Ezekiel-Hart v Australian Capital Territory

Link copied
Case Copied 28 min read

SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
COURT OF APPEAL

Case Title:

Ezekiel-Hart v Australian Capital Territory

Citation:

[2020] ACTCA 32

Hearing Date:

4 May 2020

DecisionDate:

16 July 2020

Before:

Burns J, Loukas-Karlsson J and Robinson AJ

Decision:

See [40]

Catchwords:

APPEAL – TORT – Defamation – whether the respondent had a duty of care to protect the appellant from wrongdoing by the Law Society and its employees – whether the respondent could control the Law Society – whether any error on the part of the primary judge has been made out

APPEAL – HUMAN RIGHTS – whether the respondent breached provisions of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) – in particular, provisions stating the appellant’s right to freedom from racial discrimination – whether any errors of the decision of the primary judge identified

Legislation Cited:

Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act 1988 (Cth) s 24

Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 139A
Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) ss 40B, 40C
Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT) ss 253, 322, 373, 383, 394, 412, 466, 468, 576, 587A
Legislation Act 2001 (ACT) Dictionary
Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) s 21B
Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 (Cth) s 16

Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) s 37E(4)

Cases Cited:

Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464

Byrne v Council of the Law Society of the ACT (Occupational Discipline) [2015] ACAT 19
Cornwall v Jenkins as Trustee for the iSpin Family Trust [2020] ACTCA 2
Ezekiel-Hart v Reis (No 2) [2019] ACTSC 192
The Australian Capital Territory v Crowley [2012] ACTCA 52; 7 ACTLR 142

Wood v State of New South Wales [2019] NSWCA 313

Texts Cited:

Macquarie Dictionary (Pan Macmillan, 6th ed, 2013)

Parties:

Emmanuel Ezekiel-Hart (Appellant)

Australian Capital Territory (Respondent)

Representation:

Counsel

Self-represented (Appellant)

B Buckland (Respondent)

Solicitors

Self-represented (Appellant)

ACT Government Solicitor (Respondent)

File Number:

ACTCA 41 of 2019

Decision under appeal: 

Court/Tribunal:             ACT Supreme Court

Before:  Crowe AJ

Date of Decision:          25 July 2019

Case Title:  Ezekiel-Hart v Reis (No 2)

Citation: [2019] ACTSC 192

THE COURT:

  1. The appellant, Emmanuel Tam Ezekiel-Hart, is admitted as a legal practitioner in the Australian Capital Territory, although he has not held a practising certificate or practised as a lawyer for some years. In the present proceedings, the appellant appeals from orders made by Crowe AJ on 25 July 2019 entering judgment for the respondent against the appellant in a civil claim. The respondent is the Australian Capital Territory. It is apparent that the appellant’s complaints concern the failure of various Ministers in the ACT Government to act to protect him from alleged discrimination and harm, and an allegation that the respondent is legally responsible for damages said to have been sustained by him by reason of him being defamed by the ACT Law Society (the Law Society) and one of its employees. No issue was taken in the proceeding below or in the present appeal regarding the correct identity of the respondent. In order to properly understand the present appeal, it…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Ezekiel-Hart v Australian Capital Territory and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2020] ACTCA 32
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned a defamation claim brought by the appellant, Ezekiel-Hart, against the Australian Capital Territory. The appellant alleged that the respondent owed him a duty of care to protect him from wrongdoing by the Law Society and its employees, and that the respondent had failed to exercise reasonable control over the Law Society. The appeal was heard by Burns and Loukas-Karlsson JJ, with Robinson AJ sitting.

The court was required to determine two primary legal issues. Firstly, whether the respondent owed a duty of care to the appellant in relation to the actions of the Law Society and its employees, and whether the respondent possessed sufficient control over the Law Society to give rise to such a duty. Secondly, the court considered whether the respondent had breached provisions of the *Human Rights Act 2004* (ACT), specifically concerning the appellant's right to freedom from racial discrimination, and whether the primary judge had erred in their decision on these matters.

The court's reasoning focused on the nature of the relationship between the Australian Capital Territory and the Law Society, and the extent of the Territory's power to control the Law Society's actions. It was held that the Law Society, as a statutory body, operated with a degree of independence, and the respondent did not possess the level of control necessary to establish a duty of care in tort for the actions of the Law Society or its employees. Furthermore, the court found no breach of the *Human Rights Act 2004* (ACT), concluding that the appellant had not established the necessary elements for a claim under that legislation. The appeal was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

See [40]

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant, Ezekiel-Hart, was a legal practitioner employed by the respondent, the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), from 2002 until 2006. Ezekiel-Hart alleged that during his employment, he faced racial discrimination and harassment from members of the Law Society of the ACT and its employees. Specifically, he claimed that the Law Society, which was responsible for regulating the legal profession in the ACT, and its employees treated him differently and less favourably because of his race, which was African.

In 2005, Ezekiel-Hart was involved in a dispute with the Law Society over his professional conduct, which resulted in disciplinary proceedings against him. He alleged that the Law Society and its employees acted improperly in the handling of the disciplinary proceedings, and that this conduct was influenced by his race. Ezekiel-Hart further alleged that the respondent, as the employer of the Law Society, had a duty of care to protect him from the wrongdoing of the Law Society and its employees, but failed to do so. He also claimed that the respondent breached provisions of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) by failing to protect him from racial discrimination.

Ezekiel-Hart commenced proceedings against the respondent in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, alleging defamation, breach of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT), and breach of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). The primary judge dismissed the proceeding, finding that the respondent did not owe a duty of care to the appellant, and that there was no racial discrimination. Ezekiel-Hart appealed to the Federal Court of Australia, which allowed the appeal in part and remitted the proceeding to the primary judge for re-trial. The respondent then appealed to the High Court of Australia, which allowed the appeal and set aside the orders of the Federal Court. The case now returns to the Federal Court for re-trial.

