Environment Protection Authority v Shell Co of Australia Ltd (No 3)

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Reported Decision: 106 LGERA 78

Land and Environment Court


of New South Wales

          CITATION:
Environment Protection Authority V Shell Co of Australia Ltd (No 3) [1999] NSWLEC 288
          PARTIES
PROSECUTOR
Environment Protection Authority
DEFENDANT
Shell Co of Australia Ltd
          NUMBER:
50071 of 1997
          CORAM:
Bignold J
          KEY ISSUES:
Environmental Offences :- Environmental offences- whether proceedings commenced within statutory limitation period - statutory presumption - who has onus to establish to the contrary?
          LEGISLATION CITED:
Environmental Offences and Penalties Act 1989 s 12(3)
          DATES OF HEARING:
11/05/1999; 11/08/1999; 11/09/1999; 11/10/1999
          DATE OF JUDGMENT DELIVERY:

11/15/1999
          LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES:


PROSECUTOR
Mr D Buchanan SC with Mr D Jordan, Barrister

SOLICITORS
Environment Protection Authority

DEFENDANT
Mr N Hemmings QC with Mr I Hemmings Barrister

SOLICITORS
Coudert Bros


    JUDGMENT:

IN THE LAND AND Matter No . 50071 of 1997


ENVIRONMENT COURT OF Coram : Bignold J.


NEW SOUTH WALES 15 November 1999

ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AUTHORITY

Prosecutor

v

THE SHELL COMPANY OF AUSTRALIA LTD

Defendant

JUDGMENT ON STRIKE OUT NOTICE OF MOTION (No 3)



Bignold J:

1. By Notice of Motion filed 4 November 1999, the Defendant seeks an order for the summary dismissal of the proceedings, alleging an offence against the Environmental Offences and Penalties Act 1989 s 6(1) (the EOP Act) on the ground that the proceedings were commenced beyond the three year period for the commencement of such proceedings prescribed by the Act s 12.

2. In the present case, the summons alleging the offence against the Defendant was filed in Court on 10 July 1997.

3. Both the originating summons and the application for an order pursuant to s 41 of the LEC Act were evidenced with particulars to the effect that the date on which evidence of the offence first came to the attention of any relevant authorised officer was 15 July 1994. Such endorsement was conformable to the Act s 12(3) which relevantly provides:

            If subsection (2) is relied on for the purpose of commencing proceedings for an offence, the information or application must contain particulars of the date on which evidence of the offence first came to the attention of any relevant authorised officer and need not contain particulars of the date on which the offence was committed. The date on which evidence of the offence first came to the attention of any relevant authorised officer is the date specified in the information or application, unless the contrary is established.

4. The effect of such endorsement in the present case is that the statutory three year limitation period commences to run from the endorsed date. So understood, the summons, having been filed on 10 July 1997 relevantly commenced the proceedings a few days within the three year limitation period which expired on 15 (or possibly 16) July 1997 .

5. In support of the Notice of Motion, the Defendant relied upon what was said to be admissions made by the Environment Protection Authority (EPA) in various letters and memoranda that it wrote during 1995 and 1996 to the effect…

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Details
Case
[1999] NSWLEC 288
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales, the Environment Protection Authority (EPA) filed proceedings against Shell Co of Australia Ltd, alleging an offence under the Environmental Offences and Penalties Act 1989. Shell contested the proceedings on the basis that they were commenced beyond the statutory three-year limitation period. The central issue before the court was whether the statutory presumption established by section 12(3) of the EOP Act shifted the onus of proof regarding the date on which evidence of the offence first came to the attention of an EPA officer, and if so, to whom the onus of disproving this date lay.

Bignold J determined that section 12(3) of the EOP Act created a conclusive presumption that the date endorsed on the summons was the date when evidence of the offence first came to the attention of an EPA officer, unless the defendant could establish otherwise. The court held that the defendant had the burden of proving, on the balance of probabilities, that this date was incorrect. The judge concluded that the statutory language did not merely impose an evidential burden but rather a conclusive presumption that could be rebutted by the defendant. After reviewing all the evidence, the court found that the defendant had not successfully discharged this burden, and thus the statutory presumption stood.

Consequently, the court dismissed Shell's motion to strike out the proceedings. The judge ordered that the proceedings against Shell could continue, as they were commenced within the statutory limitation period.

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