I N T H E F E D E R A L C O U R T OF' AUSTRALIA )
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BANKRUPTCY D I S T R I C T 'OF' THE STATE' OF ) No. 586 of 1978 1
NEW SOUTH WALES .AND T H E AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY 1
R E : JAMES HUNTER EX PARTE:
A C M I L I N D U S T R I E S PTY. L I M I T E D
formerly F.' & T. B U I L D I N G
P R O D U C T S P T Y . L I M I T E D ( w r o n g l y
called F. '& T. B U I L D I N G
PRODUCTS LIMITED t r a d i n g as
'PGH CERMAICS
ORDER
JUDGE MAKING ORDER: LOCKHART J.
WHERE MADE : AT SYDNEY
DATE O F ORDER: F R I D A Y 1 MAY 1 9 8 1
THE COURT ORDERS THAT: The appl ica t ion be dismissed
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
) )
GENERAL DIVISION
1 1
BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
) No. 586 Of 1978 \ NEW SOUTH WALES AND THE 1 AUSTRAL'IAN CAPITAL TERRITORY 1
RE : JAMES HUNTER EX PARTE:
ACMIL INDUSTRIES PTY. LIMITED
formerly F. & T. BUILDING
PRODUCTS PTY. LIMITED (wrongly
called F. & T. BUILDING PRODUCTLIMITED trading as PGH CERAd-rlS
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
LOCKHART J.
1 May . . 1981
AT SYDNEY
This is an application to review the decision of a
Deputy Registrar in Bankruptcy disallowing certain items on the taxation of a bill of costs, all being claims for the "travelling time" of the solicitor for the petitioning creditor between
Miranda, where he has his office, and this Court or its Registry. Y The same questions are involved in this appeal as arose in the application for review in the matter of Dacey in respect of which
I have just given judgment. The result is the same, namely that the application fails.
Details
- AGLC
- ex parte [1981] FCA 288
- Case
- [1981] FCA 288
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Federal Court of Australia, General Division, was presented with an application from ACMIL Industries Pty. Limited (formerly F. & T. Building Products Pty. Limited, trading as PGH Ceramics) to review a decision made by a Deputy Registrar in Bankruptcy. The Deputy Registrar had disallowed certain items on the taxation of a bill of costs, specifically claims for the "travelling time" of the solicitor for the petitioning creditor. The travelling time in question was between Miranda, where the solicitor's office is located, and the Federal Court or its Registry.
The legal issue before the court was whether the costs claimed for the travelling time of the solicitor were allowable under the Bankruptcy Act. This question had already been considered and ruled on in a similar case, Dacey, where the court had determined that such costs were not allowable. The current application sought to challenge the Deputy Registrar's decision in light of the Dacey ruling.
In his judgment, Lockhart J confirmed that the same legal principles applied to the present case as had been established in Dacey. The court held that the costs for the travelling time of the solicitor were not allowable as they did not meet the criteria for costs under the Bankruptcy Act. Consequently, the application was dismissed. The court's decision was consistent with the previous ruling, affirming that such claims were not permissible.
The final order of the court was that the application be dismissed. The court's reasoning was firmly rooted in the precedent set by the Dacey case, and no further orders were made beyond the dismissal of the application.
The legal issue before the court was whether the costs claimed for the travelling time of the solicitor were allowable under the Bankruptcy Act. This question had already been considered and ruled on in a similar case, Dacey, where the court had determined that such costs were not allowable. The current application sought to challenge the Deputy Registrar's decision in light of the Dacey ruling.
In his judgment, Lockhart J confirmed that the same legal principles applied to the present case as had been established in Dacey. The court held that the costs for the travelling time of the solicitor were not allowable as they did not meet the criteria for costs under the Bankruptcy Act. Consequently, the application was dismissed. The court's decision was consistent with the previous ruling, affirming that such claims were not permissible.
The final order of the court was that the application be dismissed. The court's reasoning was firmly rooted in the precedent set by the Dacey case, and no further orders were made beyond the dismissal of the application.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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