Ezekov and Chandra and Anor
[2015] FamCA 133
•5 March 2015
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| EZEKOV & CHANDRA AND ANOR | [2015] FamCA 133 |
| FAMILY LAW – PARENTING – Relocation – First respondent father –Where significant family violence perpetrated by the first respondent –Where applicant mother seeks to relocate to Country I – Consideration as to the best interests of the subject child – Where mother’s relocation not permitted – Where consideration as to appropriate orders otherwise – Where recommendation from the family report writer for ongoing long term identity supervision only for child aged three – Consideration as to issues of long term supervision – Where long terms supervision not in the best interests of the subject child – Where orders made for the child’s time with the father to be carefully and gradually increased over an extended period of time – Where presumption as to equal shared parental responsibility not to apply in the circumstances of the first respondent. |
FAMILY LAW – PARENTING – Relocation – Second respondent father –Where second respondent father fails to participate in the proceedings – Consideration as to the best interests of the subject children – Consideration as to weight to be attached to the older children’s views – Where mother’s relocation not permitted – Where views of the second respondent known through his children and the mother’s evidence – Where presumption as to equal shared parental responsibility to apply in the circumstances of the second respondent – Where orders for equal or substantial and significant time not in the best interests of the children.
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 4AB, 60B, 60CA, 60CC, 61DA, 65DAA |
| Sawant & Karanth [2014] FamCAFC 235 AMS and AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160 Sayer & Radcliffe and Anor (2013) 48 Fam LR 298 Muldoon & Carlyle (2012) FLC 93-513 B and B: Family Law Reform Act 1995 (1997) 21 Fam LR 676, (1997) FLC 92-755 Morgan & Miles (2008) 38 Fam LR 275, (2007) FLC 93-343 Taylor & Barker (2007) 37 Fam LR 461 Malcolm & Monroe and Anor (2011) FLC 93-460 Johnson and Page [2007] FamCA 1235 Moose [2008] FamCAFC 108 Champness and Hanson [2009] FamCAFC 96 Slater v Light [2011] FamCAFC 1 Malburon & Waldlow [2013] FamCAFC 191 Mazorski v Albright[2007] FamCA 520 McCall & Clark (2009) FLC 93-405, (2009) 41 Fam LR 483 Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488 Re J.R.L.; Ex parte C.J.L. (1986) 161 CLR 342 |
| APPLICANT: | Ms Ezekov |
| 1st RESPONDENT: | Mr Chandra |
| 2nd RESPONDENT: | Mr B |
| INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: | Gonzalez & Co |
| FILE NUMBER: | PAC | 2596 | of | 2013 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 5 March 2015 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Parramatta |
| PLACE HEARD: | Parramatta |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Foster J |
| HEARING DATE: | 19, 20, 21 and 22 January 2015 |
REPRESENTATION
| COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: | Mr Heazelwood |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: | Norwest Family Law |
| COUNSEL FOR THE 1ST RESPONDENT: | Mr Lethbridge SC Ms Gibbons |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE 1ST RESPONDENT: | Kheir Lawyers |
| COUNSEL FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: | Mr Hill |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: | Gonzalez & Co |
Orders
C:
That the mother Ms Ezekov have sole parental responsibility for the child C Ezekov-Chandra born … 2012.
That the child live with the mother.
That the child spend time with the father Mr Chandra as agreed in writing including SMS or email by the mother and father and in default of agreement as follows:
(a) For a period of three months from the date of these orders each Saturday from 10:00am until 2:00pm with changeovers to be facilitated at the D Region Contact Service … with the father to pay all fees payable in relation to such changeovers;
(b) For a period of three months thereafter each Saturday from 10:00am until 4:30pm with changeovers to be facilitated at the D Region Contact Service … with the father to pay all fees payable in relation to such changeovers;
(c) For a period of six months thereafter each Saturday from 10:00am to 5:00pm with changeovers to be at the McDonalds Family Restaurant F Shopping Centre, Suburb E;
(d) For a period of six months thereafter from 10:00am to 5:00pm Saturday and 10:00am to 3:00pm Sunday each alternate weekend with changeovers to be at the McDonalds Family Restaurant, F Shopping Centre, Suburb E;
(e) For a period of six months thereafter from 10:00am Saturday to 11:00am Sunday each alternate weekend with changeovers to be at the McDonalds Family Restaurant, F Shopping Centre, Suburb E;
(f) For a period of six months thereafter from 10:00am Saturday to 3:00pm Sunday each alternate weekend with changeovers to be at the McDonalds Family Restaurant, F Shopping Centre, Suburb E;
(g) For the period thereafter until the child commences school from 9:00am Saturday to 5:00pm Sunday each alternate weekend with changeovers to be at the McDonalds Family Restaurant, F Shopping Centre, Suburb E;
(h) On Father’s Day in each year from 10:00am to 5:00pm provided that the child’s time with the father shall be suspended on Mother’s Day from 10:00am to 5:00pm changeovers to be at the McDonalds Family Restaurant, F Shopping Centre, Suburb E.
(i) Upon the child commencing school and during school term:
(i)For the first two terms of child’s first year of school each alternate weekend commencing on the first weekend after the commencement of term from after school Friday to 11:00am Sunday and for the remainder of that year after school Friday to 5:00pm Sunday with changeovers if not at school to be at the McDonalds Family Restaurant, F Shopping Centre, Suburb E;
(ii)Thereafter each alternate weekend commencing on the first weekend after the commencement of term from after school Friday to before school Monday;
(j) Upon the child commencing school and during school holidays:
(i)In the child’s first year of school in the middle weekend of the Term 1, 2 and 3 holidays from 6:00pm Thursday until 5:00pm Sunday and in the Term 4 Christmas holidays commencing on the first Thursday after Christmas Day and each alternate Thursday thereafter from 6:00pm Thursday to 5:00pm Sunday with changeovers to be at the McDonalds Family Restaurant, F Shopping Centre, Suburb E;
(ii)Thereafter for the child’s second year of school in Term 1, 2 and 3 holidays from 10:00am on the first Saturday of such holiday period to 6:00pm Thursday and in the Term 4 Christmas holidays commencing on the first Saturday after Christmas Day and each alternate Saturday thereafter from 10:00am Saturday to 6:00pm Thursday with changeovers to be at the McDonalds Family Restaurant, F Shopping Centre, Suburb E;
(iii)Thereafter in Term 1, 2 and 3 holidays from 10:00am on the first Saturday of such holiday period to 10:00am the next Saturday and in the Term 4 Christmas holidays commencing on the first Saturday after Christmas Day and each alternate Saturday thereafter from 10:00am Saturday to 10:00am the next Saturday with changeovers to be at the McDonalds Family Restaurant, F Shopping Centre, Suburb E.
That the mother and father be at liberty to communicate with the child by telephone or Skype (or similar) at all reasonable times provided always that such times shall be no more than once each alternate day that the child is not in their respective care and the parent with whom the child is shall assist the child to receive the phone call or Internet communication and the other parent shall initiate such communication.
That for the purposes of changeovers such changeovers shall be as provided above or as agreed between the parties in writing such writing including SMS or email.
That the mother and father keep the other informed of their current residential address, mobile and landline telephone numbers and any available email addresses and advise the other of any change thereto within 7 days of any change.
That the mother and father shall promptly notify the other when the child is ill or visits a medical practitioner or immediately notify the other when the child has a medical emergency, accident or hospital admission.
That the mother and father make available to the other any medications prescribed for the child for the other to administer when the child is with the other and the mother and father shall authorise the child’s medical practitioner to fully discuss the child’s treatment with the other parent and for this purpose this order shall be sufficient authority for the practitioner to do so.
That the mother and father be permitted to liaise directly with the child’s school and sporting bodies to receive school notices, information, newsletters, school reports, school photographs and other necessary information about the child’s progress.
That the mother and father are at liberty to attend on such occasions and at such events significant to the child’s welfare, schooling, extracurricular activities, sport, health, religious instruction or events where the attendance of either or both parents is reasonably expected.
That until further order, or else subject to the authenticated consent of all parties required to provide consent by Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975 each party Ms Ezekov born … 1976 and Mr Chandra born … 1975, their servants and/or agents be and are hereby restrained from removing or attempting to remove or causing or permitting the removal of the said child C Ezekov-Chandra born … 2012 from the Commonwealth of Australia for a period of two years.
AND IT IS REQUESTED that the Australian Federal Police give effect to this order by placing the name of the said child on the Family Law Watchlist in force at all points of arrival and departure in the Commonwealth of Australia and maintain the child’s names on the Watchlist for the said period, until the Court orders its removal, or with consent of all parties.
G and H:
That the mother and second respondent father Mr B have equal shared parental responsibility for the children G born … 1999 and H born … 2002.
That the children G and H live with the mother.
That the children G and H spend time with the father as agreed between the mother and the father.
That until further order, or else subject to the authenticated consent of all parties required to provide consent by Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975 each party Ms Ezekov born … 1976 and Mr B born … 1967, their servants and/or agents be and are hereby restrained from removing or attempting to remove or causing or permitting the removal of the said children G born … 1999 and H born … 2002 from the Commonwealth of Australia for a period of two years.
