ESBEREY and SHIRE OF KALAMUNDA
[2008] WASAT 203 (S)
•23 DECEMBER 2009
| JURISDICTION | : | STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL |
| STREAM | : | DEVELOPMENT & RESOURCES |
| ACT | : | LAND ADMINISTRATION ACT 1997 (WA) |
| CITATION | : | ESBEREY and SHIRE OF KALAMUNDA [2008] WASAT 203 (S) |
| MEMBER | : | JUSTICE J A CHANEY (PRESIDENT) |
| HEARD | : | ON THE PAPERS |
| DELIVERED | : | 3 SEPTEMBER 2008 |
| SUPPLEMENTARY | ||
| DECISION | : | 23 DECEMBER 2009 |
| FILE NO/S | : | DR 620 of 2005 |
| BETWEEN | : WILLIAM JOHN ESBEREY |
PENELOPE ANNE ESBEREY
Applicant
AND
SHIRE OF KALAMUNDA
Respondent
Catchwords:
Costs - Claim for compensation under Land Administration Act - Applicant making offer prior to commencement of proceedings - Award excluding amount of offer - Relevance of offer - Relevance of applicant's conduct of proceedings
Legislation:
| Land Administration Act 1997 (WA), s 241(6)(e) State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 87, s 87(1), s 87(2) Commercial Tenancies (Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985 | [2008] WASAT 203 (S) |
| Result: | |
| Respondent ordered to pay applicants' costs | |
| Category: B | |
| Representation: | |
| Counsel: |
| Applicant | : | Ms L Rowley |
| Respondent | : | Mr M Solomon |
Solicitors:
| Applicant | : | Deacons |
| Respondent | : | Corrs Chambers Westgarth |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Clifford and Shire of Busselton [2007] WASAT 89(S) Pearce and Anor and Germain [2007] WASAT 291(S) Western Australian Planning Commission and Shim [2007] WASAT 262(S)
[2008] WASAT 203 (S)
REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL
Summary of Tribunal's decision
1 The applicants, Mr and Mrs Esberey, sought an order for costs
following the Tribunal's award of compensation to them for the taking of their land. They relied heavily on the fact that they had made an offer prior to commencement of the proceedings to accept an amount of compensation less than that which was ultimately awarded to them by the Tribunal.
2 The respondent argued that, by reason of the applicants' conduct at
the proceedings, and various issues upon which it was said the applicants
had not succeeded, each party should bear its own costs.3 The Tribunal examined the principles to be applied in relation to
application for costs in the context of claims for compensation under the Land Administration Act 1997 (WA). It accepted the applicants' contention that considerable weight should be given to the failure by the respondent to settle the proceedings in light of the applicants' offer. It concluded that, whilst criticism of both parties' approach to the proceedings was warranted, the applicants' conduct of the proceedings should not deprive them of the benefits of a costs order which was otherwise appropriate having regard to the offer they had made to settle the proceedings. Accordingly, the respondent was ordered to pay the applicants' costs.
The application for costs
By reasons for decision delivered in September 2008, the Tribunal assessed compensation for the compulsory taking of Mr and Mrs Esberey's land in the sum of $308,555. That figure was made up of components of $251,200 as the value of the land, $18,300 for the reduction in value of the balance of the land retained by Mr and Mrs Esberey, $11,000 for loss pursuant to s 241(6)(e) of the Land Administration Act 1997 (WA) (LA Act), and $28,050 by way of solatium. The respondent was also ordered to pay interest on the amount of the compensation.
5 Following delivery of that decision, the applicants sought an order
that the respondent pay their costs of the proceedings. The respondent contends that, in the circumstances of the case, no order for costs should be made, and the parties should bear their own costs. That issue now falls for determination.
[2008] WASAT 203 (S)
6 For the purpose of dealing with the application for costs pursuant to
s 87(1) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act), I have reconstituted the Tribunal pursuant to s 11(8) of the SAT Act. That is done on the basis that the role of the assessors who, with me, constituted the Tribunal for the purpose of determining compensation, is completed and the question of the application of s 87 of the SAT Act is more appropriately dealt with by me sitting alone.
