Eshchenko v Commissioner of State Revenue

Link copied
Case Copied 37 min read

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Eshchenko v Commissioner of State Revenue [2023] QSC 100

PARTIES:

RUSLAN ESHCHENKO

(appellant)

v
COMMISSIONER OF STATE REVENUE

(respondent)

FILE NO:

BS No 4984 of 2022

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:


Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

18 May 2023

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

26 April 2023

JUDGE:

Cooper J

ORDERS:

1.   The respondent’s decision dated 31 March 2022 to disallow the appellant’s objection is affirmed.

2.   The assessment dated 24 January 2022 is affirmed.

3.   The appeal is dismissed.

4.   The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal to be assessed on the standard basis if not agreed.

CATCHWORDS:

TAXES AND DUTIES – STAMP DUTIES – TRANSACTIONS CONCERNING DUTIABLE PROPERTY – LAND RICH ENTITIES – QUEENSLAND – where the Commissioner of State Revenue issued an assessment of landholder duty in respect of the acquisition of an interest in a company – where the appellant lodged an objection to the assessment of duty – where the Commissioner of State Revenue disallowed the objection – where the appellant appeals the decision of the Commissioner of State Revenue pursuant to s 69(2)(a) of the Taxation Administration Act 2001 (Qld) – whether the interest acquired was an excluded interest within the meaning of s 179(6) of the Duties Act 2001 (Qld) – whether the decision of the Commissioner of State Revenue to disallow the appellant’s objection should be affirmed – whether the appeal should be dismissed

Taxation Administration Act 2001 (Qld), s 47, s 69
Duties Act 2001 (Qld), s 158, s 159, s 160, s 161, s 162, s 163, s 164, s 165, s 165A, s 175, s 178A, s 179, Schedule 3

Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27; [2009] HCA 41, applied
Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 147 CLR 297; [1981] HCA 26, considered
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355; [1998] HCA 28, applied
Queensland Chamber of Commerce and Industry Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (2015) 108 ACSR 334; [2015] QSC 77, cited
R v Wassmuth; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2022] QCA 113, cited
Trust Company of Australia Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (2003) 197 ALR 297; [2003] HCA 23, cited
Wakefield v Commissioner of State Revenue [2019] 3 Qd R 414; [2019] QSC 085, cited

COUNSEL:

D Russell KC for the appellant

H Lakis for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Ponting Hynes Lawyers for the appellant

Clayton Utz for the respondent

Introduction

  1. Pursuant to s 69(2)(a) of the Taxation Administration Act 2001 (Qld) (TA Act), Mr Eshchenko has appealed the decision of the Commissioner of State Revenue to disallow his objection to the assessment of duty under the Duties Act 2001 (Qld) (Act) in respect of the acquisition of an interest in a company called Maylake Pty Ltd (Maylake).

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Eshchenko v Commissioner of State Revenue and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2023] QSC 100
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Eshchenko v Commissioner of State Revenue involved an appeal against the disallowance of an objection to a landholder duty assessment. The appellant, who had acquired an interest in a company through the issuance of redeemable preference shares, contested the assessment on the basis that the interest acquired should be considered an excluded interest under the Duties Act 2001 (Qld). The central legal issue was whether the statutory language of s 179(6) of the Act, which defines 'excluded interest', could be interpreted to exclude the appellant's interest from the dutiable value calculation. The court considered whether the statutory language, when interpreted in context, supported the appellant's argument that interests acquired from related parties should be excluded under specific conditions.

The Queensland Court of Appeal examined the statutory language and context, ultimately determining that the appellant's interpretation was too narrow. The court found that the statutory language indicated that interests held or acquired by related persons could be treated as interests of the person making the acquisition, provided they constituted the relevant acquisition. The court also noted that the statutory scheme was not intended to result in a nil dutiable value for relevant acquisitions, especially those between related parties. The court affirmed the Commissioner of State Revenue's decision to disallow the appellant's objection, upheld the assessment, and dismissed the appeal. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The respondent’s decision dated 31 March 2022 to disallow the appellant’s objection is affirmed.

2. The assessment dated 24 January 2022 is affirmed.

3. The appeal is dismissed.

4. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal to be assessed on the standard basis if not agreed.

