Estonina v Woolworths Group Limited

Case

[2024] FedCFamC2G 787

7 August 2024


FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

Estonina v Woolworths Group Limited [2024] FedCFamC2G 787

File number(s): SYG 1399 of 2024
Judgment of: JUDGE MANOUSARIDIS
Date of judgment: 7 August 2024
Catchwords: PRACTICE & PROCEDURE – application for orders for alleged contempt by respondent and his lawyers – no foundation for such application – application dismissed.
Legislation:

 Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 11.08, 16.13(2)

Federal Court Act of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 23CA(a)

Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW) No 16A of 2014 ss 296, 298  

Division: General
Number of paragraphs: 7
Date of hearing: 7 August 2024
Place: Sydney
The Applicant: Appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr M Minnuci
Solicitor for the Respondent: Kingston Reid

ORDERS

SYG 1399 of 2024

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

MARC ANTHONY ESTONINA

Applicant

AND:

WOOLWORTHS GROUP LIMITED

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE MANOUSARIDIS

DATE OF ORDER:

7 AUGUST 2024

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The interlocutory application lodged of 26 June 2024 is dismissed together with the Statement of Charge dated 25 May 2024.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Revised from Transcript)

  1. This matter was originally commenced by the applicant in the Federal Court of Australia, and has been subsequently transferred to this Court. The matter was listed today, together with a related matter the applicant commenced in this Court.  This matter was listed as a first court date, the intention being that I would consider making programming orders for the further progress of the matter.

  2. In addition, however, the applicant, on 26 June 2024, lodged for filing an interlocutory application.  The interlocutory application sought what it describes as interlocutory orders, but in effect seeks what can more accurately be described as declarations of contraventions or breaches of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (Federal Court Rules), the Federal Court Act of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FC Act), and of the Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW) No 16a of 2014 (LPU Law), the last declaration apparently being directed to the lawyers for the respondent.

  3. The interlocutory application was supported by what is titled as a Statement of Charge. In effect, therefore, the interlocutory application is an application for findings of contempt by the respondent, and more particularly, by the acts of the respondent’s solicitors. The statement of charge alleges breaches of r 16.13(2) of the Federal Court Rules, a breach of s 23CA(a) of the FC Act, a breach of r 11.08 of the Federal Court Rules, and a breach of ss 296 and 298 of the LPU Law. The statement of charge purports to be supported by an affidavit, which I have not formally read for reasons that will become apparent in a moment.

  4. On its face, the statement of charge does not disclose anything that could have been the subject of an application for contempt.  It is not alleged that there has been any conduct in breach of any order made by the Court.  Further, and in any event, the material on which the applicant - who I should have added at the beginning of these reasons, is not legally represented - is incapable of supporting any of the claims in any event.

  5. Counsel for the respondent submitted that the statement of charge and the application made on the basis of it are an outrage.  I agree.  The applicant is unrepresented, but even an unrepresented litigant has certain basic duties to the Court and also responsibilities to other parties, legally represented or not. The applicant was aware that a charge of contempt is a criminal charge, although on being pressed he accepted that he did not undertake any research about what may constitute contempt.

  6. It goes without saying that an allegation of contempt is a serious allegation to make, and should only be made on the same basis as any criminal charge or on the basis as any other serious misconduct can be alleged, and that is with a high degree of specificity, and on the basis of evidence that is capable of supporting a finding of contempt to the appropriate legal standard of proof. What I have said so far should manifest to the applicant that his application for contempt was inappropriate.

  7. Counsel for the respondent submitted that I should issue some form of reprimand.  I do not know what form that reprimand would take, but I do say this:  this Court, like all statutory courts, has an implied incidental power to control its procedures and to prevent vexatious and abusive proceedings, and it can deal with such proceedings by way of costs orders, and, ultimately, by the Court dismissing a proceeding for vexation.

I certify that the preceding seven (7) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Manousaridis.

Associate:

Dated:       26 August 2024

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