AND IT IS REQUESTED that the Australian Federal Police give effect to this order by placing the names of the said children on the Family Law Watchlist in force at all points of arrival and departure in the Commonwealth of Australia and maintain the children’s names on the Watchlist for the said period, until the Court orders its removal, or with consent of all parties.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Ezekov & Chandra and Anor has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT PARRAMATTA |
FILE NUMBER: PAC 2596 of 2013
| Ms Ezekov |
Applicant
And
| Mr Chandra |
First Respondent
And
| Mr B |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The climatic circumstances between Australia and Country I could not be more different.
The applicant mother in these proceedings seeks to relocate from Australia to Country I with the child C, born in 2012, who at the time of trial was almost three years of age together with the older two children of her former relationship.
Orders sought at trial
At trial the mother in summary sought orders as follows:
(a)That the mother have sole parental responsibility for the child C;
(b)That the child live with the mother;
(c)That the mother be permitted to relocate with the child to Country I;
(d)That pending relocation the child continue to spend time with the father in accordance with orders made on 5 September 2013;
(e)That subsequent to the mother’s relocation to Country I the mother facilitate the child having Skype communication with the father;
(f)That in the event that the father provides notice of his intention to visit Country I the father spend supervised time with the child at the mother’s expense but not being more than once in each four days with the duration of such time to be for three hours or as determined by the court;
(g)That the mother facilitate the return of the child to Sydney at her expense not less frequently than once every two years for not less than three weeks upon providing to the father at least two months’ notice of her intention to be in Sydney and whilst in Sydney the father spend supervised time with the child at a contact centre or contact service nominated by him at his expense but not more frequently than once in any four day period for three hours;
(h)That in the event the mother is not permitted to relocate with the child to Country I the child spend time with the father once each month on a supervised basis at a contact service at the father’s expense for up to three hours or such other duration as determined by the contact service;
(i)That the mother be permitted to travel overseas with the child for a period not exceeding six weeks provided the mother gives to the father not less than one month’s notice;
(j)That the mother have sole parental responsibility for the children G born in 1999 and H born in 2002;
(k)That the children G and H live with the mother;
(l)That the mother be permitted to relocate with the children G and H to Country I;
(m)That the children G and H spend time and communicate with their father Mr B as agreed between he and the mother.
Country I is a signatory to the Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Cooperation in respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children signed at The Hague on 19 October 1996. Australia is also a signatory to that Convention that is more commonly known as the Child Protection Convention.
In terms of the reciprocal enforceability of orders contemplated in these proceedings the mother sought in summary the following orders:
(a)That upon the mother serving on the father and on the independent children’s lawyer documentary proof that:
(i)She has obtained from a court of competent jurisdiction in Country I recognition pursuant to Article 24 of the Convention of orders made in these proceedings; or
(ii)That she has obtained from a court of competent jurisdiction in Country I a declaration of enforceability in Country I pursuant to Article 26 of the Convention orders made in these proceedings; or
(iii)That she has registered in a court of competent jurisdiction in Country I pursuant to Article 26 of the Convention orders made in these proceedings; and
(b)That the mother provide a bond or bank guarantee in the sum of $10,000 as security against her non-compliance with orders to be made in these proceedings with the bond if paid in cash to be paid to the registrar of this court and if by bank guarantee to be issued by the P Pty Ltd Bank to be in favour of the husband but held by the registrar with funds either paid or secured to be released to the husband forthwith upon order of this court;
(c)That upon the mother filing in this court documentary proof of her compliance with the above requirements including proof of service on the father and the independent children’s lawyer she be entitled to remove the children from Australia at the expiration of seven days from the date of such filing in this court.
The first respondent father of the child at trial sought orders in summary that provided that:
(a)The mother and father have equal shared parental responsibility for the child;
(b)That both parents be restrained from removing or attempting to remove the child from the Commonwealth of Australia and that the child be placed on the airport watch list;
(c)That the child live with the mother and father on a week about basis;
(d)That in the event that the child is to live with the mother then the child spend time with the father as follows:
(i)For a period of three weeks from the date of orders from 9:00am to 3:00pm every Saturday;
(ii)For a period of three weeks thereafter from 9:00am to 4:00pm every Saturday and Sunday;
(iii)For a period of three weeks thereafter from 5:00pm Friday to 5:00pm Sunday;
(iv)Thereafter from after school/child care on Friday to before school/child care on the following Tuesday in each alternate week and overnight from Tuesday after school/child care to before school/child care Wednesday in each other week;
(v)For one half of school holiday periods being the first half in even years and the second half in odd years;
(vi)On Father’s Day from 9:00am to 6:00pm;
(vii)On the father’s birthday from 9:00am to 6:00pm and if a school day from after school/child care until 6:30pm;
(viii)On religious festive occasions from 9:00am to 6:00pm or if a school day from after school/child care until 6:30pm;
(ix)On the child’s birthday from 9:00am to 2:00pm if not a school day or if a school day from after school/child care until 6:30pm;
(x)That otherwise the child’s time with the father be suspended on Mother’s Day, the mother’s birthday, Christmas Eve and Christmas Day in even numbered years and the child’s birthday from 2:00pm to 6:00pm or if a school day from after school/child care until 6:30pm;
(e)That the mother and father be at liberty to communicate with the child by telephone, email or Skype in all reasonable times and the parent with whom the child is living shall assist the child to make the phone call and or access the Internet;
(f)That for the purposes of changeovers such changeovers be at the child’s child care or school and at other times the father shall pick up and return the child to the mother’s home or some other location nominated and agreed between the parties;
(g)That the parents keep the other informed of their current residential address, mobile and landline telephone numbers and any available email addresses and advise the other of any change their to within seven days of any change;
(h)That the mother and father notify the other when the child is ill or visits a medical practitioner or immediately notify the other when the child has a medical emergency, accident or hospital admission;
(i)That the mother and father make available to the other any medications prescribed for the child for the other to administer when the child is with the other;
(j)That the mother and father authorise the child’s medical practitioner to fully discuss the child’s treatment with the other parent;
(k)That the mother and father be permitted to liaise directly with the child’s school and sporting bodies to receive school notices, information, newsletters, school reports, school photographs and other necessary information about the child’s progress;
(l)That the mother and father be at liberty to attend at the child’s school to the purposes of any function or activity normally attended by parents;
(m)That in the event that the mother is permitted to remove the children G and H for the purposes of relocating to Country I then:
(i)The father have sole parental responsibility for the child;
(ii)That the child live with the father;
(iii)That the child spend time and communicate with the mother and his half-siblings as agreed between the mother and father;
(iv)That the father shall facilitate communication by Skype or telephone or other means that is appropriate to the age of the child with his mother and half-siblings;
(v)That the father shall facilitate time with the mother if and when she visits Australia; and
(n)That the mother and father be restrained from denigrating or permitting denigration of the other parent or of his or her family in the presence or hearing of the child.
The circumstances
The relationship between the mother and the father did not get off to an auspicious start. In 2009 the father assaulted the mother. The father was charged with assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The father pleaded guilty to the charge and was placed on a 12 month good behaviour bond. An apprehended violence order was made for the protection of the mother for a period of 12 months from 13 January 2009. The mother’s complaint as to the father’s conduct in January 2009 is set out in the application for the apprehended violence order annexed to her trial affidavit. The father at the very least concedes that his behaviour was sufficient to cause bruising to the mother whilst the complainant police officer observed lacerations to the mother’s upper left arm and upper left breast with photos being taken of her injuries.
Subsequent to the assault the father attended some anger management counselling.
The mother and father of the subject child C commenced cohabitation in about January 2010.
The mother had been previously married to the second respondent, Mr B. The mother and the second respondent separated in October 2006 when the children of their relationship G and H were respectively aged 7 and 4. These children were at the time of trial aged 15 and almost 13.
Subsequent to the mother’s separation from Mr B they have had an informal arrangement in relation to the time spent by the children G and H with their father. The children have it appears spent time with the father on Wednesday afternoons, alternate weekends from Friday to Sunday and periods during school holidays. The children more recently have rarely spent time with their father on Wednesdays and their father rarely availed himself of half the school holidays but would spend an extra few days with his children at that time. The children’s time with their father has also been inconsistent on weekends, with the father not having the children regularly each alternate weekend and on occasions not for the full weekend.
The mother says that for a year or so before she separated from the father she had been proactive in pursuing a relationship for the children G and H with their father.
The mother is clear that Mr B does not wish her to relocate with his children to Country I.
Notwithstanding, Mr B has failed to engage in these proceedings and it appears has left the determination of the mother’s application to relocate to the court.
G and H have formed part of the household of the mother and father of the child during their cohabitation and have remained living with the mother since separation. The mother conceded that the father was engaged in the lives of G and H, coaching a soccer team, attending school events including parent teacher interviews in relation to the two boys. Yet the mother complains that the father’s relationship with the boys was controlling and to an extent intolerant.
The mother and father participated in what was described as “an … religious ceremony of marriage” in 2010. The legal effect of that ceremony is questionable but is not a matter for determination context of these proceedings.
Initially they lived in an apartment owned by the mother’s father at Suburb E. In about August 2011 the mother and father and children moved to a home at Suburb J owned by the maternal grandparents.
In April 2011 the husband commenced employment with K Pty Ltd. His employment was terminated two weeks later due to his failure to disclose the apprehended violence order made against him in 2009. Thereafter the father remained unemployed for a period of five months until he obtained full-time employment in September 2011. He disclosed to his new employer the apprehended violence order and his application for employment was supported by a letter from the mother.
