FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
EPR17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 416
Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: EPR17 v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2018] FCCA 2780 File number: NSD 1882 of 2018 Judge: O’CALLAGHAN J Date of judgment: 29 March 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for leave to appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court – application refused Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Cases cited: Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 Date of hearing: 12 February 2019 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 43 Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person with the aid of an interpreter Solicitor for the Respondents: Ms C Saunders ORDERS
NSD 1882 of 2018 BETWEEN: EPR17
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
O’CALLAGHAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
29 MARCH 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent, to be agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
O’CALLAGHAN J:
Introduction
On 8 October 2018, the applicant applied under Rule 35.12 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (the Federal Court Rules) for leave to appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (the Federal Circuit Court), delivered on 26 September 2018, in which the primary judge dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the second respondent (the IAA) pursuant to Rule 44.12 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (the Federal Circuit Court Rules). The IAA had affirmed a decision by a delegate of the first respondent (the Minister) not to grant the applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise (subclass 790) visa (SHEV).
Background
The applicant is a male citizen of Sri Lanka. He entered Australia as a so-called “unauthorised maritime arrival” on 26 September 2012.
On 16 February 2017, the applicant applied for a SHEV and made the following claims for protection:
(1)He was not a member of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), but he lived in the area controlled by them and was forced to help them sometimes.
(2)In 1997, he started working as a mechanic at a motorbike repair garage in Point Pedro. The garage was opposite the Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) office. The EPDP used to take motorbikes from the garage and threatened employees. To avoid harassment the applicant moved to Trincomalee in 2000.
(3)In Trincomalee, he was often taken by the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) because he had an identity card from Jaffna, which was an LTTE controlled area. He was interrogated about his possible links with the LTTE. On one occasion he was imprisoned for three months. After he was bailed out,…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 416
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge should have found that the IAA made a jurisdictional error in failing to invite the applicant to comment on new information, whether the IAA acted unreasonably or denied the applicant procedural fairness, and whether the primary judge should have found that the IAA failed to consider certain reports or the applicant's claims for complementary protection. The court also considered whether the primary judge failed to ensure that the show cause hearing was fair.
The court found that the applicant had not demonstrated sufficient doubt about the correctness of the judgment below or that substantial injustice would be suffered if leave to appeal were refused. The court dismissed each ground of appeal in turn, finding that the IAA had considered the applicant's claims and relevant country information, and had not erred in its assessment. The court held that the primary judge had correctly reviewed the IAA's decision and that the applicant had not shown that he would suffer substantial injustice if leave to appeal were refused.
The court dismissed the application for leave to appeal and ordered the applicant to pay the costs of the first respondent, to be agreed or assessed. The orders were made under Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent, to be agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The nine grounds may be summarised as follows: (1)the primary judge should have found that the Immigration Assessment Authority made a jurisdictional error in failing to give the applicant to invite to comment on the new information relating to the provision of mental health services in Sri Lanka;(2)the primary judge ought to have found that the IAA acted “on the ground of legal unreasonableness in the circumstances of the applicant’s matter”;(3)the primary judge should have found that the IAA committed jurisdictional error as it failed “to consider the integers of the claims to complementary protection of the applicant”;(4)the IAA failed to consider a DFAT report of 23 May 2018 in assessing the applicant’s claims, and the primary judge should have found this to be a jurisdictional error; (5)the primary judge should have found that the IAA erred in relation to its findings on credibility and that this amounted to jurisdictional error;(6)the primary judge “failed to review the component parts of the process by the IAA that lead up to the finding from the perspective of legal reasonableness and would have held it was a jurisdictional error”;(7)the primary judge should have held that the IAA denied the applicant procedural fairness;(8)the IAA failed to consider the applicant’s claim that he would be considered a supporter of the LTTE; and (9)the primary judge failed to ensure that the show cause hearing was fair, and that his duty requires that a litigant does not suffer a disadvantage from exercising his or her right to be self-represented.Consideration In Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398 - 399, the Full Court held that the leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment requires the applicant to show that the decision is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant review and, further, that, if the judgment below is assumed to be wrong, substantial injustice would be suffered by the applicant if leave to appeal were refused. The Minister submitted that the applicant has failed to show any doubt about the correctness of the judgment below, and failed to show that substantial injustice would be suffered if leave to appeal were refused. For the reasons set out below, I agree. I now take each of the grounds of appeal in turn. Ground one Ground one alleges that the primary judge erred by not finding the IAA made a jurisdictional error by failing to invite the applicant to comment on new information, and relies on s 473DE(3)(a) of the Migration Act. That provision is as follows:(1) The Immigration Assessment Authority must, in relation to a fast track reviewable decision:(a)give to the referred applicant particulars of any new information, but only if the new information:(i)has been, or is to be, considered by the Authority under section 473DD; and(ii)would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the fast track reviewable decision; and(b) explain to the referred applicant why the new information is relevant to the review; and(c) invite the referred applicant, orally or in writing, to give comments on the new information:(i) in writing; or(ii) at an interview, whether conducted in person, by telephone or in any other way.…(3)Subsection (1) does not apply to new information that:(a)is not specifically about the referred applicant and is just about a class of persons of which the referred applicant is a member; or(b)is non‑disclosable information; or(c)is prescribed by regulation for the purposes of this paragraph.