EPIC ENERGY (WA) ONE PTY LTD and COMMISSIONER OF STATE REVENUE
[2010] WASAT 37
•19 MARCH 2010
JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
STREAM: COMMERCIAL & CIVIL
ACT: TAXATION ADMINISTRATION ACT 2003 (WA)
CITATION: EPIC ENERGY (WA) ONE PTY LTD and COMMISSIONER OF STATE REVENUE [2010] WASAT 37
MEMBER: JUSTICE J A CHANEY (PRESIDENT)
HEARD: 14 OCTOBER 2009
DELIVERED : 19 MARCH 2010
FILE NO/S: CC 1179 of 2008
BETWEEN: EPIC ENERGY (WA) ONE PTY LTD
Applicant
AND
COMMISSIONER OF STATE REVENUE
Respondent
FILE NO/S :CC 1180 of 2008
BETWEEN :EPIC ENERGY (PILBARA PIPELINE) PTY LTD
Applicant
AND
COMMISSIONER OF STATE REVENUE
Respondent
Catchwords:
Stamp duty - Transfer of shares in companies - Whether companies are landholders for purposes of Stamp Act 1921 - Pipeline licences held - Pipelines fixed to land - Ownership of pipelines retained by licensee - Whether pipelines are land for purposes of Stamp Act - Whether interest in pipeline must be derived from an interest in land - Licensee holding easements in land to which pipeline fixed
Legislation:
Dampier to Bunbury Pipeline Act 1997 (WA), s 28, s 34, s 40, s 40(a), s 40(b), s 40(c)
Gas Industry Act 2001 (Vic)
Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 5
Mining Act 1978 (WA)
North Shore Gas Act 1875 (NSW)
Petroleum Pipelines Act 1969 (WA), s 6, s 12, s 12(3), s 16, s 17, s 57, s 57(1), s 57(2)
Pilbara Energy Project Agreement Act 1994 (WA)
Public Works Act 1912 (NSW), s 101, s 102
Stamp Act 1921 (WA), s 76, s 76(1), s 76(1)(b), s 76AN, s 76AN(3), s 76AO, s 76AP(2), s 76AP(2)(a), s 76AP(2)(b), Div 3, Pt IIIBA
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 27
Taxation Administration Act 2003 (WA), s 37(2)
Taxation (Administration) Act (NT)
Result:
Pipelines found to be included in interest in land to which pipelines are fixed
Category: A
Representation:
CC 1179 of 2008
Counsel:
Applicant: Mr C L Zelestis QC and Mr J Pickering
Respondent: Mr S Wright and Ms I Briggs
Solicitors:
Applicant: Freehills
Respondent: State Solicitor's Office
CC 1180 of 2008
Counsel:
Applicant: Mr C L Zelestis QC and Mr J Pickering
Respondent: Mr S Wright and Ms I Briggs
Solicitors:
Applicant: Freehills
Respondent: State Solicitor's Office
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue [2009] HCA 41
Alinta DEGP Pty Ltd v Wellington and East Gippsland Shire Councils [2005] VSC 307
Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v GSF Australia Pty Ltd (2005) 221 CLR 568
Commissioner of Main Roads v North Shore Gas Co Ltd (1967) 120 CLR 118
Delaney v Staples (t/a De Monfort Recruitment) [1992] 1 AC 687
Manly Council v Malouf (2004) 61 NSWLR 394
Municipal District of Concord v Coles (1906) 3 CLR 96
Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387
REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL:
Summary of Tribunal's decision
In June 2004, Epic Energy Pty Ltd acquired the shares in two companies which were the holders of pipeline licences for certain natural gas pipelines in the Pilbara. The Commissioner of State Revenue assessed stamp duty on the transfer of shares on the basis that the companies were landholders, and their landholdings included the pipelines the subject of the licences.
The companies sought a review of the assessment, arguing that they were not landholders because the pipelines did not constitute land for the purposes of the Stamp Act.
The Tribunal examined the applicable statutory provisions and concluded that, where the companies held an interest or estate in land, such as an easement, and the pipeline was fixed to the land the subject of that interest, the pipeline was included in the interest land to which the companies were beneficially entitled. The pipelines are, in these circumstances, land to which the relevant provisions of the Stamp Act applied. Where, however, the companies had no identifiable interest or estate in the land to which a portion of the pipeline was fixed, that portion of the pipeline was not land for the purposes of the Stamp Act.
Background to the proceeding
Each of the applicants, Epic Energy (WA) One Pty Ltd (EEWA1) and Epic Energy (Pilbara Pipeline) Pty Ltd (EEPP) is the owner of certain pipelines and infrastructure used for the transportation of natural gas in the Pilbara region of Western Australia.
On 2 June 2004, Epic Energy Pty Ltd (EEPL) acquired all of the issued shares in each of EEPP and EEWA1 from Epic Energy (WA) Investments Pty Ltd, an unrelated company, pursuant to and as part of a sale of purchase agreement entitled the Rest Securities Sale Agreement, executed on 4 April 2004 and amended by deed dated 2 June 2004 (together the RSSA).
On 9 August 2004, each of the applicants lodged a statement in the approved form with the respondent under s 76AN of the Stamp Act 1921 (WA) (Stamp Act) along with the relevant documents. In the statement, each applicant stated that the estimated unencumbered value of all 'land' in Western Australia to which they were entitled as at 2 June 2004 was 'nil', on the basis that the pipelines did not constitute land within the meaning of Pt IIIBA of the Stamp Act.
On 24 July 2007, after an exchange of correspondence between the applicants and the respondent, the respondent assessed the applicants' stamp duty in respect of the change in ownership of their shares under the RSSA on 2 June 2004 on the basis that EEPP and EEWA1 were 'landholders' within the meaning of Pt IIIBA of the Stamp Act. EEPP was assessed for duty of $7,310,110.00, calculated on a value of $121,949,000.00. EEWA1 was assessed for duty of $380,770.00, calculated on a value of $6,460,000.00.
An objection to the assessments was eventually disallowed by the respondent on 28 May 2008, and the applicants commenced these proceedings in the Tribunal.
In its statement of issues, facts and contentions, the respondent identified a number of issues for determination. Some issues went to the fundamental question of whether each of the applicants was a landholder for the purposes of Pt IIIBA Div 3 of the Stamp Act. Other issues went to the question of the value of the 'land' to which the applicants were entitled if they were found to be landholders and as to the calculation of the duty payable in that event.
The parties agreed that the fundamental question as to whether each of the applicants is a landholder should be determined as a preliminary issue.
The parties identified three subissues which required determination in order to resolve whether, as at 2 June 2004, each of the applicants was a landholder for relevant purposes. The first subissue was whether certain property of the applicants was 'fixed' within the meaning of that term as used in the definition of 'land' in s 76(1) of the Stamp Act. At the hearing of the argument on the preliminary issues, the applicants conceded that the property identified was 'fixed' for the purposes of that definition, and it is not therefore necessary to consider that issue any further.