C born in 2012 is the only child of their relationship.
Following the birth of the child the mother took extended maternity leave for twelve months commencing just prior to the birth of the child. Following the birth the father took two weeks leave from his employment.
There was a brief separation for about one week in October 2012.
They finally separated in March 2013. The child was 11 months old.
The mother asserts that her relationship with the father has been characterised by incidents of family violence. The father acknowledges the mother’s significant allegations of physical violence and verbal abuse at his hands. He concedes that he and the mother had a tempestuous relationship. He accepts that violence in the form of loud and abusive arguments with the mother occurred including in front of the children. He says that he now recognises that his behaviour was unacceptable and may have been damaging to the children in the household. However, he denies any physical violence towards the mother.
Subsequent to separation the father completed a “Managing Anger” course through Relationships Australia, learning how to deal with anger, how not to actually explode and anger management techniques including “time out”. It is to be noted that during his oral evidence touching upon anger management strategies the husband said:
Well, strategies that I work out myself. I mean, there’s no point in me getting angry and causing some more grief to everyone. So – and harming not only me but others as well.
He has also completed the post-separation parenting program “Parenting After Separation: Focus on Kids” through Relationships Australia and the “Accepting Responsibility” course with Relationships Australia. In the latter course the father acknowledged that he learnt accepting responsibility for his actions, accepting his wrongdoings, taking a step back and thinking what he had done and how he can improve going forward.
To the mother’s observation the child has an extremely close bond with his older half-siblings and they are very caring towards him. She says that the three children are inseparable when at home.
The father acknowledged that an ongoing relationship between the child and G and H was very important. He further acknowledged that, subject to unforeseen circumstances into the future, L School would be a suitable high school for the child and that either a public primary school or Catholic primary school would be suitable.
H and G have a half-sister M being a child of their father’s former relationship. M has a good relationship with all three of the subject children and provides occasional care for them at the request of the mother.
The mother was born in Country I and lived there with her family until she was 15 years of age at which time the family migrated to Australia. The maternal grandparents are now divorced and the maternal grandmother returned to live in City N, Country I in 2010.
The mother’s father resides in Sydney at Suburb E and the mother presently occupies a property owned by him. The child sees his maternal grandfather about three times a week with the mother describing the relationship as very good, beneficial to the child and a relationship that should be fostered and preserved.
Four of the mother’s brothers reside in Sydney with the mother acknowledging that the child’s relationships with his maternal uncles should be preserved and fostered. The children G and H also enjoy significant relationships with the paternal uncles who the mother acknowledges present stable male role models for the children.
The mother did not seek to call evidence from her father or any of her brothers as to her proposed relocation or indeed whether they supported her relocation overseas with the children.
Nor indeed did the mother seek to call evidence from the maternal grandmother who forms an integral part of her relocation proposals in Country I and to whom she asserts she complained about the father’s behaviour prior to the birth of the child.
The mother says that her eldest child G seemed in part excited about the plan to relocate but also in part apprehensive. The child H, says the mother, was initially upset at the thought of relocating. More recently, the mother asserts, both of the children have become more positive about the proposed move.
The allegations of violence
March 2010
In March 2010 the mother asserts an incident at the Suburb O branch of PPtyLtd where both she and the father were working at that time. The mother says that the father abused her then pushed her into the wall with his back, then grabbed her and pushed her against the wall again saying “You slut. You’re a fucking cunt.” With that the father, she alleges, ripped her necklace off her neck, tearing the chain into about eight pieces and putting the pearl that was on the necklace into his pocket. Some days later the mother requested the return of the pearl and observed the father digging it out of a pot plant before giving it to her.
The father gives a very different version of the incident. The mother, he says, leaned into him aggressively and, in holding up his hands in a claw-like motion to prevent her from lunging further forward, his hand got caught in her necklace which broke. He asserts that the following weekend he had the necklace repaired and gave the necklace and the pearl back to the mother.
December 2010
The mother further complains of an incident on the evening of 23 December 2010. She asserts that the father after visiting his mother returned to their home visibly angry. He said to the mother “It’s your fault. This is a … household.” With that the father, she says, went over the Christmas tree and pulled it to the ground breaking some of the glass baubles on the tree. The mother walked over to the tree to clean up and was grabbed on the arm by the father who threw her onto the sofa. The father then roughly attempted to pull the mother’s wedding ring off her finger, pinning her down by sitting on her chest. The mother removed the wedding ring from her own finger and it was snatched from her by the father. The father said to her “That’s it. It’s over. You are nothing to me, you fucking slut. I’m not staying here. Have a great Christmas without me.”
The father then took the mother’s purse, her credit cards and drivers licence and put them in his pocket. He threw her phone over the balcony saying “Good luck calling the police now.” The father then left the home. The mother waited for a period before going downstairs to find her phone. The father returned to the home at about 9:30am on Christmas Eve morning as though nothing had happened and he, in presence of the older children, gave the mother a pearl ring as a Christmas gift. In later conversation, the father explained to the mother that his mother was furious when she had come over to their home and saw the Christmas tree. She had told him that they were all going to hell.
The father again has a very different version of what occurred. He says that he and the mother argued over a matter relating to the mother’s brother Mr Q. The father says he was upset that the mother stood up to her brother and not for him and the children G and H. He says he then grabbed the mother on a right arm and asked her to take her ring off. He says the mother took her ring off and threw it on the kitchen floor. He then walked outside to calm down and returned to the home later that evening. He acknowledges that his behaviour in grabbing the mother was unacceptable.
In oral evidence the father conceded that he was angry, that his conduct on this occasion constituted an assault on the mother and that he had no right to do so.
May 2011
The mother asserts that a further incident occurred in May 2011. There was an issue between her and the father as to the mother bringing work home with her. Ultimately the father said to her “I’m not going to allow it, you are my wife and I don’t want you to take your work home. That’s it.” The mother says that the father appeared agitated.
The mother walked away to go to the bathroom whereupon the father grabbed her by the shoulders swung her back around and banged her into the brick wall. He put his hand on her forehead and banged her head into the wall again. She fell to the floor and the father sat on top of her saying “Not so fucking brave now are you?” The father got off her and said “You disgust me, you fucking whore, I wish I never married you. I hate you. Piss off. I don’t want to see you.” With that the father left the home not returning until about 4:00am.
The father sought to apologise to the mother for his behaviour saying “I promise things are going to change. I can’t even remember what happened last night.” Later that evening the father again sought to apologise to the mother who said to him “I have heard it all before. I think you need to go and see somebody.” With that the father left the home and a short while later telephoned the mother saying “I’m going to kill myself and the dog. I can see you are going to leave me and I’m not going to allow it. I’ll go when I want to go. I’m going to die tonight and take the dog with me.”
The father returned home at about 3:00am in the morning and did not speak to the mother for the next three days.
The father again has a very different version of what transpired. He acknowledges that he did argue with the mother over her work issues and that he was “emotional”. He says that he may have sworn throughout the argument but never directed this at the mother or the children G and H. He denies any assault on the mother. He says he left the home in the car with the family dog to take the dog for a walk and to calm down. He returned to the home later that evening and slept on the couch.
June 2011
The mother says that in June 2011 there was an argument between the parties in relation to the evening meal with the mother complaining to the father “You could have helped him with the cooking since you were home all day.” The mother asserts that the father became angry and pulled her off the sofa before dragging her across the room. He pushed her against the wall, grabbed her forehead and started banging her head against the concrete about four times. The mother fell to the floor and the father sat on top of her saying to her “You deserve so much more. This is all your fault. You reported me to the police. If you don’t like it, why don’t you do it again?”
The father, she says, then spat in her face before getting off her.
A short while later the father attempted to give the mother a hug and she pushed his arm away. With that he pushed her against the wall and yelled at her saying “I hate you, you are nothing more than a slut, just like your mother. I wish I had never married you. Go on. Go to sleep. You will never wake up again because I’m going to kill you. I fucking hate you. Fucking whore.”
The next morning when the mother got up the children G and H were sitting at the door of her bedroom. They approached her and hugged her saying “We didn’t know if you were alive. Why did he say he was going to kill you? Did he really mean it?”.
The father again has a very different version of the incident. He says that he was feeling down due to his unemployment. He recalls that he and the mother argued about the apprehended violence order in 2009. He denies any assault on the mother. He cannot recall making derogatory remarks about the mother.
Later in June 2011 the father lost his job at K Pty Ltd. He later accused the mother saying “It’s all your fault that I lost my job – because you went to the police and filed for an AVO against me.” The father then emptied a full ashtray into the mother’s face. The mother started crying at which the father laughed. The mother and father were on the balcony at the home and the mother took a blanket that was on the balcony to wipe her face. The father, she says, ripped it from her and prevented her from leaving the balcony for about 20 minutes.
The mother was able to go to the bathroom later to wash herself and on coming out the father said to her “You’re a slut and whore. Your children are spoilt little arseholes. I have given up everything to be with you and you don’t appreciate anything. All you do is go to the police as soon as something doesn’t go your way.” With that the father emptied a large cup of water over the mother.
The father continued to harass the mother until about 4:00am. The father the following morning observed the mother crying. He put his arm around her and said “Why are you crying?”. The mother replied “Because of the things you did to me last night. You scared me.” The father replied “I’m sorry for that. I need to change.”
