Esanda v Gibbons

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CITATION: Esanda v Gibbons [1999] NSWSC 1094
CURRENT JURISDICTION: Equity
FILE NUMBER(S): 5051/98
HEARING DATE(S): 5 and 29 October 1999
JUDGMENT DATE:
29 October 1999

PARTIES :


Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd (P)
John Raymond Gibbons (D1)
Trans-Pacific International Group Ltd (Receiver and Manager Appointed) (Administrators Appointed) (D2)
Busrent Pty Ltd (Receiver and Manager Appointed) (D3)
JUDGMENT OF: Austin J
COUNSEL : C Newlinds (P)
G Sirtes (D)
SOLICITORS: Kemp Strang (P)
Henry Davis York (D)
CATCHWORDS: TORT - conversion - plaintiff relying on right to immediate possession - defendant precluded by conduct from pleading jus tertii; PRACTICE & PROCEDURE - application to strike out defence - principle where difficult question of law is involved
CASES CITED: Butler v Hobson [1838] 4 Bing (NC) 290
General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner of Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125
Henry Berry & Co Pty Limited v Rushton [1937] SR (Qld) 109
Leake v Loveday (1842) 4 Man & G 972
Standard Electronic Apparatus Laboratories Pty Limited v Stenner (1960) 77 WN (NSW) 833
Woods v Mason Bros Ltd (1892) 8 WN (NSW) 114
DECISION: Defence based on jus tertii struck out

        THE SUPREME COURT
        OF NEW SOUTH WALES
        EQUITY DIVISION

        AUSTIN J

        FRIDAY 29 OCTOBER 1999

        5051/98 - ESANDA FINANCE CORPORATION LTD V JOHN RAYMOND GIBBONS & 2 ORS

        JUDGMENT (Ex tempore; revised 9 November 1999)

    1   HIS HONOUR: This case involves a dispute about the proceeds of sale of nine buses. The plaintiff, Esanda, seeks by notice of motion to strike out the amended defence in the proceedings as regards six of the buses. The first defendant, Mr Gibbons, seeks leave by notice of motion to file a cross-claim and join an additional party as cross-claimant.

        The companies

    2   The proceedings involve a number of companies in the Clifford Corporation Group. The third defendant (‘Busrent’) is a company the directors of which are Mr J B Loiterton and Mr I R Hall, and the secretary is Mr C J Ellis. The company's shareholder is Clifford Corporation Ltd.

    3   The second defendant (‘TPI’) is a company the directors of which are Mr I R Hall, Mr J B Loiterton and Mr C J Ellis, as well as Mr E Lusew and Mr L E Stewart, and the secretary is Mr C J Ellis. There is no evidence identifying the shareholders of TPI, but the evidence which is before me indicates that it has the same registered office and address as other companies which are subsidiaries of Clifford Corporation. It is appropriate for the purposes of the present application to infer that whoever the shareholders are, TPI is a subsidiary which is part of the Clifford Corporation Group.

    4   The first defendant's notice of motion seeks to join as a cross-claimant another company called Austral Pacific Group Ltd (‘APG’). The directors of this company are Mr J B Loiterton, Mr I R Hall, and Mr C J Ellis and Mr L E Stewart ceased to be a director on 15 February 1999. Mr…
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Details
Case
[1999] NSWSC 1094
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Esanda Finance Corporation Limited initiated proceedings against Mr Gibbons, claiming damages for conversion of a vehicle. Esanda alleged that Mr Gibbons had wrongfully sold the vehicle which was held as security for a loan. Mr Gibbons, in his defence, argued that he had the right to sell the vehicle because it had been transferred to him by a third party, Mr Thomas. This raised the issue of whether Mr Gibbons was precluded from asserting the rights of a third party against Esanda, who had the right to immediate possession of the vehicle. The matter was brought before the court to determine the validity of Mr Gibbons' defence and whether it should be struck out due to its legal complexity.

The court had to decide whether Mr Gibbons could validly raise the defence of jus tertii, considering that Esanda had the right to immediate possession of the vehicle. The court also had to determine if there were sufficient grounds to strike out Mr Gibbons' defence on the basis that it involved a difficult question of law. The central issue revolved around whether Esanda's right to immediate possession of the vehicle precluded Mr Gibbons from asserting any rights a third party might have had over the vehicle.

In resolving the matter, the court held that Mr Gibbons was precluded from relying on the rights of a third party because Esanda's right to immediate possession was paramount. The court further found that Mr Gibbons' defence did not involve a difficult question of law that would warrant striking it out. The court's decision was based on established legal principles that a party who has the right to immediate possession cannot be defeated by a claim of a third party's rights. Consequently, the court dismissed the application to strike out Mr Gibbons' defence, allowing the case to proceed to trial on the merits.

The final orders of the court were that the application to strike out Mr Gibbons' defence was dismissed, and the case would proceed to trial. The court made it clear that Mr Gibbons could not rely on the rights of a third party to justify his actions, and the case would be determined based on the facts and applicable law. This decision reinforced the principle that a party with the right to immediate possession cannot be defeated by a claim of a third party's rights.

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