The remaining two subissues were identified by the parties as follows:
Issue 1.2: Did each of the following thereby constitute 'land' to which EEPP was entitled (within the meaning of s.76AP(2)(a) Stamp Act)?
(a)The [Pilbara Energy Pipeline (PEP)] and associated pipeline infrastructure in the area of the [easements referred to in Statement of Agreed Facts (SAF) paragraphs 66 68 (PEP Easements)].
(b)The PEP and associated pipeline infrastructure in [Forrest Location 255 referred to at SAF paragraphs 96(c) and 97 (Duke Energy Lease Area)]. This raises a further issue:
(i)Did EEPP have an equitable sublease of [part of] the Duke Energy Lease Area?
(c)The PEP and associated pipeline infrastructure in Forrest Lot 399.
(d)The [Port Hedland Energy Pipeline (PHEP)] and associated pipeline infrastructure in the [sublease of the general purposes leases referred to in SAF paragraph 112113 (PHEP GPL Sublease Area)].
(e)The PHEP and associated pipeline infrastructure in the HBI Terminal Station.
[(ea)The PHEP and associated pipeline infrastructure in the Duke Energy Lease Area.]
(f)The [Burrup Extension Pipeline (BEP)] and associated pipeline infrastructure in the area of [easement referred to in SAF paragraph 123122 (BEP Easement)]. This raises a further issue:
(i)What is the relevance (if any) of the BEP Easement being unregistered as at 2 June 2004?
(g)The PEP, BEP and associated pipeline infrastructure in the area of [the area referred to in SAF paragraph 128 (DBNGP Access Corridor)].
(h)The [Wodgina Lateral Pipeline Northern Section (WLPNS)] and associated pipeline infrastructure in the areas the subject of the [miscellaneous licence L45/108 referred to in SAF paragraph 138 (which is the subject of the licence and trust referred to in SAF paragraphs 139140) (WLPNS Miscellaneous Licence)].
…
Issue 3: Was the following property of the Applicants 'land' (within the meaning of that term in s.76(1) Stamp Act) by reason that it occupies the physical space under the ground:
EEPP
(a)PEP underground pipes.
(b)Cathodic Protection System (CPS).
(c)PHEP underground pipes.
(d)BEP underground pipes.
EEWA1
(e)WLPNS underground pipes.
The statutory context in which the preliminary issues arise
Part IIIBA of the Stamp Act deals with duty on change of control of certain landowning corporations. As mentioned above, in August 2004, each of the applicants lodged a statement in the approved form with the respondent under s 76AN of the Stamp Act in relation to the acquisition of the issued shares in each of EEPP and EEWA1 by EEPL. Section 76AN(3) requires that the dutiable statement must include information as to the corporation's estimate of the unencumbered value of all land in Western Australia to which they were entitled. The dutiable statements submitted by the applicants estimated that value at 'nil' on the basis that the pipelines which the applicants owned did not constitute land within the meaning of Pt IIIBA of the Stamp Act. It is the contrary view of the Commissioner, namely that the pipelines do constitute land for relevant purposes, that has led to these proceedings.
Part IIIBA of the Stamp Act provides, relevantly for present purposes, that the transfer of shares in a corporation which is a landholder for the purposes of Div 3 of Pt IIIBA attracts duty on the dutiable statement calculated in accordance with the provisions of s 76AO.
Section 76AP(2) provides:
A corporation is a landholder for the purposes of this Division if at the time of a relevant acquisition
(a)it is entitled to land situated in Western Australia and the unencumbered value of the land is not less than $1 000 000, or it is entitled to land situated in Western Australia as a coowner of the freehold or of a lesser estate in the land and the value of the whole of the freehold or lesser estate is not less than $1 000 000; and
(b)the value of all land to which the corporation is entitled, whether situated in Western Australia or elsewhere, is 60% or more of the value of all property to which it is entitled, other than property directed to be excluded by subsection (3),
or if the Commissioner determines that paragraphs (a) and (b) would have applied to the corporation at the time of the relevant acquisition but for a transaction, or series of transactions, which in the Commissioner's opinion had as its purpose, or one of its purposes, the defeat of the object of this Division.
Section 76 defines 'entitled' as meaning 'beneficially entitled'. At the relevant time, land was defined in s 76 for the purposes of Pt IIIBA as follows:
'land' includes a mining tenement, and also includes —
(a)any estate or interest in land; and
(b)anything fixed to the land including anything that is, or purports to be, the subject of ownership separate from the ownership of the land.
The pipelines owned by the applicants are the subject of a pipeline licence under the Petroleum Pipelines Act 1969 (WA) (PP Act).
'Pipeline' is defined under the PP Act as not only the pipe or system of pipes, but a range of other associated infrastructure related to the system of pipes. The various items referred to as 'associated pipeline infrastructure' are accepted by the parties as comprising pipelines under the PP Act for relevant purposes in these proceedings.
Section 6 of the PP Act proscribes the construction, alteration and operation of a pipeline except pursuant to a licence. Section 12 permits the granting of a licence subject to conditions, and s 12(3) provides:
Subject to subsection (4), the licence is subject to a condition that the licensee shall not commence or cause to be commenced the construction of the proposed pipeline specified therein over any part of the licence area unless he has first acquired all the lands in that part of the licence area or a lease, licence or other authority over the lands and acquired and registered all such easements over those lands as are necessary for him to lawfully construct that pipeline over those lands or part thereof and to have the right of access thereto.
Section 57 of the PP Act provides:
Pipelines to remain property of owner
(1)Notwithstanding any Act or rule of law to the contrary, any pipeline constructed under the authority of this Act shall remain the property of the licensee whether or not the pipeline is affixed to any land and whether or not the licence granted in respect of the pipeline has been wholly or partly cancelled.
(2) The licensee, in maintaining or operating any pipeline in respect of which a licence is issued under this Act, shall do as little damage as is possible and shall make full compensation to the owner of, and any party having an interest in, land for any damage sustained by them in consequence of the exercise of any power by the licensee in maintaining or operating the pipeline, and the compensation shall in default of agreement between the licensee, the owner or other party, be determined by a court of competent jurisdiction.
At one point, the pipeline crosses what is known as the DBNGP Access Corridor which is a corridor of land 30 metres wide in respect of which rights are conferred under the Dampier to Bunbury Pipeline Act 1997 (WA) (DBP Act).
Section 28 of the DPB Act provides:
28. The meaning of 'State corridor rights'
(1)State corridor rights are an interest in land in the DBNGP corridor and the extent of the interest is such that, if State corridor rights are held in land, neither conferring rights under section 34 nor exercising any right conferred under that section would injuriously affect any right, title, or interest in the land.
