FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
EXS18 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1193
File number: MLG 2839 of 2018 Judgment of: JUDGE GOSTENCNIK Date of judgment: 18 November 2024 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for protection visa – review of the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – extension of time – significant delay – where circumstances of birth explains some of the delay – where merits of the application are very weak – not satisfied that it is in the interests of the administration of justice to extend time –– application for order extending the 35-day period within which an application under s 477(1) of the Migration Act 1958 may be made is dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5J(2), 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 36(2B)(b), 422B, 424A(2A), 477(1), 477(2), 477A(2), 499
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) item 2, div 1, pt 2, sch 2
Cases cited: BQQ15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 218
CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344
Mentink v Minister for Home Affairs [2013] FCAFC 113
Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133
Porter v Ghasemi [2021] FCAFC 144; (2021) 286 FCR 556
SZTRY v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86
Tran v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2014] FCA 533
Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 37 Date of last submission/s: 14 October 2024 Date of hearing: 28 October 2024 Place: Melbourne Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J Mintz Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz Counsel for the Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs ORDERS
MLG 2839 of 2018 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: EXS18
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE GOSTENCNIK
DATE OF ORDER:
18 NOVEMBER 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for an order extending the 35-day within which an application under s 477(1) of the Migration Act 1958 may be made is dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $4,189.38.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Judge Gostencnik
BACKGROUND
Before the Court is an application to extend the 35-day period within which a judicial…
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- Case
- [2024] FedCFamC2G 1193
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether it was necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to extend the time for the application for judicial review. The applicant's circumstances included the birth of her first child, which had occurred just before the end of the prescribed period for making the application for judicial review. The applicant had argued that the birth of her child, which was premature and required emergency caesarean surgery, had caused her stress and depression and had made it difficult for her to process the legal proceedings required to apply for judicial review. The court considered the circumstances of the delay and the merits of the application for judicial review. The court found that the applicant's case was very weak and that the circumstances of the delay did not warrant an extension of time. The court dismissed the application for an extension of time and for judicial review.
The court ordered that the application for an extension of time be dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Ultimately, the Tribunal did not accept: the applicant was threatened by [redacted]; there was a real chance the applicant would face persecution involving serious harm if she returns to Malaysia because she refused [redacted]’s marriage proposal; nor that she faced legal issues concerning any outstanding loans with a bank: at [58]. The Tribunal concluded: (a)the applicant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution and was not a refugee under s 36(2)(a) of the Act: at [59]; and(b)there was no real risk the applicant would suffer significant harm for any reason and so the applicant is not a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(aa): at [60].CONSIDERATION An application to the Court for a review of a decision of the Tribunal must be made within 35 days of the date of the Tribunal’s decision: s 477(1) of the Act. The Tribunal made its decision on 19 March 2018 and the 35-day period within which an application to the Court must be made ended at the conclusion of 23 April 2018. The applicant’s application was therefore made 151 days after the time prescribed had lapsed. Section 477(2) of the Act allows the Court to extend the 35-day period as the Court considers appropriate if it is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to do so. The applicant’s ground for an extension of time set out in her application is as follows (reproduced verbatim):1.The Tribunal made their decision on 19 March 2018. My first baby was born on 16 April 2018. The baby was born prematurely, and the birth was very traumatic, and an emergency caesarean section was required. The major abdominal surgery caused me a lot of stress and depression and I was unable psychologically to process the legal proceedings required to apply for review to court. Find annexed to this application documents relating to the birth of my child. In Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28 Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ explained the exercise of the Court's discretion under s 477(2) of the Act, by reference to the corresponding provision for applications made to the Federal Court of Australia in s 477A(2), as follows:10. The "may" in the chapeau to s 477A(2) confers an authority to exercise the jurisdiction conferred under s 476A(1)(b) or s 476A(1)(c) of the Act, and is not merely facultative in nature. The power is discretionary in the sense that it involves an evaluative judgment as to a state of satisfaction.11. At a high level of generality, it may be accepted that the purpose of a power to extend time is "to eliminate the injustice a prospective [applicant] might suffer by reason of the imposition of a rigid time limit within which an action was to be commenced". However, what amounts to injustice in this context is not obvious. The text of s 477A reveals a legislative intention to restrict the Federal Court's exercise of its original jurisdiction under s 476A(1)(b) and (c) by a 35 day time limit on applications, and to ameliorate injustice that might result from that time limit by allowing that time to be extended only in cases where a judge has reached the state of satisfaction in s 477A(2)(b).12. On its face, the power conferred by s 477A(2) is unfettered except by the requirements of a written application in conformity with s 477A(2)(a) and the Court's satisfaction that an order extending time "is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice". Other than the "interests of the administration of justice", there are no mandatory relevant considerations, whether express or to be implied from the "subject-matter, scope and purpose" of the Act. The focus of s 477A(2)(b) is not on the interests of the applicant, but the broader interests of the administration of justice. So framed, the paragraph allows the