CITATION: Eventang Development (Pyrmont) Pty Limited v The Owners Strata Plan 51573 & anor. [2001] NSWSC 452 FILE NUMBER(S): SC 13026/2000 HEARING DATE(S): 28 May 2001 JUDGMENT DATE:
1 June 2001PARTIES :
Eventang Development (Pyrmont) Pty Limited
The Owners Strata Plan 51573
Strata Schemes Board of NSW
JUDGMENT OF: Sully J at 1
COUNSEL : M. A. Bradford - Plaintiff
P. Koroknay - DefendantSOLICITORS: Alex Ilkin & Co. - Plaintiff
David Le Page - lst Defendant
I. V. Knight - 2nd DefendantLEGISLATION CITED: Strata Schemes Management Act 1996 (NSW)
Justices Act 1902 (NSW)
Strata Titles Act 1973
Strata Schemes Management Regulation 1997
Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW)CASES CITED: Liverpool Borough Bank v Turner (1860) 45 ER 715 at 718
Day Ford Pty Ltd v Sciacca (1990) 2 Qd. R 209 at 216, 217DECISION: Appeal dismissed with costs
SUPREME COURT OF
NEW SOUTH WALES
COMMON LAW DIVISIONSULLY J
1 June 2001
13026/2000 - Eventang Development (Pyrmont) Pty Limited v The Owners Strata Plan 51573 & anor.
JUDGMENT
1 HIS HONOUR: By a summons filed on 3 November 2000 Eventang Development (Pyrmont) Pty Limited, (“Eventang”), appeals against an order made in favour of the Owners, Strata Plan 51673, (“the Strata Owners”), by the Strata Schemes Board of New South Wales, (“the Board”). Such an appeal lies by virtue of s 200 of the Strata Schemes Management Act 1996 (NSW), (“the Strata Act”). The appeal lies, relevantly, only upon a question of law; and is governed, generally speaking, by the provisions of Part 5 of the Justices Act 1902 (NSW) as applicable to “a determination that a Justice ………………… made ………………in the exercise of summary jurisdiction on an information or complaint”.
2 The particular relief claimed in the summons is:
- “1. An order pursuant to Sec 109(a) of the Justices Act quashing the order of the Second Defendant to dismiss the appeal of the Second Defendant.
- 2. An order pursuant to Sec 154(1)(a) of the Strata Schemes Management Act, 1996 (“the SSM Act”) declaring that the resolutions passed at the Annual General Meeting of the First Defendant held on 19th August 1999 (“the Meeting”) are to be treated as a nullity.
- 3. Alternatively to the relief sought in 2 above, an order that the matter be remitted to the Second Defendant to be dealt with according to law.
- 4. (a) A declaration that the Second Defendant erred in law in not finding that the principles of waiver and/or estoppel were to be applied so as to preclude the First Defendant from insisting on strict compliance with the requirements of Sec 118 of the SSM Act.
- (b) A declaration that the Second Defendant erred in law in not finding that the resolutions passed at the Meeting were to be treated as a nullity pursuant to Sec 154(1)(a) of the SSM Act.
- (c) A declaration that the Second Defendant erred in law in not exercising the discretion to treat those resolutions as a nullity pursuant to Sec 154(1)(a) of…
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- Case
- [2001] NSWSC 452
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the statutory requirements for a corporation to exercise its voting rights in a strata scheme and found that the reasoning of the Board member was erroneous. The court held that a corporate owner may exercise its voting rights in either of two ways: either by a nominee duly appointed or by a proxy duly appointed. The court further held that the proxy appointment form, which was furnished to Mr. Hassall in connection with the annual general meeting of 19 August 1999, was ineffective as such an appointment because it did not specify with proper clarity, and by reference to either of the two permitted alternatives, an intended period of duration of the proxy. The court also held that the established principles of waiver or estoppel have no proper application to the operation of the legislative scheme embodied in the Strata Act and its subordinate Regulation.
