F and F
[2000] FMCAfam 52
•20 October 2000
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| F & F | [2000] FMCA fam 52 |
| CHILD SUPPORT – Departure from administrative assessment – Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 |
| Applicant: | J D F |
| Respondent: | A C F |
| File No: | ZB 2405 of 2000 |
| Delivered on: | 20 October 2000 |
| Delivered at: | Brisbane |
| Hearing Date: | 8 September 2000 |
| Judgment of: | Baumann FM |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Burridge |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr McGregor |
ORDERS
That the applicant father’s application for departure be dismissed.
That the respondent mother’s application for a substituted support order be dismissed.
That the matter be adjourned to 9.30 am on 3 November 2000 to hear any further applications for costs or the form of this order.
IT IS DIRECTED
That the matter number ZB2406/00 (DCSA and F) be listed for mention at 9.30 am on 3 November 2000.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE |
ZB 2405 of 2000
| J D F |
Applicant
And
| A C F |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
This is an application by J D F (“the father”) for departure pursuant to s116 of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (“the Act”) from administrative assessment of child support for the years 1997/1998, 1998/1999 and 1999/2000.
The respondent to the father’s application A C F (“the mother”) made a cross application seeking an order for substituted support pursuant s123(1) of the Act.
Documents relied upon
The father, who gave evidence, was cross examined and was represented by counsel relied upon the following documents:
·Application for Departure.......................... filed 6.7.00
·Affidavit of father...................................... filed 10.8.00
·Further affidavit of father.......................... filed 10.8.00
·Affidavit of P C........................................ filed by leave
·Affidavit of father..................................... filed by leave
·Affidavit of J J C...................................... filed by leave
The mother, who gave evidence by telephone, was cross examined and was represented by Counsel relied upon the following documents:
·Application for substituted support........... filed 6.9.00
·Affidavit of J A D......................................... filed 6.9.00
·Affidavit of mother ................................. filed by leave
·Mother’s Financial Statement................ filed by leave
Other documents
At the conclusion of the evidence and submissions, I indicated that I would find it of assistance if a copy of the father’s payment history was produced for consideration. The parties consented to the Child Support Registrar providing me with a copy of the history. The history as produced to the Court on 13 September 2000 direct from the Deputy Child Support Registrar is attached to these reasons.
History
The parties were married on 25 October 1986 and separated on
15 February 1990. There are 2 children of the marriage, E L F (born 29 May 1987) and T F F (born 6 October 1988). These are the children for whose benefit the assessments have been made. The marriage was dissolved on 10 June 1992.
The child support liability commenced on 28 September 1991 but it appears that it was not registered for collection by the Child Support Agency until 17 April 1997.
Relevantly the history in respect of each of the years, the subject of the father’s application for departure, is:
a)Assessment 1997/1998
An application by the mother was made pursuant s98B of the Act on 1 February 1998 for departure from the administrative assessment made for this year. Review Officer Bolas in a decision given on 22 April 1998 (“the Bolas decision”) found it just and equitable and otherwise proper to set the father’s income at $93,560 (the cap). This caused a change in the administrative assessment of child support. The Review Officer opined that “from the information presented above, I am satisfied on the balance of probability that Mr F’s income would be well in excess of the figure upon which he has been assessed”. Review Officer Bolas declined to retrospectively vary the father’s child support liability for previous years and indicated that:
“I am satisfied that I should not make an order for any period after 30 June 1998 as too many things can change in the intervening period.”
Mr Burridge in his submissions asserted that the Bolas decision was “fundamentally and obviously flawed” because of the treatment of retained profits. My reading of the Bolas decision does not suggest that her detailing of the “shareholders funds” from the previous taxation returns of D Pty Ltd was either determinate or critical to her conclusion. In hindsight, where the father’s taxable income for the year 1997/98 was ultimately declared by him to be $96,596.00 Review Officer Bolas was clearly right. It is not clear when that return was signed and lodged.
