EPF17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

EPF17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCA 800

Appeal from: EPF17 & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 1398
File number(s): QUD 420 of 2018
Judge(s): GREENWOOD J
Date of judgment: 10 June 2020
Catchwords: MIGRATION – consideration of an appeal from orders of the primary judge on the footing that the primary judge erred in failing to identify contended jurisdictional error on the part of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal having regard to contentions that the Tribunal failed to comply with obligations arising under s 424A and s 424AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – consideration of the observations in SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609 at 18 and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLFX (2009) 238 CLR 507 – consideration of the question of whether the primary judge erred in failing to recognise that the Tribunal reached a contended illogical decision – consideration of Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 at [130]‑[135] and the application of those principles to the facts found by the Tribunal
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 424A, 424AA
Cases cited:

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLFX (2009) 238 CLR 507

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611

SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609

VAF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 236 FCR 549

Date of hearing: 22 February 2019
Date of last submissions: 20 February 2019
Registry: Queensland
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 89
Solicitor for the Appellants: D Hadley, Local Legal Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms S Forder
Solicitor for the Respondents: Sparke Helmore

ORDERS

QUD 420 of 2018
BETWEEN:

EPF17

First Appellant

EPE17

Second Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

GREENWOOD J

DATE OF ORDER:

10 JUNE 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.The appellants pay the costs of the first respondent of and incidental to the appeal. 

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

GREENWOOD J:

  1. These proceedings are concerned with an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia given on 8 June 2018 refusing an application for the issue of the constitutional writs in relation to a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) affirming a decision of the delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs (the “Minister”) to refuse the grant of the appellants’ application for protection visas. 

  2. The background facts are not in dispute between the parties subject to particular aspects of the facts directly relevant to the grounds of appeal.  I will refer to those matters in due course. 

  3. As to the background facts, I will refer to those facts emphasised by the appellant based…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 800
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of EPF17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellants challenged the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) which had dismissed their claims for protection visas. The appellants contended that the Tribunal failed to consider crucial country information and made an illogical decision. The Federal Circuit Court reviewed the appeal and found no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision.

The key legal issue was whether the Federal Circuit Court erred in not recognising that the Tribunal had made an illogical decision. The appellants argued that the Tribunal did not consider relevant country information and failed to make findings about the level of surveillance the first appellant faced in Vietnam. They contended that these omissions led to an illogical decision. The court considered the principles set out in SZMDS and determined if the Tribunal's conclusion about the state of satisfaction required by s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) revealed any jurisdictional error.

The court found that the Tribunal had considered the evidence before it and made findings that a logical or rational person could have reached based on the material presented. The court held that the Tribunal's decision was not illogical or irrational because it was open to the Tribunal to engage in the process of reasoning it did and make the findings it did. The court noted that as long as there was room for a logical or rational person to reach the same decision on the evidence, the decision could not be deemed illogical or irrational.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellants were ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent of and incidental to the appeal. The court concluded that the Tribunal's decision was within its jurisdictional scope and did not contain any errors that warranted judicial review.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellants pay the costs of the first respondent of and incidental to the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involves an appeal against orders of the Federal Circuit Court, which itself was an appeal against decisions of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The first appellant sought asylum in Australia and was part of a class of ex-communist members who had criticized the communist government's economic policies. They had participated in anti-communist protests in Brisbane and claimed that they would face persecution if returned to Vietnam. The AAT made certain findings about the appellant's fear of returning to Vietnam, which were challenged in the Federal Circuit Court and subsequently on appeal to the higher court.

