Environment Protection Authority v Nulon Products Australia Pty Ltd

[2015] NSWLEC 153

Land and Environment Court

New South Wales

• Amendment notes

Medium Neutral Citation:	Environment Protection Authority v Nulon Products Australia Pty Ltd [2015] NSWLEC 153
Hearing dates:	27 August 2015
Date of orders:	28 September 2015
Decision date:	28 September 2015
Jurisdiction:	Class 5
Before:	Moore AJ
Decision:	See orders at [215]
Catchwords:	ENVIRONMENTAL OFFENCE – air pollution – discharge of odour – prosecution of company for failure to comply with condition of environment protection licence – sentence – objective circumstances – failure by employee to conduct end of shift check that heating of lubricant oil product had been turned off – emission of odour – actual environmental harm widespread but low level and transient – offence of medium objective seriousness – subjective circumstances – preventative measures adopted for the future – co-operation with the prosecutor – contrition and remorse – no prior offences – payment in lieu of a fine to the Environmental Trust established under the Environmental Trust Act 1998 of $120,000 for general environmental purposes
Legislation Cited:	Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 ss 3A, 21A, 22, 23 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 ss 215(1)(a), 257B, Environmental Trust Act 1998 Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 ss 45(d), 64, 120(1) 124, 129, 241, 243, 244(3), 250(1)(e) Work Health and Safety Regulation 2011
Cases Cited:	Camilleri's Stock Feeds Pty Ltd v Environment Protection Authority (1993) 32 NSWLR 683 Environment Protection Authority v BlueScope Steel (AIS) Pty Ltd [2004] NSWLEC 400 Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd [2006] NSWLEC 335 Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd [2008] NSWLEC 194 Environment Protection Authority v Causmag Ore Company Proprietary Limited [2009] NSWLEC 164 Environment Protection Authority v Coastal Recycled Cooking Oils Pty Limited [2008] NSWLEC 242 Environment Protection Authority v Hunter Valley Energy Coal Pty Ltd [2015] NSWLEC 120 Environment Protection Authority v Illawarra Coke Co Pty Ltd [2002] NSWLEC 21l; 118 LGERA 451 Environment Protection Authority v Orica Australia Pty Ltd (The Botany Mercury Incident) [2014] NSWLEC 110 Environment Protection Authority v Orica Australia Pty Ltd (The Evaporator Incident) [2014] NSWLEC 104 Environment Protection Authority v Orica Australia Pty Ltd (The Nitric Acid Air Lift Incident) [2014] NSWLEC 103; 206 LGERA 239 Environment Protection Authority v Timber Industries Ltd [2001] NSWLEC 25 Environment Protection Authority v State of New South Wales (Department of Environment, Climate Change and Water) [2010] NSWLEC67; 174 LGERA 19 Environment Protection Authority v Sydney Water Corporation [2015] NSWLEC 80 Environment Protection Authority v Waste Recycling and Processing Corporation [2006] NSWLEC 419; 148 LGERA 299 Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; 228 CLR 357 Morrison v Defence Maritime Services Pty Ltd [2007] NSWLEC 421 Plath v Rawson [2009] NSWLEC 178; 170 LGERA 253 R v Olbrich [1999] HCA 54; 199 CLR 270 R v Tadrosse [2005] NSWCCA 145; 65 NSWLR 740 R v Thompson; R v Houlton [2000] NSWCCA 309; 49 NSWLR 383 Veen v The Queen [No 2] [1988] HCA 14; 164 CLR 465
Category:	Principal judgment
Parties:	Environment Protection Authority (Prosecutor) Nulon Products Australia Pty Ltd (Defendant)
Representation:	Counsel: Ms Z Shahnawaz, solicitor (Prosecutor) Mr S Nash, barrister (Defendant)   Solicitors: Office of Environment and Heritage (Prosecutor) Colin Biggers & Paisley Lawyers (Defendant)
File Number(s):	50075 of 2015
Publication restriction:	No

CONTENTS

Judgment

Introduction

Nulon Products Australia Pty Ltd

The incident in the early hours of 5 february 2014

The legislative framework

Prosecution of Nulon

Other relief sought by the Prosecutor

Introduction

Legal and investigation costs

Additional orders – proposed order (5) in the Summons

A publication order under s 250(1)(a) of the POEO Act

An additional publication order under s 250(1)(b) of the POEO Act

The hearing

Nulon’s guilty plea

Timing

Sufficient factual basis for the plea

The sentencing framework

Legislation

Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997

Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999

The objective and subjective factors

Introduction

Objective factors

The maximum penalty

Environmental harm

Introduction

Actual environmental harm

Foreseeability of risk of harm to the environment

Control over the causes of the harm

No damage to property

Multiple victims?

Financial gain

Subjective factors

No prior offences

Nulon is a good corporate citizen

Likelihood of reoffending

Contrition and remorse

Introduction

Corporate apology and regret

Reparation

Conclusion on contrition and remorse

Nulon’s plea of guilty

Assistance to the Prosecutor

The process for sentencing

Introduction

Deterrence

Classifying an offence within a range

Submissions on characterisation of the offending

Consistency in sentencing

General

Other potentially relevant pollution cases

The appropriate sentence

Application of the penalty monies to the Environmental Trust Fund

General publication and specific apology orders

Orders

Annexures

Annexure A

Annexure B

Annexure C

Judgment

Introduction

1. HIS HONOUR: A Consolidated Statement of Agreed Facts was settled between the parties and formed the introductory document in Exhibit A. The factual matters set out in the immediately following sections concerning the Defendant, Nulon Products Australia Pty Ltd (“Nulon”), and the incident in the early hours of 5 February 2014, are quoted or derived from that document and from the affidavit of Mr Greg Simons, Nulon’s Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”).

2. Other elements from these documents are quoted or paraphrased at appropriate points throughout this judgment.

Nulon Products Australia Pty Ltd

3. Nulon is a manufacturing enterprise located at 17 Yulong Close, Moorebank (“the premises”). The company has operated since the 1970s, adopting its present name in 1981. It currently employs 70 people.

4. The company manufactures a range of blended lubricants, coolants and motor engine additives at the premises. The premises are a 4,500m² facility designed for the sole purpose of creating and blending those products. The plant operates one shift, with overtime in line with sales demand. As a consequence, on the night of the incident, there were no employees present at the premises.

5. Nulon is the holder of Environmental Protection Licence 20107. The Environmental Protection Licence authorises the carrying out of scheduled activities of chemical storage, petroleum and fuel production at the premises.

6. Nulon has a number of blending tanks on the premises which are used to create oil products. The blending tanks are located in the production area, which is separated from the offices (located upstairs), the warehouse, and the on-site lab. At the time of the incident, the blending tanks had heating coils within them and agitators, which were operated separately, to stir the blend. The blending tanks have vents at the top. Smoke detectors are automatically linked to Fire & Rescue NSW so that there was automatic notification of the fire alarm sounding on the date of the incident discussed below.

7. Nulon's premises are mechanically ventilated by air vents located in the roof. When switched on, motorised propellers draw hot air from the factory out and into the atmosphere outside. During extremely hot weather, the roof vents were manually left open overnight (only comprising a very small percentage of the year) to ensure that the premises would cool down. This no longer occurs following the incident.

8. There are a number of references in this judgment to Nulon’s SCADA system. To provide the appropriate contextual understanding, it is to be noted that SCADA is an automatic control system that houses blend formulas. Nulon uses SCADA to ensure the consistency of all blends that it produces. Formulations are ordinarily pre-stored in the SCADA system, with the operator identifying the recipe required and the tank in which it is to be blended. The SCADA system opens valves, turns on pumps and adds bulk liquids in the correct sequence and controls heating and agitation of any relevant blend. The SCADA system will prompt the blender to make small additions of additives when necessary and advise of the quantity to be added.

The incident in the early hours of 5 february 2014

9. At around 2.00 am on 5 February 2014, Ms Gabriella Gutierrez, Nulon’s Human Resources and Systems Manager, received a phone call from the company monitoring the alarm installed at the Nulon factory. The monitors advised Ms Gutierrez that sensors detected vapours from the production area. Ms Gutierrez instructed the alarm company to call the fire brigade and decided to attend the factory in person.

10. At 2.27 am, Fire & Rescue NSW officers from Busby Fire Station responded and arrived at the premises. When Ms Gutierrez arrived, Fire & Rescue NSW officers were inside the premises, having obtained a key from Fire & Rescue NSW officers from Liverpool Station. No significant odours were noticed by Fire & Rescue NSW officers.

11. On arrival, Ms Gutierrez could not see any smoke or smell anything unusual. When she and the Fire & Rescue NSW officers entered the production area, they heard a noise which indicated one of the tanks may have still been on. Ms Gutierrez phoned Ms Carolynn Wade, Production Manager. Ms Wade instructed the Fire & Rescue NSW officers to tap the computer screen to wake up the system, and this confirmed that the light for the heater was green, indicating it was on. She instructed them on the phone to switch it off.

12. Ms Wade arrived at Nulon’s premises sometime before 3.00 am (she would otherwise typically have arrived at the premises at 4.30 am). No smoke was observed by Ms Wade.

13. The odour in the production area was described by Ms Wade as strong but not overbearing, “pungent … like sulphur”, “kind of like when you do tarring on the road”. Ms Gutierrez described the smell as “like burnt oil”, and “it was smelly but it wasn't anything that you couldn't handle”. Both stated that the odour had no effect on them.

14. Fire & Rescue NSW officers directed Ms Wade to blending Tank 206 and showed her the reading on their temperature gun showing the tank’s temperature to be 160°C–170°C. However, SCADA was showing the temperature of blending Tank 206 to be 20°C.

15. Ms Wade then flicked the agitator on and off, to determine whether blending Tank 206 was the overheating tank and to establish its correct temperature. This resulted in what Ms Wade described as opaque steam and/or smoke and the gear oil product coming out of the breather valve at the top of the tank.

