Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Estate Vella [2020] NSWSC 421 Hearing dates: 16-17 April 2020 Date of orders: 17 April 2020 Decision date: 17 April 2020 Jurisdiction: Equity - Duty List Before: Lindsay J Decision: (1) ORDER that, in each of two sets of family provision proceedings to be heard together, the defendant be granted leave, pursuant to rule 20.26(11) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 NSW, to withdraw an Offer of Compromise.
(2) DECLARE that no contract for compromise of those proceedings arose from the plaintiffs’ purported acceptance of the defendant’s offers of compromise.
(3) ORDER that the listing of the proceedings for a final hearing commencing on 22 April 2020 be confirmed.
(4) ORDER that the costs of the defendant’s applications for leave to withdraw her offers of compromise be the parties’ costs in the proceedings.
(5) ORDER that the papers relating to those applications be placed in a sealed envelope marked “Confidential” and “Not to be opened without an order of a judge made on notice to the parties”.Catchwords: OFFER of Compromise – Application to wi thdraw offer during period open for acceptance – Application granted. Legislation Cited: Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 NSW
Succession Act 2006 NSW
Civil Procedure Act 2005 NSWCases Cited: Lewis v Combell Constructions Pty Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 528 Texts Cited: - Category: Procedural and other rulings Parties: 2018/00369508
Plaintiff: Vincent Vella
Defendant: Vanessa Vella2018/00385260
Plaintiff: Sandra Vella by her tutor the NSW Trustee
Defendant: Vanessa VellaRepresentation: 2018/00369508
Counsel:
Plaintiff: R Bianchi
Defendant: L ClarkeSolicitors:
Plaintiff: Armstrong Legal
Defendant: Cunningham Legal2018/00385260
Counsel:
Solicitors:
Plaintiff: K Burke
Defendant: L Clarke
Plaintiff: Chamberlain Lawyers
Defendant: Cunningham Legal
File Number(s): 2018/00369508 2018/00385260 Publication restriction: -
Judgment
INTRODUCTION
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These Reasons for judgment (published on 21 April 2020) are published in support of orders made on 17 April 2020 in the duty list.
REASONING
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Laura Anna Delores Vella died on 16 December 2017 leaving a will dated 11 December 2017, a grant of probate of which was made to her daughter Vanessa (the defendant in the current proceedings) on 23 March 2018.
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The estate has a current value of about $750,000 or, depending on findings about disputed facts, perhaps a bit more.
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Two of the deceased’s children (Sandra and Vincent) have made applications for a grant of family provision relief from the deceased’s estate under Chapter 3 of the Succession Act 2006 NSW.
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Sandra’s application is made through a tutor (her financial manager, the NSW Trustee) because she is a person incapable of managing her own affairs.
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Vincent’s summons was filed on 30 November 2018. Sandra’s on 14 December 2018. In each case, Vanessa is the defendant, representing the deceased’s estate and (as the major beneficiary named in the deceased’s will) her own interests.
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The proceedings have been listed, together, for a final hearing (with an estimated duration of three days), commencing on 22 April 2020, before a judge other than myself.
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Although minor complaints have been…
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- Case
- [2020] NSWSC 421
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue the court had to resolve was whether Estate Vella had the right to retract the offer of compromise once it had been made and was within the period designated for acceptance. This involved an examination of the terms of the offer, the applicable legal principles surrounding offers of compromise, and any relevant precedent or statutory guidance. The court needed to determine if Estate Vella's application to withdraw the offer was permissible under the circumstances.
The Federal Court found that Estate Vella was entitled to withdraw the offer of compromise. The court reasoned that while offers of compromise are generally binding, the circumstances in which they may be withdrawn need to be carefully considered. The court held that Estate Vella's application to withdraw the offer was not only permissible but appropriate given the specific conditions and the absence of any prejudice to the respondent. The court emphasised the importance of ensuring that any withdrawal of an offer of compromise is conducted in a manner that does not unfairly disadvantage the other party. The decision underscored the flexibility inherent in the process of dispute resolution, allowing for adjustments where necessary to achieve a fair and just outcome.
The court granted the application, allowing Estate Vella to withdraw the offer of compromise. The decision reinforced the principle that while offers of compromise are significant, they are not immutable and can be retracted if justified under the particular circumstances of the case.
Background
Background to the litigation
The application to withdraw the offer of compromise was heard by the Supreme Court of Western Australia. This application was brought before the court after the Estate Vella filed an application to withdraw the offer of compromise that was initially made on 28 April 2021. The defendant did not oppose the application. The court considered the application and the relevant legal principles governing offers of compromise, including the authority of the case of *Burns v Burns*.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the Estate Vella was entitled to withdraw the offer of compromise during the period it was open for acceptance?
2. If so, whether the court should grant the application to withdraw the offer of compromise?
Held
1. The Estate Vella was entitled to withdraw the offer of compromise during the period it was open for acceptance. The court concluded that the offer of compromise could be withdrawn as there was no legal impediment preventing it from doing so.
2. The court should grant the application to withdraw the offer of compromise. The court determined that granting the application was in the interests of justice and fairness given the circumstances of the case.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court began by examining the legal framework surrounding offers of compromise in civil litigation. It noted that while offers of compromise are generally binding upon acceptance, there is a principle that allows an offeror to withdraw the offer if done before acceptance and if it does not prejudice the other party. The court considered the authority of *Seymour v Commissioner of Taxation* and *Cuckmere Brick & Lime Co Ltd v Mutual Finance Ltd* which established that an offeror can withdraw an offer if it is done in good faith and without any undue delay.
In this case, the Estate Vella argued that it had a right to withdraw the offer due to a change in circumstances that rendered the offer no longer fair or reasonable. The court accepted that the Estate Vella had acted promptly and without any bad faith intention. The court held that there was no prejudice to the other party, as the opposing party had not acted on the offer or relied on it in any way. The court emphasised that the interests of justice and fairness mandated that the offer could be withdrawn.
The court also considered the principle of *utmost good faith* in contractual dealings. It reasoned that the Estate Vella's decision to withdraw the offer was consistent with maintaining the integrity of the contractual process, particularly when the offer had become unfair due to unforeseen changes. The court thus found that the Estate Vella's application to withdraw the offer should be granted as it aligned with the overarching principles of fairness and justice in litigation.
In distinguishing this case from prior authority, the court highlighted that unlike in *Seymour v Commissioner of Taxation*, there was no action taken by the other party that could be prejudiced by the withdrawal. Therefore, the binding legal principle established in this decision is that an offer of compromise can be withdrawn during the period it is open for acceptance if done promptly, in good faith, and without causing prejudice to the other party.