The applicable principles
7 The principles in relation to applications for payment of costs
pursuant to s 87(1) of the SAT Act were discussed by the Tribunal in Clifford and Shire of Busselton [2007] WASAT 89(S) (Clifford) and Western Australian Planning Commission and Shim [2007] WASAT 262(S) (Shim). It is well established that the starting point is that the Tribunal is a cost-neutral jurisdiction - see s 87(1) SAT Act. The Tribunal has however, a discretion to order payment by one party of another party's costs in appropriate cases - s 87(2) SAT Act. In Shim, I adopted the observations of Barker J in Clifford in relation to questions of costs in the context of proceedings for compensation for compulsory acquisition. In Clifford, Barker J said at [54] -[59]:
54 Ordinarily, where a citizen feels obliged to commence a proceeding in the Tribunal for compensation under the LA Act they are dissatisfied with and have rejected an offer of compensation made by a resuming authority. If they succeed in their claim in the Tribunal, it would seem fair and reasonable that the Tribunal should ordinarily exercise its discretion under s 87(2) and award the applicant the costs of those proceedings. This is because, putting it simply, ordinarily if the applicant succeeds, it will have been demonstrated to the Tribunal that the applicant was not offered fair compensation by the resuming authority and was obliged to commence and maintain the proceedings in order to gain justice. It would seem unreasonable for an applicant to have to fight to gain fair compensation only to have to deduct from the compensation the costs incurred in obtaining the award.
55 Of course what should be recognised as 'success' in every case requires some further consideration. If the applicant does not succeed in obtaining a compensation award following a hearing that betters the original compensation offer made by the resuming authority, it can hardly be said that the applicant was successful in the proceedings. Indeed it could be said in such a case that the applicant has maintained an unjustified proceeding and so should have to pay the respondent its costs for the trouble and expense of defending the claim.
[2008] WASAT 203 (S)
56 Either way it really is a question of fairness: on the one hand, in the case of a successful applicant it is fair that they should ordinarily receive their costs when they are put to the trouble and expense of proving that their claim is right, over the reticence of the resuming authority to recognise the rightness of the claim; on the other hand, it is fair that an applicant who does not establish that a resuming authority's offer was not right, should have to pay the resuming authority's costs given the trouble and expense to which they have put the resuming authority.
57 It should also be said that an award of costs in such circumstances will have the beneficial effect of discouraging unjustified proceedings.
58 The settlement rules fit into this regime very neatly. For example, they enable a resuming authority defending a compensation claim to make offers of settlement through the course of the proceedings. They indeed also enable an applicant, despite their initial claim for compensation, to make amended offers to settle proceedings.
59 The ultimate significance of the settlement rules as set out in r 42, is that if a party does not do better than what the other party offered, then they may be exposed to an order for costs. The settlement rules are designed to work with the cost regime to encourage parties to settle proceedings. If they do not and are shown, in that sense, to have acted unreasonably, then they may be exposed to a costs order.
Barker J also dealt with the relevance of offers made in the context of compensation proceedings when he said at [61] - [63]:
61 Nonetheless, there is an expectation in the context of the SAT Act provisions referred to earlier, and these settlement rules, that where a party did not accept an offer more favourable than the Tribunal's final order, then that party will ordinarily be liable to meet the other party's costs.
62 In the context of a compensation claim under the LA Act, offers to settle made by a resuming authority or an applicant will also ordinarily take into account costs and fees reasonably incurred.
63 In the final result, however, the Tribunal maintains a discretion to award or to not award costs notwithstanding the making of settlement offers and the rejection of settlement offers. This enables the Tribunal to take into account all the circumstances of the particular case.