16. The factory was ventilated by Fire & Rescue NSW officers opening the roller door and other doors when they first arrived at the premises. Fire & Rescue NSW officers stayed until 3.38 am, having ascertained, using an Orion Gas Detector, that there were no dangerous gases.

17. All members of Nulon’s staff were advised at approximately 5.00 am on 5 February 2014 not to attend work that day to allow the odour, which may have affected staff, to dissipate from the plant.

18. The substance in the tank which overheated was manual gearbox and transaxle oil, classified as a non-hazardous and non-dangerous good under the Work Health and Safety Regulation2011 and the Australian Dangerous Goods Code.

19. The total weight of the lost substance was approximately 37 kilograms, based on the difference of weight at the time of blending and following the incident. There is no formal record at the time of the incident of how much of the product evaporated into the atmosphere and how much was caught in the bund area at the premises after coming out of the breather valve at the top of the tank. Up to approximately 17-20 kilograms of the blend may have evaporated into the atmosphere based on visual observations of the amount of product that came out of the breather valve at the top of the tank, but the exact amount is unknown.

20. The oil was allowed to cool and, the following day, was decanted and disposed of by a contractor under instruction from Nulon employees.

21. Nulon self-reported the incident to the Environment Protection Authority (“the EPA”) and to the WorkCover Authority on 5 February 2014.

The legislative framework

22. Chapter 3 of the Protection of the Environment Operations Act1997 (“the POEO Act”) is entitled “Environment protection licences”. It sets up, amongst other things, the regime for granting licences for activities such as that carried out by Nulon. Matters to be taken into consideration in exercising this licensing function include, in s 45(d), the following:

(d) the practical measures that could be taken:

(i) to prevent, control, abate or mitigate that pollution, and

(ii) to protect the environment from harm as a result of that pollution,

23. Nulon has been issued with a licence under the POEO Act as such a licence is required for the manufacturing activities it undertakes. The licence incorporates conditions under a number of headings, the relevant one in these proceedings being “Operating Conditions”. The second operating condition (Exhibit A tab A folio 6) is in the following terms:

O2 Maintenance of plant and equipment

O2.1 All plant and equipment installed at the premises or used in connection with the licensed activity:

(a) Must be maintained in a proper and efficient condition; and

(b) Must be operated in a proper and efficient manner.

24. This condition is, self-evidently, responsive to s 45(d) of the POEO Act.

Prosecution of Nulon

25. The EPA has prosecuted Nulon for a breach of s 64(1) of the POEO Act. This provision is in the following terms:

64 Failure to comply with condition

(1) Offence

If any condition of a licence is contravened by any person, each holder of the licence is guilty of an offence.

26. The primary orders sought in the summons (including the supporting particulars for the first order sought) are in the following terms:

(1) An order that the Defendant, Nulon Products Australia Pty Ltd (ACN 000 057 036), having its Registered Office at 17 Yulong Close Moorebank in the State of New South Wales, appear before a Judge of the Court to answer the charge that, from about 4 February 2014 to 5 February 2014, at 17 Yulong Close Moorebank in the said State (the Premises), it committed an offence against section 64(1) of the Protection of the Environment Operations Act1997 (POEO Act) in that it was the holder of a licence, a condition of which was contravened by a person.

Particulars:

(a)   Licence

Environment Protection Licence 20107 (the Licence)

(b)   Licence condition

O2.1   All plant and equipment installed at the premises or used in connection with the licensed activity:

a)   …; and

b)   must be operated in a proper and efficient manner.

(c)   Manner of breach

The Defendant failed to operate plant and equipment installed at the Premises in a proper and efficient manner, as follows:

(i)   the computer system controlling Tank 206 was switched to manual mode, bypassing temperature controls, and was left unattended;

(ii)   the heating element in the tank remained on and no checks were made at the end of the shift as to whether the heating element was switched off in accordance with normal end-of-shift procedures;

(iii)   the product in Tank 206 was heated past 121oC, being the temperature at which the least thermally stable additive in the product began to break down, and being greater than the maximum temperature for heating specified on the additive’s Material Safety Data Sheet;

(iv)   the air vents were left open, delaying the detection of the overheating product;

(v)   the Defendant’s employee agitated the stirrers on Tank 206 when the temperature on the tank read 160-170 degrees Celsius, leading to smoke billowing from the tank;

(vi)   without having conducted a hazard operability study or similar systematic analysis to identify hazards associated with the heating process and the plant design; and

(vii)   without adequate work procedures including that there were no formal sign-off sheets or a policy regarding ventilation.

As a result of the Defendant’s failures to operate plant and equipment in a proper and efficient manner, Smooth Shift Manual Gearbox and Transaxle Oil overheated and caused the emission of air impurities at the Premises on or about 4 to 5 February 2014.

(d)   Date on which evidence of the alleged offence first came to the attention of an authorised officer:

Evidence of the offence first came to the attention of authorised officer Rodney Fox on 5 February 2014.

(2) That the Defendant be dealt with according to law for the commission of the above offence.

Other relief sought by the Prosecutor

Introduction

27. The relief originally sought in the Summons also included the following:

…

(3) An order that the defendant pay the prosecutor's costs.

(4) Such orders under Part 8.3 of the POEO Act as the Court in its discretion sees fit to make.

(5) Such other order or orders as the Court sees fit to make.

28. The parties subsequently reached agreement as to the terms of the additional orders that should be made. These are set out below.

Legal and investigation costs

29. The parties have agreed to two orders (satisfying orders (3) and (4) in the Summons) for the payment of agreed sums in recompense to the Prosecutor for the cost of bringing the proceedings. The agreed orders are in the following terms:

…

(4) Pursuant to s 215(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, the Defendant is to pay the Prosecutor’s legal costs of $64,530.

(5) Pursuant to s 248(1) of the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997, the Defendant is to pay the Environment Protection Authority’s investigation costs of $674.82.

30. However, with respect to the proposed, agreed order (4) for payment of the Prosecutor’s costs, s 215(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (“the Criminal Procedure Act”) only applies to proceedings in lower courts. The correct provision (to the same effect) applicable to this Court is to be found in s 257B of the Criminal Procedure Act. As a consequence, the final orders set out at the conclusion of this decision reflect the agreed positions but provide the proper statutory foundation for the costs order.

Additional orders – proposed order (5) in the Summons

A publication order under s 250(1)(a) of the POEO Act

31. Chapter 8 of the POEO Act is entitled “Criminal and other proceedings”. Part 8.3 – “Court orders in connection with offences”, applies “where a court finds an offence against this Act or regulations proved” (s 243(1)). Conviction of Nulon in these proceedings engages that provision and thus a power to make one or more orders from the broad range of options contained in s 250(1) of the POEO Act.

32. The first of the additional orders that has been agreed to by Nulon is a publication order made pursuant to s 250(1)(a), a provision in the following terms:

250 Additional orders

(1) Orders

The court may do any one or more of the following:

(a) order the offender to take specified action to publicise the offence (including the circumstances of the offence) and its environmental and other consequences and any other orders made against the person,

…

33. The parties have agreed as to the terms of the order requiring publication of an agreed statement in identified publications set out in the order. The terms of the proposed order are:

…

(6) Pursuant to s 250(1)(a) of the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997, the Defendant will:

(a)   Within 28 days of the date of this order, at its expense, cause a notice in the form of Annexure B at a minimum size of 10 cm x 18 cm to be placed in:

(i)    The Liverpool Leader;

(ii)   The Sydney Morning Herald; and

(iii)   PACE Process Control & Engineering.

(b)   Within 35 days of the date of this order, provide to the Prosecutor a complete copy of the page of the publications in which the notice appears.

34. The statement that is to be published is reproduced as Annexure B to the judgment.

An additional publication order under s 250(1)(b) of the POEO Act

35. In addition to the option of requiring publication of a general statement as set out above, s 250(1)(b) of the POEO Act permits the Court to require a convicted offender to make notification to specified persons. The provision is in the following terms:

(b) order the offender to take specified action to notify specified persons or classes of persons of the offence (including the circumstances of the offence) and its environmental and other consequences and of any orders made against the person (including, for example, the publication in an annual report or any other notice to shareholders of a company or the notification of persons aggrieved or affected by the offender’s conduct),

36. In these proceedings, there is a readily identified group of persons who have been adversely affected by the discharge from Nulon's premises. Those are the employees of Sphere Healthcare who needed to go home (as discussed in more detail later) as a consequence of the impact of the odours.

37. During the course of the proceedings, I raised, with the representatives of the parties, my view that it would be appropriate to require, in addition to the general publication order that had been agreed to by Nulon, a requirement that Nulon's CEO write to each of the adversely impacted employees of Sphere Healthcare to inform those employees of the outcome of the proceedings and to apologise for the impact that the odour escape had had on them. Ms Shahnawaz, solicitor employed by the Prosecutor, indicated that there was no objection to this course of events being followed but that she was unaware of any such order having been made in the past.

38. Mr Nash, counsel for Nulon, was instructed that Nulon raised no objection to such a course of events. As a consequence, I directed the parties to confer about the terms of an appropriate letter for this purpose. I was subsequently advised that the terms of such a letter had been settled – with it to read as follows:

Dear [INSERT]

On [INSERT DATE] Nulon Products Australia Pty Limited was convicted in the Land and Environment Court under Section 64 of the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 for breaching a condition of its Environment Protection Licence. Nulon Products Australia Pty Limited, located in Moorebank, engages in oil and lubricant production.

On 4–5 February 2014, you may recall that an environmental incident occurred at our factory in Moorebank. A heater inside a blending tank was left switched on and the gear oil in the tank overheated.

Nulon Products Australia Pty Limited unreservedly apologises to you for this incident. We have now put in place numerous controls to ensure that this incident does not happen again.

