ENZO TAVERNITI and SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT & WORKPLACE RELATIONS
[2006] AATA 875
•13 October 2006
Administrative
Appeals
Tribunal
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2006] AAT 875
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
)No W2005/291
GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION ) Re ENZO TAVERNITI Applicant
And
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT & WORKPLACE RELATIONS
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal Ms LR Tovey, Member Date13 October 2006
PlacePerth
Decision
The Tribunal affirms the decision of the Social Security Appeals Tribunal dated 1 August 2005.
………[Sgd. Ms LR Tovey]……..
Member
CATCHWORDS
SOCIAL SECURITY – newstart allowance – lump sum compensation payment – preclusion period – special circumstances
Social Security Act 1991 (Cth), ss. 17, 23, 1064, 1160, 1161, 1168, 1170, 1182, 1183, 1184, 1184A, 1184C, 1184K, 1191-1194,
Secretary, Department of Social Security v Banks (1990) 23 FCR 416
Secretary, Department of Social Security v Cunneen (1997) 78 FCR 576
Re Beadle and Director-General of Social Security (1984) 6 ALD 1
Re Beadle and Director-General of Social Security (1985) 7 ALD 670
Dranichnikov v Centrelink (2003) 75 ALD 134; [2003] FCAFC 133
Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services v Allan (2001) 116 FCR 1
Kirkbright v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services (2000) 106 FCR 281
Kertland v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services (1999) 95 FCR 64
Groth v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 40 ALD 541
Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services v Chamberlain (2002) 116 FCR 348
Re Fuller and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services (2004) 83 ALD 152; [2004] AATA 615
REASONS FOR DECISION
13 October 2006 Ms LR Tovey, Member 1. This is an application by Mr Enzo Taverniti ("the Applicant") for a review of a decision of the Social Security Appeals Tribunal ("the SSAT"). The SSAT affirmed the decision of a delegate of the Respondent. The decision affirmed was to the effect that $748.32 paid to the Applicant by way of newstart allowance was recoverable by the Respondent. It was found to be recoverable, under relevant provisions of the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) ("the Act") by reason of the receipt of a lump sum payment by the Applicant in settlement of a claim for workers' compensation.
BACKGROUND FACTS
2. The following facts are not in contention.
3. On or about 19 February 2001 the Applicant sustained injury to his right shoulder when he slipped and fell while getting onto a conveyor belt in the course of his employment with Ansett Australia Ltd ("Ansett") as a baggage handler. While the Applicant returned to work shortly thereafter, he did receive some weekly payments of workers compensation from Ansett's insurer, Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd ("Allianz").
4. The Applicant continued to work with Ansett until the collapse of that company in September 2001. When Ansett collapsed arrangements were made for the payment of benefits by Centrelink to the employees of that company. The Applicant received payments of the newstart allowance for a period of time.
5. On 12 May 2003 the Respondent's delegate wrote to Allianz referring to the Applicant's claim for compensation, and giving notice that the Respondent may wish to recover from Allianz an amount equal to all or part of the amount payable under the contract of insurance.
6. On 4 January 2005 the Applicant entered into a Deed of Settlement with Ansett and Allianz, in which the parties agreed to settle all past, present and future claims which the Applicant may have for workers' compensation and damages at common law in respect of the injury he sustained on 19 February 2001. The settlement was by way of the payment to the Applicant of a lump sum of $45,000.00 ("the Settlement Sum"). Payment of the Settlement Sum was effected on or about 3 February 2005. The Applicant received this amount, with deductions being made for legal fees and payments to the Health Insurance Commission and Centrelink.
7. On or about 8 February 2005 the Respondent was notified of the details of the settlement. On 9 February 2005 the delegate of the Respondent wrote to Allianz giving notice that the Respondent proposed to recover from Allianz an amount of $748.32, being the amount recoverable Centrelink payments received by the Applicant from 14 September 2001 to 23 October 2001. That amount was subsequently paid by Allianz to the Respondent out of the money deducted from the Settlement Sum.
8. On 7 April 2005 the Applicant sought a review of the decision to recover the amount from Allianz. On 16 May 2005 an Authorised Review Office of the Respondent affirmed the decision.