(2)State corridor rights may be taken or acquired as described in section 29(2).
The relevant minister may acquire State corridor rights by agreement or compulsory acquisition s 29(2) DBP Act.
Section 34 of the DBP Act enables the minister to confer rights in respect of land in the DBNGP corridor for the purpose of constructing and operating on the corridor any pipeline for transporting gas or for incidental purposes. Section 40 of the DBP Act is to similar effect as s 57 of the PP Act. Section 40 of the DBP Act at the relevant time provided:
40. Property in things on the land
Anything that a holder of rights conferred under section 34 or a nominee places on land in the DBNGP corridor in accordance with those rights
(a)does not become a part of the land, regardless of whether it is of the nature of a fixture;
(b)is capable of being assigned separately from the land; and
(c)may be removed from the land by, or with the authority of, the owner of that thing.
The facts
The parties agreed the facts relevant to the preliminary issues, and provided an agreed bundle of all relevant documents. It is not necessary to set out all of the agreed facts. They can be relevantly summarised as follows.
The Pilbara Energy Pipeline (PEP) was constructed and commissioned in 1995 in accordance with an agreement between BHP Minerals Pty Ltd, BHP Energy Holdings Pty Ltd, BHP Power Holdings Pty Ltd and the State of Western Australia which had been ratified by the Pilbara Energy Project Agreement Act 1994 (WA). By a deed of assignment, BHP Energy Holdings Pty Ltd and BHP Power Holdings Pty Ltd assigned to Pilbara Energy Pty Ltd all their right title and interest under the agreement with effect from 1 June 1994. The PEP extends from a junction with the Dampier to Bunbury Natural Gas Pipeline (DBNGP) at Karratha to Port Hedland.
Two further pipelines were subsequently constructed under the ratified agreement. They are the Port Hedland Energy Pipeline (PHEP) which extends from a terminal at the Port Hedland Power Station to a terminal at the Direct Reduced Iron Ore Plant known as the Hot Briquetted Iron Plan (the HBI terminal station).
The Burrup Extension Pipeline (BEP), which extends from the Natural Gas Treatment Plant at Burrup (the Woodsideoperated gas facility) to the Karratha Inlet Station (KIS) near mainline valve 7 (MLV7) on the DBNGP.
The PHEP and the BEP were constructed and commissioned in 1998. Each of these pipelines is an extension of the PEP.
There were then certain agreements in 1998 which had the effect of removing the PEP, the PHEP and the BEP from the operation of the Pilbara Energy Project Agreement Act 1994 and transferring the pipelines to EEPP with the effect that, at all material times, including on 2 June 2004, EEPP was the owner of:
(a)the PEP, which is the subject of pipeline licence PL22 (PL22) issued under the PP Act (as modified by the Pilbara Energy Project Agreement Act 1994) and dated 16 September 1994;
(b)The PHEP, which is the subject of pipeline licence 31 (PL31); and
(c)the BEP, which is the subject of pipeline licence PL38.
EEWA1 is the owner of the Wodgina Lateral Pipeline Northern Section (WLPNS), which is the subject of pipeline licence 56 (PL56).
The PEP
The PEP is approximately 214 kilometres long. It consists of sections of pipe which are approximately 18 metres long and welded together with an outside diameter of 457 millimetres. It was designed and constructed in accordance with AS2885 as published in 1987 which requires the PEP to be buried with a minimum cover of 750 millimetres, except in rock where the applicable pipeline licence required a minimum of 600 millimetre cover, although the standard requires only 450 millimetres.
The PEP has three surface manifestations. It is above ground in two places where it is held in place by metal collars welded around the pipe which are affixed to concrete pads and which are in turn embedded in the ground. An isolation valve is installed by bolts and welds onto this section of the PEP. Toward the approximate midpoint of the PEP, at the Sherlock Hills Scraper Station (SHSS), the pipeline is above the surface. All pipe work and valves in the SHSS are aboveground. The SHSS is fully fenced and signposted to provide security.
The PEP crosses several roads, railway lines and major rivers between the KIS and the Port Hedland terminal station.
On 4 November 1994, the State of Western Australia granted 35 easements under the PP Act (as modified by the Pilbara Energy Project Agreement Act 1994) to BHP Minerals and Pilbara Energy which permitted the PEP to be constructed, operated and maintained over certain parcels of crown land (the PEP easements). The PEP easements are all substantially in the same form and vary only in respect of the underlying land titles over which they were granted. The benefit of the PEP easements was transferred from BHP Minerals and Pilbara Energy to EEPP under the terms of the purchase agreement in 1988. Schedule A of these reasons sets out the details of the PEP easements.
As the schedule demonstrates, the PEP easements variously apply to vacant crown land, land the subject of crown leases, lands the subject of crown reserves and public roads. In each case, the easements are registered against the relevant title documents. The easements are undoubtedly designed to fulfil the condition on the pipeline licence imposed by s 12(3) of the PP Act.
At all material times, and in particular as at 2 June 2004, some of the sites upon which the PEP is located were not the subject of any easement under the PP Act or at all. Those locations were:
i)Forrest location 116 being part of crown reserve 33593 (plan 176233);
ii)Forrest location 266 being vacant crown land (plan 192684). Part of that area is subject to a general purpose lease issued under the Mining Act 1978 (WA) dated 21 August 1995 and held at all times by BHP Billiton Direct Produced Iron Pty Ltd for an infrastructure corridor; and
iii)Forrest location 255 (now lot 255) being a crown lease (plan 192056).
Forrest location 255 is land upon which the Port Hedland power station and part of the PEP is located. At 2 June 2004 this land was the subject of a lease held by Duke Energy WA Power Pty Ltd and Duke Energy WA Holdings Pty Ltd (together the Duke companies) as tenants in common in undivided shares. At that time, EEPP, the Duke companies and the State were negotiating a sublease of that part of Forrest location 255 upon which the Port Hedland terminal station and associated pipelines owned by EEPP were located. The significance and effect of the correspondence relating to the proposed sublease will be considered later as it is relevant to issues 1.2(b) and (c) above.
Forrest locations 116 and 266 now form part of Forrest lot 399 on deposited plan 28588, which is unallocated crown land.
Pilbara Energy entered into land access agreements by which each of the pastoralists holding leases in respect of the crown land over which the PEP easements were granted provided access to the relevant land for the purpose of constructing, operating and maintaining the PEP. Those land access agreements were subsequently assigned to EEPP when it acquired the interest in the pipeline licences and the pipeline from Pilbara Energy.
Issue 1.2(a) – Does the PEP and associated pipeline infrastructure in the area of the PEP easements constitute land?
The respondent does not contend that the pipelines by themselves constitute an estate or interest in land. Rather, he contends that PEP easements constitute an interest in land and thus 'land' to which the applicants are entitled, and that the pipelines are included in that land because they are fixed to it (and thus caught by [b] of the definition of 'land' in s 76(1) of the Stamp Act).