Again, please accept our sincere apologies.

Yours faithfully

Greg Simons

CEO, Nulon Products Australia Pty Limited.

39. As a consequence of the agreement of the parties to my suggestion, the orders will require that such a letter be sent by Nulon's CEO to each of the persons identified on the list provided by Sphere Healthcare’s CEO (at Exhibit A tab F folio 74A). The terms of the letter are also reproduced as Annexure A to this judgment.

The hearing

40. In effect, the sole matter that was in dispute between the parties is how the incident giving rise to the offence should be characterised. The Prosecutor characterises the incident as giving rise to an offence of moderate seriousness, whilst the position advanced on behalf of Nulon is that it should be regarded as being of low seriousness.

41. How the offence should be characterised forms the essential preliminary element for the commencement of the sentencing process discussed later. Other than this aspect of characterisation (and the determination of monetary penalty that flows from it), the Prosecutor and Nulon have reached agreement (as set out in the sections above) concerning all other outcomes to follow from this prosecution.

42. An agreed folder of documents was tendered (Exhibit A) containing:

1. A copy of the Consolidated Statement of Agreed Facts and the following referenced documents;

2. A copy of the “Environment Protection Licence” issued to Nulon by the Office of Environment & Heritage – this licence sets out the administrative conditions, limit conditions, operating conditions, monitoring and recording conditions, reporting conditions, and general conditions;

3. A copy of the “Record of Interview” between Robert Evans, Office of Environment & Heritage, and Gabriella Gutierrez;

4. A copy of the “Record of Interview” between Robert Evans and Carolyn (sic) Wade;

5. A copy of Nulon Products’ “Safety Data Sheet” according to WHS and ADG requirements;

6. A copy of the EPA’s “Incident Detail Report” – setting out an incident description, prioritisation, involvement, outcomes, time and costs, and a consolidated log;

7. Copies of email communication between Nulon and Sphere Healthcare in regards to Sphere Healthcare’s “Claim Following Incident On Wednesday 5th February 2014” – the claim sets out those employees of Sphere Healthcare affected as well as the requested compensation sought from Nulon;

8. A copy of the “Summary of Emergency calls and incidents in relation to the Nulon Products Alarm”;

9. A copy of the “Summary of calls made to F&RNSW” – the map displays the position of Nulon, Sphere Healthcare, and the locations from which the calls to Fire & Rescue NSW were made;

10. A copy of Nulon’s Incident Report “The Emission of Odour Smoke from Nulon Products Australia Pty Ltd Report 4th-5th February 2014” – this report pertains to the schedule of events, findings and action proposed/taken, product and pollutant details, and complaints received;

11. A copy of the Expert Report prepared by Dr Richard Michell for the Office of Environment & Heritage titled “Incident at Nulon Products Australia Pty Ltd on 4-5 February 2014”;

12. A copy of the Supplementary Report prepared by Dr Richard Michell – this Supplementary Report provides requested further expert opinion;

13. A copy of a document displaying ME Engineering’s website – this website displays the project work of Nulon’s Oil Lubricants Plant as completed by ME Engineering;

14. A copy of each of the Nulon Blending Procedure Competency Assessment Forms of Manual Mascarenhas and Roland Aggio, as completed by Carolynn Wade;

15. A copy of the Expert Report prepared by Dr Michael Robertson for the Office of Environment & Heritage – this report is in relation to forensic toxicology;

16. A copy of the Expert Report prepared by Dr Ian Spence for CBP Lawyers, solicitors for Nulon – this report offers responses to the conclusions in the expert report by Dr Michael Robertson in relation to the harm and potential harm caused by the incident at Nulon.

43. Mr Nash also read the affidavit of Mr Simons, Nulon’s CEO and a director of Nulon.

44. No oral evidence needed to be adduced at the hearing. As a consequence, the hearing was conducted efficiently and concluded in a little over half a day (in lieu of the two full days for which it had originally been listed).

Nulon’s guilty plea

Timing

45. Nulon pleaded guilty to the offence charged at the first return of the Summons before the List Judge (this being on 20 March 2015). The effect of this plea is that Nulon admits liability for the offence charged. The utility to the system of justice of this plea and the extent to which it is taken into account as part of the process in assessing the appropriate penalty to be imposed on Nulon are discussed in more detail later.

Sufficient factual basis for the plea

46. As earlier stated, a Consolidated Statement of Agreed Facts was settled by the legal representatives of the parties prior to the commencement of the hearing. I have carefully read this document and I am satisfied that it contains a proper factual basis to support the charge to which Nulon has pleaded guilty.

47. I am also satisfied that no defence is available to Nulon pursuant to s 64(2) of the POEO Act.

The sentencing framework

Legislation

Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997

48. Section 241 of the POEO Act sets out those matters that are required to be considered in assessing what penalty should be imposed after the finding of guilt in a prosecution for a breach of this act. It is in the following terms:

241 Matters to be considered in imposing penalty

(1) In imposing a penalty for an offence against this Act or the regulations, the court is to take into consideration the following (so far as they are relevant):

(a) the extent of the harm caused or likely to be caused to the environment by the commission of the offence,

(b) the practical measures that may be taken to prevent, control, abate or mitigate that harm,

(c) the extent to which the person who committed the offence could reasonably have foreseen the harm caused or likely to be caused to the environment by the commission of the offence,

(d) the extent to which the person who committed the offence had control over the causes that gave rise to the offence,

(e) whether, in committing the offence, the person was complying with orders from an employer or supervising employee.

(2) The court may take into consideration other matters that it considers relevant.

49. In these proceedings, the first four of the matters contained in s 241(1) are relevant.

Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999

50. The Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act1999 (“the Sentencing Procedure Act”) sets out, in s 3A, the purposes for which a sentence may be imposed. The provision is in the following terms:

3A Purposes of sentencing

The purposes for which a court may impose a sentence on an offender are as follows:

(a) to ensure that the offender is adequately punished for the offence,

(b) to prevent crime by deterring the offender and other persons from committing similar offences,

(c) to protect the community from the offender,

(d) to promote the rehabilitation of the offender,

(e) to make the offender accountable for his or her actions,

(f) to denounce the conduct of the offender,

(g) to recognise the harm done to the victim of the crime and the community.

51. The Sentencing Procedure Act also sets out, in s 21A, various aggravating, mitigating and other factors potentially required to be taken into account in a sentencing process. To the extent that the matters set out in these two provisions are relevant to these proceedings, I have had regard to them in the following discussion.

52. It is clear that the relevant factors that are called upon for consideration by the POEO Act also, effectively, coincide with elements requiring to be considered arising out of the provisions of s 21A of the Sentencing Procedure Act. In my subsequent analysis of Nulon's objective and subjective factors, these provisions are drawn together as appropriate, as is noted in each instance.

53. In Plath v Rawson [2009] NSWLEC 178; 170 LGERA 253, Preston CJ set out at [48] a list of matters potentially to be taken into account when assessing the objective gravity of an environmental offence. This list was not expressed as exhaustive. The matters listed by his Honour were:

• the nature of the offence;

• the maximum penalties for the offence;

• the harm caused to the environment by commission of the offence;

• the state of mind of the offender in committing the offence;

• the offender’s reasons for committing the offence;

• the foreseeable risk of harm to the environment by commission of the offence;

• the practical measures to avoid harm to the environment; and

• the offender’s control over the causes of harm to the environment.

54. In Plath v Rawson, Preston CJ also set out (at [140]) the favourable factors personal to the offender able to be taken into account within the limits set by reference to the objective gravity of the offence. This list is also not to be seen as exhaustive. The matters of this nature listed by his Honour were:

• lack of prior criminality;

• prior good character;

• plea of guilty to the offences;

• contrition and remorse; and

• assistance to authorities.

55. Those matters relevant to these proceedings from each of the above lists, together with any other relevant matters, are discussed below. I now turn to address the relevant factors concerning Nulon.

The objective and subjective factors

Introduction

56. The Sentencing Procedure Act (s 21A(2) and (3)) requires that I consider any aggravating and mitigating factors concerning Nulon that are to be taken into account in determining the appropriate sentence for Nulon.

57. For the reason set out below, there is no aggravating factor arising from consideration of the matters set out in s 21A(2) with respect to Nulon. As earlier noted, the relevant portions of s 241 of the POEO Act are also dealt with in this consideration.

58. The facts giving rise to the offence have been set out at the commencement of this judgment, as has the statutory basis for the charge against Nulon. It is against those facts and the offence itself that the objective factors are to be considered. The subjective factors are those that are peculiar to Nulon in this context.

Objective factors

The maximum penalty

59. In 2006, the maximum penalties under the POEO Act for strict liability offences were increased significantly. Relevantly, for corporations, the penalties were increased from $250,000 to $1 million.

60. Although increases in the maximum penalty for an offence will ordinarily result in higher penalties being imposed for such offences as occur after the increase in penalties has come into effect, it does not follow that there is assumed to be some automatic multiplier applied to the penalty imposed reflecting the rate of increase in the maximum penalties in the statute (see Morrison v Defence Maritime Services Pty Ltd [2007] NSWLEC 421 at [60]).

61. However, the increase in the maximum available penalty is to be taken as being the legislature’s understanding and reflection of contemporary community standards concerning the offences involved (Environment Protection Authority v Timber Industries Ltd [2001] NSWLEC 25 at [33]).

62. The maximum penalty is significant in determining the objective seriousness of the offence: Plath v Rawson at [57]. The maximum penalty also demonstrates the seriousness with which the offence charged is viewed: Camilleri's Stock Feeds Pty Ltd v Environment Protection Authority (1993) 32 NSWLR 683 at 698.

63. The size of the penalty also “indicates the gravity of the offence as perceived by the community” (Camilleri's Stock Feeds also at 698).

