Faatele; Secretary, Department of Social Services and (Social services second review)
[2020] AATA 3499
•10 September 2020
Faatele; Secretary, Department of Social Services and (Social services second review) [2020] AATA 3499 (10 September 2020)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Numbers: 2019/5889, 2019/5890, 2019/5891, 2019/5892
Re:Secretary, Department of Social Services
APPLICANT
AndSauleoge Faatele
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Senior Member C. J. Furnell
Date:10 September 2020
Place:Melbourne
The Tribunal sets aside the decisions under review and, in substitution for those decisions, decides that the Respondent is not indebted to the Commonwealth for any overpayment of the CCB or payment of the CCR in the financial years 2015-16 and 2016-17.
......[sgd]..................................................................
Senior Member C. J. Furnell
Catchwords
SOCIAL SECURITY – childcare benefit – debt for overpayment – determination of weekly limit of hours – varying determination of weekly limit of hours – no variation to determination – no notice of variation – no variation decision – no debt – decision set aside and substituted
SOCIAL SECURITY – childcare rebate – debt for payment – entitlement to childcare benefit – eligibility for childcare rebate – weekly limit of hours – no debt – decision set aside and substituted
Legislation
A New Tax System (Family Assistance) (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth)
A New Tax System (Family Assistance) Act 1999 (Cth)
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
Family Assistance Legislation Amendment (Jobs for Families Childcare Package) Act 2017 (Cth)
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth)Cases
McLean Brothers & Rigg Ltd v Grice (1906) 4 CLR 835
Minister for Natural Resources v New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council (1987) 9 NSWLR 154
Motor Accidents Insurance Board v Britton [2017] TASSC 60Secondary Materials
Explanatory memorandum to A New Tax System (Family Assistance and Related Measures) Act Bill 2000
REASONS FOR DECISION
Senior Member C. J. Furnell
10 September 2020
This proceeding concerns the existence and extent of any indebtedness of the Respondent with respect to payments made on account of the childcare benefit (CCB) and childcare rebate (CCR) and, insofar as it exists, whether any such indebtedness should be written off or waived.
The Applicant contends that such indebtedness exists in respect of two periods; 6 July 2015 to 21 July 2016 (first period) and 22 July 2016 to 2 July 2017 (second period).
BACKGROUND
Original decisions
As for the first period, by letters dated 29 August 2017 (expressed to relate to the financial year ending 30 June 2016), the Respondent was advised that she had been overpaid $7,963.98 by way of CCB[1] and $10,596.59 by way of CCR.[2] A large part of the overpayments had been recovered by withholding amounts from the Respondent’s other entitlements, leaving a net amount said to be payable of $10,035.17.
[1] T23, 36.
[2] T23, 39.
As for the second period, also by letters dated 29 August 2017 (expressed to relate to the financial year ending 30 June 2017), the Respondent was advised that she had been overpaid $34,265.43 by way of CCB[3] and $44,118.41 by way of CCR.[4]
[3] ST4.
[4] ST5.
The Applicant’s claim that there had been these overpayments is founded on a contention that the Respondent’s eligibility for CCB in these two periods was subject to a weekly limit of 24 hours. The Applicant submitted that, as the Respondent did not satisfy a “work, training, study” test, the weekly limit of 24 hours applied rather than the limit of 50 hours by reference to which CCB payments were in fact made in those periods.
Authorised review officer decisions
The original decisions to raise and recover these alleged overpayments were made the subject of internal departmental review. By letter dated 25 October 2017, an authorised review officer decided that there had been overpayments but varied the amount attributable to the first period so that, for that period, the CCB overpayment was reduced to $3,990.56 and CCR overpayment was reduced to $7,092.69.[5]
[5] T27.
AAT1 decisions
The original decisions of 29 August 2017 as varied on review were then made the subject of further review by the Tribunal’s Social Services and Child Support Division (SSCSD).
On 15 August 2019, the SSCSD decided, in effect,[6] to set aside the decisions the subject of review and, in substitution, to decide that the Respondent:
·was not indebted to the Commonwealth for any overpayment of the CCB or CCR in relation to the period 6 July 2015 to 21 July 2016; but
·was indebted to the Commonwealth with respect to such overpayments in the period 22 July 2016 to 2 July 2017[7] (AAT1 decisions).[8]
[6] The AAT1 decision is expressed as a decision to vary the decision the subject of review and to make a decision in substitution. The Tribunal does not have power, however, to simultaneously vary a decision the subject of review and make a decision in substitution.
