[2016] FWC 2687
DECISION
| Fair Work Act 2009 | |
| s.365—General protections | |
| Helen Exton | |
| v | |
| Western Health | |
| (C2015/8255) | |
| DEPUTY PRESIDENT LAWRENCE | SYDNEY, 29 APRIL 2016 |
| Application to deal with contraventions involving dismissal. |
[1] On 17 December 2015 Ms Helen Exton (the Applicant) lodged a General Protections
application involving a dismissal pursuant to s.365 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act). The
application alleged that the Applicant had been dismissed by Western Health (the
Respondent).
[2] The Applicant commenced employment with the Respondent on 12 November 2012.
The Applicant was a care co-ordinator at Western Health in Melbourne. She says that she was
forced to resign on 29 October 2015. The alleged dismissal took effect on that day.
[3] The application therefore was lodged some 28 days out of time.
Alleged Contravention
[4] The Applicant submits that she was forced to resign because the bullying that she was
submitted to was not properly dealt with. Breaches of ss.343, 344 and 351, with respect to
mental/physical disability, are alleged.
Respondent’s Submissions
[5] The Respondent denies these allegations and further denies that there has been a
breach of the General Protections provisions of the Act.
[6] The Respondent states that the Applicant resigned of her own free will after her
workers compensation claim was denied.
Relevant Legislation
[7] Section 366 of the Act provides:
366 Time for application [2016] FWC 2687
366(1) An application under section 365 must be made:
(a) within 21 days after the dismissal took effect; or (b) within such further period as the FWC allows under subsection (2).
366(2) The FWC may allow a further period if the FWC is satisfied that there are
exceptional circumstances, taking into account:
(a) the reason for the delay; and (b) any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal; and (c) prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay); and
(d) the merits of the application; and (e) fairness as between the person and other persons in a like position.”
Approach of the Commission
[8] The considerations relevant to the assessment of whether exceptional circumstances
exist have been dealt with by Full Benches (see: McConell v A & PM Fornatoro t/a Tony’s
Plumbing Service (2011) 202 IR 59; Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd (2011) 203 IR 1;
(Nulty) and Robinson v Interstate Transport Pty Ltd (2011) FWAFB 2728). The following
useful summary was provided in Nulty:
“[13] In summary, the expression “exceptional circumstances” has its ordinary
meaning and requires consideration of all the circumstances. To be exceptional,
circumstances must be out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon
but need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare. Circumstances will not be
exceptional if they are regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered. Exceptional
circumstances can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional
factors or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no
particular significance, when taken together are seen as exceptional. It is not correct to
construe “exceptional circumstances” as being…
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- Case
- [2016] FWC 2687
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether there were exceptional circumstances warranting an extension of the time limit for Exton to lodge her application, as per s.366(2) of the Act. The court considered the various factors outlined in s.366(2), including the reason for the delay, any action taken by Exton to dispute the dismissal, prejudice to the employer, the merits of the application, and fairness to Exton compared to others in similar situations. Exton cited her medical condition as the reason for the delay, but no specific medical evidence was provided to substantiate this claim. There was no evidence that Exton took any action to dispute the dismissal other than lodging the application. The court found that Western Health would be prejudiced by the time and costs involved in further litigation. Although Exton alleged a broad campaign of bullying, the court noted that she would first need to prove that her resignation was a dismissal, and that the allegations were generalised and difficult for Western Health to address.
The court concluded that there were no exceptional circumstances warranting an extension of time for Exton to lodge her application. As such, the application was dismissed. The Deputy President ordered that the application made by Helen Exton under s.365 of the Fair Work Act 2009 be dismissed, in accordance with s.587 of the Act.
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