The father gives a different version saying that there was an argument about the apprehended violence order which started off in their bedroom and then on the balcony the mother threw water in his face from a white plastic cup. He was “quite upset” and swiped the ashtray off the table with his arm and it flew across the floor, some of the ashes landing on the mother. He says it was he that took a blanket to wipe the mother down. He slept on the couch that night and the next morning he says he apologised to the mother.
The father’s version at trial is inconsistent with the circumstances of the incident referred to in his earlier affidavit filed on 10 July 2013. In that affidavit he says “I picked up the ashtray and threw it across the floor”. In the same affidavit he makes no reference to the mother throwing water at him as alleged in his trial affidavit.
On balance as to this incident the evidence of the mother is to be preferred to that of the father.
September 2011
On 23 September 2011 the mother says that the father during an argument pushed a chaise lounge at her, it missing and hitting the window behind her. The father screamed at her “I hate you and I wish you weren’t carrying my child. You don’t love me. If you loved me you would never have filed an AVO against me.” The mother replied “I didn’t. The police took out the AVO”.
The father called her a liar and then charged at her pinning her against the sofa, screaming “The marriage is over.” At the same time the father tried to rip the ring off the mother’s finger. Thereafter the father put his hand around the mother’s throat and as she tried to get away threw her across the floor, landing on her back and striking her head. The father lent over her put his hand around her throat and started squeezing. He stopped squeezing then started again. The father said to the mother “I wish it was somebody else carrying my child. Don’t worry. You will live until this baby is born. But if anything happens to it, I will kill you”.
The mother later left the home and attempted to send a text message to a friend. The mother kept walking towards the local high school. The father approached in the car and the mother reluctantly got in the car and was driven home. A short while after returning home the father attempted to put the mother’s wedding ring back on her finger and put his arm around her.
The next morning the father acted as if nothing had happened saying “I’m sorry. My behaviour was unacceptable”. The following day the mother drove and spoke to a family friend, Dr R (a PhD in Economics) about the father’s behaviour. The father met with Dr R that evening at Dr R’s request.
The father denies he did anything with the chaise lounge. He asserts an argument with the mother about the parties proposed loan application to purchase a home. He says he did lose his temper and the mother walked out of the house. He then got in the car, picked up the mother to return home, noticing that the mother had taken off her wedding ring. He later tried to put the ring back on her finger but she resisted. He apologised to the mother for the argument.
Notwithstanding the father’s denials of any physical assault on the mother photographs taken by the mother of herself subsequent to the incident and admitted into evidence as Exhibit J clearly depict bruising and scratches on her neck and throat area. She says that these injuries were as a consequence of the father’s conduct as described by her.
As to this incident the evidence of the mother is to be preferred to that of the father.
December 2011
In December 2011 the mother alleges an incident in the evening culminating in the father saying “I don’t want to have dinner with you and your fucking spoilt kids.” The father thereupon picked up the evening meal and tipped into the sink and left the home.
The father returned home at about 11:00pm saying to the mother that her children were “spoilt little bastards”. He continued saying “I hate you and I wish you weren’t pregnant with my child. There’s no way I’m going to let you spoil our child the way G and H are spoilt.” The father then left the home in the family car.
The father provides a simplistic explanation relating to this incident. He denies having sworn at the children. He recalls an occasion when he and the mother argued about G and H. He says that both he and the mother were very upset. He asserts that he moved the family car further down the road so that the mother would not leave the home that night as he was concerned it might not be safe for her to drive because of blood pressure problems due to her pregnancy and that she was upset. He says the next morning he returned the car to the home for the mother to take G and H to school.
On 17 December 2011 the father argued with the mother about the Christmas period. The father said to her:
… is your holiday now – not Christmas. There will be no more Christmas in our house. If you or your sons want to celebrate it you can do it somewhere else. Your brothers are selfish arseholes and they should be doing this. Your mother is a fucking selfish slut and you’re no better.
With that the father threw the mother’s handbag across the floor scattering the contents and then kicking those contents around the room. The father grabbed the mother by the arm, swung her round causing her to lose her balance and fall. The father laughed. The mother tried to get up and was pushed down again by the father before he walked out of the house. The mother was able to get in the family car and drive off. After a couple of hours she received a phone call from the father in which he said “I’m sorry. I didn’t mean what I said. Please come home.” The mother refused and the father responded “If you don’t come home, I’m going to kill myself. I’m nothing without you. If you leave me there won’t be anything left to live for.”
The mother later reluctantly returned to the home only for the argument over Christmas to resume. The father said to the mother “I never agreed to Christmas. I only agreed to a Christmas tree. Everything else needs to go.” With that the father removed every Christmas decoration that had Santa Claus depicted on it from the tree including the children’s Christmas stockings. The father said to the mother “If you ever walk out that door again without my permission I will kill you. I wish you weren’t carrying my baby, so I can kill you now. I will leave as soon as I can and take the baby with me and leave you to rot in hell.”
The father says in relation to this incident that there was an argument between he and the mother about the amount of stress that she was placing herself under. The father concedes that he did grab the mother by her arm.
April/May 2012
About four weeks after the birth of the child there was an argument. The father said to the mother “How dare you tell my mother that she is not welcome in the house”. The father grabbed the mother by the arm very hard and with his other hand pushed her into the shrubs in the garden. The mother then attempted to walk away with the father grabbing her again hard, breaking her bra strap and ripping her jumper, pushing her away again.
The mother went inside the home where the father came up behind in the kitchen and grabbed her around the neck. This was in the presence of the children G and H. The father pushed the mother down at which the boys started screaming and the father let her go. A while later the father’s behaviour continued. He grabbed the mother by the hair and pushed her down on the lounge. He came over on top of her, at which she tried to fight back. He grabbed the shirt she was wearing and started twisting until she could barely breathe. The mother tried to fight against him and he threw her on the floor and kicked her. Shortly thereafter he left the home in his car. The mother attempted to clean herself up and observed that the boys G and H were crying and appeared to her scared.
The photographs taken by the mother subsequent to the incident (Exh J) depict significant bruising on the mother’s arms, shoulder and neck and scratches to her right shoulder area, neck, throats and her right cheek. The injuries are consistent with the mother’s assertions as to the father’s conduct.
A short while later the mother received a phone call from the wife of Dr R, Ms R, informing her that the father had just arrived at her home. The mother was picked up by Ms R’s daughter and taken to her home. She spoke to Ms R about what had happened as did the boys, G and H. The mother showed her the injuries that the father had caused and the hair that he had pulled out of her scalp. The father was speaking to Dr R.
The mother asserts that the father apologised to her and the boys and he agreed to meet with Dr R for help with anger management. Dr R and his wife are now deceased.
As to this incident the father acknowledges that he grabbed the mother on the arm during the argument. He says the argument took place inside the home in front of G and H and he now realises that it was not appropriate behaviour in front of children and will not happen again. The father observed that the child G appeared upset during the argument and picked up the child then three weeks of age from his rocker. The father says he took the child from G at which the mother ran at him and he put up his hands to stop her, grabbing her to stop her from lunging further at him. He denies any further physical violence in this incident towards the mother.
The father says that he then left the home to stop the argument progressing further. He agrees that he went to Ms R’s house but says he did not discuss the argument with her or her husband, Dr R. He agrees that the mother was brought to the home by Dr R’s daughter and says that he and the mother then discussed the argument and he apologised for his temper, saying that his behaviour was “inexcusable”.
Reflecting on the incident in his oral evidence the father said that he was ashamed and apologetic.
He acknowledges that he subsequently met with Dr R on about four occasions to assist with anger management and was referred to a natural therapist to assist him with natural remedies. Subsequently the father concedes that he met regularly with Dr R’s wife at least once or twice a week to continue counselling for anger management.
The evidence of the mother is to be preferred to that of the father in relation to this incident.
February 2013
Shortly prior to separation and in February 2013 the mother says that one evening the child was unsettled, uncomfortable and grizzly as he was teething. She collected the child from bed and brought the child to the kitchen. The father was holding the child who continued to be unsettled and was reaching out to the mother. The father was saying the child’s name in a louder and louder voice, took hold of the child, who was sitting in his lap, by the shoulders and shook the child once to get his attention. He then shook the child back and forth yelling “No. Stop it.”
The mother moved to take the child, who was “planking out” or stiffening, off the father and before she was able to do so the father yanked the child forward by the shoulders causing the child’s head to jerk backwards.
When confronted the father said “I didn’t shake him”. The mother replied “You did. It really scared me.” With that the father said “I can’t remember”. The child suffered no injury, was taken upstairs by the mother and calmed down.
The father denies that he has ever shaken the child or been violent to the child.
Separation
The mother and father separated on 5 March 2013.
Shortly after separation and in late March 2013 the mother returned to full time work placing the child C in child care five days per week. The mother is assisted in drop-offs and pick-ups for childcare by her sister-in-law or one of her brothers as required.
The mother filed an application initiating proceedings on 20 June 2013 and in that application she sought orders that in summary provided:
(a)That she have sole parental responsibility for the child; and
(b)That the mother be permitted to remove the child from the Commonwealth of Australia for the purpose of relocating to Country I.
The mother sought no orders for the child’s time with the father either on a final or interim basis.