Environmental harm

Introduction

64. I have earlier set out a list of the documents referenced in the Consolidated Statement of Agreed Facts and tendered as part of Exhibit A. Amongst the appended documents are four expert reports setting out a range of matters relevant to consideration of matters relating to environmental harm (not only under this general heading but also under the subsequent heading “Risk of harm to the environment”).

65. These documents comprise three reports prepared for the Prosecutor (two by Dr Richard Michell, a lubricant consultant employed by an expert opinion service-providing subsidiary of the University of New South Wales (“UNSW”), and Dr Michael Robertson, a consultant forensic toxicologist also employed by the UNSW service provider). The fourth was an expert report provided by Dr Ian Spence, an independent pharmacology and toxicology expert who was retained by Nulon to respond to Dr Robertson's conclusions concerning harm and potential harm caused by the incident. Material derived from these four documents was incorporated in the Consolidated Statement of Agreed Facts.

66. It is also necessary to refer to the original reports in discussing the various aspects concerning environmental harm. The various matters discussed below between [67] and [130] encompass the various matters required to be taken into consideration in s 241(1)(a) and (c) of the POEO Act.

Actual environmental harm

Introduction

67. In considering the extent of the actual harm that was occasioned by the incident, it should be noted, initially, that the impact, although comparatively widespread, was of a comparatively short duration (about a day-and-a-quarter) and did not cause any lasting effect. The nature of the experience of the odour that was emitted by the incident was an unpleasant smell (colloquially described as rotten egg gas or a gas - impliedly a domestic use gas – smell by many who experienced it) but left no lasting effects. The nature of the potential impacts of exposure to the substances giving rise to the odour is discussed below in a later section of this part of the decision.

68. For the purposes of this analysis, the impact was anthropocentric and did not have any non-human impacts on the environment.

69. A map showing the approximate location and time of each of the phone calls and the prevailing wind direction at 3.00 pm on 4 February, at 9.00 am and 3.00 pm on 5 February 2014, and at 9.00 am on 6 February 2014 was included in the material tendered (Exhibit A tab H). As this map provides an important contextual understanding of the extent of the impact of the incident, a copy is reproduced – a larger version is reproduced as Annexure C to this judgment.

70. As can be seen, the map shows the location relative to Nulon's premises and the time at which the complaint was made to Fire & Rescue NSW. The extracted blow-up on the map shows, in greater detail, the complaints made from the more immediate vicinity of the premises.

71. In geographic terms, the impacts fall, it seems to me, into three groups, these being: the near and direct (the staff at Sphere Healthcare); a cluster within a radius of some 600m or 700m of Nulon's premises; and, finally, a much more scattered impact across distances of up to a little over six kilometres from the premises.

Wider community impact

72. Between 12.20 am on 5 February 2014 and 5.08 am on 6 February 2014, Fire & Rescue NSW records indicate that 29 community complaints were made in relation to the smell of gas or smell of chemicals in Moorebank and its surrounding suburbs. A log of these calls was included in the material tendered (Exhibit A tab G).

73. According to Fire & Rescue NSW, 29 calls represent an unusually high number of calls, compared with 12 calls received state-wide during the equivalent 29-hour period on 5-6 February 2013, and six calls received state-wide during the same time on 5-6 February 2012.

74. In addition, on 5 February 2014, four complaints were made to the EPA’s Environment Line. The callers described the following:

“Smell, in air; pungent chemical smell starting at 6.15 am”

“Caller rode her bike from Warwick Farm to Liverpool and could smell a gas like smell all the way on 5/02/215 at 7.30 am. Very strong on the Hume Highway”

“Diesel smell is very strong at the Library from unknown source”

“Strong diesel smell in Moorbank area” [sic]

75. Investigations by the EPA, Fire & Rescue NSW and Liverpool City Council did not identify any other source of odour emissions in the area between 4 and 6 February 2014.

Sphere Healthcare

76. Sphere Healthcare is located approximately 400m north of Nulon Products, on the northern side of the M5 South Western Motorway to Nulon. Records from the Bureau of Meteorology indicate that wind was travelling from the south at 3.00 pm on 4 February 2014, at 9.00 am and 3.00 pm on 5 February 2014.

77. On the morning of 5 February 2014, 15 employees of Sphere Healthcare went home sick. Five of the 15 employees were interviewed and stated:

“I wound my window of my car down to swipe my card and immediately I smelt a gas smell and thought my car was burning. The smell was very unpleasant”;

“As we drove towards work I began to notice a strong smell which I would describe as a burning oil smell. I thought there was something wrong with Erin’s car and we had a conversation in regards to that.”

“I assumed it was a gas type smell, maybe a gas leak.”

“When I opened the door of my car I immediately smelt an odour that reminded me of the smell of roadwork or tar being laid and a burning oil type of smell. The smell was so intense I thought it might have had something to do with the oil in my car burning.” The smell was “overwhelming”;

“On the way to work I was travelling on the M5. I pulled over and stopped the car as I could smell an odour and thought there was a problem with the car. The inside of the car and the outside of the car smelt the same. The odour smelled like burned oil or burned tar, like during road construction. A similar smell is like a service station workshop.”

78. The employees described the following:

1. Starting to cough and being unable to stop, followed by a headache;

2. Feeling pressure behind the eyes, tasting the odour, feeling lightheaded, having affected speech, and feeling like she would vomit if she did not get away from the odour;

3. Feeling clammy, coughing and having a headache. Tried to get a doctor’s appointment but unable to obtain one;

4. Feeling lightheaded, dizzy, nauseous, experiencing an unpleasant taste in the mouth and lump in throat; and

5. Slight headache/headache.

The furthest locations

79. It is also appropriate to reproduce the relevant extracts from the table of analysis of complaints made to Fire & Rescue NSW for the four most remote complaint locations. The extracted portions of the complaint analysis for these locations are reproduced but I have also added in the table below a column showing the distance and direction from Nulon's premises as measured by me from this map on its original, tendered at A3 size using the 1:550 scale shown on it. The extract of these four complaint locations and the distances from the source of the odour are:

Distance and direction	Time	Fire & Rescue appliances	Called to	Comments
5.9 km North	07.47 am	Canley Vale Road Fairfield	Call of gas leak. No response, units already on site.
5.1 km West-norwest	10.26 am	RP101 (Bonnyrigg Heights) P41 (Smithfield) AP7 (Horningsea Park)	Cartwright Avenue Liverpool	10.51 am Bonnyrigg Heights rescue Pump & Smith field pumper responded to smell of burning at St Therese Primary School; 10.57 am Horningsea Park responded. Gas began to dissipate. Units left site 11.12 am.
6.1 km West-norwest	10.35 am	P49 (Cabramatta)	South Liverpool/Busby Road Liverpool	10.35 am Cabramatta pumper responded to Busby Public School to smell of gas. Children being kept inside during recess. Nothing found. Same smell as before. Returned to station 11.08 am.
5.4 km East	11.22 am	HP85 and H85 (Chester Hill hazmat units)	Newbridge Road and Henry Lawson Drive Bankstown	11.22 am Chester Hill hazmat units responded to gas leak. Dredging taking place in the area that may be source of the smell. No current dredging operations found. No smell present on arrival. EPA notified. Returned to station 11.46 am.

80. It is to be noted that two of these reports came from primary schools at considerable distance from the emitting premises – a factor warranting specific consideration (as discussed in my conclusion on how the offence should be characterised).

Toxicological evidence

81. Dr Michell, lubricant consultant for the Prosecutor, set out, at some length, a technical analysis of the nature of the emissions and the thermal and other processes causing them to be generated. This information was available to both Dr Robertson, forensic toxicologist for the Prosecutor, and Dr Spence, pharmacology and toxicology expert for Nulon, (Dr Michell's Report and Supplementary Report were part of the documentation provided for their consideration). It is not necessary for me to set out, in detail, technical evidence of Dr Michell to understand the evidence of Dr Robertson and Dr Spence. To the extent that Dr Mitchell's material is engaged in their evidence, that will emerge from my consideration of their reports.

82. Dr Robertson considered the question of harm to the employees of Sphere Healthcare. His report set out his conclusions in the following terms:

24   The symptoms described by the employees following the inhalation exposure to the vapours include: throat and chest irritation; cough; headache; nausea; lightheaded; dizziness and taste. These described symptoms are all consistent with the symptoms described in studies following the exposure to sufficient amounts of one or more of hydrogen sulphide; sulphur oxides and alkyl mercaptans.

25   It is therefore my opinion that there was actual harm to the environment (including to human health and amenity) caused by the incident for the following reasons:

a)   A number of employees experienced symptoms consistent with the inhalation or exposure to vapours of unknown identity but likely included hydrogen sulphide, sulphur oxides and alkyl mercaptans;

b)   The described symptoms were generally consistent amongst those employees who described symptoms;

c)   While medical assessments were not performed or reported on the employees, the describe symptoms became apparent at or about the time of the exposure and resolved when removed from the exposure;

d)   The absence of an alternative cause for the described odours and subsequent symptoms.

26    The actual harm caused relates to both the contamination of the environment and human injury. The harm to the environment relates to the odour that was caused by the overheating of the tanks. This odour was detected by both employees and the general public with no other more likely cause for the odour. The harm to the employees relates to the transient illnesses caused following the inhalation of the odour. These include both direct illnesses (e.g. throat and chest irritation; cough; taste) and symptoms that may either be direct i.e. a response to the inhaled toxin, or due to an indirect response i.e. an emotional or psychological response e.g. headache, dizziness and nausea.