b)Assessment 1998/99
As Review Officer Bolas had decided not to review future years, it appears that the mother elected to file a further application for review of the 1998/99 assessment. This application was filed on 25 June 1998 (some 2 months after the Bolas decision). Review Officer Nuttall considered the application and handed down her decision on 25 September 1998 (“the Nuttall decision”). In essence Review Officer Nuttall concluded that “having regard to Mr F’s income, property and financial resources I consider that he has the capacity to provide for the children at the cap provided in Section 42 of the Act”. The result was a continuance, in essence, of the Bolas decision although the cap for the 1998/1999 year had increased from $93,560.00 to $96,968.00. The decision resulted in an annual rate for child support of $23,739.00. Review Officer Nuttall applied the rate for the 1998/1999 and 1999/2000 child support years. Mr Burridge asserts that the Nuttall decision is also flawed because of her reliance on the decision in DWYER & MCGUIRE (1993) FLC 92-420 and the fact that she disregarded (he asserts) the assets and financial resources of the mother. Again I cannot agree. The Nuttall decision makes it plain that the Review Officer was satisfied that:
“Mr F has a large base of financial resources, property and income which is not reflected in the formula assessment.”.
After acknowledging the income and expenses of the mother, and concluding both parties “are in a sound financial position”, the Review Officer regarded the income property and financial resources as supporting her decision to apply the maximum cap. Whilst the analysis of the rather complex financial network of the father are referred to briefly in the Nuttall decision, the conclusion in my view was open to her. She based her decision more on the assets than the income of the father. She was not aware that the father’s taxable income for 1997/98 was to be $96,596.00 Not surprisingly, since the father did not appear to sign his 1998/1999 Tax Return until 16 November 1999, Review Officer Nuttall had no reliable indication of what the taxable income position was likely to be for 1998/1999 at the time of her decision. The father declared it to be $5,472.
c)Assessment 1999/2000
The assessment of a child support liability of $23,739.00 for the 1998/1999 and 1999/2000 year as a consequence of the Nuttall decision made 25 September 1998 was the subject of an application by the father made 8 December 1998. In a written decision given 11 February 1999, Senior Case Officer Ammala refused to make a change to the assessment as she was not satisfied, on the evidence supplied, that the father had established a change in circumstances. Although it seems the father supported his application for a review with a letter of 1 December 1998 (Annexure “E” to the affidavit of P W C), again as will be apparent from the reasons in this judgement, less than full and frank disclosure was made in my view, at that time. The father took the view that the matter seemed to rely totally upon the level of taxable income. One would have thought that the decision of Bolas and Nuttall should have alerted him to the relevance of his property.
d)Finally, so far as the administrative reviews under Part 6A of the Act are concerned, the father lodged an application on
15 December 1999 against the assessment (arising initially from the Nuttall decision and not disturbed by the Ammala decision), seeking a variation on a number of grounds. This decision (“the Fritz decision”) is a careful analysis of the previous reviews. Quite correctly Senior Case Officer Fritz observed she had no power to interfere with the previous decision unless there was a material change in circumstances. She was not so satisfied. Of some interest are the remarks of Senior Case Officer Fritz when she says:“Although there has been a change to Mr F’s income earned through the company, on the information provided by Mr F, F, I cannot account for the large reduction in contract income in the second half of 1998/1999 … The evidence of the parties is conflicting on this point “(my emphasis).
e)In a tribute to his persistence, the father lodged an objection to the Fritz decision, which was considered but disallowed, the decision being made on 11 May 2000. In this most recent decision it was observed that
“Mr F still owns an unencumbered property worth between $400,000.00 and $500,000.00 as well as an old car worth a couple of thousand dollars and had savings of $3000.00. The company has retained profits of $144,000.00 . The Senior Case Officer found that this amount could be attributed to Mr F as income”
This passage of the decision is important for 2 reasons:
i)Firstly, for establishing the continued failure of proper disclosure which the father had made, which became apparent during his cross examination; and
ii)Secondly, for a repetition of an assertion that it was necessary to treat the retained profits of the company as income available to the father. For completeness, I do not accept that it is proper to so treat the notional balance in the balance sheet of the Company in this way. It was, however, not determinative of any relevant decisions.
f)The father then brought this application for departure pursuant to s116 of the Act. The payment history reflects that although the annual liability of $23,739.00 continues to accrue (at an amount of $1978.25 a month), the father has maintained payments at a rate of $463.08 per month ($5,557 per annum). Not surprisingly arrears have amounted, and a Certificate pursuant to s116(2) of the Act (Exhibit 1) confirms the arrears (excluding penalties) total $38,775.15 at 7 September 2000.
g)The current assessment for the 2000/2001 child support year is calculated at an annual rate of $23,147.00.