The child spent no time with the father from separation in early March 2013 until November 2013 when the first supervised contact visit took place. The mother acknowledges that the father has complied with the terms of the contact centre orders for time with the child. Otherwise the mother acknowledges that the father had made no attempt to approach her since separation with little communication between her and the father save for communication by text message since separation in March 2013.
Notwithstanding the father’s requests of the mother for time with the child after separation the mother failed to facilitate any time between the child and the father until such time as he commenced time at the contact centre in early November 2013.
During this period the mother acknowledged that the father did not pressure her but that he was respectful and polite in his communications with her. The mother acknowledged that she was avoidant of the issue of the father’s time with the child and non-responsive to his requests. Even though the father made direct arrangements with the contact centre at Suburb S to facilitate time with the child commencing on 4 August 2013 the mother refused to facilitate time demanding that the court orders be in place.
The father filed his response on 10 July 2013 seeking orders that in summary provided:
(a)That the mother and father have equal shared parental responsibility for the child;
(b)That the mother be restrained from removing the child from the Commonwealth of Australia and that the child be placed on the airport watch list;
(c)That the child live with the mother and father on a week about basis;
(d)In the event that the child is to live with the mother then the child spend time with the father on a defined basis;
(e)Various specific issues orders as to communication et cetera.
On 5 September 2013 interim orders were made by consent that provided:
(a)That the child live with the mother;
(b)That pending further order the father spend time with the child each alternate Saturday at the D Region contact service;
(c)Orders facilitating the mother’s attendance with the child at her brother’s wedding in Thailand for a week in late January 2012.
On 8 November 2013 the mother filed an amended initiating application joining the father of G and H, Mr B as second respondent in the proceedings and seeking orders in relation to the children G and H as set out above.
Notwithstanding the mother’s proposals as to relocation with the children G and H, the mother conceded that the children had settled well after a difficult period immediately following separation and were progressing most satisfactorily at their present school. The child G commenced year 10 in 2015 having received a report for the 2014 academic year that the mother acknowledged she was “extremely proud of”. Similarly the child H received a school report for the 2014 academic year that the mother was proud of.
In her amended initiating application the mother again sought no order for the child to have time with his father. This notwithstanding that there was in existence by that time an order for the father to have supervised time and that supervised time had all but commenced.
Notwithstanding having notice of the proceedings, Mr B has elected not to participate.
From November 2013 the father has had time with the child on a supervised basis at the contact centre until hearing, save for occasions when the centre has been closed or on occasions when the child was unwell and unable to attend.
As was to be expected for such a young child, there was a settling in period whilst he became reacquainted again with the father and thereafter the extended paternal family.
At interview for the purposes of the Family Report on 14 April 2014 and notwithstanding that the father had been having supervised time with the child for about 5 months, interrupted by the Christmas break and the mother’s holiday overseas, the mother continued with her position that the child spend no time with his father and that she should have sole parental responsibility for the child.
Again, notwithstanding that the child has been spending ongoing supervised time with the father and the paternal grandmother with whom there are developing positive relationships as evidenced by the D Region Contact Service notes up to 17 January 2015 (Exh I), the mother in her oral evidence confirmed that she seeks orders if she is not permitted to relocate that the child spend only supervised time with the father and the paternal grandmother into the future.
The mother acknowledges that the paternal grandmother had significant involvement in the family and with the child during the parties’ cohabitation. The family enjoyed a regular Tuesday evening meal at the paternal grandmother’s home and the paternal grandmother attended at the parties’ home up to 3 times a week to see the child with the mother leaving the child in the paternal grandmother’s care on occasions while she went shopping.
The mother asserts that her position is based upon “previous interactions and what I perceived to be a risk moving forward”.
The mother acknowledges that the Notice of Child Abuse filed on her behalf on 20 June 2013 makes no allegation as to child abuse but asserts a risk of child abuse arising from the incident in February 2013 referred to above where the father shook the infant child the child. The mother accepted that the Notice was completed on the basis of things she had told her solicitor “amongst a lot of other things I have told my instructing solicitor”. Her concern arose as a consequence of the shaking incident and the father’s ability to control himself.
Family violence?
Family violence is defined in the Act (s 4AB) to mean violent, threatening or other behaviour by a person that coerces or controls a member of the person’s family or causes the family member to be fearful. Various examples of behaviour that may constitute family violence are set out in s 4AB(2).
Section 4AB(3) provides that a child is exposed to family violence if the child sees or hears family violence or otherwise experiences the effects of family violence and examples of such situations are provided in s 4AB(4).
The issue of family violence and findings in regard thereto was considered by the Full Court in Sawant & Karanth [2014] FamCAFC 235 where the court said:
37. In Amador itself this Court referred to the fact that the trial Federal Magistrate had held that she was “… unable to make a finding that the father perpetrated the specific acts of violence alleged by the mother upon her …”. Their Honours considered at some length what was said by the High Court in M v M (1988) 166 CLR 69 (a case involving serious allegations of a different type – child sexual abuse) and, having done so, said:
87. The above passage from the High Court is sometimes quoted to support an argument that it is unnecessary for a trial judge to make positive findings in relation to allegations, inter partes, of assault and other serious matters of domestic violence. Consequently the Court is urged not to allow any exploration of any such allegation. A close reading of the decision makes it apparent that is not what fell from the High Court.
88. It is clear from the decision of the Full Court in A v A (1998) FLC 92-800 that, in appropriate cases, it may be important to make findings of this nature if they are available and necessary to determine what is in the best interests of the child. It is important to note that A v A was not a case where allegations of abuse of children was made. The allegation was that the father had attempted to murder the mother. The Full Court said in A v A:
3.22 We consider that his Honour's approach was inappropriate. Whilst it is correct to say that the Family Court is not a criminal court, and that its primary task is not to determine guilt or innocence, that is entirely different from an approach which declines to examine that issue at all. The whole emphasis of the decision of the High Court in M and M is its identification of the essential issue in cases of this sort as being whether the evidence establishes “an unacceptable risk”.
(Emphasis added)
…
Later the Full Court said:
44. … the High Court said in the following passage in M v M (above, at 76) noting that what was there said about allegations of child sexual abuse have been held by this Court to apply equally to allegations of violence (Amador, above; A v A, above). The resolution of the mother’s allegations of family violence were:
… subservient and ancillary to the court's determination of what is in the best interests of the child. The Family Court's consideration of the paramount issue which it is enjoined to decide cannot be diverted by the supposed need to arrive at a definitive conclusion on the allegation of sexual abuse. The Family Court's wide-ranging discretion to decide what is in the child's best interests cannot be qualified by requiring the court to try the case as if it were no more than a contest between the parents to be decided solely by reference to the acceptance or rejection of the allegation of sexual abuse on the balance of probabilities.
Having considered the evidence of the mother and father in relation to the specific incidents that occurred, having had the opportunity of observing them in the witness box, having determined that in most of those incidents the evidence of the mother is to be preferred to that of the father and considering concessions made by the father in his oral evidence and other aspects of that evidence, overall the court is satisfied that where there is a conflict between the evidence of the mother and the father the evidence of the mother is to be preferred.
There was clearly family violence perpetrated by the father on the mother with the children being exposed to some of that violence.
The mother’s other concerns
The mother expresses concern that whilst the father loves the child the father is unable to control his frustration and anger. Yet the mother acknowledges that she never made any complaint to her doctor about any concerns she may have that the father was unable to adequately to care for the child.
The mother complains of the father’s intolerant and to some extent controlling behaviour in relation to the children G and H and further complains as to what she perceives to be a very conflictual relationship between the father and his mother.
The mother asserts that she did not involve the police in the physical incidents between herself and the father after the 2009 incident because she was fearful of the father. She asserts she was frightened of what he would do if she went to the police again as he was still angry that he had been reported in 2009.
The mother further says that she did not approach her father or brothers in relation to the father’s conduct after the birth of the child as she felt ashamed.
Yet she acknowledged in cross examination that she had complained to her brothers about the father’s behaviour prior to the birth of the child. No evidence was adduced by the mother from her brothers in support of this contention nor indeed were they called to give any evidence at all.
The mother’s proposals for Country I
The mother asserts that her employment background would facilitate her obtaining appropriate employment in Country I, having already had a lapsed offer of employment in City N.
The mother expresses the view that her standard of living will be higher in Country I by reason of health care arrangements in that country, social security entitlements including tax-free allowances for children under the age of 16, study allowances for children over 16 studying full-time and a family supplement payment for families with 2 or more children.
High school tuition in Country I is free. Otherwise she contends that Country I residents after a qualifying period of 2 years residence before the age of 22 receive free university tuition.
The maternal grandmother has retired and can offer the mother and the children accommodation for as long as necessary. However the maternal grandmother lives in a one bedroom home unit. The mother asserts that the child has a close relationship with her mother.
The maternal grandmother has been able to visit the mother in Sydney particularly at about the time of the birth of the child and thereafter on about 5-6 occasions.
Significantly the maternal grandmother was not called to give evidence. She was present at times during the course of the trial and the mother acknowledged that she had not sought to adduce evidence from the maternal grandmother.
No evidence was adduced by the mother from her brother that she asserted was moving permanently to live in Country I this year.
The mother has made enquiries as to appropriate schooling arrangements for the children G and H and there are no fees for the children’s attendance.
The mother plans to purchase return airfares facilitating her move to Country I and her return to Australia within 12 months. Thereafter she would hope to return to Australia once a year to visit her father and 4 of her brothers that remained living in Australia. She asserts that her other brother is planning to return to live in Country I.