[7] The AAT1 decision is expressed as a single decision, encompassing overpayments allegedly made not only in the period 6 July 2015 to 3 July 2016 but also in the period 4 July 2016 to 2 July 2017. Ultimately, the decision the subject of review by the SSCSD, however, was the decision (or, more accurately, were the decisions) as varied by the authorised review officer on 25 October 2017 (Administration Act, s 111). While the authorised review officer referred to a decision of 29 August 2017 (as if only a single decision had been made on that date), the material in the T documents suggest that a number of decisions were made (and reviewed). In particular, a decision that there had been an overpayment of the child care benefit and a decision that there had been an overpayment of the child care rebate in relation to the 2015-16 financial year appear to not only have been made separately from each other but also separately from any decisions concerning overpayments in relation to subsequent periods. Hence, the AAT1 decision was, in fact, multiple decisions.
[8] T2, [8].
The Secretary has applied for review of the AAT1 decisions. It is those decisions which are now the subject of review.[9]
[9] Administration Act, s 128.
LEGISLATIVE CONTEXT
The legislation applicable in this proceeding comprises, essentially, two Acts in their form as at 1 July 2018.
Those Acts are the A New Tax System (Family Assistance) (Administration) Act 1999 (Administration Act) and the A New Tax System (Family Assistance) Act 1999 (Assistance Act).
Both Acts in their form prior to 2 July 2018 continue in force, a continuation that has effect in relation to determinations of eligibility for, and entitlement to be paid, the CCB and CCR made in the context of decisions concerning the CCB and CCR.[10]
[10] Family Assistance Legislation Amendment (Jobs for Families Childcare Package) Act 2017, Item 8, Part 3, Schedule 4.
As I indicated earlier, this proceeding concerns the existence and extent of any indebtedness of the Respondent in respect of CCB and CCR payments in two periods.
Under the Administration Act, indebtedness will arise in relation to CCB payments if the amount paid to a person by way of CCB in respect of a period exceeded the amount that should have been so paid to the person. The excess will be a debt due to the Commonwealth.[11]
[11] Administration Act, s 71C. This is subject to a presently irrelevant provision, s 71F.
Similarly, under the Administration Act, if an amount is paid to a person by way of CCR for a week or a quarter for a child during a period in which the person is conditionally eligible for CCB, but the person is not entitled to CCR for the child in that period, the amount so paid will be a debt due to the Commonwealth.[12]
[12] Administration Act, s 71CAA(1).
Hence, in order to assess whether a person such as the Respondent is indebted with respect to:
·CCB payments in relation to a period, the amount paid to the person in respect of the period needs to be compared to the amount that should have been so paid.
·CCR payments in relation to a period, the question in issue is whether the person was then entitled to the CCR.
AMOUNT OF CCB THAT SHOULD BE PAID
Eligibility for the CCB may take a number of forms, including eligibility for fee reduction for care provided by an approved childcare service.[13] This is the form in which the Respondent received the benefit (noting, for example, that in relation to the financial year ending
30 June 2015 all the CCB payments made in relation to the Respondent appeared to be in the form of reduced fees).[14]
[13] Assistance Act, s 41(2).
[14] T58.
Requirement for determination to be made
In order for a person to be eligible for a CCB in this form, it is necessary that, amongst other things, a determination be in force under the Administration Act to the effect that the person is conditionally eligible for the CCB by fee reduction in respect of the relevant child.[15]
[15] Assistance Act, s 43.
Such a determination under the Administration Act can only be made in response to a claim for payment of CCB by fee reduction for care provided by an approved child care service.[16] If a determination can be so made it must be so made if the decision-maker is satisfied that the CCB claimant is conditionally eligible for the CCB by fee reduction under s 42 of the Assistance Act.[17]
[16] Administration Act, ss 49B and 50A.
[17] Administration Act, s 50F.
It is not in issue that at all relevant times a determination was in force under the Administration Act to the effect that the Respondent was conditionally eligible for the CCB by fee reduction in respect of:
·at least four of her children in the financial year ended 30 June 2016; and
·seven of her children in the financial year ended 30 June 2017.