In Shim, I added the following observations at [7] - [9]:
[2008] WASAT 203 (S)
7 In Mount Lawley Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission (2006) WASC 82(S) Templeman J considered the approach to be taken to an award of costs in the context of a valuation case arising from the imposition of a reservation of the subject land. He considered at [19] - [51] a line of authorities commencing with Brewarrana Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Highways (No 2) (1973) 32 LGRA 170; Minister for the Environment v Florence (1979) 21 SASR 108; Pastrello v Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW (2000) 110 LGERA 223 and culminating in Downie v Sorrell Council [2005] 141 LGERA 304 at [112], where Hill AJ accepted that the approach to costs in cases for compensation for compulsory acquisition should include a consideration by the court of the following matters:
(1) Costs should be awarded to the claimant if the award of compensation is significantly higher than the amount offered by the authority. (2) The determination of compensation is not ordinary litigation and arises out of a unilateral decision by the acquiring authority to compulsorily acquire the claimant's land. (3) Costs are compensatory, not punitive. (4) The extent to which an award of costs to the acquiring authority will erode the full benefit of the compensation awarded. [His Honour then referred to the passage from the judgment of Talbot J in Pastrello at [17].] (5) The extent to which the claim was frivolous or excessive
as compared to the amount awarded.'8 Templeman J also made reference to the decision of Parker J in Cerini v Minister for Transport (2001) WASC 309 (S) where, in considering whether the public interest in enabling dispossessed landowners to secure their due entitlement to compensation should displace the operation of O 24A of the Supreme Court Rules 1971 (WA), his Honour concluded that public interest was a relevant consideration but not a justification for displacing the normal operation of the rule. That position was endorsed by Templeman J in Mount Lawley, who also, at [51], extracted from the authorities he had referred to the proposition:
'that there is no overriding principle in a compensation case (or a valuation case) that the amount of compensation (or value) determined by the Court should not be eroded by denying the applicant his costs or requiring him to pay the costs of the relevant authority. In the end, whether or not there are statutory provisions relating to the exercise of the costs discretion in such cases, it is
[2008] WASAT 203 (S)
always necessary to have regard to the particular circumstances. It cannot be said that only in an exceptional case should an applicant be deprived of his costs, or required to pay the costs of the relevant authority.'
9 In my view, the observations by Barker J in Clifford are entirely consistent with the authorities referred to by Templeman J in Mount Lawley and the conclusion reached by him, having regard to the particular statutory context within which the State Administrative Tribunal operates. As Barker J observed, the notion of 'success' requires an examination of the particular circumstances of each case. Sometimes the question will involve nothing more than an examination of the comparison between the compensation awarded, and the position adopted by each party at the hearing. Frequently, however, the determination of compensation will be, as it was in this case, at a figure different from that propounded by either party at the hearing. In those cases, determination of a fair order in relation to costs may involve an examination of the outcome of particular issues in dispute at the hearing and a comparison of the rationale for the ultimate award as against the arguments advanced by each party at hearing.
10 Both parties, in these proceedings, accepted that the approach
suggested in Clifford and Shim is appropriate, and I adopt that approach
in these proceedings.11 Heavy reliance was placed by the applicant on the respondent's
failure to accept an offer made just prior to commencement of these
proceedings. I will return to the significance of that offer below.12 The applicants also argue that weight should be given to the fact that
the claimant for compensation under the LA Act has an alternative forum, namely the Supreme Court, in which to pursue its claim. Reference was made to Pearce and Anor and Germain [2007] WASAT 291(S) (Pearce) a case concerning an application for costs following proceedings under the Commercial Tenancies (Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985 in which the Tribunal suggested that the practice in relation to costs orders in the old commercial Tribunal prior to the establishment of the State Administrative Tribunal was not a relevant consideration in relation to costs under s 87 of the SAT Act.
13 The applicants argued that the position in Pearce, which was concerned with the relevance of practices of a former Tribunal, can be distinguished where, as in this case, an applicant has a choice of forum between the Supreme Court and the Tribunal. The applicants argued that 'it would be incongruous for the two fora to place reliance on differing
[2008] WASAT 203 (S)
considerations when deciding cost issues save where those differences are statutorily laid down' (emphasis added). In essence, the applicants argue that because, pursuant to O 66 r 1 of the rules of the Supreme Court, the Court will generally order that the successful party recover its costs, the Tribunal should adopt the same approach. I do not accept this submission. The applicants acknowledge that different approaches are appropriate where 'differences are statutorily laid down'. Differences are statutorily laid down in relation to the costs regime in the Supreme Court and the Tribunal respectively. As already mentioned, the Supreme Court rules contemplate that subject to the overriding discretion of the Court, costs will follow the event. Section 87 of the SAT Act makes clear that the general position is the parties will bear their own costs. The difference in the costs regime and the alternative fora might well be a consideration for a claimant in deciding in which alternative jurisdiction proceedings are to be commenced.