9. On 1 August 2005 the SSAT affirmed the decision of the Respondent's delegate to recover the amount from Allianz.
10. The Applicant now seeks review by this Tribunal of the decision of the SSAT.
LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
11. Part 3.14 of the Act contains provisions for compensation recovery. Section 1160 of the Act describes the effect of that part in the following terms:
1160(1)This Part operates in certain specified circumstances to do one or more of the following:
(a)reduce a person’s compensation affected payment;
(b)render a person’s compensation affected payment not payable;
(c)require the repayment of some or all of a person’s compensation affected payment;
because of the receipt of compensation by the person or the person’s partner.
1160(2)This Part applies whether or not there is any connection between the circumstances that give rise to the person’s qualification for the compensation affected payment and the circumstances that give rise to the receipt of compensation by the person or the person’s partner.
12. The newstart allowance is a "compensation affected payment", pursuant to paragraph (c) of the definition of that term in s. 17(1) of the Act read with the definition of "social security benefit" in s. 23(1) of the Act. The Settlement Sum was "compensation", pursuant to the definition of that term in s. 17(2) of the Act.
13. Pursuant to s. 1161(1) of the Act, Part 3.14 of the Act applies to all payments of newstart allowance made after 1 May 1987.
14. Division 3 of Part 3.14 of the Act provides for the "lump sum preclusion period" where compensation is received. Section 1170 of the Act deals with the situation where a person receives both periodic payments and a lump sum payment of compensation, in the following terms:
1170(1)Subject to subsection (2), if a person receives both periodic compensation payments and a lump sum compensation payment, the lump sum preclusion period is the period that:
(a)begins on the day following the last day of the periodic payments period or, where there is more than one periodic payments period, the day following the last day of the last periodic payments period; and
(b)ends at the end of the number of weeks worked out under subsections (4) and (5).
1170(2)If a person chooses to receive part of an entitlement to periodic compensation payments in the form of a lump sum, the lump sum preclusion period is the period that:
(a)begins on the first day on which the person’s periodic compensation payment is a reduced payment because of that choice; and
(b)ends at the end of the number of weeks worked out under subsections (4) and (5).
1170(3)If neither of subsections (1) and (2) applies, the lump sum preclusion period is the period that:
(a)begins on the day on which the loss of earnings or loss of capacity to earn began; and
(b)ends at the end of the number of weeks worked out under subsections (4) and (5).
1170(4)The number of weeks in the lump sum preclusion period in relation to a person is the number worked out using the formula:
1170(5)If the number worked out under subsection (4) is not a whole number, the number is to be rounded down to the nearest whole number.
15. Section 1168 of the Act, which is also in Division 3 of Part 3.14 of the Act, provides that:
"A provision of this Division that refers to a person receiving or claiming a compensation affected payment and receiving a lump sum compensation payment has effect regardless of whether the lump sum compensation payment was received before or after the person received or claimed the compensation affected payment."
16. The formula adopted by s. 1170(4) of the Act requires the "compensation part of lump sum" and the "income cut out amount" to be ascertained.
17. Section 17(3)(a) of the Act relevantly defines the "compensation part of a lump sum payment" to be 50% of the payment where:
"(i) the payment is made (either with or without admission of liability) in settlement of a claim that is, in whole or in part, related to a disease, injury or condition; and
(ii)the claim was settled, either by consent judgment being entered in respect of the settlement or otherwise"
18. Section 17(1) of the Act defines the "income cut out amount" to mean, in relation to a person who has received a compensation payment, the amount worked out using the formula in s. 17(8) of the Act, as in force at the time when the compensation was received. Section 17(8) of the Act provides that:
"For the purposes of the definition of income cut‑out amount in subsection (1), the formula is as follows:
where:
maximum basic rate means the sum of the amount specified in column 3 of item 1 in Table B in point 1064‑B1 and the amount of pension supplement worked out under point 1064‑BA2 for a person who is not a member of a couple.
Note:Point 1064‑BA2 refers to maximum basic rate. Maximum basic rate depends on a person’s family situation. The rate used here is the rate for a person who is not a member of a couple.
ordinary free area limit means the amount specified in column 3 of item 1 in Table E‑1 in point 1064‑E4.
pharmaceutical amount for a single person means the amount specified in column 3 of item 1 in the Pharmaceutical Allowance Amount Table in point 1064‑C8."