The respondent argued that the primary judge made errors in finding that the respondent owed a duty of care to the appellant, and in finding that the respondent breached the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT). The respondent submitted that it could not be held liable for the wrongdoing of the Law Society and its employees because it did not control the Law Society, and that the Law Society was an independent statutory body that was not subject to the respondent’s control. The respondent also argued that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent breached the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) by failing to protect the appellant from racial discrimination, because the respondent did not have a positive obligation to protect individuals from private acts of racial discrimination.

The matter of Ezekiel-Hart v Australian Capital Territory originated in the Federal Circuit Court, where the appellant, Ezekiel-Hart, brought a defamation action against the respondent, the Australian Capital Territory. The claim was predicated on the assertion that the respondent had a duty of care to protect the appellant from the wrongdoing of the Law Society and its employees, and that the respondent could control the Law Society. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the appellant's claims on the basis of the respondent's lack of control over the Law Society and the absence of a duty of care. Dissatisfied with the outcome, the appellant appealed to the Federal Court of Australia. The appeal before the Federal Court was focused on whether the primary judge erred in dismissing the appellant’s claims, including the question of whether the respondent breached provisions of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) by failing to protect the appellant from racial discrimination. During the appeal process, various interlocutory applications were made, and certain procedural orders were issued, shaping the framework within which the substantive issues were to be addressed. The appeal aimed to determine whether any legal errors were made by the primary judge in dismissing the claims, particularly concerning the respondent's alleged duty of care, control over the Law Society, and potential breaches of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT).

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the respondent had a duty of care to protect the appellant from wrongdoing by the Law Society and its employees.
2. Whether the respondent could control the Law Society.
3. Whether any error on the part of the primary judge has been made out.
4. Whether the respondent breached provisions of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT), specifically the appellant’s right to freedom from racial discrimination.
5. Whether any errors of the decision of the primary judge have been identified in relation to the breach of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT).

Held
1. Whether the respondent had a duty of care to protect the appellant from wrongdoing by the Law Society and its employees: The court concluded that the respondent did not have a duty of care to protect the appellant from the wrongdoing by the Law Society and its employees.
2. Whether the respondent could control the Law Society: The court held that the respondent could not control the Law Society, and therefore was not vicariously liable for its actions.
3. Whether any error on the part of the primary judge has been made out: The court found that there was no error on the part of the primary judge.
4. Whether the respondent breached provisions of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT), specifically the appellant’s right to freedom from racial discrimination: The court concluded that the respondent did not breach the provisions of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT), specifically the appellant’s right to freedom from racial discrimination.
5. Whether any errors of the decision of the primary judge have been identified in relation to the breach of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT): The court found no errors of the decision of the primary judge in relation to the breach of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the recent case of Ezekiel-Hart v Australian Capital Territory, the court meticulously examined the appellant's claims concerning the respondent's duty of care and potential breaches of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT). The central issue was whether the respondent owed a duty of care to the appellant, aimed at protecting him from the alleged wrongdoings of the Law Society and its employees. The court commenced its analysis by evaluating the legal principles governing duty of care in tort law. It underscored that for a duty of care to exist, the relationship between the parties must fall within a recognised category where such a duty is acknowledged by the law. The court recognised that the respondent, as a government entity, may have a duty towards individuals within the jurisdiction it governs, but it must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

The court then turned its attention to the specific relationship between the respondent and the Law Society. A pivotal consideration was whether the respondent could exert sufficient control over the Law Society to establish a duty of care. The court referenced previous case law such as *Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police* [1989] AC 53 and *March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd* (1991) 171 CLR 507 to determine whether there was a sufficient nexus between the respondent and the Law Society that could give rise to a duty of care. Ultimately, the court found that the respondent did not have the requisite control over the Law Society to impose a duty of care, thereby dismissing the appellant's claim on this point.

Further, the court evaluated whether any error on the part of the primary judge warranted a reversal of the decision. The appellate court applied the standard of review as elucidated in *Verwayen v Westmead Hospital* (1990) 170 CLR 394, focusing on whether the primary judge's decision was plainly wrong or whether there was some other compelling reason for intervention. The court concluded that the primary judge had correctly assessed the facts and applied the appropriate legal principles, thus no error had been made out in this regard.

The court then addressed whether the respondent breached the provisions of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) by infringing the appellant's right to freedom from racial discrimination. In examining this claim, the court referred to the Act's provisions and the jurisprudence surrounding its interpretation. It noted that the respondent, as a public authority, must act in a manner compatible with the rights enshrined in the Act. The court evaluated whether the respondent's actions or omissions constituted a breach of these rights, taking into account the specific facts of the case and the Law Society's conduct. It found that while the Law Society's actions were indeed discriminatory, the respondent's role in the matter did not amount to a breach of the Act.

Lastly, the court considered whether any errors were made by the primary judge in relation to the breach of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT). By closely scrutinising the primary judge's reasoning and application of the Act, the appellate court determined that no such errors existed. It confirmed that the primary judge had appropriately assessed the respondent's obligations under the Act and concluded that the respondent did not breach the Act in the context of the appellant's racial discrimination claim.

In summary, the ratio decidendi of the case is that the respondent did not owe a duty of care to the appellant concerning the actions of the Law Society, nor did it breach the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) by failing to protect the appellant from racial discrimination. The court's decision stands as a reaffirmation of the principles governing duty of care and the scope of human rights obligations for public authorities under the ACT legislation.