He contends that Pt IIIBA of the Stamp Act clearly contemplates that a thing may be fixed to a mining tenement or a lesser estate or interest than fee simple, with the result that the value of that mining tenement or estate or interest to which a corporation is entitled for the purposes of s 76AP(2) must be determined on the basis that the thing forms part of the mining tenement or estate or interest. He argues that, in those areas where the PEP is fixed to land which is the subject of a PEP easement, and is also the subject of a pastoral lease (which only confers upon the lessee the right to use the land for pastoral purposes and does not give rise to any right of ownership in the PEP) the PEP must be characterised as being fixed to the PEP easement. The Commissioner refers to that argument as the 'characterisation approach'.
Alternatively to the characterisation approach, it is argued that in circumstances where a thing is fixed to land in which there is more than one interest, for the purposes of Pt IIIBA the value of the thing must be reflected in the value of one or more (or both) of the interests in the land (apportionment of value approach). The Commissioner contends that the manner of valuation of the thing apportioned between the various interests will depend upon the facts, and that, in the case where one of those interests is an easement, it will depend upon the rights conferred on the holder of the easements and the rights (if any) that the holder of any other interest in the land may have in respect of that thing.
The applicants contend that, properly construed, s 76(1) of the Stamp Act does not operate so as to include in land something fixed to the land unless the rights of the relevant corporation in the thing fixed derive from, or are conferred by, the estate or interest held by the corporation in the land to which the thing is fixed.
The starting point of the applicants' argument is that the definition of land in s 76(1) is not to be construed on its own. Rather, as was observed, in Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v GSF Australia Pty Ltd (2005) 221 CLR 568 (Allianz) at [12] the function of definitions is to aid the construction of substantive enactments that contain the defined term or terms, and that the meaning of the definition depends on the context and object of the substantive enactment. That approach was adopted by the High Court in Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue [2009] HCA 41 (Alcan) where the Court considered whether the meaning of 'land' for the purposes of a section of the Taxation (Administration) Act (NT) took its defined meaning or whether the application of the defined meaning was displaced or reversed by contextual or historical considerations.
The applicants also submit, and I accept, that when a statute adopts a definition of a term which has an ordinary meaning, that ordinary meaning informs the meaning of the entire definition: Manly Council v Malouf (2004) 61 NSWLR 394 at [8] [10]; Delaney v Staples (t/a De Monfort Recruitment) [1992] 1 AC 687 at [692]. That general proposition is, of course, subject to the proviso that a statutory definition may clearly express an intention to include within a defined term something which is clearly outside of the ordinary meaning of that term. The applicants contend that the definition of 'land' in s 76 of the Stamp Act is not in that category.
The applicants contend that the ordinary meaning of 'land' informs the intended meaning of the definition in s 76(1). They argue that the consequence of applying the ordinary meaning of land is that para (b) of the definition, which requires disregard of separate ownership of anything fixed to the land, applies, for the purposes of s 76AP(2), only as long as when the separate ownership is disregarded, the thing fixed to the land is part of the land in the sense that it is encompassed within the estate or interest in land to which it is fixed. They contend that the separate ownership of the thing is not to be disregarded so as to include within land a thing which is not part of the relevant estate or interest held by the relevant corporation. The essence of the applicants' argument was expressed as follows:
The purpose of requiring that the separate ownership of a thing that is fixed to the land be disregarded is to enable the thing fixed to become part of the land for the purposes of Part IIIBA. The consequence of the thing becoming part of the land is that, depending on the relevant corporation's estate or interest in the land, the corporation may or may not have an estate or interest in the thing as part of the land. However, the thing fixed is not to be considered separately from the land of which it forms part or separately from the relevant corporation's estate or interest in the land.
The applicants contend that, where, as here, the estate or interest in land held by the relevant corporation confers no interest whatsoever in the pipelines that are fixed to the land, the pipelines are not included within the land. The pipelines retain their ordinary status, for purposes of the law, as a chattel and fall to be treated as such under the Stamp Act.
The consequence of that submission is illustrated by the applicants by the following examples:
(a)where a corporation owns freehold land in which there is buried a pipeline which, by s.57 of the PPA, the corporation owns separately from the land, the freehold interest in land is taken to include the pipeline and the corporation thereby has a beneficial entitlement to that land;
(b)where a corporation holds a leasehold interest in land in which a pipeline is buried and which is owned separately by the corporation, the pipeline is included if and only to the extent that the leasehold interest confers on the corporation a beneficial interest in the pipeline;
(c)where a corporation owns a freehold interest in land in which a pipeline is buried and which is owned separately by a third party, the pipeline is excluded as the corporation has no beneficial interest in it.
In my view, the 'characterisation approach' contended for by the respondent is the correct approach.
Each PEP easement confers rights in relation to a defined area of land. The easements recite the grant of a relevant pipeline licence. The easement confers the full right and liberty for the licensee to remain on the identified portion of land for any of the purposes of the licence and for the purpose of laying, constructing, maintaining and examining the pipeline within certain specified depths. The easements contain covenants by and for the benefit of 'the licensee for itself and the proprietor or proprietors for the time being of the grant of easement' in relation to works in connection with or affecting the pipeline. The existence of an easement (or some other appropriate interest in land) is a condition of the licence by virtue of s 12(3) of the PP Act.
The pipeline is, it is common ground, fixed (within the meaning of that word in s 76(1) of the Stamp Act) to the land the subject of the easements.
In the applicants' statement of issues, facts and contentions, the applicants, relying on Municipal District of Concord v Coles (1906) 3 CLR 96, contend that the pipelines 'are not and cannot be fixed to the land (an easement in gross) which is beneficially owned by EEPP within the meaning of s 76(1)(b).' That contention was not developed further in oral submissions. If what is contemplated by the contention is that the PEP easements do not constitute an interest in land, because they are easements in gross, I do not accept that submission. It is correct that in Municipal District of Concord v Coles, the High Court concluded that a public road or highway is not an easement because it is not connected with a dominant tenement, and in Commissioner of Main Roads v North Shore Gas Co Ltd (1967) 120 CLR 118 at [134] (1967 North Shore Gas Case), Windeyer J described as 'fallacious' a contention that the privileges conferred on the respondent by the North Shore Gas Act 1875 (NSW) amounted to an easement and thus an interest in land. In this case, however, s 16 and s 17 of the PP Act expressly empower the grant of easements for the purpose of construction and operation of a pipeline subject of a licence. The PEP easements are registered on the relevant title document. The 1967 North Shore Gas Case was concerned only with the characterisation of statutory rights and not with easements contemplated and authorised by the relevant legislation and registered on title. As Windeyer J said in that case (at [133]), Parliament is free to create what are referred to as statutory easements. In my view, the PEP easements granted in the way contemplated in the PP Act, constitute interests in land.