Background

Background to the litigation

The issue in this appeal is whether, on its proper construction, s 179(6) of the Act applies to the agreed facts to exclude the interest the appellant acquired in Maylake from the calculation of the dutiable value of the relevant acquisition.Agreed facts The facts agreed between the parties are relatively confined. I have set those facts out in full in paragraphs [6] to [28] below. Maylake was incorporated on 29 July 1997, with a share capital of one redeemable preference share held by George Stephenson Gilltrap. At the time Mr Gilltrap was the company’s sole director. On 6 August 1997, Leonid Eshschenko (“Leonid”) became the sole director and secretary of Maylake and was allotted one ordinary share. Leonid is the father of the appellant. As at 6 August 1997, Leonid held an entitlement to all distributions on the winding up of the company. As at 6 August 1997, Maylake did not own any land in Queensland. On 1 July 1998, Maylake allotted 2,999,999 ordinary shares to Leonid. Those shares were of the same class as the share which Leonid had held since 6 August 1997, and carried the same rights. From 1 July 1998, the issued share capital of Maylake comprised 3,000,000 ordinary shares held by Leonid. A resolution of the sole shareholder of Maylake dated 11 July 2013 (“2013 Shareholder’s Resolution”) added a new Article 88 to the Constitution of Maylake providing inter alia, that:(a)there would be two classes of shares comprising:(i) 3,990,000 ordinary shares; and(ii) 10,000 redeemable preference shares;(b)the 3,990,000 ordinary shares rank pari passu and (subject to the rights of the holders of redeemable preference shares) carried the right to receive all dividends and all distributions upon a winding up; and(c)the 10,000 redeemable preference shares rank pari passu and carried the right:(i) to receive 49% of any dividend declared by Maylake; and(ii) to receive 49% of any amount distributed to the members of Maylake upon a winding up. Pursuant to a resolution of the directors of Maylake in writing dated 11 July 2013 (“2013 Directors’ Resolution”), it was resolved that 10,000 redeemable preference shares in Maylake be issued to the appellant. The appellant acquired the 10,000 redeemable preference shares in his individual capacity. By that issue of 10,000 redeemable preference shares, the appellant acquired an entitlement to a distribution of 49% of the property of Maylake upon its winding up. As at 11 July 2013 the issued share capital of Maylake comprised:(a)3,000,000 ordinary shares held by Leonid; and(b)10,000 redeemable preference shares held by the appellant. Pursuant to a special resolution dated 21 June 2021 (“2021 Special Resolution”) the shareholders of Maylake resolved that the share rights of the redeemable preference shares be varied so that the issued 10,000 redeemable preference shares carry between them the right:(a)to receive 100% of any dividend declared by Maylake; and(b)to receive 100% of any amount distributed to the members of Maylake upon a winding up.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The respondent disallowed the appellant’s objection to the initial assessment in a decision dated 31 March 2022 (Objection Decision).[19][19]Court document 8, pages 266 to 279. The reasons given for disallowing the objection are set out in the following paragraphs of the Objection Decision:[20][20]Emphasis in original, citations omitted. “35.The critical restriction is that [the term ‘excluded interest’ defined in s 179(6)] applies only to an interest constituting the relevant acquisition. Thus, it directs attention to s. 158(1) and the three circumstances that will trigger a relevant acquisition, whichever is applicable, being:a.the person acquires a significant interest in a landholder (s. 158(1)(a));b.the person acquires an interest in a landholder and, when aggregated with interests held by the person in the landholder, or interests acquired or held by related persons of the person in the landholder, results in a significant interest (s. 158(1)(b));c.the person, having acquired a significant interest in a landholder as mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), for which acquisition landholder duty was imposed, the persons’ interest in the landholder increases (s. 158(1)(c)).36.The term ‘constituting’ is not defined in the Duties Act and therefore has its ordinary meaning, which is derived from ‘constitute’: ‘(of elements, etc.) to compose; form’. On this basis, I consider the term ‘constituting’ in the current context connotes a relevant acquisition composed of, or formed by, multiple interests resulting from the aggregation of various interests under s. 158(1)(b).37.As noted above, the Commissioner’s delegate determined that the relevant acquisition arises, in this instance, under s. 158(1)(b). I concur with that finding. This is because, prior to the Special Resolution, the Taxpayer held a 49% interest in the Company on the basis that the RDPs had the entitlement to receive 49% of the Company’s property on its winding-up (a matter you do not dispute). The effect of the Rights Variation is that the Taxpayer acquired a further 51% in the landholder (being the entire interest held by Leonid in the landholder before the Relevant Date). By applying the relevant rule in s. 158(1)(b), the interest constituting the relevant acquisition is the aggregate of the interest acquired by the Taxpayer in the landholder under the Rights Variation (51%) and the Existing Interest held by the Taxpayer in the landholder prior to the Special Resolution (49%), which totals 100%.38.Your submissions indicate to me that you consider the 51% interest acquired by the Taxpayer as a result of the Rights Variation is an excluded interest on the basis that it was an interest held by Leonid, a related person of the Taxpayer, more than three years before the relevant acquisition, or at a time when the landholder did not hold land in Queensland. Alternatively, you are saying transactions between related persons should be exempted or disregarded. However, these assertions fail to recognise that Leonid ceased to hold his interest when it was acquired by the Taxpayer on the Relevant Date.39.As noted above, s. 162 specifies when a person acquires an interest in a landholder. While entitlement as a