27   The extent of the actual harm on the employees difficult to assess in the absence of any medical assessments including the presence or absence of pre-existing or co-existing medical conditions; verification of throat and chest irritation; presence of cough or difficulty in breathing; liver and lung function etc. That said, the exposure of many of the employees to the gases was acute (a number of hours) and would be unlikely to have caused any significant illness beyond that described above by the employees. Given the described symptoms would be regarded as mild and did not involve symptoms such as slurred speech and loss of consciousness etc, I would expect that symptoms associated with this short-term exposure would not be long-lasting and would most likely resolve after being removed from the environment and following the elimination of the inhaled compound and any metabolites. This appears consistent with reports of employees who state that in the hours (and in some cases days) after being removed from the source of the exposure the condition improved. It is however possible the longer-term sensitivity to fumes and gases may occur in some employees such that similar symptoms may occur following subsequent exposure to lower levels of gases.

83. Dr Spence commented on these aspects of Dr Robertson's report. He did so in the following terms:

4   The inference that the symptoms experienced by employees at Sphere were the result of the leak from Nulon is reasonable as there is no evidence of any other source of the odours. Dr Robertson's comments (paragraph 24) on the relation between the symptoms described by the employees in Sphere (unpleasant taste, headache, nausea, light-headedness/dizziness) and the agents to which the employees may have been exposed (hydrogen sulphide, alkyl mercaptans and alkyl sulphides) are reasonable. All the symptoms are, however, non-specific and cannot be attributed with certainty to any of the agents believed to have been released in the incident.

5   The statement “the extent of the actual harm on the employees is difficult to assess in the absence of any medical assessments …“ (paragraph 27) is not accurate. The actual harm is quite easy to assess. The key information is that no one received medical assistance at the time, or subsequently, indicating that no severe or persistent symptoms occurred as a result of this incident. This indicates that the episode may have been unpleasant and inconvenient to individuals but beyond this there is no evidence of harm.

84. Considering these two reports together, it is clear that both experts accept that there has been actual harm. Both experts agree, by implication, that removal from exposure to the odour caused the actual harm to the employees of Sphere Healthcare to be of comparatively short duration. Although Dr Robertson describes in [27] of his report the reasons for absence of any information indicating any long-term impact, Dr Spence's observation that, again by inference, such information is not available because the response to the exposure by Sphere Healthcare employees did not require medical attendances that would have caused such material to become available is correct. As Dr Spence puts it, as earlier quoted, this indicates that “the episode may have been unpleasant and inconvenient to individuals but beyond this there is no evidence of harm”. In this context, it is clear that this use of the word “harm” means harm of an ongoing nature. It does not deny the fact that the immediate impact on the employees of Sphere Healthcare constituted harm.

Was the harm substantial?

85. The first relevant factor is that in s 21A(3)(a) of the Sentencing Procedure Act as to whether I could be satisfied that “the injury, emotional harm, loss or damage caused by the offence was not substantial”. These matters also link to consideration of s 241(1)(a) of the POEO Act. The conclusion drawn in this section as to whether or not the impact was substantial also relates to the extent of harm in the provision of the POEO Act just cited.

86. Although, with respect to one of Sphere Healthcare's employees, it is accepted that that employee attended a medical practitioner for the purposes of seeking treatment, there is no evidence that any treatment was required and/or given as a consequence of the attendance.

87. In addition, although the impacts on the employees of Sphere Healthcare are on a comparatively confined and specifically localised population, those immediate impacts cannot be regarded as insignificant. Although there is, consistent with the broader scientific discussion dealt with later, no likelihood that there will have been any residual impact on the affected employees of Sphere Healthcare, the earlier reproduced material from a significantly sized sample of those employees makes it clear that the experience was more than that which arose from merely a minor unpleasantness of smell.

88. However, the circumstances of the offence earlier set out show that the nature, incidence and spread of the human impact occasioned by exposure to the odours were extensive. As a consequence, I cannot be satisfied that “the injury, emotional harm, loss or damage caused by the offence was not substantial” (Sentencing Procedure Act s 21A(3)(a)).

Conclusion to be drawn about actual harm

89. Although the locations and time of complaints shown on the map and the commentary concerning them in the table of analysis shows that there was a range of impacts, both temporally and geographically, there is no valid basis upon which I could assume that the impact fell in any sort of uniform fashion across a “line of best fit”, almost semi-circular area defined by the outer recorded complaints.

90. There is no evidence of such a uniform spread of the impacts – indeed it seems clear that the extent of the impact and the direction of its location from the premises was influenced by wind directions, the variations of which are also marked on the map. Plume behaviour, if relevant, may also have played a part – however, any conclusion would be mere speculation and has no role in these proceedings.

91. Although a blanket conclusion is to be rejected as there is no evidence to support it, nonetheless the spread and extent of complaints, when compared to the broader historical complaint information from Fire & Rescue NSW earlier set out, leads, inescapably in my view, to the conclusion that this incident has had a much wider impact (albeit of a comparatively transient and low-level irritation nature other than for the employees of Sphere Healthcare) than has been recorded in the past by Fire & Rescue NSW.

92. The combination of these factors leads me to conclude that the harm was, in fact, substantial.

Potential harm to the environment

93. Preston CJ set out, under the heading “Objective harmfulness of offence”, in Environment Protection Authority vWaste Recycling and Processing Corporation [2006] NSWLEC 419; 148 LGERA 299 (at [145]), a number of principles. The first of them, relevant in these proceedings, is that:

Harmfulness needs to not only be considered in terms of actual harm, the potential or risk of harm should also be taken into account.

94. There are a number of matters requiring consideration to assess what might have been the potentiality for harm to the environment when compared to the actual results of the incident.

95. Dr Michell considered Nulon’s plant and operations in his report. The relevant elements are reproduced below:

7   By the standards of the industry, Nulon has invested in quite sophisticated plant to blend its products. Based on my meeting with them, their operations, technical and managerial staff appear to be competent. However, based on the transcript provided, Nulon has not conducted a Hazard and Operability study (HAZOP) or made any similar, systematic analysis to identify the potential hazards associated with its blending operations.

8   The blending of lubricating oils and similar products is a relatively simple, physical mixing operation. The main environmental risks are associated with containment. However, in Tank 206, this mixing operation can be facilitated by using an in-tank electric heater element. The availability of this heater adds a significant further risk. This risk was not adequately recognised and hence not managed appropriately.

96. After identifying SCADA and some of its operational attributes, he continued:

12   However, these process controls should not be confused with controls for ultimate safety. They play a major safety role but such control systems can fail, human errors can be made (a wrong temperature programmed), relays to turn items off can fail, etc. For critical safety items there should be independent controls and alarms which are not dependent on computer logic or process control systems being in operation. Over-temperature is one such critical item in this blending operation. The level of the contents of the tank with respect to the heater and the forced movement of the contents via the stirrer are lesser but still important safety items when the heater is on.

13   Preferably, these shortcomings of the plant should be overcome or minimised by its design. However, at the 4-5 February 2014 they existed and so the proper operation of the plant needed to take them into account. In my opinion this was not done adequately. There was no systematic procedure to ensure that the main environmental risk, leaving the heater on, was managed. Also, the inadequacy was compounded by the general practice of the Blender not logging off from the SCADA when he left for the day. This meant that, potentially, anyone could subsequently turn the heater on quite easily, with no authorisation to do so.

97. Dr Michell then proceeded to draw a conclusion, at [14] (Exhibit A tab J folio 90), concerning the absence of such a failsafe design at the Nulon plant when the incident occurred. He said that:

14   I conclude that Nulon failed to operate the plant installed on the premises (in relation to Blending Tank 206) in a proper and efficient manner on 4–5 February 2014, with respect to its environmental performance.

98. With respect to this opinion, he was requested, for the purposes of drafting his Supplementary Report (Exhibit A tab K), to comment further on this:

2a.   Please confirm whether it is your understanding that Nulon did not have in place independent controls and alarms not dependent on computer logic or process control systems at the time of the incident, and if so, the basis of your understanding.

99. In response, Dr Michell said (Exhibit A tab K folio 119) the following:

6   The matters which I was asked to provide an opinion on with respect to the Nulon operation were limited to just a single mixing tank (Tank 206) and a single safety incident (overheating of the contents of Tank 206 on 4–5 February 2014). Hence, while the question has a wider scope, my answer is limited to the matters which I investigated.

7   With respect to overheating of Tank 206, Nulon did not have in place, at the time of the incident, any system to detect or respond to the excessive temperature of the tank contents, outside of the control logic in the SCADA system. If the SCADA was not on, but the heater was, there was no control limit to temperature rise.

8   Also, the primary purpose of the SCADA system was process control – the blending of a batch. It was not operational safety. As an example, if an error were made in entering a batch target temperature into the SCADA, the control system would attempt to take the tank contents up to that erroneous temperature.

100. This evidence is uncontradicted. It therefore follows, I am satisfied, that these design deficiencies meant that there was always the inherent potential for an incident such as that which occurred if there were to be human operator error. It is clear that, although the plant as installed had received recognition for its design (material in Exhibit A tab L), there was the inherent weakness of vulnerability to human error such as that giving rise to this incident (where design changes could have eliminated this – as I accept is now the case following the ameliorative measures undertaken by Nulon after the incident).

Foreseeability of risk of harm to the environment

101. The POEO Act requires my consideration of “the extent to which the person who committed the offence could reasonably have foreseen the harm caused or likely to be caused to the environment by the commission of the offence” (s 241)(1)(c)) in the circumstances of this incident.

102. In his Primary Report, Dr Michell was asked to comment on the environmental risks arising from the deficiencies he had identified in Nulon's processes and controls in the context of the incident that had occurred. He identified (at [18]) two main environmental risks so arising in the following terms:

i.   emission of vapours and gases from overheating of the components of the product in Tank 206

ii.   the potential for a fire or explosion in and around Tank 206

103. He observed that what had actually happened was:

19   The incident reached the point where i) occurred. The vapours from i) were detected by the smoke detection system sufficiently early to allow a response which avoided potential progression to ii).

