received as part of the consideration for the sale 90,000 paid up £1 shares in that company. In September 1929 the 90,000 shares in the N. company and the 10,000 shares in the A. company were, pursuant to a power contained in the articles of association of the G. company, distributed among the members of that company. One of such members was E. At the time of this distribu- tion the market value of the N. shares was 5s. 6d. per share and of the A. shares £2 per share. In June 1930 the G. company disposed of its interest in the lower leases, and in November 1930 made a cash distribution of 10s. per share among its members out of portion of the consideration received. E. participated in this distribution also. After each of the two distributions the G. company had sufficient assets left to answer its issued share capital. The Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation included in E.'s assessable income (at their respective market values) the shares in the N. and A. companies distributed to him and the 10s. per share paid to him in cash.
(1) That the shares in the N. company contained no profit on the sale of the upper leases, that there was no reason to suggest any marked drop in values between the acquisition and the distribution of those shares by the G. company, that they represented surplus assets not required to make good its issued share capital and that the whole amount of 5s. 6d. per share should
(2) By Rich, Diron and Evatt JJ. (Starke J. dissenting) that profit consisting in an accretion in value of the shares in the A. company fell within the charging part of sec. 16 (b) (i) (1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1922-1930 and that the shares should be included in E.'s assessable income except to the extent to which the actual value of the shares in the A. company exceeded their face value at the time of their allotment to the G. company.
(3) By Rich, Dixon and Evatt JJ. (Starke J. dissenting), that the object which actuated the G. company in taking up the lower leases was not the making of profit by turning them over at an increased value, but to make money for its shareholders by working or exploiting the leases themselves or transferring them for shares to some other company possessing more capital which could do so, that the leases were assets which were not acquired for the purpose of resale and at a profit and that the 10s. per share cash distribution
Per Rich, Dixon and Evatt JJ.: The "purpose" referred to in the final proviso to sec. 16 (b) (i) (2) is the dominant purpose actuating the acquisition of assets, and the proviso is concerned with the difference between the enlarge- ment of capital by sale of capital assets and obtaining detachable capital by buying and selling assets.
Decision of the Supreme Court of South Australia (Murray C.J.) Evans V. Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation, (1934) S.A.S.R. 457, varied.
APPEAL from the Supreme Court of South Australia.
The appellant Arthur Ernest Herbert Evans, a resident in Australia, was a shareholder in Guinea Gold No Liability (hereinafter called