It is correct that, under s 76AP(2), to be a landholder, a corporation must be beneficially entitled to land. By virtue of the definition in s 76(1), s 76AP(2) applies where a corporation is beneficially entitled to an interest in land. EEPP is beneficially entitled to the interest in the land which the PEP easements confer.
As the applicants observe, the definition of land in s 76(1) includes 'anything fixed to the land' (emphasis added). I accept that the use of the definite article requires that the thing concerned be fixed to land to which the relevant corporation is beneficially entitled. Thus, s 76AP(2) would not be enlivened where a corporation merely had a beneficial entitlement to something fixed to land in respect of which the corporation had no estate or interest. The respondent's argument that the pipelines are themselves land is dealt with below.
In my view, however, para (b) of the definition of land does operate to include something fixed to land in respect of which the corporation concerned has an estate or interest less than freehold, including an interest as grantee of an easement.
The applicants contend that things fixed to the land are only caught by the definition, and thus considered to be land, where the source of rights in relation to the thing fixed is encompassed within the estate or interest in the land to which it is fixed. They contend that, by virtue of the provisions of the PP Act, and in particular s 57, the source of rights in relation to the pipelines is the licence, and not the relevant easement. In other words, the corporation must have a beneficial entitlement to the thing fixed which derives from the interest in land.
In my view, that contention is inconsistent with the inclusion in the definition of land of anything fixed to the land that is, or purports to be, the subject of ownership separate from ownership of the land. Reading s 76AP(2) and the definitions in s 76(1) together, a corporation is a landholder where it is beneficially entitled to an interest in land, which includes anything fixed to the land the subject of that interest (assuming the land has the threshold value). Once the item is found to be relevantly fixed, the fact that there is some source of rights in relation to the thing which derives from something other than the interest in the land does not result in the thing ceasing to be part of the land for the purposes of Pt IIIBA.
This conclusion does not have the effect of treating the thing attached separately from the land of which it forms part. The land in this case is that the subject of the easements which exist expressly for the purpose of installing and maintaining the thing fixed, namely the pipelines. There is nothing inconsistent with the natural meaning of the word 'land' to include as part of land things which are fixed to it. I consider that the conclusion I have reached is consistent with the approaches to statutory construction taken in Allianz and Alcan referred to above.
I have not reached this conclusion on the basis of accepting a submission by the respondent that s 57 of the PP Act does not create rights of ownership in the pipelines. It was argued that s 57 only has effect where some Act or rule of law might work to deprive a licensee of property in its pipeline. Thus, it was argued, where a pipeline became a fixture on land owned by the licensee of that pipeline, ownership of the pipeline would accrue to the licensee as owner of the land, rather than as holder of the licence. A corollary to that argument is that, if the licensee transferred the licence and pipeline, but not the land, to a third party, the source of ownership of the pipeline would revert from the land title to the licence. In my view, the intention of s 57 of the PP Act was to determine that ownership of a pipeline, the subject of a licence, would rest at all times with the licensee by virtue of the licence. That conclusion does not, however, alter my conclusion that the definition of land in s 76 of the Stamp Act includes a pipeline fixed to land, or an interest in land, beneficially held by the relevant corporation, notwithstanding that the source of ownership of the pipeline is separate from ownership of the interest in the land.
Issue 1.2(b) and 1.2(ea) – Did EEPP have an equitable sublease of part of the Duke Energy Lease Area
As mentioned above, Forrest location 255 (the Duke Energy Lease Area) is the land upon which the Port Hedland power station is located and was subject to a lease dated 1 July 2003 held by the Duke companies. The Port Hedland power station includes the Port Hedland terminal station and associated gas pipeline which forms part of the PEP. It is also the one terminal of the PHEP.
As at 2 July 2004, the EEPP, the Duke companies and the State were negotiating a sublease of that part of Forrest location 255 upon which the Port Hedland terminal station and associated pipelines owned by EEPP were located. The respondent contends that the correspondence containing those negotiations gave rise to an equitable sublease of the Duke Energy Lease Area in favour of EEPP on the basis that the correspondence amounts to an agreement to grant a sublease.
The correspondence relied upon includes a letter dated 27 August 1998. The letter was from BHP Minerals Pty Ltd and Pilbara Energy Pty Ltd to EEPP. The letter reads:
I understand that part of the pipeline the subject of pipeline licence PL31 is located on a part of the Pilbara Energy Project Port Hedland power station site the subject of a proposed Special Lease to be issued pursuant to the Land Act and Pilbara Energy Project Agreement Act 1994 (Power Station Lease).
This is to confirm that on the Power Station Lease being granted, and subject to necessary Ministerial consent, the Pilbara Energy Joint Venturers will agree to a sublease of the area of the terminal facilities and pipeline the subject of pipeline licence PL31 located within the boundaries of the Special Lease. Such sublease will be on reasonable terms and conditions similar to those contained in the sublease of general purpose leases in which that pipeline is located and between BHP Direct Reduced Iron Pty Ltd and your company, including rental based on the proportion of the total rent payable by the Joint Venturers under the Special Lease which the area occupied by the PL31 pipeline and terminal facilities bears to the total area of the Special Lease.
By an earlier letter dated 20 July 1998 the chief executive officer of the Department of Resources Development had written to Mr Michael Knowles, senior lawyer with BHP Iron Ore and company secretary of Pilbara Energy Pty Ltd.
DRD will, at the appropriate time, recommend to the Minister for Resources Development that he approve an application by the Pilbara Energy Joint Venturers to a sublease of a portion of the Special Lease that is proposed to be issued for the Port Hedland power station site. This recommendation will be made on a sublease being presented with content substantially similar to that in the draft of the sublease of general purpose leases that you provided for review.
Some time between 27 August 1998 and 1 July 2003, Pilbara Energy Pty Ltd changed its name to Duke Energy WA Power Pty Ltd.
On 4 February 1999, BHP Minerals assigned its interest in and obligations under the State agreement to Duke Energy WA Holding Pty Ltd. On 1 July 2003, the Minister for Lands granted to the Duke companies a lease of the Duke Energy Lease Area under the Land Administration Act 1997 (WA).
As at 2 June 2004, EEPP had not executed a sublease of the Duke Energy Lease Area.
The respondent submits that the sublease which was being negotiated as at 2 June 2004 had a proposed deemed commencement date of 4 February 1999. In the course of submissions, counsel for the applicants suggested that that commencement date was found in a draft sublease produced some time after 2 June 2004, but as yet remaining unexecuted. My attention was not drawn to that document in the papers before me, and it is apparently not included amongst them. The respondent did not object to the assertion, and I am proceeding on the basis that there is no issue as to the source of that date. I note that the deemed commencement date coincides with the date upon which BHP Minerals assigned its interest in and obligations under the State agreement to Duke Energy WA Holding Pty Ltd, and is expressed to be the commencement of the term of the crown lease of Forrest location 255 to the Duke companies dated 1 July 2003.