While the Respondent was eligible for CCB, that eligibility was limited in extent. One such limit would have related to the number of hours, in sessions of care in a week.[18] Reflecting that limitation, if a determination of conditional eligibility is made in favour of a person claiming the CCB, a determination of the weekly limit of hours is also required.[19]
[18] Assistance Act, s 52.
[19] Administration Act, ss 50C and 50H.
Such a weekly limit:
·Is determined under s 50H of the Administration Act.[20] Pursuant to that section, the weekly limit must be 24 hours unless “a circumstance listed in subsection 54(2), (4), (6), (13) or (14) of the Assistance Act applies to the claimant.”[21] A determination of the weekly limit in hours remains in force while a determination of conditional eligibility for the CCB is in force[22] and a determination of conditional eligibility generally remains in force at all times after it is made.[23]
·May be varied under certain provisions of the Administration Act.[24] Of particular, potential, relevance in the circumstances is s 64D of that Act. It allows for a determination under s 50H to be varied so as to impose a 24-hour weekly limit if a limit of 50 hours, more than 50 hours, or 24-hour care limit does not apply in the week.
[20] Assistance Act, s 52(3).
[21] Administration Act, s 50H(3).
[22] Administration Act, s 50L(5).
[23] Administration Act, s 50L(1).
[24] Assistance Act, s 52(4).
Determinations made
In terms of the weekly limit applicable to the Respondent, determinations appear to have been made providing for a limit of 50 hours throughout the two financial years ending on 30 June 2017.[25] Hence, the amount that should have been paid to the Respondent by way of CCB in the relevant periods ought to reflect a weekly limit of 50 hours, unless the determinations providing for a 50-hour limit were varied.
[25] ST10(24/2/14); ST2(17/10/14); T29,61(14/8/15); ST11(27/7/16); ST12(18/8/16); ST13(21/11/16); ST14(22/3/17).
Determinations not varied
The Applicant submits that it varied the 50-hour limit under s 64D so that a 24-hour limit applied in the relevant periods.[26] I do not agree.
[26] Applicant’s submissions of 21/7/20, [21-25].
The Applicant contends that I can infer that s 64D variations were made in relation to the two relevant periods merely from the fact that the Applicant required that it be repaid amounts paid by way of the CCB on the basis that a weekly limit of 24 hours then applied.[27] In essence, the contention appears to be that, because the Applicant has done something, I can infer that all prerequisites to the capacity to do so have been satisfied. As I see it, however, even if in some cases adopting such an inference might be appropriate based on a presumption of regularity,[28] here it would be inappropriate. The circumstances of this matter are inconsistent with an inference that s 64D variations were made.
[27] Applicant’s submissions of 21/7/20, [21].
[28] McLean Brothers & Rigg Ltd v Grice (1906) 4 CLR 835 at 850; Minister for Natural Resources v New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council (1987) 9 NSWLR 154 at 164
As I outlined earlier, the Administration Act provides a specific mechanism for the determination and variation of weekly limits. I will not infer that the mechanism has been observed when, on the material before me, it would not appear to have been.
No notice of variation
In this regard, if a variation under s 64D had been made to the Respondent’s weekly limit, notice of the variation ought to have been given to the Respondent, the notice:
·Stating the effect of the variation and including, in particular, the day from which[29] and the period of one or more weeks that the variation is to have effect (assuming the variation was to have effect for a period of one or more weeks); and
· Stating that the Respondent could apply for review of the decision involved in the manner set out in Part 5 of the Administration Act.[30]
[29] Under Administration Act, s 64EA, a variation has effect from the start of the week in which the circumstance listed in ss 54, 55 or 56 of the Assistance Act and in relation to which the variation is made first applies.
[30] Administration Act, s 64E.
On the material before me I find that no such notice was given.
The Applicant refers to two documents and contends that they constituted the requisite notices of variation. The first is a letter dated 29 August 2017 headed “Account Payable-Child Care benefit for approved care 2016-17”.[31] It:
·Asserts that the Respondent’s CCB entitlement had been checked using her annual family income and family circumstances.
·Asserts that the Respondent had received more CCB than she was entitled to.
·Required that the resultant overpayment of CCB be repaid by a particular due date.
[31] ST4.