104. With respect to the second of the identified risks, that of fire, Dr Michell said the following (Exhibit A tab J folios 95 and 96):

35   In my opinion, the risk of a fire was a real and not remote risk. Fire could potentially have occurred by two routes - continued rise in temperature of the vessel contents until their autoignition temperature was reached or ignition, by a spark or similar mechanism, of flammable gaseous compounds given off at elevated temperature.

36   With respect to the first route, although, by the time the tank contents reached 180°C, the fumes had increased to a level sufficient to trigger the smoke detector, this temperature was still, in my estimate, at least 50°C below the autoignition temperature of the blend (estimated from the components of the blend – the MSDS for the SS75W/90 does not give a value for its autoignition temperature). The smoke detector alarm and the response to it were timely. Further unabated heating would have resulted in auto or self-piloted ignition within a few hours.

37   With respect to the second route, as explained in i) above, the gaseous emissions would have contained hydrogen sulphide. This is highly flammable and potentially explosive.

38   The lower flammability limit of hydrogen sulphide is 4%volume in air (Ref. 21). This concentration is about 400 times greater than the level that gives a health risk (Ref. 21). It would require about 16 litres of hydrogen sulphide to be present in the 400 litre headspace to render its contents flammable. On the information I have available, I cannot estimate whether this concentration would have been reached at any time during the event that there was sufficient Anglamol 6085U in the blend to make it possible.

39   Even if a flammable mixture were present, it still requires a source of ignition for a fire/explosion to result. The stirrer motor is positioned immediately above the tank and the stirrer shaft passes through an unsealed hole in the centre of the tank roof. If it had been in operation, a spark from the stirrer motor could have been an ignition source.

40   Although I believe there was a real and not remote risk of fire or explosion via the second route, I cannot quantify it. However, irrespective of its quantitative level, the presence of a comprehensive smoke detection system, and the fact that the stirrer was not operating, meant that the risk did not materialise.

105. At this point, I should observe that Dr Michell's Primary Report was not without positive comment for Nulon. He had earlier said (Exhibit A tab J folio 90):

17   On the positive side of the ledger, the smoke detection system installed was comprehensive and sophisticated. It did the job for which it was designed. The notification to security and emergency services also worked well and efficiently. Overall, the systems in place to respond to such an incident were adequate and minimised its consequences.

106. With respect to this avoidance of the progression to a fire or explosion in and around Tank 206, it is appropriate to note, as set out above from Dr Michell's Primary Report, that the comprehensive and sophisticated smoke detection system had functioned for the purpose for which it had been installed and, therefore, had acted to prevent realisation of any outcome from the second of the risks identified by Dr Michell.

107. I am satisfied that it is appropriate to conclude, despite Dr Michell’s mildly apocalyptic tone concerning these risks he has identified, that the “comprehensive and sophisticated” and fully operative smoke detection system means that the only foreseeable risk likely to be occasioned in circumstances such as those that gave rise to this incident were those that, in fact, were caused by the incident.

108. It follows, therefore, that the risk was, in fact reasonably foreseeable but the foreseeable risk was limited in the confined fashion set out rather than in the more extensive fashion canvassed by Dr Michell.

109. If I am incorrect in so concluding as a consequence of consideration of Dr Michell’s reports, I also consider that the same conclusion follows from the toxicological evidence. I have reached that conclusion based on the following analysis of that evidence.

110. Dr Robertson was asked to respond to the following question:

Was there any potential harm to the environment (including to human health and amenity) caused as a result of the incident? If so, what was the extent of the potential harm?

111. Dr Robertson's response to this question was in the following terms:

32   Whilst the actual harm is outlined above, further potential harm may have arisen and been more significant had exposure to either a greater concentration of vapours or to the vapours for a longer period of time that occurred, particularly if heating and vapour emissions had continued and/or ventilation been inadequate. This may have subsequently led to greater toxicity including but not limited to: loss of consciousness and death.

33   In addition, there existed the potential harm of exposure to the product that may have occurred due to fire or explosive combustion. It is noted that the flashpoint of the heated product was 190°C and it appears that the heat of the mixture was in the range of approximately 160°C to 180°C, close to this flashpoint. As such with ongoing heating and an ignition source, ignition of the highly flammable gases may have led to fire or explosion and subsequent exposure via additional inhalation of toxic fumes; gases and direct contact of the product i.e. eyes, skin etc. It is unknown what the autoignition temperature is for the product.

112. Relevant to this point (and discussed by Dr Spence as considered below), it should be repeated from the earlier extract from Dr Robertson's report that he had observed:

It is however possible that longer term sensitivity to fumes and gases may occur in some employees such that similar symptoms may occur following subsequent exposure to lower levels of gases.

113. Dr Spence dealt with the views of Drs Robertson and Michell relevant to this point in the following terms:

6   Dr Robertson’s answer in relation to ‘potential harm’ should also be clarified. Paragraph 32 states “further potential harm may have arisen and been more significant had exposure to either a greater concentration of vapours or to the vapours for a longer period of time than occurred, particularly if heating and vapour emissions had continued and/or ventilation been inadequate.” While this statement would be true if the hypothetical conditions were met the simple facts are that none of these conditions arose as a result of the Incident on 4-5 February and speculation about what might have occurred if circumstances had been completely different is not helpful.

7   In relation to this speculation I would note that loss of consciousness as a result of exposure to hydrogen sulphide only occurs at concentrations in the range 500-1000 ppm and death has only been reported following inhalation of quantities in excess of 2000 ppm2. The estimates of the concentrations occurring in this incident are less than 1 ppm and could have been considerably lower than this as the odour is detectable at concentrations in the range of 1 ppb2. No one would have lost consciousness or died at the estimated concentrations, no matter how long the exposures had been. Dr Michell suggests that a concentration of 100 ppm may have been reached inside the headspace of the tank. Acute exposure to 100 ppm is still below the threshold for serious adverse effects and as far as I can understand the tank headspace is not in a place where human exposure can occur.

8   There is very little quantitative information on the link between exposure level and serious adverse effects and level of exposure to alkyl sulphides or alkyl mercaptans in humans. What information is available suggests a similar profile for alkyl mercaptans to that of hydrogen sulphide: irritation/mild symptoms at ~1 ppm with the possibility of more serious effects at exposures greater than 500 ppm for significant periods of time. There is less information concerning the toxicity of alkyl sulphides but the limited data available suggests only moderate toxicity.

9   Dr Michell’s report also includes the statement “It is however possible that sensitivity to fumes and gases may occur in some employees such that similar symptoms may occur follow (sic) subsequent exposure to lower levels of gases.” Sensitization to chemicals following exposure has been reported for many different agents. Chemical sensitization appears to be idiosyncratic and related to different behaviour of the immune system in different individuals. The effect is more often seen in skin than in the respiratory system although it does occur there. I could find no reports of this phenomenon with hydrogen sulphide or the other agents which may have been released. There is some indirect evidence that this phenomenon does not occur with hydrogen sulphide: the EPA estimate of the Rfc (estimate of a daily exposure that is likely to be without an appreciable risk of deleterious effects during a lifetime) for hydrogen sulphide is 1.4 ppm. This suggests that exposure to hydrogen sulphide in this incident is unlikely to have any long-term effects.

114. As with the risk of harm from the specific incident, I am satisfied that, for the reasons set out by Dr Spence, the existence of the alarm system earlier discussed meant that there was no realistic probability that, in the hypothetical possibility of such an event recurring, there was any potential for harm to the environment of greater seriousness of impact than that which had actually occurred.

115. It might well be that, if there were to have been some differing wind pattern, there might have been some greater occurrence of impact (only mentioned for the purposes of this consideration and not otherwise taken into account) but there is no possibility, I accept from Dr Spencer's evidence, that there would be any greater potential for a more serious impact, merely that it might have been more widespread. As a consequence, I draw no adverse conclusion against Nulon on the basis of potentiality for harm.

Control over the causes of the harm

116. The POEO Act also requires my consideration of “the extent to which the person who committed the offence had control over the causes that gave rise to the offence” (s 241)(1)(d)) in the circumstances of this incident.

117. It is clear that the initial failure to ensure that the heating element in Tank 206 was turned off at the end of the shift on 4 February was the underlying cause of the incident and that ensuring that this did not occur was entirely within the control of Nulon.

118. However, I should note that I am satisfied that the prompt response by Ms Guiterrez and Ms Wade after being notified of the incident contributed to minimisation of the consequences of the earlier failure to turn off the heating element.

119. Although the flicking of the agitator switch for Tank 206 by Ms Wade had the effect of mobilising the heated liquid and thus, apparently, exacerbating the extent of the discharge, I am satisfied that this was, under the circumstances, an understandable (and, perhaps, even necessary) action given the then limitations in SCADA as to the information available when the equipment was being heated but was in a passive state. As I understand the evidence, this information deficiency has now been rectified as part of the measures taken by Nulon as a consequence of the incident. I do not consider that this action by Ms Wade, although contributing to the scope of the incident, could in any way be regarded as a factor of aggravation.

120. Once the incident had been triggered, however, there was little else that could be done by Nulon, of a practical nature, to ameliorate the impact of the wind-carried odour. Although Nulon took the step of advising its own employees not to attend the premises on the day of the incident, it did not take steps to canvass in the neighbourhood.

121. Although the only way of viewing this is through the lens of hindsight, I am satisfied that this reaction was not unreasonable and that, given the nature of the odour and that it was generally merely found to be unpleasant by those experiencing it, this response was reasonable. There is certainly, I consider, no way that it was possible for Nulon's management staff to predict with any specificity the directions in which any odour plume might travel or where it might ground. To this extent, I am satisfied that there was no reasonable measure available to mitigate the impact and certainly no basis whatsoever upon which Sphere Healthcare could have been identified as a specific location likely to be subject to any intensity of the odour.

