HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
CALLINAN J
Matter No B70/2003
DAVID WILLIAM ETTRIDGE APPLICANT
AND
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (QUEENSLAND) RESPONDENT
Matter No B71/2003
PAULINE LEE HANSON APPLICANT
AND
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (QUEENSLAND) RESPONDENT
Ettridge v Director of Public Prosecutions (Q))
Hanson v Director of Public Prosecutions (Q)
[2003] HCA 68
23 September 2003
B70/2003, B71/2003ORDER
Applications dismissed.
Representation:
Matter No B70/2003
B W Walker SC for the applicant (instructed by Boe Callaghan)
B G Campbell for the respondent (instructed by Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland))
Matter No B71/2003
C E K Hampson QC with K S Howe for the applicant (instructed by Nyst Lawyers)
B G Campbell for the respondent (instructed by Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland))
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
CALLINAN J. Anyone who turns out to have been wrongly imprisoned, even for a day, is entitled to feel a deep sense of grievance. Accordingly our system of law is intended to ensure, so far as is possible, that an accused person be given a fair trial, and if convicted, not be excessively penalised. Even so, trials can and do miscarry, and punishments more harsh than the crime and the circumstances of the convicted person warrant, are sometimes imposed. Unfortunately however whether either of those events has occurred can only be determined in hindsight, and with the careful evaluation of the trial by an appellate court with the benefit of argument and the time to undertake it. In the meantime, conventionally, all concerned are, as a practical and a legal matter, obliged to accept that the conviction and punishment have been regularly entered and imposed.
But there are exceptional cases. And when these are shown to exist, the courts may react by allowing bail to a convicted person pending the hearing of his or her appeal.
In this Court however matters are somewhat more complicated. By the time that convicted applicants seek to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court they have almost always not only been tried and convicted, but also have had the benefit of a review of their cases by an appellate court. It follows inevitably that no matter how difficult it may be for a convicted person to persuade an intermediate appellate court that he or she should be granted bail pending the disposition of his or her appeal to that Court, the difficulties are compounded when the applicant comes to this Court seeking bail before that appeal is heard. Self-evidently, the difficulties are further compounded by the facts here that the applicants' application for bail has been rejected by the intermediate court, and they have not been granted special leave to appeal to this Court against that rejection.
It is convenient to deal with both applicants' cases together.
Ms Hanson was convicted on three counts: first, contrary to s 408C(1)(f) of the Criminal Code (Q) ("the Code"), of dishonestly inducing the Electoral Commission of Queensland…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Ettridge v Director of Public Prosecutions and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2003] HCA 68
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the applicants had demonstrated exceptional or special circumstances warranting the grant of bail at this stage of the proceedings. This involved considering the prospects of success on their applications for special leave to appeal and their substantive appeals, as well as the principles governing the High Court's intervention in state discretionary bail matters.
Callinan J dismissed the applications, finding that the applicants had not established the requisite exceptional or special circumstances. His Honour noted that it was not possible at this stage to form a confident view about the outcome of the substantive appeals against conviction, and that it was inappropriate for a single Justice of the High Court to embark on a detailed factual exploration. Furthermore, the High Court is not a sentencing court, and its general practice is to remit sentencing matters to the intermediate court. The applicants had not yet succeeded in obtaining special leave to appeal the Court of Appeal's refusal of bail, and it was considered unlikely that bail would be granted by a Full Court when the substantive appeal had not been heard. The relatively prompt hearing of the substantive appeal was also a relevant factor.
Orders
Orders of the court
Applications dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
The applicants then sought special leave to appeal to the High Court against the refusal of bail by an intermediate appellate court, before even the substantive appeal against conviction had been heard by the Court of Appeal. The applicants argued that there were exceptional or special circumstances that warranted the grant of bail, including the unlikelihood of their appeal being successful, the length of their sentences, and the failure of the trial judge to consider certain factors in sentencing. They also argued that the High Court should intervene in the exercise of the state's discretionary jurisdiction in a pending matter.
The Court of Appeal had previously rejected the applicants' argument that they were entitled to bail pending the hearing of their application for special leave to appeal against the refusal of bail by the primary judge. The Court of Appeal held that the applicants had not demonstrated exceptional or special circumstances that would warrant the grant of bail. The Court of Appeal also held that it was not possible to form any confident view about the outcome of the substantive appeals against conviction, and that the High Court was not a sentencing court in the ordinary sense. The Court of Appeal further held that the applicants had not yet succeeded in obtaining a grant of special leave to appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal refusing bail.
The matter of Ettridge v Director of Public Prosecutions involves an application for bail pending the hearing of an application for special leave to appeal against a refusal of bail by an intermediate appellate court, before even the substantive appeal against conviction has been heard by that court. The applicants, Ettridge and Hanson, sought bail on the basis of exceptional circumstances despite having their appeals against the refusal of bail by the Queensland Court of Appeal dismissed. This case came before the High Court as a result of an application for special leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal's decision. Prior to this, the applicants had unsuccessfully applied for bail in the Queensland Court of Appeal, which had upheld the refusal of bail by a primary judge. The High Court's consideration focused on the prospects of success of obtaining special leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal's decision and the potential outcome of such an appeal. The procedural steps leading to this point included applications for bail in the trial court and the Court of Appeal, culminating in the current application for special leave to appeal to the High Court.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: CALLINAN J
In Ettridge v Director of Public Prosecutions, the court addressed the issue of whether exceptional or special circumstances were shown to warrant the granting of bail pending the hearing of an application for special leave to appeal against a refusal of bail by an intermediate appellate court, before the substantive appeal against conviction had been heard. The court reasoned that at this stage, it was not possible to form any confident view about the outcome of the substantive appeals against conviction. The court emphasized that it was not for a single Justice in this jurisdiction to embark upon a detailed exploration of the facts, particularly at this stage. This would only be possible with the benefit of full argument on a substantive appeal.
The court also considered whether the trial judge failed to comply with s 9 of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Q) by disregarding or giving no weight to the applicants' good character, the absence of any prior criminal conduct, their participation in public affairs, and their personal family circumstances, and not giving proper or real weight to their efforts to reimburse the State in full for the money received. The court found that the trial judge had paid attention to the applicants' good character and other relevant factors, and had regarded the significant popular electoral support that the party and its candidates received as a factor reflecting on their characters.
Further, the court examined whether the trial judge failed to properly consider the applicants' representation that One Nation was a registered party and the significant popular electoral support that the party and its candidates received, as factors reflecting on their characters. The court found that the trial judge had clearly paid attention to this matter and had regarded it as a factor reflecting on the applicants' characters.
The court also considered whether the applicants' penalty was harsher than that of other persons convicted of comparable offences, and if so, whether this demonstrates special or exceptional circumstances warranting bail. However, the court found that the applicants' submissions on penalty did not demonstrate special or exceptional circumstances of the kind which would lead to a grant of bail at this stage.
Lastly, the court considered whether it should interfere with the exercise of a state discretionary jurisdiction in a pending matter, especially a single Justice of it, save perhaps for a very exceptional case. The court found that it would not be right for this Court, especially a single Justice of it, to interfere with the exercise of a state discretionary jurisdiction in a pending matter, save perhaps for a very exceptional case which it was not easy to envisage.
In conclusion, the court dismissed the applications for bail, holding that there were no exceptional or special circumstances shown to warrant the granting of bail in these cases. The court found that the applicants had not even succeeded yet in obtaining a grant of special leave to appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal refusing bail, and it was highly unlikely that a Full Court of this Court would grant bail to any applicant whose substantive appeal to an intermediate court of appeal had not been heard.