In my view, the exchange of correspondence relied upon by the respondent does not amount to an enforceable agreement to sublease, and therefore to an equitable sublease. In its terms, the letter of 27 August 1998 suggests that the joint venturers 'will agree to a sublease', rather than to there being an existing agreement. The letter also refers to agreement to a sublease 'of the area of the terminal facilities and pipeline the subject of pipeline licence PL31'. The calculation of rent is based upon 'the area occupied by the PL31 pipeline and terminal facilities'. The pipeline the subject of PL31 is the PHEP. It is common ground that, within the Duke Energy Lease Area, there lies a portion of the PEP which is the subject of pipeline licence PL22. The respondent's case is that the sublease applies to the area occupied by both pipelines. He submits that the reference to 'terminal facilities' contemplates all of the pipelines and facilities within the Duke Energy Lease Area. However, given that specific reference is made to PL31, I do not consider it open to construe the letter of 27 August 1998 as an agreement to sublease the area occupied by PL22. The rent payable under the proposed sublease is calculable by reference to the area occupied by PL31. If it was intended to include the area occupied by PL22 within the sublease area, it might be expected that that area would be included in the proportionate calculation.
There is similar uncertainty as to the commencement date of a sublease. The respondent's position is that the term of the sublease was to commence on 4 February 1999. The letter of 27 August 1998 speaks of a sublease being granted 'on the power station lease being granted'. The power station lease was granted on 1 July 2003. It is unclear on the face of the correspondence whether the sublease would commence from the date of the grant of a head lease, the date of the grant of the sublease, or, as the respondent appears to contend, from a date which coincides with the commencement date of the term of the head lease.
In my view, the letter of 27 August 1998 is insufficiently certain to constitute a binding equitable sublease.
Alternatively, the respondent submits that if no equitable sublease exists, an equitable interest in favour of the EEPP arises by reason of equitable estoppel. It is contended that the correspondence referred to above, and the occupation of the relevant land by EEPP, demonstrate that the lessees of the Duke Energy Lease Area and the State have knowingly induced EEPP to maintain the pipelines in that area in reliance upon the expectation that a sublease will be granted. It is said that 'to refuse to grant a sublease would cause EEPP to suffer detriment and therefore the Duke companies and the State would be estopped in equity from denying the rights of EEPP to continue to access and use the land for the period it was entitled to operate the PEP and PHEP in accordance with the terms of the proposed sublease.
Having concluded that the letter of 27 August 1998 lacked the requisite detail and certainty to constitute a sublease, a difficulty arises in relation to the respondent's case based on estoppel. The respondent relies upon Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387 as establishing the applicable principles. The first requirement to establish an equitable estoppel is the existence of an assumption of fact. In Waltons Stores, the assumption was that a particular legal relationship existed between the parties, or would exist between them. The legal relationship concerned was of lessor and lessee. The terms of the lease had been negotiated and accepted on both sides. In this case, as discussed above, the precise terms of any sublease were not clear or identifiable as at 2 June 2004. In the absence of clarity as to the land to which the assumed sublease is to apply, and as to the term of the assumed sublease, it is not possible to identify the precise remedy necessary to satisfy the asserted equity.
A further requirement to create an estoppel of the nature discussed in Waltons Stores is that the person entitled to the equity has acted in reliance upon the assumption or expectation. There is no evidence before me of any act of reliance. Relevant pipelines were constructed and in place prior to 27 August 1998. They had been constructed and operated for some time by the pipelines' original owners, it would seem without the benefit of any leasehold or other interest in the land within the Duke Energy Lease Area. They continued to be operated and maintained by EEPP after the pipelines were transferred to it in 1998. It is not possible on the materials before the Tribunal to conclude that EEPP relied for any purpose upon the representation in the letter of 27 August 1998 or the indication in the letter of 20 July 1998 that ministerial consent would be recommended.
The respondent argues that the onus of establishing that an assessment is valid or incorrect lies on the taxpayer see Taxation Administration Act 2003 (WA) s 37(2). He argues that it is therefore not a matter for the Commissioner to adduce evidence as to reliance on the letter of 27 August 1998, and in the absence of evidence from the applicants that they did not do anything in reliance upon the assumption created by that letter, the assessment should stand.
In exercising its review jurisdiction, the Tribunal is to conduct its review by way of a hearing de novo for the purpose of producing the correct and preferable decision State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) s 27. A threshold issue for present purposes is the identification of any entitlement to land held by the applicants. If an entitlement is to be found in the form of an equitable estoppel, then it must be necessary for the Tribunal to identify elements necessary to give rise to the estoppel. The respondent's position necessarily depends upon an inference of reliance. There is, however, nothing before the Tribunal other than the agreed fact that the correspondence referred to above was sent, and that the applicants subsequently continued the operation and maintenance of the pipeline within the Duke Energy Lease Area. In my view, those facts alone are insufficient to draw an inference of reliance sufficient to support a conclusion that an equitable estoppel arises.
It follows that, in my view, the applicants did not, as at 2 July 2004, hold an interest in land within the Duke Energy Lease Area to which the pipelines and the Port Hedland terminal station were affixed.
As an alternative argument, the respondent contended that, even if the pipelines are fixed to an estate or interest in land, the pipelines are themselves 'land to which the applicants are entitled'. The respondent contends that the pipelines in this case are 'land' not because they are affixed to land, but because, by analogy with ratings cases, the applicants were in occupation of a portion of the substratum of the earth being that substratum through which the pipelines run.
In making that submission, the respondent seeks to distinguish the 1967 North Shore Gas Case. In that case, the High Court concluded that the respondent's rights in relation to gas pipes laid beneath certain public streets and parks did not constitute an interest in land for the purposes of the compensation provisions of the Public Works Act 1912 (NSW). The respondent notes that in the joint judgment of Barwick CJ, McTiernan, Kitto and Taylor JJ, their Honours said (at 125) 'the question in the case, and the only relevant question, is whether the mains and pipes, or the space occupied by them, constituted an interest in land'. The respondent contends that, that being the case, the High Court was focused on the nature of North Shore Gas Co's interest, rather than the question as to whether the pipes were themselves land.
The respondent relies on the passage from the judgment of Windeyer J at 132, where his Honour said:
To my mind it is pedantic logicchopping to suggest that because a pipe is hollow the space of the earth which it occupies when embedded in the soil is not 'land'. A basement, a subway, a cellar or a tunnel can be the subject of occupation and ownership. It can be held for an estate in fee simple; for a parcel of land can be defined by horizontal or by vertical boundaries: see Metropolitan Railway Code v Fowler (1893) AC 416, and the cases mentioned by Roper J in Resumed Properties Department v Sydney Municipal Council (1937) 13 LGR (NSW) 170. But to say that a space below the surface of the earth may be a freehold is not to say that every space below the surface of the earth is the freehold of the person who has the use of it. And to say that the space which a gas main or pipe occupies is 'land' is not to say that the gas company has an estate in that land.
