Executive Director Medical Services, Perth Children's Hospital and Cutcheon & Anor

[2023] FCWA 257

JURISDICTION : FAMILY COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

ACT: FAMILY LAW ACT 1975

LOCATION: PERTH

CITATION: EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR MEDICAL SERVICES, PERTH CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL and CUTCHEON & ANOR [2023] FCWA 257

CORAM: COHEN J

HEARD: 14 NOVEMBER 2023

DELIVERED : Ex tempore

FILE NO/S: 8890 of 2023

BETWEEN: EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR MEDICAL SERVICES, PERTH CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL

Applicant

AND

MS CUTCHEON

First Respondent

AND

MR OVERTON

Second Respondent

Catchwords:

FAMILY LAW - Medical treatment – Medical authorities from Perth Children’s Hospital seek orders for the child to remain in hospital to receive palliative care treatment – The child’s parents are opposed to the application and want child discharged as soon as possible – The Department of Communities support the parents’ position with safety planning in place – The court has the jurisdiction to make the orders sought under s 67ZC of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and the court’s parens patriae jurisdiction – Serious concern raised about one parent’s mental health functioning – Interim order made restraining the parents from removing the child from the hospital and for palliative care treatment to be provided – Proceedings adjourned for short period to allow parents to respond to application

Legislation:

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

Category: Reportable

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant	:	Mr P. D. Spragg
First Respondent	:	No Appearance
Second Respondent	:	In Person (via audio)
Amicus Curiae	:	Ms C. Smith

Solicitors:

Applicant	:	State Solicitor's Office
First Respondent	:	In Person
Second Respondent	:	Self-Represented Litigant
Amicus Curiae	:	Legal Aid WA

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Director Clinical Services, Child and Adolescent Health Services v Kiszko & Anor [2016] FCWA 19
Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550
Minister for Health v AS (2004) 29 WAR 517
Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v JWB & Anor (1992) 175 CLR 218

THE PARTIES' NAMES AND IDENTIFYING DETAILS HAVE BEEN CHANGED

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Executive Director Medical Services, Perth Children's Hospital and Cutcheon & Anor has been approved by the Family Court of Western Australia pursuant to s 243(8)(g) of the Family Court Act 1975 (Cth).

This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 312(b) Family Court Rules 2021 (WA)), or to record a variation to the orders pursuant to r 311 Family Court Rules 2021 (WA).

1These are the Reasons I delivered ex tempore on the day of the hearing. Ordinarily, I would have reserved my decision because the issues are so difficult and important, but the decision had to be made on that day.

2I want to make my decision clear at the outset, rather than putting the father through what is no doubt a distressing exercise of waiting for my consideration of the legal and factual matters to know the outcome of the application. I am going to make the orders that have been sought by the Executive Director Medical Services, Perth Children's Hospital ("the Applicant"), with one minor amendment.

3I am called upon to determine an urgent application brought by the Applicant, who is part of the Child and Adolescent Health Service, seeking various orders authorising palliative medical treatment, which includes but is not limited to, pain management for Child A who was born in 2013.

4For reasons which will become apparent, an order is also sought to ensure that Child A is not removed from Perth Children's Hospital ("PCH") to ensure he receives the medical treatment and care recommended by his treating medical professionals.

5The respondents are Child A's parents, Ms Cutcheon and Mr Overton. I intend to refer to Child A's parents as "mother" and "father", not out of disrespect, but simply to avoid any confusion that might otherwise arise if I was to refer to them as the First and Second Respondents.

6This matter was listed on a very urgent basis because of concerns held by Child A's treating medical professionals that Child A's parents may remove or attempt to remove him from PCH. The mother has expressed beliefs that the medical treatment currently being provided to Child A is killing him, and if he is discharged from hospital, he will be cured by God. In submissions made on behalf of the Applicant, it is asserted that the mother's beliefs appear to arise from an abnormal religiosity that is inconsistent with beliefs and behaviours expressed by her at the time of Child A's initial diagnosis.

7The Court was advised that Child A's father initially shared the Applicant's concern and expressed his support for this application; namely, he considered it to be in Child A's best interests to receive palliative care as recommended by the medical professionals treating him. Whilst his view in this regard has not changed, he strongly believes that it is in Child A's best interests for that palliative care to be provided to Child A at home. To facilitate this, the father also considers it to be in Child A's best interests to be discharged from hospital as soon as possible so that he can spend his last remaining months in an environment that is familiar to him, surrounded by his family and loved ones.

