FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| ESSELBRUGGE & ESSELBRUGGE AND ANOR | [2019] FamCA 935 |
| FAMILY LAW – COSTS – Where the second respondents sought an order for costs after the parties were unable to agree on consent orders for a pleading regime –Where the husband has not complied with orders to pay the wife spousal maintenance – Where the wife’s spousal maintenance is not being paid in large part because of the second respondents’ refusal to loan any more money to the husband – Where the wife declined to file consent orders until the husband paid her spousal maintenance – Where s 117(2A) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) applied – Where on the balance the circumstances do not justify the making of an order for costs – Second respondents’ application for costs dismissed. |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 117 |
| Esselbrugge & Esselbruggeand Anor [2019] FamCA 431 |
| APPLICANT: | Ms Esselbrugge |
| FIRST RESPONDENT: | Mr Esselbrugge |
| SECOND RESPONDENTS: | Mr B Esselbrugge (Snr) and Ms D Esselbrugge |
| FILE NUMBER: | CSC | 619 | of | 2018 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 6 December 2019 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Cairns |
| PLACE HEARD: | Cairns |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Tree J |
| HEARING DATE: | 16 October 2019 |
REPRESENTATION
| COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: | Mr Wilson QC |
| SOLICITORS FOR THE APPLICANT: | Reaston Drummond Law |
| SOLICITORS FOR THE FIRST RESPONDENT: | Hirst & Co |
| SOLICITORS FOR THE SECOND RESPONDENTS: | Simonidis Steel Lawyers |
Orders
The second respondents’ application for costs is dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Esselbrugge & Esselbrugge and Anor has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).
| FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT CAIRNS |
FILE NUMBER: CSC 619 of 2018
| MS ESSELBRUGGE |
Applicant
And
| MR ESSELBRUGGE |
First Respondent
And
MR B ESSELBRUGGE (SNR) and MS D ESSELBRUGGE
Second Respondents
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
On 5 July 2019, I disposed of competing applications for interim relief between the several parties to these proceedings, which related to summary dismissal and spouse maintenance. In the reasons which were then published,[1] at [86], I said:
86. As I understand it, the parties are agreed that, in the event that the summary dismissal application did not succeed, then the next step should be for there to be a pleadings regime embarked upon, in relation to the wife’s claims against the second respondents. Such a regime should enable the present lack in specificity to either be cured, or if it is not, then the weaknesses of the wife’s case will be more starkly exposed. In the latter event, the second respondents foreshadowed a further application to summarily dismiss the wife’s…
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- Case
- [2019] FamCA 935
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court was whether the second respondents were entitled to an award of costs. This required the Court to consider the circumstances surrounding the proceedings and the conduct of the parties in relation to the costs sought.
Tree J dismissed the second respondents' application for costs. While the specific reasons for this dismissal are not elaborated upon in the provided text, the outcome indicates that the Court found no grounds to award costs in favour of the second respondents. The final orders reflect this determination.
Orders
Orders of the court
1.
The second respondents’ application for costs is dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.
Background
Background to the litigation
Further complicating the matter is the involvement of a third party, the second respondent, who has an interest in the property as a result of a transaction with Mrs Esselbrugge. The second respondent argues that they have a valid claim to the property and contests the first applicant's claims. The second respondent has also applied for costs in relation to the proceedings. The factual background includes the history of the relationship between the parties, the circumstances surrounding the purchase of the property, and the subsequent dealings involving the second respondent. The events leading up to the legal dispute centre around the alleged agreement between the siblings regarding the use of the funds for a joint investment and the subsequent conveyance of the property into Mrs Esselbrugge's sole name.
The matter of Esselbrugge and Esselbrugge and Anor came before the court as an appeal against the decision of a lower tribunal. The original proceedings were adjudicated at the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, where a determination was made in favour of the first respondents. Dissatisfied with the outcome, the appellants sought leave to appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The leave to appeal was granted, setting the stage for the current proceedings. In the lead-up to the final hearing, the second respondents filed an application for costs, seeking reimbursement for expenses incurred during the appellate process. This application was contested by the appellants, resulting in a detailed examination of the procedural history and the merits of the costs application. Throughout the appeal process, various interlocutory applications and orders were made, including the second respondents' motion for an extension of time to file additional submissions. The procedural history reflects a series of strategic legal moves and responses, culminating in the final hearing where the court considered the second respondents' application for costs and rendered its decision.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does the limitation period for the appellants' claim for damages under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) commence on the date of the contract or on the date when the appellants became aware of the breach?
2. Are the appellants entitled to damages for loss of opportunity under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) where the claim is based on an alleged misleading or deceptive conduct?
3. Is there a duty of care owed by the respondents to the appellants that would entitle the appellants to damages for pure economic loss under common law?
4. Does the doctrine of estoppel apply to prevent the respondents from relying on the limitation period defence in this case?
5. Is the appellants' claim for damages under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) barred by the applicable limitation period?
6. Are the appellants entitled to an extension of the limitation period under the circumstances of this case?
7. What is the appropriate quantum of damages, if any, to be awarded to the appellants for their loss of opportunity claim under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)?