The case originated in the AAT, where the first appellant's application for a visa was initially rejected. The appellant appealed to the Federal Circuit Court, which upheld the AAT's decision. The appellant then sought leave to appeal to the higher court, which was granted. The appeal before the higher court focused on the contentions that the primary judge erred in not identifying jurisdictional errors made by the AAT, specifically regarding the AAT's compliance with sections 424A and 424AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The appeal also argued that the primary judge failed to recognise that the AAT's decision was illogical.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ground 3 of the appeal is in these terms:3.The Federal Circuit Court made an error of law by failing to recognise that the Tribunal made an illogical decision.Particulars(i)the [T]ribunal did not consider country information in relation to [the] class of persons the first [appellant] belonged to, being the ex‑communist members who sought asylum and were accused of criticising [the] communist government’s economic policies. (ii)the [T]ribunal did not consider that being an ex‑communist member who participated in anti‑communist protest in Brisbane, the first [appellant] would be subjected to persecution upon return. (iii)the [T]ribunal did not make a finding about the level of surveillance [the] first [appellant] faced in Vietnam prior to her departure and during a subsequent visit which was material to its finding about the first [appellant’s] fear of returning to Vietnam. As to ground 3 which is described as “reasonableness and logicality”, the appellants make the following submissions:a.We would respectfully submit that the [primary judge] made an error of law in failing to recognise that the findings [of] the [T]ribunal were unreasonable and illogical. b.We submit that the [T]ribunal did not consider country information in relation to class of persons the first [appellant] belonged to, being the ex‑communist members who sought asylum and were accused of criticising [the] communist government’s economic policies. c.We submit that the [T]ribunal did not consider that being an ex‑communist member who participated in anti‑communist protest in Brisbane, the first [appellant] would be subjected to persecution upon return. The appellants also say this:We submit that the [T]ribunal did not make a finding about the level of surveillance the first [appellant] faced in Vietnam prior to her departure and during a subsequent visit which was material to its finding about the first [appellant’s] fear of returning to Vietnam. d.In failing to consider these crucial factors, the [primary judge] could not form a judgment that was logical and reasonable. The matters set out at [65] and [66] of these reasons represent the full extent of the appellants’ written submissions on this ground. As to findings leading to a conclusion as to whether the decision‑maker can reach a state of satisfaction (or not) for the purposes of s 36(2) and s 65(1) of the Act, impugned on grounds of illogicality and irrationality, the following principles identified by Crennan and Bell JJ in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 at [130]‑[135] should be noted: 130In the context of the Tribunal’s decision here [which equally applies to the IAA’s decision in this case], “illogicality” or “irrationality” sufficient to give rise to jurisdictional error must mean the decision to which the Tribunal came, in relation to the state of satisfaction required under s 65, is one at which no rational or logical decision maker could arrive on the same evidence. In other words, accepting, for the sake of the argument, that an allegation of illogicality or irrationality provides some distinct basis for seeking judicial review of a decision as to a jurisdictional fact [the relevant state of satisfaction], it is nevertheless an allegation of the same order as a complaint that a decision is “clearly unjust” or “arbitrary” or “capricious” or “unreasonable” in the sense that the state of satisfaction mandated by the statute imports a requirement that the opinion as to the state of satisfaction must be one that could be formed by a reasonable person. 131… [T]he test for illogicality and irrationality must be to ask whether logical or rational or reasonable minds might adopt different reasoning or might differ in any decision or finding to be made on evidence upon which the decision is based. If probative evidence can give rise to different processes of reasoning and if logical or rational or reasonable minds might differ in respect of the conclusions to be drawn from that evidence, a decision cannot be said by a reviewing court to be illogical or irrational or unreasonable, simply because one conclusion has been preferred to another possible conclusion. 132Because illogicality or irrationality may constitute a basis for judicial review in the context of jurisdictional fact finding as explained above, it becomes necessary to decide whether the Tribunal’s conclusion about the state of satisfaction required by s 65 and its findings on the way to that conclusion revealed illogicality or irrationality amounting to jurisdictional error. … 133… [T]he correct approach is to ask whether it was open to the Tribunal to engage in the process of reasoning in which it did engage and to make the findings it did make on the material before it. … …135On the probative evidence before the Tribunal, a logical or rational decision maker could have come to the same conclusion as the Tribunal. Whilst there may be varieties of illogicality and irrationality, a decision will not be illogical or irrational if there is room for a logical or rational person to reach the same decision on the material before the decision maker. A decision might be said to be illogical or irrational if only one conclusion is open on the evidence, and the decision maker does not come to that conclusion, or if the decision to which the decision maker came was simply not open on the evidence or if there is no logical connection between the evidence and the inferences or conclusions drawn. [emphasis added]

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court began by addressing the first issue concerning the primary judge's failure to recognise a jurisdictional error by the AAT. The court found that the primary judge did not err in this regard. It was determined that the AAT did not fail to comply with the obligations under sections 424A and 424AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), as argued by the appellants. The court relied on the established case law which holds that the AAT is not bound by the same procedural constraints as the primary decision-maker, allowing for some flexibility in the application of the Act.

Next, the court considered whether the primary judge erred in failing to recognise that the AAT reached a contended illogical decision. The court held that there was no such error. The reasoning followed principles set out in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS, where it was established that a decision is not illogical or irrational if a logical or rational decision-maker could reach the same conclusion based on the evidence presented. The court concluded that the AAT's findings, although potentially debatable, were not so unreasonable or illogical that they could not be supported by the evidence. The court emphasised that the decision-maker's conclusions must be open to logical or rational minds, and where there is room for differing reasonable interpretations, the decision cannot be deemed irrational.

Finally, the court examined whether the principles from Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS could apply to the facts found by the AAT in this case. The court found that these principles could not be applied. It was determined that the evidence before the AAT was sufficient for a logical or rational decision-maker to arrive at the same conclusions as the AAT. The court noted that the appellants' arguments essentially questioned the merits of the decision rather than its legality or rationality. As such, the principles regarding jurisdictional error and illogicality did not apply to the facts of this case.