8Child A is treated by a multidisciplinary team at PCH, which includes, and is not limited to, a paediatric neurologist, a paediatric palliative care consultant, various nurses, social workers, psychologists, a psychiatrist, and other allied health professionals. His clinical care is led by Dr B, who is a neurologist at PCH. Dr B's qualifications are set out at [2] to [7] of his affidavit filed 14 November 2023.

9Dr C is a paediatric palliative care consultant who is also involved with Child A's care. Her qualifications are set out at [3] to [6] of her affidavit also filed on 14 November 2023.

10Suffice to say, I have no hesitation in accepting that both Dr B and Dr C are eminently qualified to provide expert evidence to this Court about Child A, his medical condition, including as to his prognosis and care needs, with the emphasis on providing Child A with adequate pain relief to ensure the remainder of his life is both comfortable and dignified.

11Who is Child A? Child A is a much-loved 10-year-old little boy. He has a 13-year-old sister, Child D.

12Child A presented to the Emergency Department at PCH [in October 2022] with symptoms of confusion, drowsiness, and visual impairment. He was admitted to the Neurology Department and diagnosed with [Genetic Disorder E] in November 2022. His diagnosis has been confirmed through genetic and biochemical testing in conjunction with clinical and radiological assessment. Prior to his admission, there is no evidence to suggest Child A was anything other than healthy.

13It is Dr B's evidence that Child A's condition is a rare genetic disorder that affects boys. Amongst other things, it affects the brain, which causes progressive neurological deterioration. According to Dr B's evidence, Child A's condition may have been treatable if diagnosis occurred prior to the onset of symptoms which, sadly, was not the case for Child A. Tragically, his condition is terminal, and Dr B has estimated, with the understandable caveat that predicting life expectancy is not done with any degree of certainty, that Child A has approximately 6 months left to live.

14I do not consider it necessary for present purposes to outline the degree of Child A's deterioration since diagnosis, which is otherwise set out at [14] of Dr B's affidavit. Suffice to say the disease has significantly progressed such that Child A's quality of life has been severely impacted. He has no control over any body movement or function and experiences symptoms that are extremely painful, and equally importantly in my view, are likely to be frightening for him.

15According to Dr B, Child A's pain is communicated through physiological signs such as back arching, arm cycle movements, sweating and increased heartrate. It is believed he can hear, and he responds to familiar voices. Dr B is of the opinion that Child A remains aware of his environment which, in my view, lends weight to his parents' view that he would be better treated at home.

16Dr B's evidence is that he has consulted widely about Child A's condition, including with adult neurologists and other paediatric neurology colleague’s interstate who also have an interest and expertise in Child A's diagnosis.

17Child A's current treatment and care needs are set out at [22] to [29] of Dr B's affidavit and [23] to [33] of Dr C's affidavit. In summary, Child A is on a range of medications designed to manage symptoms which will become progressively worse as disease progression continues. The medications treat Child A's pain and are also employed to manage life-threatening conditions arising, by way of example, from specific organ failure.

18Whilst I appreciate this is a simplistic explanation of Dr B's evidence, Child A's medical needs are multifactorial and highly complex. A sudden change could result in a deterioration in Child A's health, which could be extremely dangerous to Child A and impact his already limited life-expectancy. More importantly, it could result in Child A experiencing extreme pain and discomfort.

19In addition to Child A's medical needs, his care requirements are also high; expertise is required to move and handle Child A physically and he requires a hygienic environment to shield against, by way of example, infection.

20It is Dr B's opinion that Child A's medical team have been able to establish an adequate medical regime such that he is now stable enough to receive in-home care. As I understand it, it is also possible for Child A to receive in-home palliative care treatment, from specialist medical services, which would enable him to also remain at home when he is actively dying. Regrettably for Child A, his treating medical team do not believe this is currently a viable option for him due to the significant concern they hold about his mother's ability to meet Child A's emotional, psychological, and physical needs, importantly in respect to pain management.

21I pause for a moment to reflect that throughout the Applicant's documents, what is apparent to me is that all of Child A's treating medical practitioners accept that Child A's mother loves him and that she is committed to his wellbeing. What is also readily apparent to me is that she is bereft by the horrible position that she, her husband, and family find themselves in. Dr B opines that in the last six months, hospital staff have seen a significant decline in the mother's mental health, which has resulted in the breakdown of the working relationship between her and hospital staff. Self-evidently, this cannot be in Child A's best interests.

