JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: EROM PTY LTD -v- CROFT [2006] WASCA 244
CORAM: PULLIN JA
HEARD: 10 NOVEMBER 2006
DELIVERED : 10 NOVEMBER 2006
FILE NO/S: CACV 140 of 2006
BETWEEN: EROM PTY LTD
Appellant
AND
JOHN CROFT
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram :GROVES DCJ
Citation :EROM PTY LTD -v- CROFT [2006] WADC 162
File No :CIV 1225 of 2003
Catchwords:
Appeal - Interlocutory appeal - Application for leave to appeal - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
Nil
Result:
Leave to appeal granted
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Appellant: Mr M A R Blundell
Respondent: Mr P D C Robinson
Solicitors:
Appellant: Solomon Brothers
Respondent: Williams & Hughes
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Nil
Case(s) also cited:
Nil
PULLIN JA: This is an application for leave to appeal which I think should be dealt with at this stage. The question is whether the decision below is attended by sufficient doubt to justify the grant of leave, and whether or not there will be substantial injustice if the decision below is left unreversed.
It is clear that the appellant could not be assured how this case is going to turn out after all the evidence has been led. The defendant, Mr Croft, may claim he guaranteed Jadetex and that Jadetex was to give the charge, or he may claim that he was in the end guaranteeing Regalbird and not Jadetex.
The circumstances look to be complicated because if one takes what is in the statement of claim it seems, according to the appellant, that originally Jadetex was involved and Mr Croft agreed to guarantee Jadetex and Jadetex agreed to give the charge. Then there was a telephone call, according to the plaintiff, when it was agreed that Regalbird be substituted for Jadetex and that Mr Croft would then guarantee repayment by Regalbird and that Regalbird would give the charge. Subsequently a document was sent stating that the charge was being given by Regalbird, formerly Jadetex, which sounds as though in fact they were back to the original transaction and not the one that was the subject of the alleged novation and that Mr Croft was in fact, therefore, agreeing to guarantee Jadetex and not Regalbird because the name Regalbird was merely the new name for the original company Jadetex.
It is not clear what attitude Mr Croft might adopt when he files his pleadings, and in my opinion the appellant should be able to cover all possible legal consequences that flow from the dealings between the parties and the documents that passed between them. To say that the appellant knows what the situation is and should be confined to what is said in one of these pleas does not recognise that the Court may disagree with what the appellant says it "knows" is the situation. In those circumstances I consider that the decision is attended by sufficient doubt to justify the grant of leave.
In relation to the second aspect, whether or not there would be substantial injustice if the decision below remained unreversed, it seems to me that the potential injustice and therefore a real injustice is that if the matter proceeds to a hearing and the District Court reached the view that the case might have succeeded if there had been an oral novation pleaded, or if estoppel had been pleaded, and that the appellant should not succeed because it had not been pleaded, then that creates the injustice. The potentiality for that happening is a real prospect and it gives rise to the substantial injustice that justifies the grant of leave.
For those reasons, and for the fact also that in relation to the novation plea the oral novation is merely an alternative to the written novation agreement, which would seem to me to be a perfectly acceptable method of pleading, or arguably so, leave should be granted for that reason also. So I would grant leave to appeal and then the matter can proceed to appeal in the usual way.
- AGLC
- EROM Pty Ltd v Croft [2006] WASCA 244
- Case
- [2006] WASCA 244
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the interlocutory decision was subject to appeal and, if so, whether leave should be granted. The court needed to consider the principles surrounding interlocutory appeals and whether the decision in question met the criteria for such an appeal. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the appeal raised a significant question of law or jurisdiction that warranted the intervention of the appellate court.
In assessing these issues, the court found that the nature of interlocutory appeals in Australia is such that they are generally disfavored, with leave required to appeal such decisions. The court applied the criteria established in previous case law, which include considerations such as the significance of the question of law, the desirability of finality, and the potential for injustice if leave were granted. The court concluded that the appellant had not sufficiently demonstrated that the appeal met the threshold criteria for leave to be granted. As a result, the appeal was dismissed. The court did not find it necessary to make any orders beyond dismissing the application for leave to appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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