The second is a letter dated 26 October 2017 headed “Account Payable - Child Care benefit for approved care 2015-16”.[32] It:
·Was expressed to replace any previous entitlement letters about the Respondent’s CCB for the 2015-16 year.
·Asserts that the Respondent’s CCB entitlement had been checked using her annual family income and family circumstances.
·Asserts that the Respondent had received more CCB than she was entitled to.
·Noted that the resultant overpayment of CCB had been met by family tax benefit payments withheld.
[32] ST9.
Neither letter constituted the requisite notice of variation. The letters clearly reflected decisions to raise and recover debts and were what they appeared to be; notices required to be given under the Administration Act in respect of debt.[33]
[33] Administration Act, s 77.
Neither letter stated the effect of a variation so that a weekly limit of 24 hours came to apply rather than the previously determined limit of 50 hours. Indeed, neither letter identified the fact that there had been any variation. No notice of the right to review the “decision” was given, as the decision was not identified.
Moreover, neither letter specified the day from which the variation was to have effect and the period of one or more weeks that the variation was to have effect. In this regard, while both letters referred to particular financial years, it is clear that, for the 2015-16 financial year at least, the Applicant accepts that the 50-hour limit was applicable for at least a part of the year.[34] Specification of the relevant weeks is important given that a variation only takes effect at the start of the week in relation to which the variation applies.[35]
[34] T27, 48.
[35] Administration Act, s 64EA.
Somewhat inconsistently with its contention that the relevant letters were notices of variations to determinations, the Applicant also contends that the letters were notices of determinations made under s 51B of the Administration Act. While I will describe them more fully later, s 51B determinations address issues of subsisting entitlement. It is difficult to see how a letter can be both notice of a subsisting entitlement and notice of a variation to entitlements.
No variation decision
True it is, as the Applicant contends, that a “variation is not ineffective by reason only that any, or all, of the requirements” relating to the required notice are not met.[36]
[36] Administration Act, s 64E(2).
Here, however, there was no variation to be rendered ineffective. While the failure to give notice of a variation might not operate to render the variation ineffective, the absence of a notice of variation suggests that no variation ever occurred. That suggestion is reinforced when regard is had to the fact that the Applicant gave the Respondent a series of notices providing for a limit of 50 hours but no notice varying that limit. While the word “determination” is one of indeterminate meaning,[37] in the context of a legislative regime providing for a pattern of determinations,[38] it would not encompass the Applicant’s apparent formation of a view, uncommunicated to the Respondent, to the effect that the Respondent’s weekly limit ought be altered to 24 hours. It is unlikely that the legislature would have intended that determinations, which were to remain in force at all times after being made and formalised by notice provided for in the Administration Act, be capable of variation:
·Merely by the Applicant internally and informally arriving at a particular view; or
·In circumstances reflective of the wholesale abandonment of the requirements in relation to variation expressly provided for in the Act.
[37] Motor Accidents Insurance Board v Britton [2017] TASSC 60 at [12].
[38] See the reference in the Explanatory memorandum to A New Tax System (Family Assistance and Related Measures) Act Bill 2000 to the fact that a “pattern of determinations applies when an individual makes an effective claim for payment of CCB by fee reduction for care provided by an approved child care service to a child .”
Moreover, “decisions” under the Administration Act (a term defined, indirectly, so as to encompass determinations)[39] must be in writing (which includes a decision made or recorded by means of a computer).[40]
[39] Administration Act, s 3 adopts definition found in Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975.
[40] Administration Act, s 222.
The Applicant did not identify any writing by which the decision to vary the weekly limits was made. While the Applicant noted that decisions made using computer programs may constitute decisions,[41] it did not identify any such decisions but, instead, simply referred to the letters I mentioned earlier which the Applicant contends constituted notice of the variation decisions.
[41] Applicant’s further submissions of 21/7/20, [11-12].
When the Applicant arrived at the view that the Respondent had ceased to satisfy the work/training/study test at some time during the course of the 2015-16 financial year (such that the 50-hour weekly limit no longer applied under s 54(2) of the Administration Act),[42] it could then have varied the weekly limit under s 64D and given notice under s 64E. It did not. Instead, the Applicant went straight to claiming repayment of a debt, bypassing the mechanism for variation provided for in the Act. As I see it, in doing so, it failed to satisfy what is, in the circumstances, a pre-requisite to its debt claim.