Court to look at a myriad of facts and circumstances, including the length of the applicant's delay, reasons for the delay, prejudice to the respondent, prejudice to third parties and the merits of the underlying application. The level of satisfaction for the Court to reach is not low: the Court must be satisfied not just that an extension of time is desirable, but that it is needed in the interests of the administration of justice.13. In the absence of mandatory considerations for determining whether his Honour had the state of satisfaction required by s 477A(2)(b), the primary judge properly referred to the well established principles guiding decisions whether to extend time under s 11 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) that were stated by Wilcox J in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen. Those principles, which are non-exhaustive of the factors that may be relevant to an extension of time under s 477A(2), include that "[t]he merits of the substantial application are properly to be taken into account in considering whether an extension of time should be granted".14. Guidelines for the proper exercise of the power in s 477(2) of the Act (which is in relevantly similar terms to s 477A(2)) were stated by the Full Court of the Federal Court in DHX17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs. In particular, the Full Court stated that an evaluation of the merits of the proposed substantive application that goes further than an "impressionistic evaluation of the [applicant's] proposed ground of review, strongly suggests that it misconceived its function or power and acted in excess of its jurisdiction". The Court added that "the decisional process of exercising the discretion in s 477(2) neither requires nor warrants anything more than an impressionistic consideration of the proposed grounds of review" and, if "a court seeks to assess the merits of the proposed grounds of review against a standard of whether they would ultimately succeed on the hearing of the application, the conclusion will usually be drawn that it has misconceived its function and or power".15. The reasoning of the Full Court in DHX17 was informed by the earlier decision of Mortimer J in MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection concerning s 477(2), endorsed on appeal by a different Full Court. In MZABP, Mortimer J noted that the subject matter of an application under s 477(2) is not whether the applicant will ultimately be successful in challenging the decision under review. Her Honour considered that the "correct approach" to the assessment of the merits of the proposed application, for the purpose of deciding whether to extend time, "may be expressed by the use of language such as whether a ground is 'arguable', 'reasonably arguable', 'sufficiently arguable' or has 'reasonable prospects of success'". Her Honour also expressed the view that "[i]f a judge travels beyond an examination of the grounds at what should be a reasonably impressionistic level ... into a fuller consideration of the arguments for and against each ground of review ... that is not a function appropriate to a discretion such as that contained in s 477(2)".16. Underlying Mortimer J's reasoning was an analysis of the nature of the power conferred by s 477(2). Her Honour considered the legislative history and extrinsic materials but concluded that they shed no particular light on the content of the phrase "in the interests of the administration of justice". Ultimately, her Honour characterised the judgment to be made under s 477(2)(b) as involving a conclusion that "it is appropriate, or fair and equitable, that a litigant should have the opportunity for which the legislative scheme provides: namely, a review of the lawfulness of the decision said to affect the litigant, conducted in accordance with judicial process and subject to considered judicial determination". Her Honour also expressed the view that it will seldom be appropriate to refuse to extend time where a ground of review is properly described as weak as opposed to hopeless, citing the observation of French J in Seiler v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs, made in relation to s 11 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act, that "a strong case may be a positive factor in favour of the grant of extension, but an apparently weak case cannot be treated as a factor weighing against it". 17. French J's observation in Seiler cannot be applied to the operation of s 477A(2) without regard to the important fact that the power considered by his Honour did not require the state of satisfaction set out in s 477A(2)(b). Even so, it may be accepted that, in determining what is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice for the purposes of s 477A(2) (or s 477(2)), it will often be appropriate to assess the merits of the proposed grounds of review at a "reasonably impressionistic level". That is because the interests of justice are likely to be advanced by granting an extension of time to an application with some merit, depending, of course, on other relevant factors. In this regard, it may be relevant, as Mortimer J observed, that an extension of time will confer upon the applicant not only the right to a determination of their substantive application on the merits but also a right of appeal from that judgment, if adverse to the applicant.18. However, and as the plaintiff accepted, there will be circumstances in which it is appropriate for the Court to engage in more than an impressionistic assessment of the merits. For example, if the delay is lengthy and unexplained, the applicant may be required to show that their case is strong or even "exceptional". In such a case, a proper exercise of the power conferred by s 477A(2) will not require the judge to confine their consideration of the merits to an assessment of what is "reasonably arguable" or some similar standard. In other cases, the proposed ground of review may be hopeless but it may be necessary to examine the proposed application in some detail to reach that conclusion. The broad power in s 477A(2) does not prevent a judge from undertaking such an examination and from relying upon that determination to refuse an extension of time.19. It follows that the Full Court in DHX17 was wrong to say that "the decisional process of exercising the discretion in s 477(2) [here, s 477A(2)] neither requires nor warrants anything more than an impressionistic consideration of the proposed grounds of review". As the merits of a proposed application are a permissible consideration, it is within the Federal Court's jurisdiction under s 477A(2) to have regard to that factor in such manner as it considers appropriate in the circumstances. Put another way, s 477A(2) entrusts to the Federal Court the function of identifying and formulating the interests of the administration of justice and how they should be weighed and assessed, including by reference to the merits of the proposed application. The opinion expressed by the Full Court in DHX17, that a judge who undertakes more than an impressionistic evaluation of the underlying merits of the applicant's case is likely to commit jurisdictional error, was mistaken.(citations omitted)