19. The amounts identified in the tables in s. 1064 of the Act are subject to adjustments for CPI indexation in the manner prescribed by ss. 1191 – 1194 of the Act.
20. Section 1182 of the Act provides for the Respondent to issue a preliminary notice to an insurer of a person against whom a compensation claim has been made, that the Respondent may wish to recover an amount from the insurer. Where such a notice is given, s. 1183 of the Act requires the insurer to notify the Respondent of any liability it has to pay compensation. Section 1184 of the Act then relevantly provides that:
"1184(2) If:
(a)an insurer is liable, under a contract of insurance, to indemnify a compensation payer against any liability arising from a person’s claim for compensation; and
(b)the person has received a compensation affected payment in relation to a day or days in the periodic payments period or the lump sum preclusion period, as the case may be;
the Secretary may give written notice to the insurer that the Secretary proposes to recover from the insurer the amount specified in the notice.
1184(3)If a compensation payer or insurer is given notice under subsection (1) or (2), as the case may be, the compensation payer or insurer is liable to pay to the Commonwealth the amount specified in the notice.
1184(4)The amount to be specified in the notice is the recoverable amount under section 1184A."
21. Section 1184A of the Act then provides for the recoverable amount, being the lesser of a number of possible amounts. The lower amount in this case is that provided for by s. 1184A(1)(a) of the Act, being:
"the sum of all compensation affected payments made to the person that relate to a day or days in a lump sum preclusion period".
22. Section 1184C(2) of the Act provides that:
"Payment to the Commonwealth of an amount that an insurer is liable to pay under section 1184 in relation to a person operates, to the extent of the payment, as a discharge of:
(a)the insurer’s liability to the compensation payer; and
(b)the compensation payer’s liability to pay compensation to the person."
23. Finally, section 1184K(1) of the Act provides that:
"For the purposes of this Part, the Secretary may treat the whole or part of a compensation payment as:
(a)not having been made; or
(b)not liable to be made;
if the Secretary thinks it is appropriate to do so in the special circumstances of the case."
THE ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
24. In my view there are three issues to be determined in deciding whether the amount of $748.32 should be recovered from Allianz under s.1184 of the Act:
(a)What is the lump sum preclusion period for the Applicant?
(b)What was the amount of newstart allowance received by the Applicant during the lump sum preclusion period; and
(c)Do I consider that there are special circumstances of the case which make it appropriate to treat payment of the whole or part of the Settlement Sum as not having been made or not liable to be made?
25. Although expressed slightly differently, these are the issues which were identified in the Respondent's Statement of Facts Issues and Contentions. At the hearing of this matter the Applicant agreed that the issues identified by the Respondent were the issues for determination.
CONSIDERATION OF THE ISSUES – LUMP SUM PRECLUSION PERIOD
26. The Settlement Sum was clearly a "lump sum" payment for the purposes of Part 3.14 of the Act. Where a payment by way of compensation consists of the aggregate of several amounts which could have been paid separately or at different times, or is arrived at by adding amounts for different heads of loss, the payment is one of a lump sum: see Secretary, Department of Social Security v Banks (1990) 23 FCR 416 at 422; Secretary, Department of Social Security v Cunneen (1997) 78 FCR 576 at 583.
27. In determining this issue, it is necessary to identify the last day of the periodic payments period (s. 1170(1)(a) of the Act), the compensation part of the Settlement Sum (s. 1170(4) of the Act) and the "income cut-out amount" (s. 1170(4) of the Act).
28. The report of the settlement by Allianz to the Respondent (T8) identifies the date to which periodic compensation was paid as 27 February 2001. I find that this was the last day in respect of which periodic payments of workers' compensation were paid to the Applicant. Therefore, pursuant to s. 1170(1)(a) of the Act, the lump sum preclusion period begins on 28 February 2001.
29. The terms of the settlement Deed (T7) make it clear that the payment was made in settlement of a claim that is related to an injury, for the purposes of s. 17(3)(a) of the Act. Therefore, the compensation part of the lump sum payment is 50% of the Settlement Sum. The compensation part of the lump sum is therefore $22,500.00, being 50% of the $45,000.00 Settlement Sum.
