FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Fabian & Azarola [2023] FedCFamC1F 949
File number:
SYC 5734 of 2023
Judgment of:
REES J
Date of judgment:
8 November 2023
Catchwords:
FAMILY LAW – HAGUE CONVENTION – Return application for only one child of the relationship – Assessment of grave risk of exposure to psychological harm - regulation 16(3)(b) and its application – Sibling with significant medical issues required to reside in Australia with the mother – Application by the father for the return of the eldest child to Singapore – Separation of siblings – Where the child has existing behavioural issues – Lack of parental cooperation – Where the Court finds there is a grave risk of exposure to psychological harm upon return – Orders for the father’s return application to be dismissed
Legislation:
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 69, 69E, 111D(1)(f)
Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986 (Cth) reg 16(1), 16(1A), 16(3)(b), 16(4), 16(5)
Convention of 19 October 1996 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Cooperation in respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children
Cases cited:
Bant v Clayton, (2015) 53 FamLR 621
Isles & Nelissen [2022] FedCFamC1A 97
LK & Director-General Department of Community Services (2009) 237 CLR 582
N and S and the Separate Representative (1996) FLC 92-655
Oswald & Karrington (2016) FLC 93-726
Re C and B (Children) (Care Order: Future Harm) [2001] 1 F.L.R 611
Division:
Division 1 First Instance
Number of paragraphs:
177
Date of hearing:
25 & 26 October 2023
Place:
Sydney
Counsel for the Applicant:
Ms Mallett K.C.
Solicitor for the Applicant:
Broun Abrahams Burreket
Counsel for the Respondent:
Mr Anderson
Solicitor for the Respondent:
Bartier Perry Lawyers
ORDERS
SYC 5734 of 2023 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MR AZAROLA
Applicant
AND: MS FABIAN
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
REES J
DATE OF ORDER:
8 NOVEMBER 2023
THE COURT ORDERS:
1.That the Hague Convention Return Application filed 17 August 2023 be dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Section 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym Fabian & Azarola has been approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
REES J:
The proceedings before the Court relate…
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- Fabian & Azarola [2023] FedCFamC1F 949
- Case
- [2023] FedCFamC1F 949
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether the return of X to Singapore would expose him to a grave risk of psychological harm, as outlined in regulation 16(3)(b) of the Hague Convention. This required the court to assess the evidence regarding X’s existing behavioural issues, his diagnosis of ADHD, and the impact of being separated from his sibling Y, who required medical treatment and would remain in Australia with the mother. The court had to weigh the risk of psychological harm against the rights of the father under the Convention.
The court found that X had significant vulnerabilities, including a diagnosis of ADHD and possible Autism Spectrum Disorder. The father’s lack of cooperation with the mother and the potential for severe psychological harm if X were separated from his sibling Y were critical factors. The court concluded that the grave risk of psychological harm to X from being separated from his brother and returned to Singapore outweighed the father’s rights under the Hague Convention. Consequently, the court dismissed the father’s return application.
The court issued an order dismissing the Hague Convention Return Application filed by the father. The order noted that the form of the order was subject to review or variation in accordance with the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021.
Orders
Orders of the court
SYC 5734 of 2023
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN:
MR AZAROLA
Applicant
AND:
MS FABIAN
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
REES J
DATE OF ORDER:
8 NOVEMBER 2023
THE COURT ORDERS:
1. That the Hague Convention Return Application filed 17 August 2023 be dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Section 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
I am satisfied that X would be placed at risk of psychological harm if he were only to spend time with his mother and brother three or four times each year.CONSIDERATION In determining whether there is a grave risk in returning X to Singapore to permit the courts in Singapore to determine his future parenting arrangements, some guidance can be found in the cases relating to the assessment of unacceptable risk of abuse. In Bant v Clayton, (2015) 53 FamLR 621, Tree J, writing separately, said,Risk assessment involves determining first, the degree of the likelihood of the postulated event, and secondly, the prospect and magnitude of harm that may flow if the event occurs. The weighing of those two considerations - even accepting they may be imprecisely expressed within parameters - will inform whether the risk is adjudged to be acceptable or not. Similar statements were made by the Full Court in Oswald & Karrington (2016) FLC 93-726 where their Honours said,First, a finding expressed in terms of the balance of probabilities (ie “high risk”) is not the test to be applied in assessing future hypothetical events which may or may not occur. With respect to the assessment of future potential risk to children, the assessment requires identification of the nature and magnitude of the risk and whether or not the risk posed is unacceptable. In Isles & Nelissen [2022] FedCFamC1A 97, referring with approval to the decision of Fogarty J in N and S and the Separate Representative (1996) FLC 92-655, the Full Court stated,Fogarty J stated it is necessary for a trial judge to give real and substantial consideration to the facts of the case and to decide whether or not, and why or why not, those facts could be said to raise an unacceptable risk of harm to the child (at 82,713–82,714) and, furthermore, the qualitative analysis of the evidence must be directed not just to the existence of the risk of harm but also the magnitude of the possible harm. Further, their Honours adopted, as a correct statement of the law, the decision of Hale LJ (as her Honour then was) in Re C and B (Children) (Care Order: Future Harm) [2001] 1 F.L.R 611 at [28], in child-related proceedings, a comparatively small risk of really serious harm can justify action, while even the virtual certainty of slight harm might not. It could hardly be otherwise, because no prudent adult would willingly expose a child to the risk of sexual abuse when there is an unacceptably high chance of its occurrence, even though the chance is not proven by the evidence to be probable. Requiring the proof of any possible future child abuse as a probability would pervert the law as settled by the High Court in M v M and Malec. The psychological harm which might be suffered by X is very serious. This is a child who has significant vulnerabilities. He has been diagnosed as suffering from ADHD. Dr P stated that X presented to her with a trauma response “compounded by features suggestive of underlying neurodiversity with suspected Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) in addition to his current diagnosis of ADHD.”