The law
Section 117(1) of the Act requires the Court to be satisfied that in the “special circumstances” of the case one or more of the grounds for departure outlined in s117(2) exists before the Court may make an order for departure and that pursuant to s117(1)(b)(ii), it would be:
“(A)Just and equitable as regards the child, the carer entitled to child support and the liable parent; and
(B)Otherwise proper;
to make a particular order under this Division”.
The Court must address each of the separate issues as part of a “clear three step process” as stated by the Full Court in THE MARRIAGE OF GYSELMAN 15 FAM LR219 at p224 namely:
“1.Whether one or more grounds of departure in s117 is established.
If so,
2.Whether it is “just and equitable” within the meaning of s117(4) to make a particular order;
3.Whether it is “otherwise proper” within the meaning of s117(5) to make a particular order.
It is clear from the careful way in which s117 has been structured that the Court must address each of those separate issues”.
Section 117(2) set outs the grounds for departure from an administrative assessment. As a threshold requirement, each of these grounds requires that there be “special circumstances” before a departure order may be made.
In Gyselman’s care (supra) the Full Court stated at p225, when considering the meaning of the term “special circumstances”:
“whilst it is not possible to define with precision the meaning of that term, as a generality it is intended to emphasise that the facts of the case must establish something which is special or out of the ordinary. That is, the intention of the legislature is that the Court will not interfere with the administrative formula result in the ordinary run of cases”.
Therefore all of the relevant facts of the particular case must be considered to determine whether or not the circumstances which exist are “special” within the meaning of s117(1) and (2) of the Act so as to set the case apart from other cases: see SAVERY & SAVERY (1990) FLC 92-131.
In his application the father effectively seeks to rely upon s117(2)(c)(I) which provides as a ground for departure that:
“in the special circumstances of the case, application in relation to the child of the provisions of this Act relating to administrative assessment of child support would result in an unjust and inequitable determination of the level of financial support to be provided by the liable parent for the child because of:
a)The income, earning capacity, property and financial resources of either parent or the child;
b)… ”
The father does not allege that the infant children have any income, property of resources which are relevant to this matter.
Where the Court is asked to make a departure order for more than one administrative assessment relating to a past child support year or years, the Court must for each of the departure orders sought for each of the years in question, apply the strict three step process required by GYSELMAN’S case (supra) (see HIDES & HATTON (1997) FLC 92-759).
Section 123(3) of the Act would require me to hear and determine any pending application for departure before hearing the mother’s application for substituted support. The 2 applications were heard together and submissions and cross examination in respect of both applications took place. This amounted to a waiver by the parties, in my view, of the requirement to strictly comply with the process set out in s123(3) (see LIGHTFOOT & HAMPSON (1996) FLC 92-663 per Fogarty and Kay JJ). See also the remarks of Lindenmayer J in DWYER & MCGUIRE (1993) FLC 92-420 at 80,311.
The evidence
The applicant father carries the onus of establishing, as the first step in the process that the ground for departure relied upon (s117(2)(c)(i)) has been established.
His evidence was generally vague and uncertain and I formed the view that he had a generally poor understanding of his financial position. He repeatedly sought retreat from some questions in cross examination by making remarks like:
“The company structure was set up by my Accountant – I don’t understand it”; and
“I do whatever my Accountant tells me to do”’ and
“Paperworks is out of my league”; and
“The work side I do – the accountancy side he does. I follow their advice on each occasion”.
In his submissions, Counsel for the father send I should make no advise findings of credit against the father because he was not a “sophisticated person”.
I accept the father to be a hard worker in his trade as a concreter. I accept he works 6 days a week. I don’t accept that his accountant would act without his general instructions. The father acknowledges he wants things to be “tax efficient”. In view of this history of these proceedings I formed the clear view, that the father was also of the belief that “tax effective” was also “child support effective”.
I find that he has not been frank in his statements to the Child Support review officers and also has not made full and frank disclosure in this matter, until in some cases, confronted in cross examination with compelling evidence. His affairs are reasonably complex however I find he knew clearly what he was seeking to achieve, even if he wasn’t capable of achieving the result without engaging professional assistance.