122. Further, to the extent that Nulon is vicariously liable for Ms Wade's actions, I do not consider that they warrant any specific adverse finding concerning Nulon by the engagement of the provisions of s 241(1)(c) and (d) of the POEO Act.

123. Whilst Nulon’s conduct is to be taken into account in determining the position of the incident within the descriptive range of seriousness (as discussed later), the Prosecutor has not proved beyond reasonable doubt that the conduct of Nulon or of any of its employees was reckless or careless or negligent so as to be an aggravating factor (R v Olbrich [1999] HCA 54; 199 CLR 270 at [27]).

124. I am also satisfied that it is appropriate to conclude, as a consequence of the range of additional measures introduced by Nulon in response to the incident (as discussed later under the heading “Likelihood of reoffending”), that the first of the risks identified by Dr Michell has had the likelihood of any further occurrence significantly ameliorated (if not eliminated entirely). However, this current position does not eliminate the necessity to have regard to the foreseeability of the risk and the control that Nulon had, at the time of the occurrence of the incident, over the practical measures that, had they been taken, would have prevented the incident.

No damage to property

125. The odour escape has not resulted in any damage to property.

Multiple victims?

126. I now turn to consider the extent of the engagement of s 21A(2)(m) of the Sentencing Procedure Act, a provision in the following terms:

(m) the offence involved multiple victims or a series of criminal acts,

127. During the course the proceedings, I invited Mr Nash to address me on this point given the wide range of complaints (particularly those of the employees of Sphere Healthcare) concerning the impact that the incident had on members of the general public. In response, Mr Nash made the following submissions on this point:

Your Honour, the submission that is put - and I think I say this with the agreement of the prosecutor - is that the words "multiple victims" as used in that incident would not be captured by the type of victim, as you might call it, in this instance. Yes, members of the public were affected by the emission of the odour and the compounds that were released into the atmosphere, but I think the agreed position of the parties is that for the purposes of the description of multiple victims of crime, they are not victims of crime in the sense used in that provision of the Act.

128. I am unable to accept Mr Nash's submission as to how this element of the Sentencing Procedure Act should be viewed in the circumstances of the incident giving rise to these proceedings.

129. I have earlier set out in some detail the extent of the actual harm that was occasioned by the incident and the number of people impacted over a wide geographic spread. It seems to me that this specifically engages the concept of “multiple victims” as it is properly to be understood (see R v Tadrosse [2005] NSWCCA 145; 65 NSWLR 740 at [28]-[29] per Howie J).

130. However, having so concluded, it seems to me that this cannot be added, in aggravation, for sentencing purposes as to do so would, in my view, impermissibly double-count, given the necessity to consider, as required by s 241(1)(a) of the POEO Act, “the extent of the harm caused” as this was earlier discussed.

Financial gain

131. The next factor to be dealt with is that in s 21A(2)(o) of the Sentencing Procedure Act, a provision in the following terms:

(o) the offence was committed for financial gain,

132. The sole purpose in noting this point is the invitation by Mr Nash that I should expressly conclude that there was no element of financial gain as a consequence of the fact that the company had to dispose of a quantity of otherwise potentially valuable product that had been spoiled as a result of the overheating of it during the incident.

133. There was, from the Statement of Agreed Facts, no possible basis upon which I could have drawn any inference that there was any financial gain to Nulon, let alone any inference that there was some intention to obtain such a gain. Indeed, as is clear from [44] and [47]-[48] of Mr Simons’ affidavit, the reverse was true. As a consequence, this provision has no role to play in these proceedings.

Subjective factors

No prior offences

134. The first relevant factor is that in s 21A(3)(e) of the Sentencing Procedure Act as to whether the company has “any record (or any significant record) of previous convictions”.

135. As Mr Simons attested at [8] of his affidavit:

Nulon has not previously been charged or convicted of any environmental offences. It has not had any penalty notices issued to it. Further, prior to the incident which occurred between 4 and 5 February 2014 the subject of these proceedings, Nulon generally had a good environmental record.

Nulon is a good corporate citizen

136. The second relevant factor is that in s 21A(3)(f) of the Sentencing Procedure Act as to whether the company is “of good character”.

137. I am satisfied that I should regard Nulon as being a good corporate citizen and to take that fact into account in the sentencing consideration later to be undertaken. I have reached that conclusion for two reasons.

138. First, affidavits from the CEOs of two of Nulon's suppliers were read – with those affidavits incorporating references attesting to the company's professionalism and operational commitment. Each of those references discloses that the writer of the reference had been informed of the offence with which Nulon has been charged and opines, either expressly or by implication, that the author is of the view that it is unlikely that the company would reoffend.

139. Second, and perhaps more significantly, is material contained in the second of the two [12]s of the affidavit of Mr Simons (there being two paragraphs given that number in his affidavit) concerning community activities undertaken by Nulon. Relevantly, his affidavit sets out Nulon’s public service activities in the following terms:

Nulon regularly donates to “Helping Hand”, which is a committee formed in 2004 to recognise worthy recipients for financial assistance. It assists and helps individuals with medical equipment, modification of homes for disabled people, replacing necessities etc. It has annually donated money from 2004 to date. Currently Nulon is supporting a local public school in two of its programs – MultiLit, for kids with literary skill challenges, and a speech therapy program for indigenous students at the school.

140. These activities extending over a decade prior to the incident giving rise to these proceedings demonstrate that Nulon has, altruistically, provided support in its local community in a socially responsible fashion. This is a factor needing to be given more than modest weight in the company's favour when addressing all factors to derive an appropriate penalty level.

Likelihood of reoffending

141. The third relevant factor is that in s 21A(3)(g) of the Sentencing Procedure Act as to whether Nulon “is unlikely to re-offend”. This is also relevant, for the future, to prevention and, thus, avoidance of the potential for future incidents of this type. This is relevant as part of my consideration of matters required by s 241(1)(b) of the POEO Act.

142. The Statement of Agreed Facts records (at [59]) that Nulon has responded to the incident in the following manner:

…

(a)  Interviews were conducted with the staff involved at the time of the incident, following the incident.

(b)  Mechanical air vents will now close automatically at 11pm every night, even if left open. There is an end of shift procedure to ensure the air vents are off or in automatic mode.

(c)  All heaters within the blend Tanks are limited to 85º Celsius in both automatic mode and manual mode.

(d)  The blending work instruction manual has been updated, to particularly refer to the completion of the end of shift checklist to record that all valves and motors of the Tanks have been turned off, and if any motor or pump of the Tanks is still running (this includes heaters) after 1:45pm, a red beacon located on the SCADA control box will flash.

(e)  A Competency Assessment of certain employees was undertaken following the incident.

(f)  Linking the heaters and agitators together in the Tanks to provide accurate read out of temperatures.

(g)  Installing a visual beacon, comprising a red light, on timer to flash if a motor is active on each of the Tanks after 1.45pm daily.

177. He concluded his submissions on this point by saying:

So, your Honour, in summary, the way in which we characterise this case is an unfortunate incident caused by simple human error which had minor amenity impacts on some people and the environment and there was no other quantifiable risk to any person or the environment. We say the objective seriousness is low, the subjective considerations are overwhelmingly strongly in favour of the defendant, and your Honour would, in undertaking the instinctive synthesis exercise, weighing up all of the relevant cases that you have been taken to, decide on the appropriate quantum for payment to the Environmental Trust (Transcript P44 L40-48).

178. He also sought, earlier in his submissions, to draw comfort from the fact that the Prosecutor, in its regulatory capacity, had not intervened, in any regulatory fashion, with Nulon after the event. In this regard he said:

What we know here, your Honour, is that upon the EPA being self-notified by Nulon of the incident, there is no evidence that anything was done at any time by the EPA between the time of the incident, or later, that would show any cause for concern held by the EPA in relation to the ongoing operations of the plant at the premises. It was within the power of the relevant regulatory authorities, both the EPA and the council, to do something if it was concerned that there was harm at the time of the incident, immediately after the time of the incident or subsequently.

I make the strong point, your Honour, that this is not a criticism of the EPA. I am not criticising the EPA at all in making that observation. But we say it is relevant because it demonstrates that fact that to the extent it is said that there was potential harm, no injunctive or other regulatory action was taken at or immediately after the time of the incident (Transcript P33 L8-22).

179. This submission is dealt with below at [196].

180. Mr Nash’s submissions on sentence, inter alia, made reference to two earlier odour prosecutions, Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refineries NSW Pty Limited [2008] NSWLEC 194 (Caltex Refineries) and Environment Protection Authority v Hunter Valley Energy Coal Pty Ltd [2015] NSWLEC 120 (Hunter Valley Energy). He did so in support of his proposition that the objective seriousness in this instance was sufficiently conformable with the circumstances in each of those cases that a similar characterisation approach should be taken in these proceedings.

181. I am unable to agree with that proposition. My disagreement arises for differing reasons in relation to each of these two cases. I turn, first, to Caltex Refineries. The facts may be summarised briefly as being:

1. an unpleasant odour was emitted from faulty operation of the refinery’s flare;

2. complaints about the odour were primarily from residents of Kurnell, the suburb in the immediate vicinity of the refinery;

3. complaints commenced to be made on 23 December 2006 and continued until 29 December 2006;

4. the majority of the complaints were made on 26 December 2006; and

5. the complaints were typically of a very strong and very unpleasant odour characteristic of sulphur.

182. Lloyd J’s consideration of matters in Caltex Refineries set out in s 241 of the POEO Act dealt with the impact of the odours on the residents in the following terms:

Extent of the harm caused or likely to be caused to the environment

28 The prosecutor submits that the failure to operate the plant in a proper and efficient manner has directly caused actual environmental harm and that the offence is therefore aggravated: citing Environment Protection Authority v Ballina Shire Council (2006) 148 LGERA 278 at 294. Foul odours were emitted for six days, occasioning a direct and significant impact on the amenity of the residents which was magnified by the fact that it was over the Christmas period.