22Whilst not an exhaustive list of the behaviours of concern, Dr B deposed to the mother holding a belief that the medical management of Child A's condition will ultimately kill him; and that she has reduced Child A's feeds because of a belief that he is unable to tolerate them, which resulted in Child A becoming malnourished. The father does not accept this was an intentional act on the part of the mother and believes there was an issue with feeding him; he also does not accept the medical opinion that Child A was malnourished, although he accepts a hospital admission was necessary and during the admission, Child A significantly improved.

23There is concern about the mother physically and verbally abusing the father in the family home in front of Child D who apparently had to intervene. This incident resulted in the father applying for and obtaining an interim family violence restraining order against the mother, the net effect of which is that she can only attend the family home if the father is not present and she is in the company of a support worker or nurse. The father is not certain where the mother lives when he is at home.

24Concern has been raised about the mother using a short-acting hallucinogen, which she apparently has both admitted and denied using. Hospital staff have reported the mother presenting as if she were intoxicated on a number of occasions.

25There is a concern about the mother being heavily sedated which, on one occasion, resulted in Child D being required to call for assistance to manage Child A's distress because she was unable to wake her mother.

26A concern has been raised about the mother disappearing and being uncontactable for hours, sometimes days, and of her refusing to administer pain relief to Child A, having expressed a belief that Child A does not require pain medication. In particular, she has expressed the view that she does not support the administration of opiates. Hospital staff report the mother stating that when Child A has dystonia, his body is receiving a workout and is reaching euphoria.

27Understandably, the mother is concerned there may be a potential cure for Child A of which his medical professionals are unaware. She spoke to hospital staff about a private organisation in Melbourne that Dr B took the time to contact. It is his professional opinion that there is no alternate cure for Child A's condition at that particular organisation.

28Dr B opined that the mother's presentation is consistent with an untreated mental health condition with psychotic features. He considers that she has no insight in respect of the same and that she is refusing mental health support. To Dr B' credit, he acknowledges that it is, in fact, beyond his expertise and knowledge base to formally diagnose the mother. However, it is his professional opinion that she currently does not have capacity to deliver a safe and caring environment for Child A or to make reason-based decisions about him.

29Dr B's concerns about the mother's mental health functioning is shared by the multi-disciplinary team. Psychological support and PCH's Child Protection Unit have also been involved with the family in order to provide support to her. She has been encouraged to accept adult mental health support services.

30Notwithstanding having heard from the father, I remain unclear about whether the parents remain in a committed relationship at present, but it appears that they might. However, it is Dr B's opinion that the father has limited ability to protect Child A from the mother's behaviour. Regrettably, the father is financially required to work to support his family, and as such, he is unable to provide full-time care for Child A. The situation is further complicated by the interim family violence restraining order in place between the parents and how that impacts the mother's ability to be in the family home.

31The hospital staff have experienced a deterioration in the working relationship with the mother but have continued to have a constructive relationship with Child A's father. However, they are concerned, understandably, that the present application may now adversely impact their relationship with him.

32At a meeting [in late] October 2023, hospital staff met with the parents to review Child A's disease progression, treatment needs, and to discuss their concern about Child A's discharge. I accept it was the father's preference, which he continues to hold, for Child A to be treated at home. However, it is Dr B's evidence that even the father conceded it may not be a safe environment for Child A at home because of the mother's current beliefs and the risks this posed to him. It is evident from the comments made by the father at the hearing that his position in respect to this has changed.

33Notwithstanding the father's previous concerns, hospital staff believe he may now seek to discharge Child A as he holds the belief there is adequate NDIS funding and supports in place to manage any safety concerns the hospital may have about the mother. He considers Child A can receive safe and consistent care at home; the multi‑disciplinary team do not share this view.

34Hospital staff are in an invidious position by bringing this application. Any residual working relationship they may have had with Child A's parents and extended family may be adversely impacted. Noting what is likely to come in the next 6 months, this cannot be in Child A's best interests.

The evidence

35The Court received into evidence affidavits filed by Dr B, Dr C, and [a lawyer from the State Solicitor's Office]. I was also provided with a memorandum from the Department of Communities ("the Department") shortly before the hearing.

36The Court also was greatly assisted by the written submissions filed on behalf of the Applicant.

