FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| FAIR WORK OMBUDSMAN v SAFECORP SECURITY GROUP PTY LTD & ANOR (No.2) | [2018] FCCA 611 |
| Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Declarations made by default against one of two respondents – at trial of proceeding against the non-defaulting respondent it was held that the declarations made against the defaulting respondent were not binding on the non-defaulting respondent – on appeal held that the declarations made against defaulting respondent were binding on non-defaulting respondent – whether on remittal the declarations should be set aside on the ground that, given the appeal court’s conclusion that the declarations granted by default against the defaulting respondent also bound the non-defaulting respondent, the declarations were granted on the basis of an erroneous understanding of the law – whether the declarations should be set aside because, although the non-defaulting respondent received notice of the application for default judgment against the defaulting respondent the non-defaulting respondent was not given notice that the effect of the granting of default judgment against the defaulting respondent would prevent the non-defaulting respondent from having determined at trial the allegations of fact the non-defaulting respondent put in issue by filing a defence - declarations set aside. |
| Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), s.45 |
| Cases cited: Autodesk Inc v Dyason (No.2) (1993) 176 CLR 300 Banque Commerciale SA v Akhil Holdings Ltd [1990] HCA 11 Cameron v Cole (1944) 68 CLR 571 Fair Work Ombudsman v Lohr [2018] FCA 5 Otkritie International Investment Management Ltd v Urumov & Others [2012] EWHC 890 (Comm) |
| Applicant: | FAIR WORK OMBUDSMAN |
| First Respondent: | SAFECORP SECURITY GROUP PTY LTD (ACN 153 771 898) |
| Second Respondent: | JOHN LOHR |
| File Number: | SYG 2379 of 2013 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Manousaridis |
| Hearing date: | 20 February 2018 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 20 February 2018 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 16 March 2018 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr J Darams |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Office of the Fair Work Ombudsman |
| No appearance by or on behalf of the First Respondent |
| Second Respondent in person |
ORDERS
Pursuant to r.16.05(2)(a) and (c) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) the declarations made on 14 November 2014 against the first respondent are set aside.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 2379 of 2013
| FAIR WORK OMBUDSMAN |
Applicant
And
| SAFECORP SECURITY GROUP PTY LTD (ACN 153 771 898) |
First Respondent
| JOHN LOHR |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
In Fair Work Ombudsman v Lohr[1] Bromwich J set aside orders I made on 28 February 2017, [2] and ordered that the matter be remitted to me for rehearing in accordance with his Honour’s reasons. One of the orders his Honour set aside was an order refusing the applicant (FWO) leave to reopen her case against the second respondent, Mr Lohr. The evidence the FWO intended…
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- Case
- [2018] FCCA 611
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether declarations made against SSG, in circumstances where Mr Lohr had filed a defence and disputed the underlying facts, were binding on Mr Lohr. This question arose because the court had previously concluded that the declarations were not binding on Mr Lohr as he was not "in default" for the purposes of rule 13.03B(2)(c).
The court, in considering the FWO's application for leave to reopen, relied on a previous decision by Bromwich J. Bromwich J had upheld the FWO's submission that the declarations were indeed binding on Mr Lohr, notwithstanding that Mr Lohr was not in default and had filed a defence. This conclusion was based on two key reasons. Firstly, Mr Lohr had received notice of the FWO's intention to seek default judgment against SSG, which alerted him to the FWO's pursuit of declarations against SSG. This notice was considered sufficient to put Mr Lohr on notice and afford him an opportunity to oppose the declarations, thereby making him a "contradictor" in the necessary sense for the lawful making of the declarations. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, Bromwich J viewed the declarations as having a legal effect that extended beyond the procedural mechanism for their making. His Honour reasoned that declarations, by their terms, declare rights relevant to the interests of parties like Mr Lohr, and unless set aside, must be given effect according to their terms, irrespective of whether there had been a trial of the disputed facts. The court found that the "trigger mechanism" for making declarations cannot limit their legal impact, which is determined by the face of the order itself.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As Bromwich J found, a necessary premise on which I relied for not allowing the FWO leave to reopen her case was my opinion about the effect of the declarations (Declarations) I made against SSG on 7 November 2014. I made the Declarations on the application of the FWO pursuant to r.13.03B(2)(c) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (FCC Rules) because SSG had not filed a defence to the statement of claim. At the time I made the Declarations, however, Mr Lohr was not “in default” for the purposes of that rule; he had filed a defence in which he put in issue allegations of fact on which the FWO relied in her statement of claim for alleging SSG had contravened s.45 of the FW Act and that Mr Lohr was involved in those contraventions. I was of the opinion that the Declarations were not binding on Mr Lohr because Mr Lohr was not “in default” for the purposes of r.13.03B(2)(c) of the FCC Rules. In Lohr Bromwich J upheld the FWO’s submission that, contrary to what I had concluded, the Declarations were binding on Mr Lohr. His Honour did so even though Mr Lohr was not in default; and even though Mr Lohr had filed a defence in which he put in issue material facts on which the FWO relied for claiming SSG contravened s.45 of the FW Act and that Mr Lohr was involved in those contraventions. His Honour appears to have upheld the FWO’s submission for two reasons. One was that Mr Lohr had been given notice that the FWO intended to apply for default judgment against SSG, which made clear that the FWO sought declarations against SSG.[3] This was important because, according to his Honour, that put Mr Lohr on notice, and thus “was given the opportunity to appear and oppose the making of declarations that were plainly against his interests”. His Honour further concluded Mr Lohr “was therefore a contradictor in the sense necessary for the lawful making of the declarations”.[4][3] [2018] FCA 5 at [21][4] [2018] FCA 5 at [21] The second, and perhaps paramount, reason on which Bromwich J relied for accepting the FWO’s submission that the Declarations bound Mr Lohr is his Honour’s view of the effect of the Declarations. His Honour appears to have been of the view that, because by their terms they declared rights that were relevant to Mr Lohr’s interests, the Declarations, unless set aside, must be given effect according to their terms, whether or not there was a determination by the Court after a trial of the allegations of facts contained in the statement of claim Mr Lohr put in issue by filing a defence. That is apparent from the following passage from his Honour’s reasons for judgment:[5]The trigger mechanism for making such declarations [in this case, r.13.03B(2)(c) of the FCC Rules] does not and cannot operate to confine their legal effect and impact. That will always turn on the face of the order or declaration that has been made, and is sometimes a reason for varying or setting aside such an order or declaration because of a failure to properly reflect the intention of the Court. To operate otherwise would be to introduce uncertainty as to the meaning of an order or declaration once made.[5] [2018] FCA 5 at [21]