30. The ARO and the SSAT adopted an "income cut-out amount" of $656.63. Pursuant to leave which I gave at the hearing, on 17 January 2006 the Respondent provided me with a letter which explained how the amount of $656.63 was calculated. I gave the Applicant an opportunity to respond to that letter, and he did not make any further submission in relation to it. I accept that this letter correctly calculates the "income cut-out amount" at the time compensation was received by the Applicant, and find that the income cut-out amount applicable to the Applicant is $653.63.
31. The calculation provided for by s. 1170(4) of the Act is then:
$22,500.00 ÷ $656.63 = 34.26
This is rounded down to 34 pursuant to s. 1170(5) of the Act.
32. The lump sum preclusion period then ends 34 weeks after 28 February 2001, pursuant to s. 1170(1)(b) of the Act. That period ended on 23 October 2001.
33. For the above reasons, I find that the lump sum preclusion period for the Applicant began on 28 February 2001 and ended on 23 October 2001.
CONSIDERATION OF THE ISSUES – AMOUNT OF NEWSTART ALLOWANCE RECEIVED DURING THE LUMP SUM PRECLUSION PERIOD
34. The recoverable amount of newstart allowance is the amount of that allowance received by the Applicant during the lump sum preclusion period of 28 February 2001 to 23 October 2001.
35. The Respondent provided its record of the payments made to the Applicant (T9), which show the Applicant to have received the following amounts of newstart allowance relating in whole or part to the preclusion period:
Payment Date
Payment Amount
Paid to
28 September 2001
$306.32
27 September 2001
12 October 2001
$285.50
11 October 2001
26 October 2001
$182.60
25 October 2001
Total
$774.42
36. That record is consistent with the Respondent's contention that the payments relating to the period 28 February 2001 to 23 October 2001 were $748.42. It is also generally consistent with the evidence of the Applicant that he received newstart allowance for a period following the collapse of Ansett in September 2001.
37. I therefore find that the amount of newstart allowance paid to the Applicant, which relates to days in the lump sum preclusion period, was $748.32. Subject to the exercise of discretion under s. 1184K(1) of the Act, that is the amount recoverable from Allianz.
CONSIDERATION OF THE ISSUES – SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES
38. The term "special circumstances" is not defined by the Act, and the approach of the Tribunal and the Federal Court in a large number of cases has been to regard the matters to which the Tribunal may have regard when considering whether special circumstances exist as unconfined. Although it dealt with a somewhat different provision to s.1184K of the Act, the following passage from the decision of this Tribunal in Re Beadle and Director-General of Social Security (1984) 6 ALD 1 at 3 is often cited in this context:
"An expression such as 'special circumstances' is by its nature incapable of precise or exhaustive definition. The qualifying adjective looks to circumstances that are unusual, uncommon or exceptional. Whether circumstances answer any of these descriptions must depend on the context in which they occur. For it is context which allows one to say that the circumstances of one case are markedly different from the usual run of cases. That is not to say that the circumstances must be unique but they must have a particular quality of unusualness that permits them to be regarded as special".
39. The decision of the Tribunal in Beadle was affirmed by the Full Court of the Federal Court on appeal: (1985) 7 ALD 670. While the Court recognised that it was not possible to lay down precise rules as to what constituted special circumstances, the expression "unusual, uncommon or exceptional" was not, as Hill J noted in Dranichnikov v Centrelink (2003) 75 ALD 134; [2003] FCAFC 133 at [65], actually affirmed by the Full Court.
40. In Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services v Allan (2001) 116 FCR 1 at [17] Heerey J said, in the context of the statutory predecessor to s. 1184K of the Act:
"It is not sensible to lay down precise limits or precise rules about what may constitute special circumstances: Beadle v Director-General of Social Security 7 ALD 670 at 673; 60 ALR 225 at 228. Ill health financial circumstances and the unfairness of a strict application of the Act are some matters which may in an individual case, constitute special circumstances Kirkbright v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services (2000) 106 FCR 281 at 284, 288; see also Kertland v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services (1999) 95 FCR 64 at 71."