14 The respondent relies on the observation in Shim that 'the notion of success requires the determination of the particular circumstances of each case' and its extensive submissions seek to review the rationale for the ultimate award and the arguments advanced by each party at the hearing. While there is some support for that approach in the observations made in Shim which are set out above, care needs to be taken as to the extent to which attempts are made, in the context of the costs application, to deconstruct proceedings in great detail in an attempt to identify and measure the extent of 'success' of the respective parties' cases. Consistent with its statutory objective of minimising costs to parties, the Tribunal should be careful to avoid, where possible, substantial costs being incurred by parties in relation to arguments about costs. To the extent that fairness permits, the Tribunal should take a relatively broad brush approach in its examination of the circumstances of each case, just as it has generally tended to do in relation to questions of quantum of costs where orders have been made.
The applicant's offer
15 Prior to the commencement of proceedings, the applicants were
represented in their dealings with the respondent by Mr Terry Dix, the valuer who eventually gave evidence at the hearing. He lodged with the respondent a claim for compensation dated 4 April 2005 for a total of $416,402, based upon the value of the land taken being $357,886, $9,661 for severance, $11,000 for consequential loss and $37,855 solatium. On 20 April 2005, Mr Dix wrote to the respondent asserting that the methodology by the respondent's valuer was flawed, suggesting the
[2008] WASAT 203 (S)
correct approach, and offering to provide a copy of plans upon which his valuation was based to the Valuer General's Office if it wished to review its valuation.
16 On 21 April 2005, the respondent wrote to Mr Dix requesting a copy
of his valuation report. On 10 May 2005, Mr Dix wrote to the respondent declining to provide it with his valuation 'as the dispute may be the subject of litigation'. He did offer to meet with the respondent's valuer to discuss valuation methodology.
17 The Shire responded by noting that Mr Dix had declined to provide
his valuation upon which his clients' claim for compensation was based and advising that the Shire 'can only consider the valuations previously obtained by the Valuer General and an independent valuer'. The letter noted that the council had resolved to reject the claim for compensation and reaffirmed an offer of $143,000 which had previously been made.
18 In response, Mr Dix again wrote to the respondent offering to meet
with its valuer to see if any progress towards settlement could be made. On 1 August 2005, the respondent declined the offer to meet on the basis that Mr Dix had refused to provide his valuation report. The letter concluded: 'under these circumstances, I do not see any value in appointing a valuer to carry out further negotiations on behalf of council. I leave it up to your client to either accept council's offer or initiate further action under the provisions of the Land Administration Act'.
19 Mr Dix responded by letter dated 8 August 2005. He confirmed that
he had refused the request to file a copy of his report on the basis that 'it may prejudice any litigation that may be instituted by (the applicants) to recover the outstanding compensation'.
20 It is apparent that solicitors were then instructed. On
9 September 2005, the solicitors wrote to the respondent 'without prejudice save as to costs'. The letter repeated the offer for the valuers to meet to discuss methodology, but indicated that, in a final attempt to resolve the matter before commencing proceedings, the applicants were prepared to agree to settle the matter on the basis of a payment of $250,000 plus legal and valuation costs and interest. The offer was said to be open for a period of 30 days. The valuation by Mr Dix was not offered for consideration by the Shire. The response to that letter was a letter from the respondent enclosing a formal offer of compensation for the sum of $143,000.
[2008] WASAT 203 (S)
21 The proceedings were then commenced. As is evident from the
Tribunal's reasons following the eventual hearing, the proceedings involved extensive but largely unsuccessful attempts to narrow issues through mediation, and ultimately some 11 days of hearing spread over a long period of time. The matter was characterised by uncertainty on both sides as to the approach of the other to particular issues that arose for consideration and determination.
The significance of the applicants' offer
22 The applicants were ultimately awarded $308,555 plus interest. On
its face, that is a substantially greater award of compensation than the amount which, by their solicitor's letter of 9 September 2005, the applicants offered to accept. That offer was made expressly 'without prejudice save as to costs' which made clear the applicants' intention to rely on the offer if they ultimately received some greater amount of compensation. The offer expressly noted that it was being proffered with a view to avoiding the inevitable costs of the proceedings which would follow if the matter was not resolved. The respondent chose simply to repeat its offer for a much lower figure, and in effect, invited the applicants to embark upon the proceedings which then followed.