In my view, the suggestion that the reasoning in the 1967 North Shore Gas Case leaves open the possibility that the pipelines were themselves 'land', but that the North Shore Gas Co's rights did not constitute an interest in land is not reasonably open.
The case concerned a claim for compensation under the Public Works Act 1912 (NSW). Section 101 of that Act provided for an entitlement to compensation 'for the land of which they have been deprived'. Section 102 provided for a claimant to serve notice with the relevant authority 'claiming compensation in respect of any land resumed'. The notice was required to set forth 'the nature of the estate or interests of the claimant in such land'. The joint judgment recites that North Shore Gas Co 'sought to support its claim … on the ground that its interest in the mains and pipes underlying the soil, or in the space occupied by them, was land or an interest in land'. The rights of the gas company arose under the North Shore Gas Act 1875 (NSW). The gas company was the owner of the pipes by virtue of the rights conferred by that Act. In their joint judgment, their Honours said (at 127):
Whatever is fixed to the freehold is said to become part of it and is subject to the same rights of property as the land itself (Woodfalls Landlord and Tennant, 24th edition 1939 page 749). The presumption is said to be rebuttable and, it seems to us, it must be so when a statute empowers someone other than the owner of land to affix to or embed things in the soil and yet retain ownership of the things so affixed or embedded. In such circumstances why should it be assumed that the exercise of a specific statutory right to lay and maintain pipes, as in the present case, operates to vest in the donee of the power an interest in the land in which the pipes have been laid? The conclusion that it does seems to us to result from a lawyer's inherent tendency to assimilate such a right to some category known to the common law. It is, of course, a very special right.
While it is understandable that, given that the case considered an analysis of the statutory rights, discussion revolved around consideration of the gas company's 'interest in land'. Given, however, that the right to compensation arose in respect 'of any land resumed', and given that the gas company claimed that the pipes were 'land or an interest in land', it is inconceivable that the High Court intended to deny the gas company's right to compensation on the basis of a lack of an interest in land if it considered that the pipes owned by the gas company were themselves land.
The respondent also seeks to distinguish the decision in Alinta DEGP Pty Ltd v Wellington and East Gippsland Shire Councils [2005] VSC 307, where Osborn J (at [55]) drew a distinction between the space occupied by a pipeline, which his Honour held was 'land' for ratings purposes, and the pipeline itself. The distinction was based on the fact that the Alinta DEGP case was concerned with pipelines the subject of the Gas Industry Act 2001 (Vic) which provided that the relevant pipeline 'is not part of the land through which it runs; and is personal property'. As I have already concluded, ownership of the pipeline itself derives from s 57 of the PP Act. The source of beneficial ownership is the PP Act, and not title to the interest in the land to which the pipeline is fixed. In the absence of any interest in the land to which the pipeline is fixed, the licenceholders interest in the pipelines comprises a statutory right which by itself, in my view, does not amount to an interest in land. Taken separately, the pipelines with which we are concerned in this matter are not, by themselves, land even though the substratum of earth through which they pass is land. The distinction taken by Osborn J equally applies in this case.
As I have already concluded, however, the pipelines are land for the purposes of the definition in s 76 of the Stamp Act where they pass through (and thus are fixed to) land in respect of which the applicants have a beneficial interest, for example the land the subject of the PEP easements. The pipeline is not land to which the applicants are beneficially entitled where the applicants have no interests in the land through which the pipeline passes, such as the Duke Energy Lease Area.
Issue 1.2(c)
Issue 1.2(c) involves consideration of that part of the PEP which passes through Forrest location 116 and Forrest location 266 (now lot 399) which are in the vicinity of the Duke Energy Lease Area. The respondent conceded that the applicants have no separate interests in those locations. Having concluded that the pipeline itself does not constitute land to which the applicants are beneficially entitled where it is not fixed to land in respect of which the applicants have a beneficial interest, it follows that the pipeline within those locations is not land for the purposes of the Stamp Act.
Issue 1.2(d), (e), (f) and (h)
The pipeline and the infrastructure, the subject of these various issues, all lie within or on land in respect to which the applicants have some form of interest. It was accepted by the parties that the outcome in relation to those issues would follow the outcome in relation to issue 1.2(a). For the reasons expressed in relation to that issue, the applicants are (respectively) the holders of an interest in land which includes the pipelines and infrastructure fixed to the land the subject of the interest.
Issue 1.2(g) – Do the PEP/BEP and associated pipeline infrastructure in the area of the DBNGP access corridor constitute land?
As mentioned earlier, at a point shortly before reaching the KIS, the BEP crosses under land which is the subject of the DBNGP access corridor, which is approximately 30 metres wide. The BEP terminates at MLV7 some distance from where it crosses the DBNGP access corridor, but a portion of MLV7 also lies within the DBNGP access corridor.
When the easement in relation to the BEP was prepared, it apparently purported to cover that portion of the BEP which crossed the DBNGP access corridor. However, by letter dated 24 July 2000, the Department of Land Administration suggested to EEPP that the area of the access corridor should be excluded from the easement because 'access rights over this portion of land have already been provided to you under the provisions of the DBNGP Act.' That recommendation was apparently acted upon.
As mentioned above, s 34 of the DBP Act enables the relevant minister to 'confer on a person any right in respect of land' for the purpose of constructing or operating any pipeline on the DBNGP corridor. The letter from the Department of Land Administration suggests that a conferral of rights has occurred under the DBP Act. Although no instrument of conferral was produced at the hearing before me, the hearing proceeded on the basis that there had been some grant under s 34.
Section 28 of the DBP Act is set out above. It prescribes that 'State corridor rights' are an interest in land. The rights which can be conferred by the Minister under s 34 of the DBP Act are not described as State corridor rights, but simply as 'any right in respect of land'. As a matter of logic, the rights conferred by a minister under s 34 must be rights which the minister is entitled to grant by virtue of having acquired the State corridor rights and thus must fall within the ambit of State corridor rights.
It follows that the rights which EEPP enjoys as a result of a conferral under s 34 of the DBP Act amount to an interest in land.
The applicants rely on s 40 of the DBP Act as demonstrating that the pipelines constructed and maintained in accordance with the rights granted under the DBP Act are not part of the land.