Some examples of the non-disclosure and lack of frankness include:
a)His initial failure to disclose the existence of G C CONCRETING SERVICES PTY LTD and his interest in it until late in these proceedings;
b)His failure to produce any financial information in respect of G C CONCRETING SERVICES PTY LTD;
c)His assertion that his brother owned 55% of the company D PTY LTD, when in fact he held 4999 shares whilst his brother held one share;
d)His failure to property disclose his connection and assets and financial involvement in J D F NO 1 (NZ) LIMITED and J D F NO 2 (NZ) LIMITED;
e)His statements, which I do not accept, of his minimal involvement in G C CONCRETING SERVICES PTY LTD before 30 June 1999 including:
i)
That he worked for his past Accountant D P for almost
12 months, purely for a reduction in accountancy fees (which he was unable to quantify);
ii)About the reason why bank statements for this business before 30 June 1999 were forwarded to him.;
iii)The reasons for the withdrawal of $115,000.00 from the company account which was apparently the subject of some “round robin” of cheques involving the NZ companies and either the superannuation Fund and/on H INVESTMENTS PTY LTD.
f)Failure to disclose any documentation relating to H INVESTMENTS PTY LTD in its own right and/on as Trustee for the H FAMILY TRUST since the period ending the 30 June 1998.
g)Failure to adequately account for or explain the transaction relating to the borrowing from the Bank of Queensland in December 1997 of approximately $100,000.00 which was apparently repaid in March 1998.
The evidence of Mr C was not helpful to me, or in fact, to the case of the father. He indicated that he wasn’t aware that the father was working without pay for G C CONCRETING SERVICES PTY LTD, as he says his understanding was the company commenced operation on 1 July 1999. He indicated that approximately $155,000.00 is in the “Employees Mutual Fund”, but when pressed as to who the employees were, he replied that he wasn’t “sure”. Under cross examination, he sought to assert that his report attached to his affidavit filed 10 August 2000 (which was the basis of the father’s objection to the Fritz decision) was a full accurate and complete disclosure on behalf of the father. The report fails to disclose the interest in G C CONCRETING SERVICES PTY LTD or the other assets, other than in a superficial way.
The best indication of the continued financial strength of the father is that during the periods in question to 30 June 2000 he has:
a)Not been required to encumber his home;
b)The home could have a value now of as much as $600,000.00 (if his representations on the loan application to the Bank of Queensland are to be accepted);
c)He has accumulated at least $155,000.00 (and quite possibly more) in either the employee mutual fund; the NZ companies and trusts and/or H INVESTMENTS PTY or Trust.
Whether the father’s conduct during the course of the lengthy review process and even these proceedings amounts to a “deliberate non-disclosure” (as that term was described in WEIR & WEIR (1993) FLC 92-338) or some sort of calculated disguise based on professional advice, I cannot determine. I do find however that the totality of the evidence of the father and his witnesses is such that I reasonably infer his assets, earning capacity and financial resources are greater than he has chosen to reveal or estimate them to be.
Although I did not have an opportunity to see the mother give evidence, as she gave her evidence by telephone, I accept her statements as accurate when (either in her oral evidence or her affidavit) she says:
a)The extent of her current assets, liabilities and financial resources. (In this regard her Financial Statement sworn 7 September 2000 revealed:
i)Income................................... E$1,049 per week
ii)Assets................................................ E$128,000
iii)Liabilities......... E$61,000 (half of housing loan)
iv)Superannuation ................................. E$40,000
b)Her arrangements with her partner M H (who essentially is the “full time homemaker”);
c)That her estimate of the children’s expenses (at Annexure “C”) and her estimate of the needs of the household (at Annexure “F”) are reasonable ;
d)That she expects to share in the expenses relating to the children and already does so.
During submissions, some comments were made on the weight or reliance I should give to the various decisions of the Review Officers. In summary these were given on:
·22 April 1998
·25 September 1998
·11 February 1999
·19 March 2000
·11 May 2000
I adopt the comments of Nicholson CJ & Moore J in JOHNSON & JOHNSON (1999) FLC 98-004 when they say:
“It is open to a Court to look at the reasons of the reviewing officer for altering an administrative assessment pursuant to Division 6A of the Act (following IVANOVIC (1996) FLC 92-689) and to give it such weight as the Court determines appropriate”.