shareholder to a distribution of the corporation’s property is necessary for an interest, it is not necessary for a person to acquire a shareholding in a corporation to acquire an interest in a corporation. An interest is acquired if a person obtains an interest, or increases their interest, regardless of how this occurs. Section 162(2) sets out some of the ways a person may acquire an interest. The abrogation or alteration of a right for a share (as in this instance) is just one of those ways.40.The cumulative effect of ss. 162 and 163 make it clear that the focus is on the person who has ‘acquired’ an interest in a landholder. Where the person acquires an interest from a related person (as in this instance), it ceases to be held by the related person and therefore, it does not count towards the interests (if any) to be aggregated under s. 158(1)(b). Interests held by related persons will only count as an interest constituting the relevant acquisition if held by the related person immediately before and after the relevant acquisition. There were no such interests constituting the subject relevant acquisition, only the Existing Interest held by the Taxpayer (see paragraph 37 above).41.The landholder duty provisions are not designed or intended to reduce the dutiable value of a relevant acquisition to nil, or to exempt acquisitions between related persons. This would have an unintended effect or outcome not contemplated by the legislature, as it seeks to excise from the calculation of the dutiable value under s. 179(1) (by utilising s. 179(6)) the very interest for which landholder duty is required to be imposed on the basis that the Taxpayer has made a relevant acquisition in a landholder.42.It is also important to note that the sum of the interests held or acquired by the person, and related persons of the person, in the landholder, can never exceed 100%. Following, the Rights Variation, the Taxpayer is now entitled to 100% of the Company’s property on its winding-up, compared to 49% prior to the Special Resolution. Landholder duty is intended to apply in these situations because the taxpayer has acquired a significant interest of 51% in a landholder. To not impose landholder duty in this instance is clearly not the policy intent when the statutory requirements are properly construed.43.The policy of not including, for duty purposes, acquisitions that occurred more than three years before the relevant acquisition, or at a time when the landholder did not hold land in Queensland, ensures these interests are disregarded for working out the dutiable value of the relevant acquisition under s. 179(1). An exception applies where the interest is acquired under an arrangement which also involved the interest most recently acquired.44.It follows, the dutiable value of the relevant acquisition worked out under s. 179(1) is the interest constituting the relevant acquisition (100%), less any excluded interest (49%), multiplied by the unencumbered value of the Queensland land-holdings of the landholder ($30,700,000), resulting in the landholder duty as reflected in the assessment ($880,802.50).”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In summary, the proper approach to statutory construction requires that the court’s consideration focus on the text of the relevant provision, in context.[37] The task must begin with a consideration of the text itself, although the meaning of the text may require consideration of the context, which includes the general purpose and policy of the provisions.[37]R v Wassmuth; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2022] QCA 113 at [26].Consideration The appellant’s central argument on this appeal was that, adopting a literal interpretation of s 179(6), the legislative intention was to exclude, from the calculation of duty under s 179(1), an interest acquired from a related party which satisfied the requirements of ss 179(6)(a) or (b). I am unable to accept that submission. The appellant’s argument faces an initial difficulty because the opening words of s 179(6) describe an “excluded interest” as being an interest “of a person who makes a relevant acquisition in a private landholder”. Adopting a literal interpretation of those words would limit the application of the definition to an interest held or acquired by the person who makes the relevant acquisition: in this case, the appellant. Plainly, that construction would not be correct given the further words of s 179(6) and, particularly, the references to interests “held by … a related person” (in s 179(6)(a) and to interests “acquired by … a related person” in s 179(6)(b). Consistently with the aggregation of interests in s 158(1)(b), the inclusion of these words indicate that interests held or acquired by a related person can, for the purposes of the landholder provisions, including s 179(6), be treated as an interest of the person who makes the relevant acquisition. Two matters must be considered in order to determine whether, in applying s 179(6), an interest held or acquired by a related person is to be treated as an interest of the person who makes the relevant acquisition. First, there is the requirement that the interest of the person used to calculate the dutiable value of the relevant acquisition under s 179(1), and any interest excluded from that calculation by the application of the definition in s 179(6), be an interest “constituting the relevant acquisition”. As is clear from s 158(1), the interests which constitute the relevant acquisition are not limited to the interest acquired by the person at the time of the relevant acquisition. It might also include the following interests aggregated under s 158(1)(b):(a)an existing interest held by the person at the time the relevant acquisition is made;(b)an existing interest held by a related person at the time the relevant acquisition is made;(c)an interest acquired by a related person at the time the relevant acquisition is made. Secondly, the time at which the interests which constitute the relevant acquisition are to be identified for the purpose of applying the definition in s 179(6) is the time of the relevant acquisition. That is because, under s 179(1), the dutiable value of a relevant acquisition is reduced by “any excluded interest of the person at the time of the acquisition”.