41. Similarly, in Groth v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 40 ALD 541 at 545 Kiefel J said, in a passage she again adopted in Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services v Chamberlain (2002) 116 FCR 348 at [19]:
"The phrase “special circumstances”, it has been said, although imprecise is sufficiently understood not to require judicial gloss: Beadle's case (at ALR 229 ; ALD 674), and for present purposes it is sufficient to observe that it would require something to distinguish Mr Groth's case from others, to take it out of the usual or ordinary case. That was, I consider, the only enquiry to be undertaken in this case. It would of course follow that if one were to conclude that something unfair, unintended or unjust had occurred that there must be some feature out of the ordinary. The enquiry I have referred to would involve considering what would be the effect, if the provision in question or the principle of liability it creates, is applied."
42. In Re Fuller and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services (2004) 83 ALD 152; [2004] AATA 615 at [27] Downes J expressed the view that both hardship and unfairness can form the basis of exercising the discretion under s. 1184K of the Act.
43. I do not consider that all of the circumstances of this case demonstrate special circumstances which would justify the exercise of my discretion to reduce the preclusion period by treating payment of the whole or part of the Settlement Sum as not having been made or not liable to be made.
44. I do not consider that it has been demonstrated that the requirement in s.17(3)(a) of the Act, to regard 50% of the Settlement Sum as forming the compensation part of the lump sum payment, produces an unjust result in its application to this particular case. While the components of the Settlement Sum are not specified in the settlement deed, I do not think it has been shown that substantially less than half of that payment can be attributed to economic loss.
45. Apart from the sum of $748.32, the Applicant gave evidence that $4,500.00 of the Settlement Sum was paid to the Health Insurance Commission and about $5,000.00 - $6,000.00 was retained in legal fees. The Applicant was subsequently able to recover the $4,500.00 from the Health Insurance Commission, so that he estimated the net amount of the Settlement Sum which he received as being "in the high 30's". This does not suggest that the deducted components of the Settlement Sum were of such a significant amount as to render unjust the attribution of 50% of the Settlement Sum as the compensation part of the lump sum payment.
46. It is also relevant to note that the amount recovered by the Respondent was, in comparison to the total amount of the Settlement Sum, a relatively modest amount.
47. I also find that the Applicant was, or ought to have been, aware at the time of settlement that a component of the Settlement Sum may have to be paid to the Respondent. In that regard clause 6 of the settlement deed described the Settlement Sum as being:
"…inclusive of any amount or amounts payable to … Centrelink … and Taverniti indemnifies Allianz and Ansett against all liability in respect of any action, demand, notice, claim or proceedings made in any jurisdiction by … Centrelink … relating to or arising out of or in connection with the alleged disability"
48. The Respondent provided the Tribunal with an electronic copy of a letter sent to the Applicant on 12 May 2003 advising that, if he received a lump sum compensation payment, some or all of the Centrelink payment paid to him since the date of the injury may need to be paid back to Centrelink (T4). The Applicant gave evidence that he did not receive this letter, and said that it was addressed to his former matrimonial home where his wife still lived. The Applicant gave evidence that he last lived there in January 2003 and that his wife had not forwarded his mail to him. I do not find it necessary to resolve the question of whether the Applicant received the letter of 12 May 2003. Even if he did not receive that letter, the terms of the settlement deed clearly contemplated that part of the Settlement Sum may need to be repaid to the Respondent.
49. This is not a case where any officer of the Respondent provided misleading information to the Applicant as to the extent of his preclusion period or his liability to make repayments to the Respondent. I also note that the Respondent provided the Tribunal with an electronic copy of a letter sent to the Applicant on 9 February 2005 advising him of the preclusion period and the recoverable amount. The Applicant said in evidence that he probably received this letter, but was not sure about it. The letter was addressed to the Applicant's current address. I find that this letter was sent to, and received by, the Applicant.
50. The Applicant gave evidence that he did not think that the reference in the settlement deed to the Settlement Sum being paid inclusive of any Centrelink payments would affect him, as the payments had been received five years previously. However, I do not consider that to have been a reasonable assumption, given the express reference to Centrelink payments in the settlement deed and the fact that the Applicant's injury had been received prior to the commencement of those payments.
