the petitioning creditor has offered no evidence on review and has consented to the sequestration orders being set aside, it is submitted that there is no power for the Court now, to make a sequestration order on review (see s 52(1) of the Act). Thus, the Court on review, should set aside the decision of the Registrar in its entirety and make the orders sought, by consent, by the parties.
It is submitted on behalf of the respondents, that if the sequestration order is set aside, there is no ability for the Court to exercise any discretion, in respect of the annulment, pursuant to s 153b of the Act. Annulment cannot accompany a dismissal of a petition and setting aside of a sequestration order, because once the petition is set aside, there is no juridical condition of bankruptcy, to attract an order for annulment (see Pattison v Hadjimouratis (2006) 236 ALR 1 (“Pattison”) at [18], per Nicholson J).
In relation to the Trustee’s contentions, it is submitted on behalf of the respondents, that the Trustee’s reliance on cases such as Barnes v Lion Finance Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 951 (“Barnes”) is misconceived. Barnes was not an application for review, but rather an application under s 153B(1) of the Act. Different considerations apply to such an application. The Trustee has admitted that the main reason for blocking the consent orders proposed by the parties, is the payment of his own fees.
In Vaucluse Hospital Pty Ltd v Phillips [2006] FMCA 44, Riethmuller FM (as he was then), said at [53] –[ 54] and [65]:
[53] In this regard it must also be borne in mind that undertaking the role of trustee is a function that a trustee embarks upon aware of the inherent risk that he or she may not be remunerated. If an estate contains no assets that can be realised then the trustee will remain without remuneration, unless creditors are prepared to fund investigations. Prescribed remuneration rates are higher than scale fees for similar work carried out in the course of litigation, presumably (at least in part) to recompense trustees for the risk inherent in the function.
[54] The result is that a lack of remuneration ‘may be an incident of the risk associated with the performance of the trustee’s duties in the period between the sequestration order and the expiry of the 21 days’: see Garrett v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2005] FMCA 19 at [34] per Lindsay FM. It is certainly a well accepted incident of the risk inherent in the performance of the trustee’s duties in asset less estates.
[65] Using s 153b solely to overcome a lack of power to order that a party pay the trustee’s remuneration and expenses (or part thereof) in a review or appeal is an approach that requires considerable care. To allow the consequences of a registrar’s order upon those choosing to participate in the effect of the order to become a basis to refuse to set aside has the appearance of less than appropriate review.
The respondents submits that the Trustee should be granted leave to intervene, but his application should otherwise be dismissed. The appropriate course of action, is for the Trustee to seek payment, consistent with his undertaking to keep his costal minimum, on general principles. The respondents advised the Trustee of this course of action on 20 July 2020 (see Pattison at [20], per Nicholson J).
It is submitted on behalf of the respondents, that the Court is free to make orders as it sees fit, pursuant to s 104(3) of the FCCA. It is submitted that the provision extends to orders as to the payment of trustees costs and remuneration or part thereof on a basis other than s 154 of the Act. The respondents submits that the Trustee’s position as to costs incurred, is adequately protected by the orders proposed above. This includes the orders that the respondents’ pay the Trustee’s costs properly and reasonably incurred, between 23 April and 6 May 2020 and in relation to the 12 June 2020 hearing. It is further proposed that the respondents’ indemnify the Trustee, in respect of any disbursements properly and reasonably made for the benefit of their estates, including insurance on the respondents’ properties.
In Kyriackou v Shield Mercantile Pty Ltd (No 2) [2004] FCA 1338 (“Kyriackou”), at [42], Weinberg J said the following:
It seems to me that a trustee who administers a bankrupt estate, in the knowledge that the bankrupt is challenging the validity of the sequestration order, must exercise caution when incurring expenses whilst the status of the bankruptcy remains uncertain… The argument for fixing the estate with the costs and expenses of the administration seems to me to be less cogent when the putative bankrupt should never have been the subject of a sequestration or the first place. That is particularly so when the sequestration order is based upon a bankruptcy notice that has always been attacked as invalid.
