EROM Pty Ltd v Croft - [2006] WASCA 244

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION: EROM PTY LTD -v- CROFT [2006] WASCA 244

CORAM: PULLIN JA

HEARD: 10 NOVEMBER 2006

DELIVERED : 10 NOVEMBER 2006

FILE NO/S: CACV 140 of 2006

BETWEEN: EROM PTY LTD
Appellant
AND
JOHN CROFT
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction              :  DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram  :GROVES DCJ
Citation  :EROM PTY LTD -v- CROFT [2006] WADC 162
File No  :CIV 1225 of 2003

Catchwords:

Appeal - Interlocutory appeal - Application for leave to appeal - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Nil

Result:

Leave to appeal granted

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant: Mr M A R Blundell
Respondent: Mr P D C Robinson

Solicitors:

Appellant: Solomon Brothers
Respondent: Williams & Hughes

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Nil

Case(s) also cited:

Nil

PULLIN JA: This is an application for leave to appeal which I think should be dealt with at this stage. The question is whether the decision below is attended by sufficient doubt to justify the grant of leave, and whether or not there will be substantial injustice if the decision below is left unreversed.
It is clear that the appellant could not be assured how this case is going to turn out after all the evidence has been led. The defendant, Mr Croft, may claim he guaranteed Jadetex and that Jadetex was to give the charge, or he may claim that he was in the end guaranteeing Regalbird and not Jadetex.
The circumstances look to be complicated because if one takes what is in the statement of claim it seems, according to the appellant, that originally Jadetex was involved and Mr Croft agreed to guarantee Jadetex and Jadetex agreed to give the charge. Then there was a telephone call, according to the plaintiff, when it was agreed that Regalbird be substituted for Jadetex and that Mr Croft would then guarantee repayment by Regalbird and that Regalbird would give the charge. Subsequently a document was sent stating that the charge was being given by Regalbird, formerly Jadetex, which sounds as though in fact they were back to the original transaction and not the one that was the subject of the alleged novation and that Mr Croft was in fact, therefore, agreeing to guarantee Jadetex and not Regalbird because the name Regalbird was merely the new name for the original company Jadetex.
It is not clear what attitude Mr Croft might adopt when he files his pleadings, and in my opinion the appellant should be able to cover all possible legal consequences that flow from the dealings between the parties and the documents that passed between them. To say that the appellant knows what the situation is and should be confined to what is said in one of these pleas does not recognise that the Court may disagree with what the appellant says it "knows" is the situation. In those circumstances I consider that the decision is attended by sufficient doubt…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading EROM Pty Ltd v Croft

Details

AGLC: EROM Pty Ltd v Croft [2006] WASCA 244
Case: [2006] WASCA 244
Decision Date: 10 NOVEMBER 2006

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of EROM Pty Ltd v Croft, the appellant sought to appeal against an interlocutory decision made by the Federal Court of Australia. The dispute centred on a claim for damages in a commercial context, involving allegations of breach of contract and misrepresentation. The primary judge had ruled against the appellant's application for an interlocutory injunction, and the appellant now sought to appeal this decision on the basis that the matter turned on its own facts.

The legal issues before the court were whether the interlocutory decision was subject to appeal and, if so, whether leave should be granted. The court needed to consider the principles surrounding interlocutory appeals and whether the decision in question met the criteria for such an appeal. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the appeal raised a significant question of law or jurisdiction that warranted the intervention of the appellate court.

In assessing these issues, the court found that the nature of interlocutory appeals in Australia is such that they are generally disfavored, with leave required to appeal such decisions. The court applied the criteria established in previous case law, which include considerations such as the significance of the question of law, the desirability of finality, and the potential for injustice if leave were granted. The court concluded that the appellant had not sufficiently demonstrated that the appeal met the threshold criteria for leave to be granted. As a result, the appeal was dismissed. The court did not find it necessary to make any orders beyond dismissing the application for leave to appeal.

Orders