The Department's position

37Before turning to the preliminary issue, namely, whether I should proceed with making orders in circumstances where the parents received the documents shortly before the hearing, and where self‑evidently, they have not had an opportunity to similarly put evidence before the Court, I want to highlight some concerns that I have about the position seemingly adopted by the Department.

38The Department's present position, as I understand it, is that it is satisfied that should Child A be medically fit for discharge, it would be safe for Child A to return home to the care of his parents with safety planning in safe. The Department advised that the safety plan will be finalised by close of business the day after the hearing.

39I agree with submissions made by the Independent Children's Lawyer ("ICL"),[1] that it is somewhat vexing to understand how the Department have come to this position in circumstances where its safety planning has not yet been finalised. Further, it is unclear on the information provided by the Department as to who has been consulted as part of the safety planning process, whether the safety plan will involve other family members and if so, who. For example, it is not clear whether the safety plan will include the father. I also do not know what consideration the Department has given to information it has about the circumstances that gave rise to the interim family violence restraining order in place between the parents, particularly noting, on the Department's own information, the mother grabbed the father around the throat and Child D was required to intervene. Of further concern, there is an open child safety investigation on foot in respect of that particular issue. Until that is resolved, I cannot understand how the Department could conclude it is safe for a highly vulnerable little boy to return home.

[1] The ICL attended the hearing as amicus curiae in anticipation of orders being made for the appointment of an independent children's lawyer, which I did.

40The Department indicate the mother attended upon an unnamed mental health service on 6 November 2023 for a two-hour assessment with a consultant psychiatrist and a clinical nurse. It was apparently assessed that:

•the mother's religious beliefs were not outside the context of a belief system;

•she did not present as acutely psychotic and that her behaviour was not due to any type of psychiatric illness; and

•there were no identified indicators of psychosis or concerns that her behaviour was being impacted by problematic drug use.

41In respect to this issue, I agree with submissions made by counsel for the Applicant. Firstly, it is unclear, what information was provided to the consultant psychiatrist to enable that person to reach their conclusions. It appears that it is likely to have been limited to the mother's self-report. In the context of being provided with independent collateral information, for example Dr B's affidavit, or broader consultation with other staff at PCH who have had an opportunity to work and engage with and observe the mother over an extended period of time, the lack of collateral information, in my mind, calls into question the reliability of the psychiatric assessment.

42I have no information as to who undertook the assessment save the person is a consultant psychiatrist; I do not know any more about the specific qualifications of that person than that. More importantly, and what is of forensic interest to me, is that no alternate explanation was provided for the mother's presenting behaviour. By way of example, in the absence of the mother having a diagnosis of a psychiatric condition, leaving aside psychosis, one might have reasonably thought the psychiatrist considered the possibility of an adjustment disorder, particularly having regard to the circumstances in which she finds herself.

43Until such time as the Court, and I would suggest the Department, have further information about the psychiatric assessment, in particular what collateral information that person had available at the time they met with the mother, the circumstances warrant a prudent approach being adopted, particularly given the seriousness of the application before the Court and how concerns about the mother's mental health functioning may impact on Child A's health needs moving forward.

44Whilst there appears to be an excellent plan in place put forward by the parents for Child A to be cared for at home, and that the Department intend to prop up that plan, by way of example, providing some funding when the NDIS funding expires (which the Department indicates is likely to happen in around 7 weeks' time), and that the Department are prepared to assist with the funding of a nurse, it is not clear to me that the Department fully appreciate the multifactorial and complex nature of Child A's health needs, which will only increase as his health deteriorates.

45In fact, I do not know whether an assessment has taken place to ascertain whether those individuals who have apparently been contracted to work in the home environment can sufficiently manage the mother should she become heightened and distressed, as she has with the father on a previous occasion, which gave rise to the interim family violence restraining order.

46Ultimately, there may be a very reasonable explanation for the mother's situation; she is in the most painful of circumstances. However, I am required to separate myself from the mother and her experience and prioritise Child A's best interests.

Procedural fairness

47It is important that I acknowledge that a determination about the appropriateness of proceeding with an application for orders of the kind I am being asked to make, in the absence of the mother and where both parents have not had an opportunity to obtain legal advice or put evidence before the Court, draws into sharp focus the Court's duty to afford litigants procedural fairness, a principle which has long been expressed as one of the maxims which the common law observes as an indispensable requirement of justice.