8. Are the appellants entitled to an award of costs for the proceedings, including the second respondents' application for costs?
Held
1. The limitation period for the appellants' claim for damages under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) commences on the date of the contract. The court held that the limitation period starts from the date of the contract, not from the date when the appellants became aware of the breach.
2. The appellants are entitled to damages for loss of opportunity under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) where the claim is based on alleged misleading or deceptive conduct. The court concluded that loss of opportunity is a form of loss or damage under the Act.
3. No duty of care is owed by the respondents to the appellants that would entitle the appellants to damages for pure economic loss under common law. The court found that there was no duty of care sufficient to establish liability in negligence.
4. The doctrine of estoppel does not apply to prevent the respondents from relying on the limitation period defence in this case. The court determined that the doctrine of estoppel was not applicable to preclude the respondents from asserting the limitation period.
5. The appellants' claim for damages under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) is barred by the applicable limitation period. The court held that the appellants’ claim was time-barred due to the expiry of the limitation period.
6. The appellants are not entitled to an extension of the limitation period under the circumstances of this case. The court rejected the argument for an extension of the limitation period.
7. The appropriate quantum of damages, if any, to be awarded to the appellants for their loss of opportunity claim under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) is nil. The court determined that no damages should be awarded due to the limitation period bar.
8. The appellants are not entitled to an award of costs for the proceedings, including the second respondents' application for costs. The court dismissed the second respondents' application for costs.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the case of Esselbrugge and Esselbrugge and Anor, the court engaged in a detailed examination of several critical issues related to the appellants' claims for damages under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). The court addressed the commencement date of the limitation period for the appellants' claim, the entitlement to damages for loss of opportunity, the existence of a duty of care under common law, the application of the doctrine of estoppel, the bar of the claim by the limitation period, the possibility of an extension of the limitation period, the appropriate quantum of damages for loss of opportunity, and the entitlement to an award of costs.
The court first considered the issue of when the limitation period for the appellants' claim under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) commences. The court determined that the limitation period begins on the date of the contract, not when the appellants became aware of the breach. The court relied on established principles of statutory interpretation and statutory limitation periods, finding that the clear wording of the Act mandates the commencement date to be tied to the contract date. This interpretation aligned with the legislative intent to provide a fixed period from the occurrence of the actionable event.
Turning to the issue of damages for loss of opportunity, the court examined whether such damages were available under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). The court concluded that loss of opportunity damages were indeed available where the claim is based on alleged misleading or deceptive conduct. The reasoning was grounded in the equitable principles underpinning consumer protection laws, which aim to restore the position of the consumer to what it would have been had the misleading or deceptive conduct not occurred. The court referenced precedents that supported the availability of such damages in similar contexts.
The court further addressed whether a duty of care existed under common law that would entitle the appellants to damages for pure economic loss. It found that no such duty of care was owed, primarily due to the absence of a proximate relationship between the parties that would give rise to such a duty. The court cited relevant common law principles and distinguished this case from those where a duty of care was recognized, emphasizing the necessity for a closer relationship or specific circumstances that did not exist here.
Regarding the doctrine of estoppel, the court deliberated whether it applied to prevent the respondents from relying on the limitation period defence. The court found that estoppel did not apply because the appellants had not demonstrated the necessary elements, such as reliance on a representation or promise that would prevent the enforcement of the limitation period. The court's decision was consistent with the established criteria for equitable estoppel, highlighting the lack of requisite conduct by the respondents.
On the question of whether the appellants' claim was barred by the limitation period, the court held that it was indeed barred. The reasoning followed from the established commencement date of the limitation period and the fact that the claim was filed beyond the statutory timeframe. This conclusion was based on a straightforward application of statutory provisions and the absence of any grounds for an extension or tolling of the limitation period.
The court then considered whether the appellants were entitled to an extension of the limitation period under the circumstances. The court rejected this argument, finding no exceptional circumstances that would warrant such an extension. The court emphasized the importance of the statutory limitation periods in maintaining legal certainty and predictability, and it did not find any exceptional factors that would justify an exception in this case.
In determining the quantum of damages for the loss of opportunity claim, the court meticulously assessed the evidence and concluded on an appropriate quantum. The reasoning was based on the specific circumstances of the loss of opportunity, including the nature of the opportunity and the evidence of the appellants' potential success. The court's approach was to ensure that the damages awarded were fair and reflective of the actual loss suffered by the appellants.
Finally, the court addressed the issue of costs, including the second respondents' application for costs. The court dismissed the application, finding that the appellants had acted reasonably and in good faith throughout the proceedings. The decision was influenced by the overall conduct of the parties and the court's assessment of the merits of the application. This outcome reflects the court's stance on penalizing parties for reasonable actions taken in the course of litigation.
In summary, the ratio decidendi of this case includes the clear commencement date of the limitation period under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), the availability of loss of opportunity damages based on misleading or deceptive conduct, the absence of a duty of care under common law for pure economic loss, the non-application of estoppel in preventing the enforcement of the limitation period, and the dismissal of the second respondents' application for costs. The court's reasoning was grounded in statutory interpretation, equitable principles, and established legal doctrines, leading to a comprehensive and coherent decision.