In Pattinson at [102], Lander J referred to the first instance decision under appeal, where Connolly FM said the following:
[15] In my view this letter indicates the Trustee had very early warning of what was being maintained by the applicant. That is, that he was solvent, would pay the debt, and intended to make an application to set aside the sequestration order.
[16] Notwithstanding this the Trustee did work up until 16 August 2005 costing a total of $24,125.95 of which $19,182.68 represented the Trustee’s remuneration and of which all but $8,680.68 was incurred prior to 31 July 2005. While it is clear that the Trustee has certain obligations, the Trustee in this instance had knowledge very early on that the bankrupt is challenging the validity of the sequestration order and was required to exercise some caution when incurring expenses of the status of the bankruptcy remained uncertain. It would be quite unfair in my view to burden the applicant who is the successful applicant in this proceeding with the costs of administering the estate. For these reasons, I am satisfied it is appropriate to set aside the sequestration order but that it is not appropriate to make an order annulling the bankruptcy. This leaves the Trustee to pursue whatever remedies he might have by virtue of the general law.
In this present case, it is submitted that the respondents received notice of the appointment of the Trustee on 6 May 2020. The Trustee was notified of the intention of the respondent, to file an application for review on 7 May 2020 and the grounds for the application for review. The Trustee agreed to keep his time to a minimum on 8 May 2020. The Trustee now claims costs and remuneration in excess of $86,000.00 including, it is suggested, costs of more than $36,000.00, after having been informed of the consent orders of the parties that the bankruptcy be set aside on 15 July 2020.
It is submitted on behalf of the respondents, that it is inexplicable as to why a Trustee faced with an application for review, made within time, on grounds that would, if made out, lead to the sequestration order being set aside, proceed to prepare a long and detailed report to creditors well in advance of the statutory date (three months from the date of bankruptcy), that for such a report to be in far more detail than statutorily mandated. There is no evidence that the volume of material submitted by the Trustee in evidence, in the scheduled work that is claimed against this matter, is one that shows caution, rather the complete opposite.
It was submitted that the orders set out are fair and reasonable, in all the circumstances and having reference to the relevant case law, as detailed above.
The Trustee’s Submissions
The Trustee firstly submits that there is a deficiency including contingent creditors, of $115,586.74 in the respondents’ bankrupt estate. It is submitted that upon the request of the respondents, the Trustee completed a sale of the property at Darlington and that a Seaforth property is due to settle on 11 September 2020.
The respondents’ submissions discuss the power of the Court to review a Registrar’s decision under s 104(2) of the FCCA and
r 2.02(3) of the Federal Circuit Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2016 (Cth) (“the Rules”). The orders sought in the respondents’ application for review, filed on 12 June 2020, had no mention of these rules and instead, at Order 1, referred to r 16.05(2) of the Rules and Order 2
s 153B of the Act. It is submitted the respondents’ cannot move to review the Registrar’s decision under s 104(2) of the FCCA and r 2.03(3) of the Rules.It is submitted that the consent orders filed by the parties, does not address the fault of the respondents. It was submitted that the Trustee was validly appointed by the Court and has incurred costs in administering the bankrupt estate, which could have been prevented on multiple opportunities by the respondents. It is submitted that the respondents are effectively indemnifying the applicants but refusing to pay the Trustee’s costs in administering the estate. It is submitted that this position is unfair to the Trustee.
In Pattinson at [20], Nicholson J clarifies that the position of the Court, as regards to setting aside a bankruptcy order, as compared to any other power:
… I summarise my understanding of the law as follows. A Federal Magistrates Court sitting on a review of the making of a sequestration order, being vested by statute with the power “to make any order or orders it thinks in relation to the matter in respect of which the power was exercised”, is not confined to setting aside a sequestration order but may consider whether annulment is a preferable course in all the relevant circumstances. In doing so it will be a relevant consideration to the exercise of the discretion on remedy whether the circumstances of the trustee’s conduct in the administration are such that the trustee should receive the protection for his or her costs, charges and expenses in the administration which would flow from an order of annulment as a consequence of s 153B of the Bankruptcy Act.