She proposes that when she returns to Australia for a holiday she would facilitate the child having time with the father in a supervised environment using commercial supervisors at his expense if the contact centre was unavailable.
Otherwise the mother’s plans for her relocation to Country I are imprecise and unformulated. She asserts that she always had an intention to return to Country I although she had never communicated this to the father.
The mother acknowledged the family report writer’s opinion that if the child was to move to Country I, given his age, it is unlikely that he would be able to maintain a relationship with the father through the means available. The mother was dismissive of the family report writer’s view with which she simply did not agree.
The mother’s taxable income for the year ended June 2014 will be about $72,000. She presently receives $683 per month child support from the father although she expects this assessment to fall by reason of a recent increase in her own income. The mother also receives child support of about $566 per month from the second respondent for the children G and H that she applies to payment of outstanding school fees for the children at L School. His payments include payments relating to arrears of about $1,000.
Otherwise the mother is indebted to Citibank for $9,000, ANZ Visa $2,000 MasterCard $22,000 and a personal loan of $19,500.
The mother receives financial assistance from friends and family for living expenses and her legal expenses. She presently resides in a property owned by her father where she pays rent slightly below market rent.
The mother conceded in oral evidence that in the event that she was not permitted to relocate to Country I she would remain living in Sydney.
The father’s circumstances
The father resides with his mother at Suburb T. The home is a four-bedroom home with 2 spare bedrooms, one of which would be allocated to the child should he spend time with the father.
The paternal grandmother, now aged 68, was until recently a part-time childcare worker but retired in late 2014. She obtained the equivalent of a Certificate III in Childcare from U College in 2002 and has worked in childcare since 2003. The paternal grandmother is available to support the father and assist him with the care of the child.
The paternal grandmother has attended on supervised contact visits on about each third occasion.
In the event that the mother relocates to Country I without the child the father proposes that the child live with him with the child attending the local public school. The father would continue the child’s current placement in childcare for 5 days per week at Suburb E.
The father proposes that the child be raised in his religious faith.
The Family Report Writer
The family report writer initially prepared a child responsive program memorandum (Exh B) that was dated 6 December 2013.
The children G and H were spoken to by the family report writer. At the time of the memorandum the child G expressed a confident view in relation to his mother’s proposal to relocate to Country I. Although he had reservations that he would not see his father or friends in Australia. He said he was reassured by the mother that she would bring him back to Australia each year for a month and he would be able to stay with his father for the whole time. This reassurance seems somewhat ill-founded having regard to Mr B’s lack of commitment to time with his sons to date. If he stayed in Australia, G expressed a view or that he would like to spend time with his father on alternate weekends.
In relation to Mr Chandra, G had prepared a written list of concerns. There is a significant inference that the child is aligned with the mother but nevertheless G expressed a view that the child should not spend any time with the father or at least the time should be supervised. He explained that his reason for this view was that he had witnessed the father be physically and verbally abusive to the mother and threatened to kill her. He said that he would lie awake listening to the father fight with the mother and he was worried what might happen to her. G criticised the father’s abuse of himself and his brother H and the father’s controlling attitude in relation to he and his brother.
The child H informed the family report writer that he was not sure he wanted to go to Country I as he would miss his father, family and friends here. He seemed to accept his mother’s assurances that she could provide a better life for them in Country I and he told the family report writer that he would be happy to see his own father for one month per year if they did move to Country I. It was H’s belief that his father was not happy about the prospect of him moving to Country I. Should he stay in Australia, H said he would like to see his father on alternate weekends as he now does although not regularly.
H, like his older brother, had a written list of concerns in relation to the father. Once again there is an inference that he is aligned with his mother. The child became distressed as he discussed his concerns with the family report writer in relation to the father. He described the father as having a “bad temper” and “bad tantrums”. He said he had witnessed the father push his mother down the stairs, break lots of items and destroy their dinner. He described the father as abusive to he and his brother.
The matters reported to the family report writer by G and H lend significant support to the mother’s evidence in relation to the father’s conduct, lack of emotional control and as to the question of family violence.
Not unexpectedly the observations of the father with the child were not satisfactory. The father having had precious little opportunity to resume and develop his relationship with his son by reason of circumstances following separation as referred to above.
The mother reported to the family report writer that she did not think that the father would intentionally hurt the child but she did not think that he could control himself, giving the report writer the example of the incident that occurred in February 2013.
The mother felt that the children would adjust to a move to Country I.
The father denied to the family report writer that he had ever shaken the child, or verbally assaulted G and H. He further denied that he had never physically or verbally assaulted the mother. This later assertion is simply inconsistent with his sworn oral evidence. He accused the mother of having anger management issues.
In summary, in the memorandum the family report writer observed “it appears that the alleged family violence perpetrated by Mr Chandra may be indicative of coercive controlling violence”.
The Family Report: the Family Report (Exh A) prepared by the family report writer was dated 21 May 2014.
As at the time of the report the children G and H continue to spend time on alternate weekends with their father usually for one night.
The father’s time with the child had progressed from one hour to 2 hours per fortnight with the paternal grandmother also involved in some supervised time.
The mother informed the family report writer that much of the maternal family still reside in Australia including maternal uncles and the maternal grandfather. However the mother asserted that moving to Country I would allow access to additional family support including the maternal grandmother who was described as her “mother, friend and confidant”. Regrettably the maternal grandmother was not called to give evidence in the mother’s case notwithstanding that she was clearly available to do so.
The mother was not supportive of the child spending time with the father even on a supervised basis. The mother expressed concerns that the father would likely try and turn the child against her; that he would continue to try and manipulate her through court proceedings and other legal means, even if it meant making false statements.
The mother reported that there was no communication between her and the father and that she did not want the father near her, her children or her house.
It is of note that the mother reported that the child’s behaviour before and after spending time with the father had settled more recently and that prior to this the child had been clingy and had difficulty sleeping and was getting upset when she left the contact centre before a visit. Having regard to the age of the child and the minimal development of the child’s relationship with the father, the child’s early reactive behaviour is not surprising.
The mother reported that G and H had developed more confidence since her separation from the father. The mother had suggested counselling to the boys but nothing had been implemented.
The mother for herself had not sought assistance in relation to circumstances pertaining to her relationship with the father, but had started to speak about her experiences with her family and friends.
It is to be noted that the mother adduced no evidence of complaint by her other than as referred to above at trial.
The mother alleged that she had witnessed the father and his mother have a very conflictual relationship where they would yell and scream at each other with the father having reported to her that belongings were thrown and broken and the paternal grandmother ringing her late at night to go and collect the father after an argument. These assertions were not repeated in evidence at the trial.
The father seemed to have little insight into appropriate arrangements for the child, believing that his proposal for a week about arrangement for young the child was fair. Otherwise the father told the family report writer that he would be seeking an order that the child live with him and spend time with the mother. The father spoke positively of his developing relationship with the child at the contact centre and it is of note that the mother makes no adverse comment as to the child’s time with the father at the contact centre right up to trial. As at the time of the family report the father reported the child establishing a relationship with his mother through the contact centre.
The father expressed no concerns in relation to the mother’s parenting of the child and during their relationship he would defer to her regarding parenting decisions.
The father continued to deny to the report writer that he had perpetrated family violence towards the mother, G, H or the child although conceding they did have disagreements where they both may have got upset and yelled at each other. He denied any physical violence between he and the mother.
The child G informed the family report writer that he continued to be supportive of his mother’s proposal to move to Country I although he would miss his friends here but that the move “sounds exciting”. G was of the view that he could maintain a relationship with his father via Skype but reported that his father kept changing his mind about whether it was okay for them to go or not. H reported to the family report writer that he feels better about moving to Country I, feeling that he has more confidence that he could make friends there after doing this at his new high school. He could talk to his father via Skype. H did not believe that his father was happy about them moving to Country I but was of the view that he would actually get to spend more time with his father when they visited Australia than they do now.
At the time of the family report interviews the child was 2 years old. The mother reported that the child was due for his sleep on arrival for interviews and that she expected his behaviour to be more difficult than usual as a consequence. As expected the child’s behaviour was difficult during the observation session with the father with the father at one stage speaking in a frustrated tone to the child.
In evaluation the family report writer suggested that significant weight be given to the views of G and H. However it was noted the mother had existing family support in Australia through the maternal grandfather and uncles and the children G and H appear to have built up friendships and supports through their schools and extracurricular activities. The mother reported stable employment in Australia.
The older children G and H would likely to be able to maintain relationships with their father either by living in Australia or if in Country I via telecommunication and through infrequent visits to Australia.
However as to the child the family report writer opined:
…given his age it is unlikely that he would be able to maintain a significant relationship with the father through the means available to them…. It is unlikely however, given her aversion to the child spending time with the father that she would be able to put in the significant effort required to try and maintain any type of relationship between the child and the father should they relocate to [Country I].
The family report writer expressed a view that it was likely that the father did perpetrate family violence against the mother and the children and if family violence was found to have occurred consideration is often given to offending parents attending services such as anger management or family violence courses for the purposes of there being educated with strategies to ensure that this does not occur again. The family reporter noted that the father had attended both anger management and family violence courses but expressed the view that it was unlikely he had gained any benefit from these courses in the face of his continued denial that family violence had actually occurred.