48However, there is no fixed content to the duty to afford procedural fairness. The fairness of the procedure depends on the nature of the matters in issue, and what would be a reasonable opportunity for parties to present their cases in the relevant circumstances. I have regard to the matter of Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 where Mason J said:

The expression "procedural fairness" conveys the notion of a flexible obligation to adopt fair procedures which are appropriate and adapted to the circumstances of the particular case.

49Having regard to the seriousness of the issues before the Court today, and the potential consequences for Child A that could follow, which could be life-threatening if interim orders were not made as sought by the Applicant, I am satisfied that it is appropriate and in Child A's best interests to proceed, notwithstanding the fact that his parents have not yet had the opportunity to properly be heard. As I have stressed on multiple occasions, the orders that I intend to make are simply "holding orders" until the matter can come back to Court, which will be in the shortest available timeframe.

Relevant law

50There can be no doubt the Court has the jurisdiction to make orders as sought by the Applicant. The legal principles in respect to the Court's jurisdiction to make orders about medical treatment for children were cogently elucidated by Thackray CJ (as he then was), in the matter of Director Clinical Services, Child and Adolescent Health Services v Kiszko & Anor[2016] FCWA 19 ("Kiszko"), at [62] to [77]. I respectfully adopt his Honour's summary.

51Whilst those proceedings dealt with parents who were not married, the Court's power to deal with applications of this kind pertaining to children of a marriage, are grounded in sections 67ZC and 68L of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). His Honour also provided extensive commentary on the Court's parens patriae jurisdiction, in which he observed the Court's powers to be exceptionally wide.

52In the absence of an order to the contrary, parental responsibility for a child under the age of 18 years lies with parents. In this case, the parents have parental responsibility, which means all the duties, powers, responsibilities and authority which, by law, parents have in relation to children. It is also accepted that it would be within the power of the parents to give consent to and make decisions about Child A's medical care.

53When further considering this issue in Kiszko, his Honour had regard to comments made by the High Court in the matter of the Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v JWB & Anor (1992) 175 CLR 218 ("Marion's Case"), where the Court commented on the implicit power for parents to consent to medical treatment for a child incapable of giving consent, as recognition of the fact that parents will act in a way that is best for the welfare of the child. The High Court concluded the overriding criterion of the child's best interests to be, itself, a limit on parental power. However, as Thackray CJ sagely reflected:

Put another way, parental power is not unlimited. It is to be exercised in the best interests of a child.

54Whilst terribly sad, the reality is that parents are sometimes unwilling or unable to make decisions in the best interests of their children. In this case there is a dispute as to what is in Child A's best interest, hence the necessity for me to decide where others involved cannot.

55When reaching his decision in Kiszko, Thackary CJ was guided by the judgment of Pullin J in Minister for Health v AS & Anor (2004) 29 WAR 517. His Honour quoted Pullin J as follows:

The question is not whether to respect the parent's wishes. The role of the court is to exercise an independent and objective judgment and balance the advantage or disadvantage of the medical step under consideration. While the parent's wishes may be relevant, they are not determinative.

The guiding principle upon which the exercise of the parens patriae jurisdiction is based is that the welfare of the child is paramount. Protection of the child should be elevated above all other interests, although those other interests are not completely disregarded. The welfare of the child encompasses the child's physical wellbeing.

When faced with the stark reality that the child will die if lifesaving treatment is not performed which has a good prospect of a long‑term cure, it is beyond doubt that it is in the child's best interests to receive that treatment. Obviously, the court's power in the inherent jurisdiction to countermand the wishes of a child the patient or a parent is to be exercised sparingly and with great caution.

56Whilst this case is not about long-term cure, it is about medical intervention designed to ensure the last months of Child A's life are as painless as possible and with as much dignity that can be afforded to him.

57The father disputes some of the evidence put forward on behalf of the Applicant and puts a different complexion on the mother's behaviour, inviting me to view it from a lens of understandable grief and distress. As much empathy as I have for her and the father, the decision I must make requires me to consider the impact (actual or potential) of her behaviour on Child A and his emotional and physical wellbeing.

58Child A is a very vulnerable little boy, and all things being equal, he should be able to receive treatment at home, which is everyone's desire. However, at this stage, the concerns raised about the mother are so serious, that I do not consider it to be in his best interests to be discharged from hospital at the moment. There are currently too many unknowns.

59I am proceeding on the basis that I am making short-term orders, which will give the parents and the ICL an opportunity to put evidence before the Court, so that a more fulsome consideration of what is in Child A's best interests moving forward can take place. It would be useful at that juncture for the ICL to provide some information about the outcome of the Department's safety planning.