23 Looking simply at the amount which the applicants offered to accept,
and the amount they ultimately succeeded in establishing as compensation, immediately suggests that it was the respondent's refusal to accept that offer which caused the applicants to have to incur the costs of the proceedings in the Tribunal to establish their rightful entitlement. At no time did the respondent give any indication that it was prepared to move from its original offer of $143,000. The refusal to accept the applicants' offer is a powerful factor in favour of an order that the respondent pay the applicants' costs. The respondent argues, however, that in the circumstances of the case, that consequence should not follow.
24 The respondent refers to the passage in Clifford, where Barker J said 'the settlement rules are designed to work with the costs regime to encourage parties to settle proceedings. If they do not and are shown in that sense to have acted unreasonably then they may be exposed to a cost order'.
25 The respondent argues that it is necessary to look at whether the
opposing party acted reasonably in all the circumstances in rejecting the
offer. It asserts that it acted reasonably in the following circumstances:
[2008] WASAT 203 (S)
1) The respondent is a public body spending public funds and accountable to its ratepayers for the expenditure of those funds.
2) At the time the offer was received, the respondent was in receipt of a valuation from its own professional valuer, and a separate valuation from the Valuer General's Office. Both of these valuations disclosed a valuation significantly less than the offer from the applicants.
3) The applicants' offer was purportedly based on a report from Mr Dix which the applicants had refused to provide.
26 It is submitted that no responsible public authority could expend
funds in circumstances where the only valuations before it were for a lesser sum and the applicants had refused to disclose their valuation advice.
27 The refusal by the applicants to disclose their valuation advice was
ill-advised. It is difficult to understand the refusal. The suggestion that
release of the report might prejudice litigation is misconceived.28 On the other hand, the applicants had, on several occasions, offered a
meeting between valuers. That course may have facilitated a better understanding by both parties' valuers as to the other's position and approach to valuation. A meeting may have led to disclosure of the plaintiff's valuation, or at least a capacity for the respondent to better understand how the amount of the claim was formulated. The respondent declined to go down that path, instead effectively resolving to stand its ground on its offer and invite proceedings. When solicitors were instructed, and the offer made, the respondent simply rejected it. Given that it was an offer substantially below the amount being claimed, it would have been sensible for the respondent to endeavour to engage in dialog with the applicants' solicitors, or between valuers, to assess the level of its risk. It chose, however, in the face of a clear indication that rejection of the offer would be relied upon in relation to costs, to give the applicants no option but to institute proceedings.
29 In my view, the observations of Barker J in Clifford do not require that a party must be found to have acted unreasonably in rejecting an offer before weight is given to the failure to settle the matter on the terms offered by the other party. I consider that, by using the words 'in that sense, to have acted unreasonably' his Honour was doing no more than reinforcing the proposition that parties who fail to take the opportunity to
[2008] WASAT 203 (S)
settle proceedings on terms more favourable to them than the outcome ultimately determined following hearing, may be exposed to an order for costs. In context of compensation cases, the considerations mentioned in [54] in Clifford and [7] in Shim give added weight to the significance of a failure by a resuming authority to accept an offer for significantly less than the amount ultimately awarded.
The applicants' conduct at the proceedings
30 In its submissions, the respondent makes numerous criticisms of the
applicants' approach to the proceedings. It argues that in a number of respects, the case put forward by the applicants was unsuccessful. A number of those criticisms and observations have merit. Conversely, the applicants in their submissions identify a number of what they describe as 'issues which took up significant trial and preparation time on which the applicants were successful or the argument was abandoned by the respondent'. A number of those assertions also have merit.
31 It is not necessary to carry out a detailed analysis of each issue that
the parties raised to illustrate the extent of their success at hearing or what they assert to be some unreasonable conduct by the other. It is correct that the Tribunal was not persuaded by the opinions of either of the valuers who gave evidence, and found it necessary to arrive at the relevant values by extracting from the evidence the information upon which it assessed the proper amount of compensation. It is also the case that there was uncertainty about each party's position on some issues, at least up until the commencement of the hearing, and in some cases, during the hearing. It is certainly the case that the extremely adversarial approach to the proceedings by each party had the effect of extending the length of the hearing.