In my view, s 40 of the DBP Act operates in the same way, for relevant purposes, as s 57 of the PP Act. That is, s 40 of the DBP Act operates so as to avoid the common law doctrine of fixtures applying to pipelines which are attached to or embedded in land by preserving ownership of the pipeline in the hands of the grantee of the rights (in the case of the DBP Act) or the licensee (in the case of the PP Act). The precise nature of the rights conferred under s 34 of the DBP Act in this case is not clear. I am satisfied, however, that the rights must come within the term 'any estate or interest in land' for the purposes of the definition of land in s 76 of the Stamp Act. That is because s 28 of the DBP Act provides that State corridor rights are an interest in land. Even if the rights conferred under s 34 of the DBP Act are not properly characterised as 'State corridor rights' they must amount to an estate in land. 'Estate in relation to land' is defined by the Interpretation Act 1984 (WA) s 5 as including 'any legal or equitable estate or interest, easement, right, title, claim, demand, charge, lien or encumbrance in, over, to, or in respect of the land'. Rights conferred under s 34 of the DBP Act fall within that broad definition. The definition of land in s 76 of the Stamp Act includes an estate in land.
In my view, EEPP has land, in the sense of an estate or interest in land, within the DBNGP corridor through which the PEP passes and MLV7 is located. While, by virtue of s 40 of the DBP Act, the pipeline would not, at common law, be 'land', it is caught by the definition of 'land' for the purposes of the Stamp Act. That is so because the pipeline is fixed to the land of the subject of the interest. The definition of land in s 76 of the Stamp Act includes as land anything fixed to the land regardless of whether it would be characterised as a fixture at common law, or indeed regardless of its ownership.
The land the subject of access rights granted under s 34 of the DBP Act, and the pipeline or infrastructure fixed to that land, are land for the purposes of s 76 of the Stamp Act, and EEPP is entitled to that land for the purposes of s 76AP.
Issue 3 - Were specified pipelines and infrastructure 'land' by reason that they occupied physical space under the ground
I have dealt with the respondent's submissions on this point in the context of consideration of issue 1.2(b), and for the reasons there discussed, the answer to this question is no.
Conclusion
The issues identified by the parties are determined as follows:
1.The pipelines and infrastructure identified in issues 1.2(a), (d), (e), (f) and (g) constitute 'land' to which EEPP was entitled within the meaning of s 76AP(2)(a) of the Stamp Act.
2.The pipeline and infrastructure referred to in issue 1.2(h) constitutes 'land' to which EEWA1 was entitled within the meaning of s 76AP(2)(a) of the Stamp Act.
3.The PEP, the PHEP, and associated pipeline infrastructure in Forrest location 255, Forrest location 116 and Forrest location 266 (now lot 399) is not 'land' to which EEPP was entitled within the meaning of s 76AP(2)(a) of the Stamp Act.
Order
The matters are adjourned to a further direction hearing at 9.30 am on 13 April 2010 in order to consider appropriate directions to enable finalisation of all remaining issues.
SCHEDULE A
Easement number
Land Description
Certificate of Title/Crown Lease
G225412E
(No 287)
De Witt location 264, Pastoral Lease 3114/464
Crown Lease 55/1967
G225386E
(No 288)
De Witt location 150, Special Lease 3116/7842
Crown Lease 161/984
G225320E
(No 289)
De Witt location 285, portion of Karratha lot 4547 being portion of reserve 36991 'Water Supply and Pipeline'
Crown Land Record 3093/655
G225318E
(No 290)
De Witt location 32, Special Lease 3116/4984
Crown Lease 144/1975
G225115E
(No 291)
De Witt location 215, Special Lease 3116/9678
Crown Lease 191/1989
G225387E
(No 292)
Karratha lot 4565 (vacant crown land)
Crown Land Record 3103/923
G225351E
(No 293)
De Witt location 306, (vacant crown land)
Crown Land Record 3099/297
G225319E
(No 294)
Karratha lot 4566 (vacant crown land)
Crown Land Record 3103/924
G225116E
(No 295)
De Witt location 276, (vacant crown land)
Crown Land Record 3041/78
G225390E
(No 296)
Portion of Karratha Road (delineated on Plan P18556)
G225117E
(No 297)
De Witt location 224, being portion of Reserve 351
Crown Land Record 3063/819
G225395E
(No 298)
De Witt location 246, being portion of Reserve 1766
Crown Land Record 3063/850
G225397E
(No 299)
De Witt location 265, Pastoral Lease 3114/716
Crown Lease 335/1976
G225392E
(No 300)
Portion of Cleaverville Road, Mt Welcome Station
G225388E
(No 301)
De Witt location 64, Special Lease 3116/4621
Crown Lease 348/1976
G225391E
(No 302)
De Witt location 63, Special Lease 3116/4622
Crown Lease 349/1976
G225350E
(No 303)
Portion of Reserve 611 'Common Extension' delineated on Plans 18558 and 18559
G225394E
(No 304)
Portion of Point Samson Roebourne Road delineated on Plan 18559
G225321E
(No 305)
De Witt location 275, Special Lease 332/2096
Crown Lease 488/990
G225393E
(No 306)
De Witt location 269, Pastoral Lease 3114/490
Crown Lease 482/1966
G225322E
(No 307)
Portion of Reserve 18267 'Stock Route' delineated on Plan 18560
G225405E
(No 308)
Portion of Reserve 1539 'Watering Place' delineated on Plan 18560
G225406E
(No 309)
Portion of Reserve 9701 'De Grey Mullewa Stock Route' delineated on Plan 18560
G225389E
(No 310)
Portion of Peawah location 50, portion of Pastoral Lease 3114/490
Crown Lease 482/1966
G225409E
(No 311)
Portion of Peawah Location 49, Pastoral Lease 3114/558
Crown Lease 311/1966
G225411E
(No 312)
Portion of Peawah location 51, portion of Pastoral Lease 3114/1209
Crown Lease 304/1988
G225408E
(No 313)
Portion of Balla Balla Road delineated on Plan 18563
G225118E
(No 314)
Portion of Whim Creek Road delineated on Plan 18563
G225114E
(No 315)
Portion of Peawah location 44, Pastoral Lease 3114/517
Crown Lease 526/1966
G225398E
(No 316)
Portion Mundabullangana Road delineated on Plan 18565
G225399E
(No 317)
Portion of Forrest Location 131, being portion of Reserve 33015
Crown Land Record 3059/662
G225400E
(No 318)
Portion of Forrest location 206, portion of Pastoral Lease 3114/517
Crown Lease 526/1966
G225407E
(No 319)
Portion of Forrest location 222, Pastoral Lease 398
Crown Lease 756/1990
G225410E
(No 320)
Portion of Forrest location 203, portion of Pastoral Lease 3114/618
Crown Lease 58/1967
G225396E
(No 321)
Portion of De Witt location 158, being portion of Reserve 41275 'National Gas Pipeline Purposes' vested in the State Energy Commission of WA
Crown Land Record 3061/973
I certify that this and the preceding [98] paragraphs comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.
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JUSTICE J A CHANEY, PRESIDENT
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