And then further at $95,295.00:
“Whilst the Act does not provide for a review or appeal from the decision of the reviewing officer … We do not think that it makes sense to treat such reasoning as irrelevant. The fact that it is obviously flawed may give substance to a proposition that there are special circumstances requiring a departure order to be made under s117. On the other hand it may provide sound reasons why a departure order should not be made. While it is time that it is the decision and not the reasoning that led to it that is under consideration, we do not think it reasonable to pay no regard whatever to such reasoning:.
In this case I regard the reasoning and conclusions of the review officers as essentially correct (without adopting all of their findings of fact).
Findings in respect of father’s application
For the reasons set out above:
a)In respect of the assessment for the year 1997/1998 as the actual taxable income exceeded the capped amount, I find that there are no special circumstances and no evidence to support the ground for departure. I would also have found, if necessary to decide, that the father had not satisfied me that it is “just and equitable” or “otherwise proper” to make the order sought.
b)In respect of the assessment for the year 1998/99 I find that due to the father’s income, property and financial resources there are no special circumstances and no evidence to support the ground of departure. I would also have found, if necessary to decide, that the father had not satisfied me that it is “just and equitable” or “otherwise proper” to make the order sought.
c)In respect of the assessment for the year 1999/2000 I find that due to the father’s income property and financial resources there are no special circumstances and no evidence to support the ground of departure. I would also have found, if necessary to decide, that the father had not satisfied me that it is “just and equitable” or “otherwise proper” to make the order sought.
The mother’s application for substituted support
Having dealt with the father’s departure application, it is now proper for me to consider the mother’s application under s123 of the Act.
The law
Section 123(1) of the Act provides that:
“(1) Application may be made to a Court having jurisdiction under this Act for an order that a liable parent provide child support otherwise than in the form of periodic amounts paid to the carer entitled to child support”.
Before a Court can make an order for substituted support, the court is required by s124(1)(b) to be satisfied that so to would be:
“(i)Just and equitable as regards the child, the carer entitled to child support and the liable parent; and
(ii)Otherwise proper;
to make an order otherwise than in the form of periodic amounts …”
The Court is required to have regard to the matters contained in s124(2) and in determining whether it is “just and equitable” or “otherwise proper” the Court must have regard to the matters contained in subsections 117(4),(5),(6),(7) and (8) of the Act. The Court is not limited to by those factors alone (see s124(5)), which suggests the Court has a wide discretion in determining the application.
In BOLTON & BOLTON (1992) FLC 92-309, BENDEICH & BENDEICH (1993) FLC 92-355, and STONE & STONE (unreported Full Court decision of April 1994), the application of lump sum concepts in child support cases was discussed. In BOLTON, Cohen J found that the husband would probably take steps to avoid his obligations if a periodic order were made so he granted a lump sum order. In BENDEICH, Mushin J was not satisfied the husband would default nor was he satisfied that the financial position of the parties in the future was predictable. He declined to make an order.
As was observed by Ellis, Lindenmayer and Kay JJ in PRPIC & PRPIC (1995) FLC 92-574 at 81,688:
“Capitalisation orders may well be appropriate where there are difficulties in enforcement or where it is proper to sever the financial link between the parties. However, as a general rule, given that payments of child support depend upon circumstances prevailing from time to time which circumstances cannot be predicted with any significant degree of certainty, it seems to us that the provision of child support by way of a lump sum should not be considered to be a readily available alternative but one that is only exercised when there are circumstances that make it appropriate to do so. We would endorse the observations of Mushin J in BENDEICH where his Honour said:
“The rationale underlying the general approach of the Court was that the longer a lump sum order operates the greater the change of change in circumstances necessitating a variation of that order, thereby making the order unjust. Those changed circumstances might be in relation to the liable parent, custodial parent or the children. Incomes may increase or decrease and children may change their living arrangements from one parent to another.”
The evidence on this issue
The children, the subject of any future assessment, are currently aged 13 and 12. The application for substituted support seeks an amount based on an assumption that circumstances will remain as they are (namely the father’s capacity and income; the living arrangements of the children and the financial position of the mother). The mother also asserts that the father has shown every indication of an intention to avoid payment of child support and/or structure his affairs to disguise his true position.
