Evans and Anor. v Maclean Shire Council

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NEW SOUTH WALES LAND AND ENVIRONMENT COURT

CITATION:      Evans and Anor. v Maclean Shire Council and Anor. [2005]  NSWLEC 67

PARTIES:
APPLICANTS:
Evans and Anor.

RESPONDENTS:
Maclean Shire Council and Anor.

CASE NUMBER:      41468 of        2003

CATCH WORDS:     Costs

LEGISLATION CITED:
Land and Environment Court Act 1979, s 69

CORAM:        Bignold J

DATES OF HEARING:          18 February 2005

DECISION DATE:     28/02/2005

LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES

APPLICANTS:
Mr C Leggat, Barrister
SOLICITORS
Solicitor Environmental Defenders Office

RESPONDENTS:
Ms N Levi (in person)
SOLICITORS
N/A

JUDGMENT:

THE LAND AND
ENVIRONMENT COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES

BIGNOLD J

28 February 2005

41468 of 2003     S AND R EVANS v MACLEAN SHIRE COUNCIL; INTEGRATED SITE DESIGN

JUDGMENT

HIS HONOUR:

A.           INTRODUCTION

  1. By their Notice of Motion filed 10 December 2004, the Applicants seek an order that the second Respondent pay their costs in these class 4 proceedings, including the costs of their present Motion which was opposed by the second Respondent.

  2. The class 4 proceedings which were commenced on 1 December 2003 claimed a declaration that a development consent granted by the Maclean Shire Council (the first Respondent) on 21 July 2003 for the expansion of existing facilities on land known as the “Clarence Coast Resort” was void.  They also claimed a declaration that the development, the subject of the impugned development consent, was relevantly “State significant development” in terms of State Environmental Planning Policy No 71—Coastal Protection (SEPP71) and that the Minister for Planning was the relevant “consent authority” to determine the development application that had been made by the second Respondent.  Additionally, an injunction was claimed restraining the second Respondent from carrying out development in reliance upon the impugned development consent.  The sole basis advanced by the Applicants for impugning the development consent was that it was not granted by the relevant “consent authority”.

  3. On 1 March 2004, the first Respondent filed a submitting appearance save as to costs and the proceedings were defended by the second Respondent.

  4. In my reserved judgment delivered on 9 September 2004 (Evans v Maclean Shire Council and Anor [2004] NSWLEC 512), I held that the Applicants had been successful on the single issue raised, namely whether the approved development was relevantly “State significant development” and since no question of discretion had been raised in the proceedings, I declared the relevant development consent to be null and void and restrained the second Respondent from carrying out development in reliance upon it.

  5. In seeking an order for costs, the Applicants rely upon their success in the proceedings and the general well established rule in the exercise of the broad costs discretion conferred by the Land and Environment Court Act 1979, s 69 that ordinarily costs will follow the event and a successful litigant in class 4 proceedings has a reasonable expectation of receiving his/her costs in the absence of special circumstances or disentitling conduct on the part of the successful litigant.

  6. It is submitted on behalf of…

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Details
Case
[2005] NSWLEC 67
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Evans and Anor. sought a declaration that a development consent granted by Maclean Shire Council for the expansion of the Clarence Coast Resort was void. The Applicants also claimed that the Minister for Planning was the relevant "consent authority" to determine the development application made by the second Respondent. The proceedings were defended by the second Respondent. In a reserved judgment, the court held that the Applicants had been successful on the single issue raised, namely whether the approved development was relevantly "State significant development." The court declared the relevant development consent to be null and void and restrained the second Respondent from carrying out development in reliance upon it.

The Applicants sought an order for costs, relying on their success in the proceedings and the well-established rule that a successful litigant in class 4 proceedings has a reasonable expectation of receiving their costs in the absence of special circumstances or disentitling conduct. The second Respondent opposed the making of a costs order, claiming that there were special circumstances that justified the withholding of a costs order in favour of the Applicants. The second Respondent argued that the Applicants' success in the proceedings was a "fluke" and that the Applicants had caused costs to be unnecessarily incurred by raising an unnecessary and false issue.

The court reviewed the arguments advanced by both parties and found that the Applicants' success in the proceedings was not a "fluke" but rather founded upon their success on the disputed question of statutory interpretation. The court also found that the Applicants had unnecessarily incurred costs by raising an unnecessary and false issue. The court concluded that the Applicants should not recover any costs incurred on the unnecessary and false issue.

The court applied established principles for the exercise of the Court's costs discretion, which include that the usual rationale of making a costs order is to indemnify or compensate the person in whose favour it is made. The court held that the Applicants should not obtain an order for the payment of their full costs but should obtain only a limited order recognising that they were the successful party but that the manner in which they had conducted the litigation had involved the incurring by both parties of unnecessary and wasted costs.

Accordingly, the court made the following orders:

1. The second Respondent shall pay 40 percent of the Applicants' costs in the proceedings (other than the costs of the hearing of the Applicants' Motion for costs) in the sum agreed, or failing agreement, as assessed.
2. There be no order for costs on the hearing of the Applicants' Notice of Motion seeking an order for costs.

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