In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed with costs. The court found that the Board member's reasoning was erroneous, and that the proxy appointment form was ineffective as such an appointment. The court also held that the principles of waiver or estoppel have no proper application to the operation of the legislative scheme embodied in the Strata Act and its subordinate Regulation. The court's decision highlights the importance of strict compliance with the statutory requirements for a corporation to exercise its voting rights in a strata scheme.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case came before the Supreme Court of New South Wales as an appeal by Eventang against an order made in favor of the Owners Strata Plan 51673 by the Strata Schemes Board of New South Wales. The appeal was brought pursuant to section 200 of the Strata Schemes Management Act 1996 (NSW) and was heard by Sully J. The appeal was based on a question of law and was governed by the provisions of Part 5 of the Justices Act 1902 (NSW). Eventang sought various orders, including the quashing of the order dismissing its appeal, the declaration of the resolutions passed at the annual general meeting as a nullity, and a declaration that the Strata Schemes Board of New South Wales had erred in law.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the non-compliance by a person with the requirements of Section 118 of the Strata Schemes Management Act 1996 means that the person is deprived of the right to vote.
2. Whether Eventang had complied with the relevant requirements of Section 118 of the Strata Schemes Management Act 1996.
3. Whether Eventang was purporting to exercise its right to vote by a proxy and not by tendering a vote through its nominee.
4. Whether it assisted Eventang that in the past the requirements of Section 118 had been ignored by the Strata Schemes Board of New South Wales.
5. Whether the Strata Schemes Board of New South Wales should have found that the First Defendant had waived any non-compliance by Eventang with the requirements of Section 118, or that the First Defendant was estopped from insisting that Eventang comply strictly with those requirements.
6. Whether the Board erred in law in finding that the Proxy Appointment form was "otherwise defective".
7. Whether the Board should have found that the Proxy Appointment form substantially complied with the Strata Schemes Management Regulation and that such compliance was sufficient.
8. Whether the Board should have found that the First Defendant, by its conduct in the past and/or at the Meeting, waived any deficiency in the Proxy Appointment form, or that the First Defendant was estopped from asserting that any such deficiency operated to deprive Eventang of its right to vote.
9. Whether the Board erred in law in failing to give any or any sufficient reasons for the finding in 4 above.
Held
1. The court held that the non-compliance by a person with the requirements of Section 118 of the Strata Schemes Management Act 1996 does not mean that the person is deprived of the right to vote if they have otherwise fulfilled the basic mandatory requirements to be entitled to vote.
2. The court held that Eventang had not complied with the relevant requirements of Section 118 of the Strata Schemes Management Act 1996 as it failed to provide the address of the nominee in the notice.
3. The court held that Eventang was purporting to exercise its right to vote by a proxy and not by tendering a vote through its nominee.
4. The court held that it did not assist Eventang that in the past the requirements of Section 118 had been ignored by the Strata Schemes Board of New South Wales.
5. The court held that the Strata Schemes Board of New South Wales should not have found that the First Defendant had waived any non-compliance by Eventang with the requirements of Section 118, or that the First Defendant was estopped from insisting that Eventang comply strictly with those requirements.
6. The court held that the Board erred in law in finding that the Proxy Appointment form was "otherwise defective".
7. The court held that the Board should have found that the Proxy Appointment form substantially complied with the Strata Schemes Management Regulation and that such compliance was sufficient.
8. The court held that the Board should not have found that the First Defendant, by its conduct in the past and/or at the Meeting, waived any deficiency in the Proxy Appointment form, or that the First Defendant was estopped from asserting that any such deficiency operated to deprive Eventang of its right to vote.
9. The court held that the Board erred in law in failing to give any or any sufficient reasons for the finding in 4 above.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court examined the provisions of the Strata Schemes Management Act 1996, particularly Section 118 and Schedule 2, to determine the requirements for voting at meetings of the Owners Corporation. The court held that a corporation has the right to vote if it has given the required notice under Section 118, and can exercise its voting rights either through a nominee or by proxy. The court found that Eventang had complied with the basic requirements to be entitled to vote but failed to provide the address of the nominee in the notice, which did not deprive Eventang of its right to vote. The court also examined the Proxy Appointment form and found it ineffective as it did not specify the duration of the proxy's effect. Despite Eventang's argument that the Board's past conduct and the principles of waiver and estoppel should apply, the court concluded that the legislative scheme of the Strata Act prevents the applicability of these doctrines to avoid the consequences of a failure to comply with the relevant requirements of the scheme. The ratio decidendi of the case is that the legislative scheme embodied in the Strata Act and its subordinate Regulation takes precedence over the principles of waiver and estoppel when it comes to the orderly and consistent application of voting rights.