In Iosifidis v Hanson Construction Materials Pty Ltd [2016] FCCA 998 at [71], the following was said:
In this case, the bankrupt sought relief alternative basis - to review the registrar’s sequestration order or to annul the bankruptcy. So far as the bankrupt was concerned, either course was acceptable to him as each provided the means to a result by which his bankruptcy ended. However, for the trustee, the difference was important. As was pointed out by the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in Pattinson v Hadjimouratis if an order is made setting aside the sequestration order upon the bankrupt successfully reviewing the decision of the Registrar, then the trustee has no entitlement under the Act to the costs and expenses occurred in the bankruptcy administration. Yet the harshness of that approach can be ameliorated as was done by the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in Flint v Richard Busuttil & Co Pty Ltd where the Court set aside the sequestration order making consequential orders that the appellant and respondent pay some of the trustees costs.
It was submitted that the reliance on Kyriackou by the respondents in their submissions, is misplaced, as the facts in that case are distinguishable. That was a case where there was a defect in the bankruptcy notice. In this present case, the respondents allege that they were not served with a bankruptcy notice, which the applicant denies. It is submitted that without finding of whether the respondents’ were properly served, the Court cannot fully consider which party bears the burden of the Trustees costs.
In Flint v Richard Busuttil & Co Pty Ltd (2013) 216 FCR 375, the Full Court stated at [58]:
…This is not a case where the trustee should be limited to recovering its cost incurred after the appeal period expired. The work he undertook immediately after his appointment concerned the settlement of a contract of sale of land that had been entered into by Ms Flint and her brother. Not only was the sale for her apparent benefit, but her brother made it clear to the trustee that he would be held responsible if the sale did not go ahead. Other steps taken by the trustee during this time, as afterwards, were either reasonable or required by law. In those circumstances, it would be manifestly unjust to deprive the trustee of his costs and remuneration for any part of the period between the making of the sequestration order and the setting aside of that order. The trustee should therefore have his costs and remuneration for the whole of the period after the sequestration order was made, although an avenue for their review should be available. The trustee’s costs should include costs of intervening in these proceedings.
The respondents’ application for review at Order 2 requests an annulment. The entire argument put forward by the respondents’ is baseless and an annulment seemed to be an acceptable position to the respondents’ when the application was filed. The Trustee claims that $86,004.39 for their fees and disbursements. $9,900.00 of these fees was an estimate of the hearing date on 27 July 2020. Trustee also claims an additional $12,587.06 for further costs and disbursements to 7 August 2020, which are costs incidental to this application, redirecting rent and progressing the sale of the Seaforth property. Thus, the total costs and disbursements to date, are now $98,591.45.
The Trustee acknowledges that the costs of administering the bankruptcy of the respondents’ is higher than it normally would be. It is submitted that part of this relates to additional fees due to nondisclosure debts and assets. Part is due to the conduct of the respondents and the litigious nature of the current proceedings.
On 27 July 2020, this Court requested that the respondents identify costs of the Trustee that were not reasonable. This has not been completed by the respondents and it is still unclear what costs the respondents consider, as having been unreasonably incurred.
Consideration
The Court is reasonably satisfied that it has available to it, the option of either setting aside the order of the Registrar in sequestering the respondents’ estates, or annulling the order. Each alternative has certain effects and to a large extent, depends upon whether or not the sequestration order ought not to be made, or ought not to have been made.
That in turn depends upon whether or not there was compliance with the requirements of the Act for the service of the bankruptcy notice. In Kyriackou, the Federal Court found the bankruptcy notice was defective and therefore no act of bankruptcy had occurred. In those circumstances, the Court felt the appellant should not be required to pay the Trustee’s costs. In the present case, as is conceded by the trustee, essential to the task of the Court in determining whether to prefer an annulment of the bankruptcy of its setting aside, depends upon the finding by the Court as to whether or not the bankruptcy notice was served.
In two affidavits, each sworn 19 February 2020, John Vitanza, licensed process server, deposes that he served each of the respondents’ a copy of the bankruptcy notice at 11:25am on Monday 27 January 2020, by delivering the notices to the respondents’ personally at 52 Gumnut Road, Cherrybrook, New South Wales.