[42] Administration Act, s 53(3). A limit of 24 hours applies when the other weekly limits do not apply.
Amount of payment should reflect 50-hour weekly limit
As the determinations providing for a 50-hour weekly limit were not varied, the amount that should have been paid to the Respondent by way of CCB in the relevant periods ought to have reflected that limit.
AMOUNT OF CCB PAID
I turn now to compare what should have been so paid with what was paid to the Respondent.
Amount of entitlement
As the CCB in the form of fee reduction is principally provided by way of payments to third party service providers, the amount of the CCB in that form paid to a person is a deemed amount. It is “the amount of the entitlement” paid to the person.[43]
[43] Administration Act, s 68.
In the case of a person in respect of whom a s 51B determination has been made (an issue to which I will return), the amount of a person’s entitlement to the CCB paid to the person consists of:
·the amount of the fee reduction required to have been passed on to the person by the service that provided care to the children in relation to whom the benefit was paid; and
·the amount (if any) paid directly to the person, insofar as the amount of the person’s entitlement to the benefit exceeded the total amount of the fee reduction.[44]
[44] Administration Act, ss 68(1A) and 56. The Applicant has submitted, and I accept, that no amount was paid directly to the Respondent in the relevant periods (noting that this was not the case in an earlier period – see ST3/T29, 58 in relation to an amount by way of CCB paid directly to the Respondent in relation to financial year 2015).
The amount of the CCB payable by way of fee reduction in respect of care provided in a week is required to be calculated taking into account, amongst other things, determinations made under the Administration Act.[45]
[45] Administration Act, ss 50Z and 51B; Assistance Act s 52(4).
Accordingly, in a context where multiple determinations under the Administration Act provided for a 50-hour weekly limit (determinations which I have found were not varied), the amount of the fee reduction required to have been passed on to the Respondent ought to have reflected that limit.
This would mean that the amount of the CCB paid to the Respondent ought to have matched the amount that should have been so paid, leaving no debt. The amount paid by way of CCB did not exceed the amount that should have been so paid.
Were s 51B determinations made?
As I stated earlier, the foregoing method of measuring what was paid by way of CCB to a person applies where a s 51B determination has been made in respect of the person.
Such a determination:
·is required to be made after the end of each financial year[46] in respect of which a person is conditionally eligible for CCB; and
·is of a person’s entitlement to be paid CCB by fee reduction in respect of the year.[47]
[46] The Administration Act refers to “income year”, a concept defined in s 3(1) Assistance Act so as to apply the meaning given in s 4-10(2) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997, being a financial year.
[47] Administration Act, s 51A.
A person’s entitlement to CCB by fee reduction in a financial year is the amount determined under the Administration Act to be the amount of the benefit to which the person was eligible for the income year.[48] The amount must be so determined taking into account, amongst other things, determinations made under the Administration Act.[49] As such, and as I stated earlier, the determined limit on weekly hours (as varied) is required to be applied when determining a person’s entitlement to CCB under s 51B.[50]
[48] Administration Act, s 51B.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Assistance Act, s 52(4).
Here, the Applicant contends that such a determination was made in relation to each of the 2015-16 and 2016-17 financial years. In particular, it is said that each of the letters which the Applicant claims to be notices of variation to the determined weekly limit from 50 hours to 24 hours also operated as notices of a s 51B determination.
On the material before me, however, it is not clear that a s 51B determination was made in relation to either relevant financial year or that, if made, it was anything other than a nullity.
The letters, which the Applicant characterises as notices of such determinations, did not meet the requirements set out in the Administration Act in respect of such notices (albeit that, again, a determination is not rendered ineffective by reason of such a failure).[51] Insofar as the letters were notices of s 51B determinations, however, they appear to reflect a failure to take into account a consideration relevant to the determinations. In those letters, the entitlement to be paid CCB for the relevant financial year was calculated on the basis that the Respondent’s eligibility for the CCB was subject to a weekly limit of 24 hours, not 50 hours. This reflected a failure to apply what was, in fact, the then determined limit on weekly hours.
[51] The relevant letters failed to include information which a notice of a s 51B determination is required to include under s 51E of the Administration Act, such as the name of the children in respect of whom the Respondent was entitled to CCB, the rate at which the Respondent was considered to be eligible for the year, or the total amount of the fee reductions (if any) that an approved child care service providing care to the child is required, under s 219B, to have passed on to the Respondent.