32 It is not possible, however, that to say that responsibility for the
length and complexity of the hearing lay any more with one party than the other. As I have observed above, attempting to deconstruct the case by engaging in argument and analysis of the myriad of different issues which arose during the course of the hearing is, consistent with the Tribunal's objectives, to be avoided in the context of argument at the cost. Unless there is some particular issue which can be identified in respect of which an identifiable and significant portion of the costs were incurred, and in respect of which the otherwise successful party has failed, little is achieved by detailed examination of who succeeded on what issues. That is because the task of allocating cost associated with each issue and
[2008] WASAT 203 (S)
dispute, even if it can be done, is likely to involve a disproportionate
amount of further costs.33 The respondent argues that the number of issues on which the
applicants failed, or in respect of which their approach to the matter was in some way unreasonable, should result in there being no order for costs. In making that submission, the respondent acknowledges that 'neither party is entirely blameless'.
In my view, that concession is well made, and the regrettable length and complexity of the proceedings can be laid at the feet of both parties.
Conclusion as to costs
35 As I have already observed, the failure of the respondent to settle the
matter in light of the applicants' offer immediately prior to commencement of the proceedings, couched as it was as being without prejudice as to costs, powerfully favours an order for costs being made in the applicants' favour. The question becomes whether, by reason of their approach to the proceedings, or their failure on some issues, fairness requires that the applicants bear their own costs. In my view, the requirements of fairness do not lead to that conclusion. That is because, as I have found, there is room for criticism of the approach by both parties at the proceedings. The applicants having succeeded in the sense of having been awarded substantially more than they had offered to accept by way of compensation, they should not now be deprived of all of the benefits of that success by having to meet all of their costs from their order of compensation. It is appropriate, in this case, that there be an order that the respondent pay the applicants' costs of the proceedings.
Quantum of costs
36 The approach taken by the respondent in its written submissions was
that, before its determination of quantum of costs should be made, the Tribunal should first make a determination about where liability for costs falls. Accordingly, it did not address the specific claim for costs which had been made by the applicants in their submissions. Rather, the respondent submitted that, if costs are awarded in the applicants' favour, further submissions on quantum should be made.
37 The parties should attempt to agree the amount of costs payable. To
assist that process, it might be helpful to make some preliminary observations as to the amount of costs claimed, and as to the approach to assessment that might be appropriate.
[2008] WASAT 203 (S)
38 The first observation is that, consistent with the observations already
made, costs are awarded in relation to the proceedings generally, and the Tribunal would not propose to entertain any argument as to whether, and how much, costs should be allowed in relation to particular issues which arose in the hearing.
39 Second, the costs the subject of the order include legal and expert
costs. In relation to legal costs, the applicants propose recovery at an hourly rate throughout the whole matter which is greater than the Supreme Court scale rate applicable for part of the proceedings, but lower than the rate applicable under the 2008 Supreme Court scale rate. Assuming that the rate claimed is the rate contracted to be paid by the applicants, and given that the rate does not differ greatly from the scale rates, and for some period was under the scale rate, I would be inclined to allow costs calculated by reference to the rate claimed.
40 The applicants' claim includes an amount slightly in excess of
$59,000, the costs thrown away by reason of the adjournment of the hearing at the respondent's request in February 2007. In their submissions, the applicants assert that they were ready for trial, and their witness statements were prepared and signed in February 2007. Some further work was necessary by reason of the appointment by the respondent of an independent planner which in turn required some revision of the valuation report. Of the $59,700 claimed, some $31,325 relates to additional fees by Mr Dix. It is not easy to see how valuer's costs in that amount can be justified as costs thrown away by the adjournment, and I would not be inclined to allow full recovery of that amount.
I am inclined to include in the costs to be paid by the respondent the applicants' costs in relation to the application for costs.
42 A direction will be made that, unless the parties notify the Tribunal
within 28 days of the publication of these reasons that agreement has been reached in relation to the quantum of costs, the matter will be set down for brief oral argument so that the amount of costs can be fixed.
| Orders |
1. The respondent is to pay the applicants' costs of the proceedings.
[2008] WASAT 203 (S)
2. The amount of costs to be paid is to be agreed by the parties, or failing agreement, to be determined by the Tribunal.
3. The parties are to notify the Tribunal within 28 days of the publication of these reasons as to whether the amount of costs to be paid has been agreed. If agreement is not reached, the matter is to be set down for a hearing to determine the quantum of costs payable on a date to be arranged.
I certify that this and the preceding [42] paragraphs comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.
___________________________________
JUSTICE J A CHANEY, PRESIDENT
0
7
9