The respondents’ deny they were served. In a joint affidavit, sworn 11 May 2020, each of the respondents swear that they were not served with any bankruptcy notice, prior to the sequestration order being made. On 27 January 2020, they depose that they left their home at Cherrybrook at around 9:30am and visited friends, a Mr Sharjarat and a Mrs Kord at Carey Bay in the Hunter Valley, arriving between 11:15am at 11:30am. The respondents’ spent day with their friends, leaving at around 9:00pm and arriving home at around 11:00pm.
In a joint affidavit sworn 12 May 2020, Mr Sharjarat and Mrs Kord confirm that the respondents’ arrived at their home before midday. The respondents’ house is about a two hour drive from Cherrybrook. The respondents’ spent the day with Mr Sharjarat and Mrs Kord and left their home around 9:00pm.
In an affidavit sworn 11 May 2020, Aria Ghasemi, the son/stepson of the respondents’ and Saina Roumi, the daughter/step daughter of the respondents’, depose that their parents went to visit friends at approximately 10:00am on 27 January 2020 and arrived home after 10:00pm, that same day. No one came to the house during the morning of the 27 January 2020 to serve any documents.
The evidence of Mr Vitanza is at odds with the evidence of the respondents’, their friends and their children. In these circumstances, whilst the respondents’ might have a strong motive to lie, this cannot be said about their friends. Whilst it is conceivable that the respondents’ children may have been convinced to lie to support their parents, the Court cannot, on the material before it, draw the same conclusion about their friends.
The Court is left with a position whereby it has two opposing versions of events, which cannot stand together. Given the weight of the evidence, together with the independent verification by the respondent’s friends that the respondents’ were not at home when the alleged bankruptcy notices were served, the Court cannot be satisfied that it should prefer Mr Vitanza’s version of events, over that of the respondents. In these circumstances, the Court is reasonably satisfied that the sequestration order ought not to have been made, as the bankruptcy notices were not served as required.
As discussed above, in circumstances where the order ought not to have been made, the preferable course is for the sequestration order to be set aside, as compared to being annulled.
While that has certain consequences for the Trustee, the Court is satisfied that the Trustee can be reasonably protected, by the making of orders as set out by the respondents, that they pay the Trustees costs properly and reasonably incurred between 23 April 2020 and 7 May 2020, being the day when they were put on notice of the respondents’ intention to seek a review of the Registrar’s decision.
The Trustee was under an obligation after that period of time to keep costs to a minimum. Notwithstanding the complexities of the case, the Trustee was under a duty to do so. The Court is reasonably satisfied that the Trustee should be protected, in relation to any disbursements properly and reasonably made, for the benefit of the respondents’ estates, including an insurance on the respondents property. Noting the concession by the respondents’, it is reasonable that they pay the Trustees costs properly and reasonably incurred, in relation to the 12 June 2020 hearing.
In relation to the balance of the costs said to be incurred by the Trustee, the Court notes that the Trustee is at liberty to seek those costs at general law, subject to the limitation of the Trustee being able to show that they were properly and reasonably incurred.
Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court makes the following orders:
a. The orders set out in the Short Minutes dated 15 July 2020, signed by the applicant and the respondents’ made by consent, be confirmed.
b. The creditor’s petition is otherwise dismissed.
c. The Trustee is granted leave to intervene.
d. The Trustee’s application is otherwise dismissed.
e. The respondents’ pay the Trustee’s costs properly and reasonably incurred:
i. between 23 April and 6 May 2020; and
ii. in relation to the 12 June 2020 hearing.
f. The respondents’ to indemnify the Trustee in respect of any disbursements properly and recently made for the benefit of their estates, including insurance on the respondents’ properties.
g. The Trustee to pay the respondents’ costs of the Trustee’s application.
h. The parties and the Trustee otherwise bear their own costs of the applications.
I certify that the preceding forty-six (46) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Humphreys
Associate:
Date: 15 September 2020
CORRECTION (15 April 2021)
At paragraph 22, the word “not” was removed.
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