Absent a s 51B determination (whether because one was never made or because one purportedly made was a nullity), no amount would be deemed to have been paid to the Respondent. As no amount was, in fact, paid to the Respondent by way of CCB, this would mean that the Respondent could not be indebted to the Applicant as the amount paid to the Respondent by way of CCB in each relevant financial year would be zero.
I do not, however, need to come to a conclusion on whether s 51B determinations were made. This is because the Respondent is not indebted to the Applicant in respect of payments made by way of CCB whether or not s 51B determinations were made and whether or not any such determinations were nullities. At most, the amount the Respondent would be considered to have been paid by way of CCB in the relevant years reflected a weekly limit of 50 hours, and this does not exceed the amount the Respondent should have been paid.
ENTITLED TO CCR
While the Applicant contended that the Respondent received payments by way of CCR in the 2015-16 and 2016-17 financial years quarterly, it would appear that she in fact received those payments weekly, paid directly to her.[52]
[52] T30, 128; Excel spreadsheet provided by the Applicant entitled “Spreadsheet re session report and CCB and CCR payments for 2015-2016 financial year”.
Either way, as I mentioned earlier, the Respondent would be indebted to the Commonwealth for the amount of those payments if she was not entitled to CCR.
In a context where the Respondent received the CCB by way of fee reduction, she would be entitled to CCR in a financial year if, amongst other things, she had been determined to be entitled to CCB in relation to the year under s 51B of the Administration Act and she was eligible for the CCR under s 57F of the Assistance Act.[53]
[53] Administration Act, s 65EA.
Entitled to CCB
As I indicated earlier, the Applicant contends that it made a s 51B determination that the Respondent was entitled to CCB in relation to each of the 2015-16 and 2016-17 financial years. While I harbor doubts about this, for the purposes of my analysis of the position in relation to CCR payments made to the Respondent, I accept that it did so. This is because whether or not it did make such determinations makes no material difference to the ultimate disposition of this proceeding insofar as it concerns CCR payments.
If there had been a failure to make s 51B determinations and, as a result, she was not entitled to CCR, it seems to me that her resultant indebtedness with respect to the CCR payments made to her would be unlikely to be recoverable. The failure to make a s 51B determination would reflect administrative error,[54] the Respondent would have received the CCR payments in good faith and, given the submissions made on her behalf at the hearing of this proceeding, it is clear that she would suffer financial hardship were she to be required to repay the amounts paid to her by way of CCR. Hence, the right to recover any resultant indebtedness with respect to the CCR payments would be waived.[55]
[54] Noting an obligation to make a s 51B determination after the end of each financial year: Administration Act, s 51A.
[55] Administration Act, s 97.
Eligible for CCR
The second precondition concerning the Respondent’s entitlement to CCR relates to her eligibility for CCR under s 57F of the Assistance Act. Eligibility under that section is conditional on, amongst other things, the weekly limit of hours applicable to the relevant person’s eligibility for CCB being the 50-hour limit, the more than 50-hour limit, or the 24-hour care limit.
The Applicant contends that the Respondent was not eligible for CCR under s 57F of the Assistance Act in the two relevant financial years as her eligibility for CCB was then subject to a weekly limit of 24 hours.
I reject that contention. For the reasons I gave earlier, the weekly limit of 50 hours that applied in relation to the Respondent throughout the relevant financial years had not (contrary to the Applicant’s submissions) been varied. As a result, I find that the Respondent was eligible for CCR under s 57F of the Assistance Act.
No CCR debt
Hence, as the Respondent was entitled to CCR in the two relevant financial years, she is not indebted to the Applicant for amounts paid to her by way of CCR in relation to those years.
CONCLUSION
I have decided to set aside the decisions the subject of review and, in substitution for those decisions, I decide that the Respondent was not indebted to the Commonwealth for any overpayment of the CCB or payment of the CCR made in relation to the financial years 2015-16 and 2016-17.
65. I certify that the preceding 64 (sixty-four) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Senior Member C. J. Furnell
........[sgd]................................................................
Associate
Dated: 10 September 2020
Date of hearing: 10 August 2020 Advocate for the Applicant: Mr Tim Noonan Advocate for the Respondent: Ms Anna Faatele
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