Whilst the mother complained of her concerns that the father may continue to harass her post-separation, the family reporter noted that there was no current evidence to suggest that these issues will arise and there has been no evidence of the father directly perpetrating family violence against the mother since the parental separation.
It is noted at trial that the mother conceded that her concerns as to the father’s post-separation conduct were not realised.
Given the difficulty of the child being able to maintain a relationship with the father should the child move to Country I the family report writer was of the view that it may not be in his best interests that this occur. In doing so the family report writer noted that, whilst there were issues of family violence, it did not appear to have been a significant issue post-separation. Otherwise the child had been able to successfully start to re-establish a relationship with the father through the use of the contact centre.
The mother for her part has supports in Australia to assist her with parenting all 3 children.
The report writer was of the view that should the court find that the father was likely to continue to perpetrate family violence towards the mother or the mother’s ability to tolerate the child’s time with the father is less than has been assessed then it may be more appropriate for the mother to be able to move to Country I with the children.
Should the mother not be allowed to take the children to Country I the report writer was clear that it was not in the interests of the child to live in an equal time arrangement between parents and it was recommended that the child remain living primarily with the mother.
Similarly in circumstances where there is reported conflict, allegations of family violence and reported communication difficulties, shared parental responsibility is not recommended or considered to be effective. If the child was to live primarily with the mother then she should have parental responsibility.
The family report writer identified only ongoing supervised time between the child and the father with the frequency of such time to be determined by the availability of the contact centre but to occur no more than once per month.
The family reporter’s oral evidence
The family report writer acknowledged that the mother was able tolerate the father’s time with the child under the present court arrangements in that it was not causing her such a degree of emotional distress that she wasn’t able to support the time.
The report writer’s recommendation as to ongoing supervised time arose as a consequence of the reported physical and verbal family violence but also behaviour from the father which she would classify as psychological and emotional abuse as evidenced in the complaints by G and H as to the father’s behaviour in relation to them. In the absence of the father acknowledging those behaviours she could see nothing at this stage that means that the child was any safer from that potential harm than when the parties were together.
Psychological abuse, said the report writer, is very difficult. Often there are signs of physical abuse but in the context of psychological abuse a child often doesn’t realise that it’s even happening.
The implementation of long-term supervision was acknowledged by the family report writer as an inappropriate way to deal with a long-term relationship and perhaps the commencement of formal schooling by the child would place him in a better circumstance where he was older and more verbal.
The child may have questions ultimately about why he has to see his father in a contact centre and that might be confusing for him and might make him feel different from his friends.
Perhaps, said the family reporter, there could be a payment for private supervision to facilitate the child having time with the father other than in an institutional circumstance. The report writer expressed her belief that you would need continue to reassess how things are going.
The family reporter acknowledged that her option for the least intrusive position, that is ongoing long-term supervision, probably arose because of “her background” presumably referring to her employment as a child protection case worker and in the child protection sphere from 2008 to 2013 as set out in her report. The time recommended by the report writer was acknowledged as being in effect identification contact yet the report writer was unwilling to make any recommendation as to no time with the father.
In the circumstances of this matter it is clear having regard to the court’s findings as to family violence that the presumption should not apply.
It is in the best interests of the child that the mother have sole parental responsibility.
As to the children G and H the mother and their father have an ongoing relationship with the father engaged in the children’s lives. In those circumstances it is appropriate that the mother and father retain equal shared parental responsibility in relation to the children G and H.
Section 65DAA: equal or substantial and significant time
For the reasons set out above it is not in the best interests of the child for the child to have equal time with both parents nor at this stage is it in the best interests of the child that the father have substantial and significant time. Accordingly the court need not determine whether such concepts of time are in the circumstances practicable.
The orders to be made in relation to the child fall to be determined by a consideration of the best interest factors referred to above.
As to the children G and H, the clear evidence before the court is that their father is engaged in their lives albeit it appears somewhat begrudgingly and that arrangements between the mother and their father as to time have worked effectively by agreement. In that circumstances it is not in the best interests of the children for the court to consider equal time or indeed substantial and significant time. An order will be made for the children G and H to spend time with their father as agreed between the mother and their father.
Discussion
It is clear that the best interest considerations in relation to the children G and H are strongly indicative of the children remaining here in Australia in their present circumstances. They are further indicative of the mother and their father having equal shared parental responsibility and that they have time with their father as agreed between the mother and their father. Such orders will be made accordingly.
As to the child, the best interest considerations are again strongly indicative of the child remaining here in Australia in his present circumstances. They are a clear indication that the mother should remain the child’s primary carer and that the father’s time, absent a finding of “unacceptable risk”, should be expanded carefully and gradually as submitted by the independent children’s lawyer.
The mother by all inferences is functioning well here in terms of her employment. She has sought no professional help in relation to issues arising from her relationship with the child’s father.
Orders will be made accordingly.
The disqualification application
At the commencement of day 2 of the hearing, counsel for the mother made application that the court recuse itself from further hearing of the matter on the basis of apprehended bias.
A short written outline of argument was provided by counsel for the mother.
After hearing and considering submissions the mother’s application was dismissed with reasons to be published concurrently with final reasons in the primary proceedings.
The following are those reasons.
The mother’s primary complaint concerned questions or propositions put by the court to the mother during her cross-examination relating to her reluctance to initiate changes at the contact centre to facilitate the child’s time with the father by reason of what she asserted were her full-time employment obligations.
During the exchange the court said this:
HIS HONOUR: Why wouldn’t you just leave work early, ma’am? In the interests of your son? --- Because on Friday afternoons I have compulsory teleconferences that ends at 5 o’clock. By the time I get to the day care centre, have collected him and travelled through the traffic to get to [Suburb V] from [Suburb E] and I have to be at the contact centre at quarter to 6 for the 6 o’clock appointment to start ---
So why not make some other arrangements with your employer --- ? --- I couldn’t guarantee that I would make that ---
--- in the interests of your son’s relationship with his father and put that over and above your own self-interest? --- It wasn’t my self-interest it was the child’s ---
Well, it was. You put your employment ahead of your child’s relationship with father. Is that right? --- It was also a time of night when the child, the age that he is, and specially was then, was very tired. He was hungry---
Well, ma’am, that’s not a practicable response. This is just something you are telling me now? --- Well, that was my reasoning.
Is that right? --- No. That was my reason.
The enquiry was simply a question to the mother to which she responded.
A further complaint made by the mother was as to questions directed by the court to her in relation to her proposal if any to adduce evidence from her mother, who was present at the hearing from Country I, her father and her brothers or some of them that appeared to be present in court during the course of the hearing. The mother asserts that the inference was that in the absence of evidence from these witnesses her case left something to be desired.
The enquiry was directed to simply their availability to give evidence and the mother’s intention in that regard. Any inference that arises would be a be a matter for submissions.
A further complaint related to the following exchange with the senior counsel for the father:
HIS HONOUR: Mr Lethbridge, is it proposed at some stage that the childcare notes be tendered?
MR LETHBRIDGE: Yes.
HIS HONOUR: Will that be coming in through you?
MR LETHBRIDGE: Yes. I’m ..
HIS HONOUR: Or was whoever else
MR LETHBRIDGE: I certainly propose that your Honour have them because they are quite illuminating.
HIS HONOUR: Well, that’s what I mean. This child now has, from what can be inferred from the affidavit, a robust and understanding relationship of his father ..
MR LETHBRIDGE: Yes.
HIS HONOUR: … and his paternal grandmother. And that, I would have thought, would certainly be indicative of that not being terminated in the short term until it comprised a very substantial relationship with the child of an age, if the witness proposed to continue with her proposal to move to [Country I], where the tyranny of distance would not hinder the relationship – and that’s a very problematic issue.
The mother contends that the above passage makes it clear that the court had descended into “the arena”. The exchange was simply identifying an issue for determination.
Otherwise the mother complains about the following exchange:
MR LETHBRIDGE: Your Honour, that then brings me to the second of the matters that I wish to raise, and that is this. On any view of the evidence in these proceedings, these parties had a - and I can put it mildly - on the one hand, a tempestuous relationship; on the other hand, a violent relationship, accepting the mother's case. There is no doubt that as between the parties, the mother and the father, there was at least one incident prior to their commencing to cohabit, where violence was involved and consequences flowed. Having said that, there is then, in the mother's material, a succession of incidents that are said to have occurred commencing, as I say, in 2009, well before the parties commenced cohabitation, and continuing - and at this stage, I deal only with the period up to the child's birth - that is from my perspective - and that's my client's perspective - the relevant child, [C] - up to his birth in … of 2013.
There is nothing before the court that would suggest that there is any connection between whether or not the parties had a violent relationship, and the determination of the extent or otherwise of that violence, and the likelihood that the child would thereby be placed in danger. So that in our submission, it is - apart from a time consuming experience - of no benefit to the court to delve into incident by incident what each party says occurred in the period at least up to the date of birth of the child, by way of violence. So your Honour, I object, firstly, on the grounds of relevance to those matters; secondly, if your Honour were against me on that ground, on the basis that the determination of the incidents and their dissertation or exploration, is of such little weight that it must and would be excluded pursuant to section 136 of the Evidence Act, it's…
HIS HONOUR: Mr Heazlewood, what's the relevance of the behaviour between the parties prior to cohabitation, because the position then is that notwithstanding her complaints, she elected to live with him, and in any event, that's almost two and a half years before [the child]. I can see the relevance of the incidents during the cohabitation, because it demonstrates that in that relationship there's some history, but prior to the relationship does it really assist me? Like, she chose to live with him.