Orders

60Accordingly, I made the following orders:

ITIS ORDERED THAT:-

1The affidavits of [Dr C], [Dr B] and [a lawyer from the State Solicitor's Office] affirmed 13 November 2023 be accepted as filed in Court this day.

2The Memorandum from the Department of Communities dated 14 November 2023 be accepted into evidence and marked as Exhibit 1.

3The Interim Family Violence Restraining Order between the First Respondent, [MS CUTCHEON], and Second Respondent, [MR OVERTON], dated [in 2023] in which the Second Respondent is the protected person, be accepted into evidence and marked as Exhibit 2.

4Until further order of the Court and subject to paragraph 5 below:

(a)without admission as to need, the First and Second Respondents are restrained by injunction and an injunction is hereby granted restraining each of them from removing or attempting to remove the child, [CHILD A] born [date of birth of Child A] ("the child") from the Perth Children's Hospital ("PCH") save with the prior written consent of the Applicant or order of the Court;

(b)the child is to receive the following treatment:

(i)[omitted];

(ii)[omitted];

(iii)[omitted];

(iv)feeding via gastrostomy tube; and

(v)medication for [omitted],

asdirected by the clinical staff at PCH; and

(c)the clinical staff at PCH are authorised to provide the treatment referred to in subparagraph (b).

5Nothing in these orders is to be taken to prevent:

(a)the child receiving treatment in addition, or in the alternative, to that specified in Order 4(b) where such treatment is recommended by the clinical staff at PCH and consented to by at least one of the First or Second Respondents; or

(b)the non-provision or withdrawal of any treatment where such non-provision or withdrawal is recommended by the clinical staff at PCH and consented to by both Respondents.

Independent Children's Lawyer

6The child be independently represented at the further hearing of these proceedings, by a senior inhouse practitioner if possible, and the Director – Client Service, Legal Aid Western Australia (LAWA) be requested to arrange such representation. Noting such representation is requested on an urgent basis for the following reason/s:

(a)the child has been diagnosed with a terminal disease and has limited life expectancy;

(b)there is a dispute between the child's treating medical professionals and the First and Second Respondents as to whether it is in the child's best interests to receive medical care (including of a palliative nature) at home;

(c)a concern has been raised about the First Respondent's mental health functioning; and

(d)the Department of Communities have had involvement with the family and are engaged in safety planning in an effort to support the child's discharge into the First and Second Respondent's care.

7The parties comply with any request for information concerning the parties and the child in these proceedings from the Independent Children's Lawyer within 7 days of such request being made.

8If requested to do so by LAWA, the First and Second Respondents file a Form 13 Financial Statement and provide a copy to the Director - Lawyers Engagement Network, LAWA.

9There be leave to the Independent Children's Lawyer to issue subpoena for the production of documents relevant to an issue in the case, including to the Department of Communities or the WA Police.

Minuteof Procedural Orders

10By no later than 48 hours prior to the next court date, the parties have leave to file a Minute of Proposed Procedural Orders setting out those orders they consider necessary to progress the matter to a final hearing.

Procedural

11The parties have liberty to apply to vary or discharge these orders on 24 hours' written notice to the other parties.

12The proceedings be adjourned for directions to Thursday 23 November 2023 at 2:15pm before Chief Judge Sutherland.

13Legal Aid Western Australia are to be included on the distribution list of this order.

14The Independent Children's Lawyer and/or the State Solicitors Office have leave to provide a copy of the Form 1 Initiating Application, affidavits filed in support, the written submissions filed on behalf of the Applicant and a copy of these Orders to the Department of Communities.

15A copy of the transcript of the extempore reasons be provided to the parties.

ANDIT IS NOTED THAT:

(a)The Court has attempted to contact the First Respondent on the mobile number provided by the SSO which was unsuccessful.

(b)Orders were not made today for the First and Second Respondents to file responding documents, noting the urgent filing of the application, proximity of the next court date and the need for them to obtain independent legal advice. It is envisaged that said programming orders will be made on the next occasion.

These reasons are the reasons for decision as delivered by the Honourable Justice Cohen on 14 November 2023, edited in places only as to correct grammatical errors and some infelicity of expression, without variation to the substance thereof.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Family Court of Western Australia.

MF

Associate

20 NOVEMBER 2023