CITATION: Errol Frederick Lymbery v Commonwealth of Australia [2007] NSWSC 183 HEARING DATE(S): 27,28, 29, 30 November 2006
1, 4, 5, 6, 7, December 2006
JUDGMENT DATE :
9 March 2007JUDGMENT OF: Patten AJ at 1 DECISION: See paragraph 176 CASES CITED: Medlin v State Government Insurance Commission (1995) 69 ALJR 118
Malec v J C Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 64 ALJR 316
National Insurance Co of New Zealand v Espagne (1961) 105 CLR 569 at 598;
Thatcher v Charles (1961) 104 CLR 57
Victoria Stevedoring Pty Ltd v Farlow (1963) VR 594
Simonius Vischer & Co v Holt and Thompson [1979] 2 NSWLR 322
Bennett v Jones (1977) 2 NSWLR 355PARTIES: Errol Frederick Lymbery
Commonwealth of AustraliaFILE NUMBER(S): SC 20824 of 2001 COUNSEL: Mr M.Williams SC with Mr A Gemmell - Plaintiff
Mr R. Burbidge QC with Mr D. Brogan - DefendantSOLICITORS: Hollows Lawyers - Plaintiff
Australian Government Solicitor - Defendant
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COMMON LAW DIVISION
Patten A J
9 March 2007
Errol Frederick Lymbery v Commonwealth of Australia
No: 20824 of 2001
JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION:
1 The Plaintiff was born on 10 November 1944 at Maleny in Queensland. He grew up in the Sunshine Coast area and was educated at Caboolture High School where, in his teens, he met the woman who subsequently became his wife.
2 About the end of 1961, he decided to make a career in the Navy. To that end, in January 1962, he passed various mental and physical examinations and on 9 February was accepted as a recruit. He was posted to HMAS Cerberus for training. Thereafter, his naval career progressed satisfactorily, as I will relate hereafter in greater detail. By February 1964, he was serving on the aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne as a member of the arrestor gear party stationed on the flight deck. At that time he was classed as an Engineer Mechanic.
3 On the night of 10 February 1964, the Plaintiff was on board Melbourne, which was engaged with the Daring Class Destroyer HMAS Voyager in night flying exercises, some 21 miles east of Jervis Bay. About 9pm, there was a collision between Melbourne and Voyager, as a result of which some 82 sailors died and Voyager sank. I will, hereafter, simply refer to this terrible event as “the collision”.
4 In these proceedings, which were commenced on 10 October 2001, the Plaintiff claims damages for psychiatric injury and sequelae thereof suffered as a result of the collision. Master Harrison granted him an appropriate extension of time to bring action on 2 June 2005.
5 The Defendant, on the pleadings, admitted liability for the Plaintiff’s claim but denied that he suffered damage causally connected to the collision. The hearing before me largely concerned that issue. He was represented by Mr M Williams SC with Mr Gemmell, and the Defendant by Mr Burbidge QC with Mr Brogan.
THE PLAINTIFF’S EARLY LIFE:
6 The Plaintiff recounted a happy normal childhood and early…
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- Case
- [2007] NSWSC 183
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Background
Background to the litigation
The case was commenced on 10 October 2001. Master Harrison granted Lymbery an appropriate extension of time to bring the action on 2 June 2005. The matter was heard before Patten A J over several days in November and December 2006. The Plaintiff was represented by Mr M Williams SC with Mr Gemmell, and the Defendant by Mr Burbidge QC with Mr Brogan. The court considered the evidence presented by both parties and made a judgment on 9 March 2007.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether Lymbery suffered psychiatric injury and sequelae as a result of the collision between HMAS Melbourne and HMAS Voyager.
2. Whether the psychiatric injury and sequelae were causally connected to the collision.
3. Whether Lymbery's decision to leave the Navy, Amoco, and BP were causally connected to the collision.
4. Whether Lymbery failed to mitigate his losses.
Held
1. The court held that Lymbery suffered psychiatric injury and sequelae as a result of the collision between HMAS Melbourne and HMAS Voyager.
2. The court held that the psychiatric injury and sequelae were causally connected to the collision.
3. The court held that Lymbery's decision to leave the Navy, Amoco, and BP were not causally connected to the collision.
4. The court held that Lymbery failed to mitigate his losses by not seeking timely psychological treatment.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court examined the evidence provided by Lymbery and his witnesses to determine if Lymbery suffered psychiatric injury and sequelae from the collision. The court accepted that Lymbery suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which manifested in flashbacks, changed personality, gastric reflux, and loss of confidence. The court rejected the argument that Lymbery's increased smoking, alcohol consumption, and skin rashes were causally connected to the collision.
Regarding the causation of Lymbery's decisions to leave the Navy, Amoco, and BP, the court held that his decision to leave the Navy was reasonable as it was causally related to the collision. However, the court found that his decisions to leave Amoco and BP were predominantly for personal reasons and only remotely connected to the collision. Therefore, Lymbery could not claim compensation for diminished earning capacity related to those decisions.
The court also found that Lymbery failed to mitigate his losses by not seeking timely psychological treatment. The court reasoned that had Lymbery sought treatment soon after leaving the Navy, his degree of disability would likely have been reduced. The court deducted 10% from the general damages to account for this failure to mitigate.
The ratio decidendi of this decision is that while a plaintiff may be entitled to compensation for psychiatric injury caused by a collision, they must also take reasonable steps to mitigate their losses, such as seeking timely psychological treatment. The court distinguished prior authority by holding that a plaintiff's decisions to leave employment may not be causally connected to the initial injury if those decisions were predominantly for personal reasons.