MR HEAZLEWOOD: Yes, your Honour, it does, with respect, because the family consultant deals with it. She wants to know about it. She has asked the court - she has mentioned that she would need to have some information relating to the police documents, and I can take your Honour to that paragraph if your Honour would like me to; but secondly…
HIS HONOUR: Well, the police documents in a way speak for themselves, don't they?
MR HEAZLEWOOD: Yes, they do, but it so happens in this case that the applicant was the person who was assaulted, so it is, we would submit, extremely relevant. It's an act of violence. It's an incident which occurred between these parties, and it will assist your Honour - your Honour is going to have to assess the father's personality in this case, and one of the real issues is is he likely to continue to behave the way it is alleged he has behaved. So this is a critical issue, and it's not the only one, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: No.
MR HEAZLEWOOD: He has also got some traffic and other matters. I haven't seen the police records yet, but there will be other factors before the commencement of the cohabitation, and it's not even relevant, with respect, that this woman elected to spend time with this man on a permanent basis, notwithstanding that he had assaulted her. You can't say it can't be discounted, and section 136 of the Evidence Act - I'm not sure how it's suggested that it's unfair. Your Honour hears cases of this nature every day, and there are always issues in relevant cases about persons being involved with the police and assaults in the past, and so forth so, your Honour, I submit it is relevant and it ought to be accepted.
HIS HONOUR: Thank you. Well, Mr Lethbridge, there's no temporal restriction in terms of the relevance of the 60CC factor that relates to violence in the consideration for the court. It's probably a question of what weight should be attached to those incidents, if I find they happened in any event ultimately. So I trust we won't spend too much time. I think they're more properly matters for cross examination, so I will leave them in.
The mother complains that the exchange to the mind of an impartial observer that the mother, by moving in with the father, somehow condoned the assault, and that there are circumstances when persons who assault others can do so with impunity or without civil consequences.
In fact the exchange above reveals an enquiry of counsel for the mother as to the relevance of the issue and the ultimate rejection of the objection and the retention of the impugned paragraph in the mother’s affidavit into evidence.
In Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 the High Court said:
6. Where, in the absence of any suggestion of actual bias, a question arises as to the independence or impartiality of a judge (or other judicial officer or juror), as here, the governing principle is that, subject to qualifications relating to waiver (which is not presently relevant) or necessity (which may be relevant to the second appeal), a judge is disqualified if a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide. That principle gives effect to the requirement that justice should both be done and be seen to be done, a requirement which reflects the fundamental importance of the principle that the tribunal be independent and impartial. It is convenient to refer to it as the apprehension of bias principle.
7. The apprehension of bias principle may be thought to find its justification in the importance of the basic principle, that the tribunal be independent and impartial. So important is the principle that even the appearance of departure from it is prohibited lest the integrity of the judicial system be undermined. There are, however, some other aspects of the apprehension of bias principle which should be recognised. Deciding whether a judicial officer (or juror) might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of a question that has not been determined requires no prediction about how the judge or juror will in fact approach the matter. The question is one of possibility (real and not remote), not probability. Similarly, if the matter has already been decided, the test is one which requires no conclusion about what factors actually influenced the outcome. No attempt need be made to inquire into the actual thought processes of the judge or juror.
8. The apprehension of bias principle admits of the possibility of human frailty. Its application is as diverse as human frailty. Its application requires two steps. First, it requires the identification of what it is said might lead a judge (or juror) to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits. The second step is no less important. There must be an articulation of the logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits. The bare assertion that a judge (or juror) has an “interest” in litigation, or an interest in a party to it, will be of no assistance until the nature of the interest, and the asserted connection with the possibility of departure from impartial decision making, is articulated. Only then can the reasonableness of the asserted apprehension of bias be assessed.
…
19. Judges have a duty to exercise their judicial functions when their jurisdiction is regularly invoked and they are assigned to cases in accordance with the practice which prevails in the court to which they belong. They do not select the cases they will hear, and they are not at liberty to decline to hear cases without good cause. Judges do not choose their cases; and litigants do not choose their judges. If one party to a case objects to a particular judge sitting, or continuing to sit, then that objection should not prevail unless it is based upon a substantial ground for contending that the judge is disqualified from hearing and deciding the case.
…
21. It is not possible to state in a categorical form the circumstances in which a judge, although personally convinced that he or she is not disqualified, may properly decline to sit. Circumstances vary, and may include such factors as the stage at which an objection is raised, the practical possibility of arranging for another judge to hear the case, and the public or constitutional role of the court before which the proceedings are being conducted. These problems usually arise in a context in which a judge has no particular personal desire to hear a case. If a judge were anxious to sit in a particular case, and took pains to arrange that he or she would do so, questions of actual bias may arise.
22. The particular principle or principles which determine the grounds upon which a judge will be disqualified from hearing a case follow from a consideration of the fundamental principle that court cases, civil or criminal, must be decided by an independent and impartial tribunal.
23. Bias, whether actual or apprehended, connotes the absence of impartiality. It may not be an adequate term to cover all cases of the absence of independence.
24. In Webb v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41 at 74, a case concerning a juror, Deane J identified four distinct, though overlapping, categories of case involving disqualification by reason of the appearance of bias: interest; conduct; association; and extraneous information. It is not necessary to decide upon the comprehensiveness of such categorisation, and its utility may depend upon the context in which it is employed. However, it provides a convenient frame of reference.
In Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488 the plurality (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ) said:
12 … The hypothetical reasonable observer of the judge’s conduct is postulated in order to emphasise that the test is objective, is founded in the need for public confidence in the judiciary, and is not based purely upon the assessment by some judges of the capacity or performance of their colleagues. At the same time, two things need to be remembered: the observer is taken to be reasonable; and the person being observed is “a professional judge whose training, tradition and oath or affirmation require [the judge] to discard the irrelevant, the immaterial and the prejudicial”.
13. Whilst the fictional observer, by reference to whom the test is formulated, is not to be assumed to have a detailed knowledge of the law, or of the character or ability of a particular judge, the reasonableness of any suggested apprehension of bias is to be considered in the context of ordinary judicial practice. The rules and conventions governing such practice are not frozen in time. They develop to take account of the exigencies of modern litigation. At the trial level, modern judges, responding to a need for more active case management, intervene in the conduct of cases to an extent that may surprise a person who came to court expecting a judge to remain, until the moment of pronouncement of judgment, as inscrutable as the Sphinx. In Vakauta v Kelly Brennan, Deane and Gaudron JJ, referring both to trial and appellate proceedings, spoke of ‘the dialogue between Bench and Bar which is so helpful in the identification of real issues and real problems in a particular case’. Judges, at trial or appellate level, who, in exchanges with counsel, express tentative views which reflect a certain tendency of mind, are not on that account alone to be taken to indicate prejudgment. Judges are not expected to wait until the end of a case before they start thinking about the issues, or to sit mute while evidence is advanced and arguments are presented. On the contrary, they will often form tentative opinions on matters in issue, and counsel are usually assisted by hearing those opinions, and being given an opportunity to deal with them.’
In Re J.R.L.; Ex parte C.J.L. (1986) 161 CLR 342, where Mason J said, at 352:
It needs to be said loudly and clearly that the ground of disqualification is a reasonable apprehension that the judicial officer will not decide the case impartially or without prejudice, rather than that he will decide the case adversely to one party. … [D]isqualification is only made out by showing that there is a reasonable apprehension of bias by reason of prejudgment and this must be “firmly established”.
Kirby J in Johnson v Johnson (supra) said at [46.2]:
Whatever may have been the tradition in earlier times, opinions favouring silence on the part of an adjudicator during a hearing (which is the surest means of avoiding most allegations of prejudgment) are now seen as carrying risks of an even greater injustice. Unless the adjudicator exposes the trend of his or her thinking, a party may be effectively denied justice because that party does not adduce evidence or present argument that could have settled the adjudicator's undisclosed concerns. A frank dialogue will commonly be conducive to the avoidance of oversight and the repair of misapprehensions. Uninformed members of the public are doubtless sometimes surprised by the robust exchanges which take place in Court, especially between a judge and experienced lawyers. But judges and other adjudicators and lawyers know that such dialogue can have great value…
and later his Honour said at [46.4]:
The adversary system depends on vigorous interaction not only adjudicator and those persons. Where the parties are represented by trained lawyers, the latter can be taken to be aware of (and presumed, if necessary, to have explained to their clients) the character and purpose of tentative opinions that guide the direction of the trial and encourage its proper focus. No rule of law should be adopted in relation to disqualification for prejudgment which unreasonably undermines, or is fundamentally inconsistent with, that system.
The mother has not established apprehension of bias in terms as contemplated by the authorities. The mother has failed to identify any fact or circumstances that might lead the court to decide the present case other than impartially or without prejudice or any fact or circumstances that the court would decide the case adversely to the mother. Nor has there been any articulated logical connection between the matters complained of and the feared deviation from deciding the case on its merits.
The mother’s application was dismissed.
I certify that the preceding three hundred and sixteen (316) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Foster delivered on 5 March 2015.
Associate:
Date: 5 March 2015
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
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Family Law
Legal Concepts
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Jurisdiction
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Injunction
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