51. The Applicant also referred to the hardship which he now faces as justifying the exercise of my discretion under s. 1184K of the Act.
52. In that context the Applicant gave evidence that, following his injury and the collapse of Ansett, he worked as a baggage handler for a company called Ready Workforce, which was contracted to provide services to Qantas, for approximately six months. He said that he began working for Ready Workforce in about February 2002, after being terminated by Ansett in about January 2002. However, after that time the Applicant did not pass health surveillance requirements by reason of his shoulder injury. He has not worked since that time.
53. The Applicant gave evidence that he has separated from his wife and reached a financial settlement with her in February 2005. Prior to that settlement he and his wife owned three properties. These were the former matrimonial home where his wife still lives, the property where the Applicant now resides and a third property which was sold. The settlement proceeds from his wife and the sale of the investment property were used to pay out the mortgage on the Applicant's current residence. He says that he has one 22 year old son who lives with the Applicant's wife.
54. The Applicant gave evidence that he has approximately $80,000.00 in a bank account. The Applicant gave evidence that his accountant had advised him that approximately $64,000.00 of this sum would need to be paid to the government as capital gains tax resulting from the sale of his investment property. He also gave evidence that he owed about $18,000.00 to friends who had given him financial assistance in the past. The Applicant did not produce any documentary evidence in relation to either of these alleged debts. The Applicant gave evidence that he owned two cars, one worth about $2,000.00 and the other for which he paid $11,000.00. He also owns a boat worth approximately $8,000.00. He owns the house in which he lives outright, and does not have any continuing maintenance obligations to either his wife or son.
55. The Applicant gave evidence that he requires a further operation to his shoulder, and he is on a waiting list for that operation in the public health system. His evidence was that he has been on that waiting list for a considerable period of time and has "another three [years] to go".
56. The Applicant has not been receiving benefits from Centrelink since the collapse of Ansett. It appears that the Applicant has made previous applications for benefits but that those applications had been rejected because of the amount of his assets at the time of making the application. It does not appear that he has made an application since settlement with his wife, the sale of his investment property and the repayment of the mortgage on his current residence.
57. Having considered all of the above evidence, I do not consider that the financial position which the Applicant is in is unusually difficult for a person who has received payments of Centrelink benefits, or that his health difficulties are unusual for a person who has received workers compensation payments. Further, to the extent that the Applicant is currently in a difficult situation, that situation is not a product of the application of the preclusion period or the decision to recover part of the compensation payments made to the Applicant in 2001. The preclusion period ended in 2001, and the failure of the Applicant to obtain benefits since he has been unable to work is not due to the operation of Part 3.14 of the Act.
58. The submissions of the Applicant at the hearing focussed on the period of time which had passed since he had received payment of the newstart allowance. I do not consider the length of that period to be productive of unfairness. The payments were received by the Applicant after his injury, and it has not been shown that the Settlement Sum does not include any component for past economic loss which the Applicant may have suffered in the period during which he received newstart allowance.
59. The Applicant also referred in evidence to a statement that the Prime Minister had made to the effect that former Ansett workers "won't be disadvantaged by anyone". Assuming that the Prime Minister made such a statement, I would not regard that as constituting, either alone or together with the other factors I have considered, special circumstances justifying the exercise of my discretion under s. 1184K of the Act. I do not consider that the Applicant has been disadvantaged by the ordinary application of Part 3.1 of the Act in a manner that operates to allow the recovery of newstart allowance paid in respect of a period for which compensation is taken to have been paid.
60. For all of the above reasons, I am unable to find special circumstances in this case which I consider would justify my treating the whole or part of the Settlement Sum as not having been made or not liable to be made.
DECISION
61. For the above reasons, the Tribunal affirms the decision of the Social Security Appeals Tribunal dated 1 August 2005.
I certify that the 61 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Ms LR Tovey, Member
Signed: ..................[Sgd. Ms R Riberi] ...........................
AssociateDate of Hearing 17 January 2006
Final Written Submissions 27 January 2006
Date of Decision 13 October 2006
Representative for the Applicant Self Representative
Representative for the Respondent Mr P Maishman, Centrelink
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