The father says he has always been prepared to pay the child support as assessed but merely sought to exhaust his legitimate options for review and departure. He says at paragraph 22 of his affidavit sworn 7 September 2000 that if these proceedings are not determined in his favour then he will meet his obligations whatever they might be without the need for any enforcement. He will be given an opportunity to do that. The father says he is suffering from “mechanical low back pain” and relies upon the opinion of Dr R P, Orthopaedic Surgeon, in his report of 24 July 2000 when he says:
“Mr F has increasing backache, which is limiting his activities as a concreter. He is unable to continue working doing the manual aspects of concreting but can continue doing the supervising work … This restriction is permanent. The prognosis is that his back condition will not improve and there may be a gradual deterioration with further limitation of activity with the passage of time and the natural process of ageing.” The father is 42 years of age.
The mother’s income stream appears assured. She expressed an intention to remain in the Public Service, by whom she has been employed since 1992. She is 39 in December and is currently positioned as an Acting Executive Level 1. She has a capacity to contribute to the needs of her children and says she will do so. She denied that she expects the father to meet all the future needs.
The father’s payment history is relevant. For the period to August 1998, his payments seem irregular punctuated by large lump sum payments of arrears:
Example :
·7 August 1998..................... $14701;
·11 December 1997................ $939;
·2 July 1996........................... $9,165.
Since August 1998 he has regularly made payments, albeit at the rate of $463.08 a month (which he asserted was the correct assessment) rather than the varied amount of $1,928.92 a month. As a result of my orders he now will have a liability to meet substantial arrears together with such penalties as are administratively imposed, for late payment.
Findings
As was said in BASSINGTHWAITE & LEANE (1993) FLC 92-410 the father:
“Is perfectly entitled to arrange his financial affairs as he wishes. What he cannot do is avoid his responsibilities as a parent.”
The objects of the Act make it clear that children should have their proper needs met from reasonable and adequate shares in the income, earning capacity, property and financial resources of both their parents (see s114) and that the Act seeks to ensure that children receive a proper level of support from their parents (see s4). If the father, and his advisers, were under an illusion that the only basis of assessment was his taxable income, then hopefully by now that view has been dispelled. The legislature clearly anticipated the emergence of “asset rich, income poor” liable parents in drafting the Act as they have. (See also, the remarks of Kay J in CAREY & CAREY (1994) FLC 92-489).
Although the father has sought to creatively structure his affairs, he has maintained his major personal asset in his own name and, to this point of time, it remains unencumbered. It appears as a future security for proper payment of a periodic sum. The father should also be well aware of the impact of s72C of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act.
The father’s occupation and state of health, coupled with ages of the children (who notoriously, as they reach these ages, become less predictable as to their preferred living arrangements and scholastic attitudes) do create a level of unpredictability as to the future capacity to pay and needs of the children. Also these parties; who perhaps regrettably haven’t entered into a child support agreement, have both shown no difficulty in undertaking reviews of the administrative assessments. The absence of any reliable current financial particulars makes it difficult for me to estimate how the father’s income for the year 2000/2001 and beyond will track. He has been entitled to take the opportunities for review that he has and has otherwise pursued his objections and this application with reasonable diligence.
For these reasons I do not believe that this is an appropriate matter in which I should order substituted support. In the circumstances I believe to do so, would not be just and equitable to the father or otherwise proper. In the absence of the parties properly entering into a child support agreement, which seems to me to be a logical solution, they will be subject to the provisions of the Act so far as an administrative assessment is concerned.
I contemplated what powers were available to me to secure the future payment of the assessed periodic child support – most likely over the father’s currently unencumbered property. I did not receive, nor did I call for, any submissions on this point. I am aware that a future certain and ascertainable liability, has been secured by use of an ATM card (see HARTNETT & BAKER (1995) FLC 92-621); by a charge over property (see HAMPSON & LIGHTFOOT (1997) FLC 92-775); and a formal registered encumbrance (see DWYER & MCGUIRE (1993) FLC 92-420). If it were possible to better secure the future performance of the father to pay periodic child support as assessed from time to time I would certainly contemplate that approach.
Formal orders
(1)That the applicant father’s application for departure be dismissed.
(2)That the respondent mother’s application for a substituted support order be dismissed.
(3)That the matter be adjourned to 9.30 am on 3 November 2000 to hear any further applications for costs or the form of this order.
IT IS DIRECTED
(4)That the matter number ZB2406/00 (DCSA and F) be listed for mention at 9.30 am on 3 November 2000.
I certify that the preceding forty-six (46) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Baumann FM
Associate:
Date:
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