29 Caltex acknowledges the impact which the odour had on the amenity of the residents during the Christmas period. However, it submits that there is no evidence that the odour caused any actual harm beyond amenity impacts, despite the concerns over health which the residents expressed.

30 I agree with Caltex that the effects of the odour are limited to amenity. There is no evidence of actual environmental harm.

183. Although, obviously, his Honour's comments were in response to the particular facts and circumstances of that case, I understand Mr Nash to be seeking to have me draw a conclusion that his Honour's comments in [30] are ones that I should adopt and apply in these proceedings.

184. I am unable to do so. Contrary to the brief position adopted by his Honour at [30], I disagree that it is inappropriate to treat impacts to human amenity as not being actual environmental harm in the sense of environmental harm as called up by the POEO Act. “Harm” is defined as “harm to the environment includes any direct or indirect alteration of the environment that has the effect of degrading the environment and, without limiting the generality of the above, includes any act or omission that results in pollution”.

185. There are two observations to be made supporting my rejection of his Honour’s conclusion. First, the statutory definition expressly imports acts of pollution into the concept.

186. Second, there is no temporal yardstick stated in or able to be implied from the definition. The harm may, indeed, be transitory and merely unpleasant as is the position with respect to the odour released from Nulon's premises. However, there is no necessity for the impact to be either ongoing or one causing permanent damage for it to fall within the concept of environmental harm.

187. In addition, Caltex Refineries is further considered later in the context of consistency of sentencing.

188. With respect to Hunter Valley Energy, I should initially observe that Pain J was not, apparently, referred to the Caltex Refineries decision. However, in this case her Honour did not demur from the acceptance by the Defendant that the amenity impacts from the blast fume giving rise to that prosecution did cause actual harm to the environment as defined in the POEO Act. Her Honour went on to say in [19]:

… Those affected experienced relatively minor symptoms which resolved shortly afterwards (SOAF at par 40-53). There is no evidence that anyone required medical treatment or suffered long lasting health impacts. The environmental harm was transitory and therefore less harmful, relying on Kirby P in Camilleri’s Stock Feeds at 701. The harm was to amenity rather than human health. The blast dispersed within 25 minutes and dispersed over vacant property owned by the Defendant on the other side of the industrial estate. I agree with the Defendant that there is no evidence of any potential for serious impact on human health as a result of the blast fume.

189. The proposition that her Honour refers to in Camilleri’s Stock Feeds at 701 is the proposition (citations omitted):

(4) The odour was non-toxic. There was no serious and lasting environmental harm. In environmental matters the Court has previously exercised its discretion in relation to penalty on the principle that the more serious the lasting environmental harm involved the more serious the offence and, ordinarily, the higher the penalty.

190. This provision is, self-evidently, relevant in the present proceedings.

191. Although I here accept, for reasons earlier set out, that “there is no evidence of any potential for serious impact on human health as a result of” the Nulon incident, there is also considerable difference between the factual circumstances in Hunter Valley Energy when compared to those arising in the present proceedings.

192. In particular, although the immediate impact on employees in the industrial estate described in the Statement of Agreed Facts in Hunter Valley Energy are comparable, by analogy, with those of the employees of Sphere Healthcare in these proceedings, the more general geographic and temporal spread of the odour in this case is far more extensive.

193. Having said that, I do observe that, at [33], her Honour agreed with the submission made on behalf of the Defendant in those proceedings that the offence is at the low end of the medium-range.

194. I see no reason why, in these proceedings, the Hunter Valley Energy proceedings might not be regarded as a relevant benchmark for comparable classification purposes with the objective facts applicable in these proceedings.

195. Indeed, because of the much broader temporal and geographic extent of the impact of the Nulon odour, I am fortified in my conclusion that the Nulon incident should be regarded as being of greater seriousness when compared to her Honour's finding in Hunter Valley Energy.

196. I have earlier set out the measures that Nulon has undertaken, since the event, to ensure that there will be no repetition of that which has occurred. I consider it reasonable to infer that the EPA was aware of the steps that the company was undertaking in the immediate aftermath of the event giving rise to the prosecution and thereafter.

197. Although there is no express evidence on this point, it is not unreasonable to assume that regulatory intervention may have been considered unnecessary given the positive steps (of more than passing utility to the company in my assessment of the subjective matters requiring to be taken into account in these proceedings) being taken by Nulon rendered regulatory intervention unnecessary.

198. I am unable to accept Mr Nash's submissions as to the characterisation of the incident and the consequences which flowed from it. Having considered these submissions and all the objective factors in this case, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to regard the company’s offending as being of moderate seriousness and in the middle of the range of such offences.

199. I have so concluded for the following reasons:

1. I have earlier set out the number and distribution of the complaints made to Fire & Rescue NSW from the early hours of 5 February 2014 to the time of the last relevant contact some 29 hours later. For the reasons earlier discussed, the only conclusions appropriate to be drawn about the impact are those that derive from the specific evidence available to me and, for the reasons earlier described, I do not go beyond the specifics derived from the complaints. However, the extent of the impact recorded over such a broad area and over a significantly extending period of time supports a conclusion that the impact is of moderate seriousness;

2. The impact of the employees of Sphere Healthcare, although lasting, effectively, for only a day, significantly if transitorily impacted on their well-being; and

3. The nature of the temporary impact was disruptive of the daily activities of a more than an insignificant number of people – ranging from those in the immediate vicinity (such as the employees of Sphere Healthcare) to those at a distance of more than six kilometres (the necessity to keep the pupils at Busby Public School inside during recess).

200. The wide extent of the actual (although generally transient) impacts confirms that, qualitatively, the incident should be regarded as being of moderate seriousness.

Consistency in sentencing

General

201. Although each such prosecution needs to be considered on the facts and circumstances of the particular event, it is also relevant, in sentencing, to ensure that the sentence given in a particular prosecution is not inconsistent with sentences given in other prosecutions for events that might – to a greater or lesser extent – potentially be regarded as providing guidance for sentencing purposes.

Other potentially relevant pollution cases

202. I have been taken by Ms Shahnawaz and Mr Nash to a number of other pollution cases from which it is suggested I might garner some guidance on how I might characterise the seriousness of Nulon’s offending and the level of penalty that might be appropriate to attach to it.

203. These cases (together with a short analysis of each) are:

No	Case name	Offence and maximum penalty	Short facts and sentencing considerations	Penalty
PROSECUTOR
1	Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd [2006] NSWLEC 335	S 124 POEO Act Air pollution caused by failure to operate plant in a proper and efficient manner Maximum $250,000	Black smoke being emitted for approximately 9 minutes. 31 people made 38 complaints over 5 days. Symptoms caused by the odour included nausea, headache, diarrhoea, shortness of breath, tightness in chest, some had to close doors and windows. [21]-[22] Harm The harm was ‘reasonably serious but short-term with no evidence of long-lasting impacts and no evidence that medical assistance was sought by the complainants’. [45] Objective seriousness ‘The matter is serious given … harm to the environment, that the offence was reasonably foreseeable and that the Defendant had control over the causes of the offence.’ [66]	Fine of $77,000
2	Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Limited [2008] NSWLEC 194	S 64 POEO Act Fail to operate in a proper and efficient manner Maximum $1,000,000	Over the course of 6 days, 31 residents made 35 complaints of a very strong and unpleasant odour characteristic of sulphur. The impacts were limited to impacts were limited to impacts on amenity, which also occurred over the Christmas holiday season. [19]-[20] Harm Limited to amenity impacts. No evidence to actual harm. [30]	$78,000 Environmental Services Order
3	Environment Protection Authority v Orica Australia Pty Ltd (The Evaporator Incident) [2014] NSWLEC 104	S 64 POEO Act Failure to carry out licensed activities in a competent manner Maximum $1,000,000	A visible plume of ammonium nitrate was emitted into the atmosphere. Some employees were affected. Three reported eye/throat irritation, coughing and headaches. The effects lasted several hours for two, and for one night for the other. The actual harm was of limited duration. Harm Moderate environmental harm, being actual harm to three employees of limited duration. [114]-[118] Objective seriousness ‘Having regard to all the objective factors … particularly the actual, albeit temporary, harm that occurred to the employees, and the potential harm that could have been caused by the incident, that the offence should be classed in the mid-range of seriousness.’ [136]	$122,500 Environmental Services Order
4	EPA v Illawarra Coke Co Pty Ltd [2002] NSWLEC 21; 118 LGERA 451	S 129 POEO Act Offensive odour Maximum $250,000 [38]	On three occasions over a period of two months, hydrogen sulphide was emitted in excess of the permitted limits, for a period of 4 hours, 4 hours, and 6 hours. On the first occasion, three complaints were made. On the second, three complaints were made. On the third, two complaints were made. Each complaint was similar – ie headaches, itchy nose/throat/ eyes. The harm was minor and settled after removal from the odour. The small number of complainants indicated sensitive individuals were affected only. Harm Prosecutor’s case alleged disamenity only. [33] Objective seriousness ‘not of the most serious kind, as harmful long-term impacts are not alleged’. [38]	Fines imposed: $40,000; $20,000 and $10,000
5	Environment Protection Authority v BlueScope Steel (AIS) Pty Ltd [2004] NSWLEC 400	S 64 POEO Act Fail to maintain plant and equipment in a proper and efficient manner Maximum $250,000	Discharge of gases from coke ovens, black smoke and the discharge of some liquid. The gases included chemical components, the most acutely toxic of which was hydrogen sulphide. The emissions lasted approximately 3 hours. There was no evidence that any persons suffered any health effects. [26] [26] … but if an individual were to have particular sensitivity they could experience an acute respiratory effect. Harm Of short duration, no direct harm apart from visual impact. [65] Potential existed for mild irritation to potentially lethal consequences. [59]	$70,000
DEFENDANT
1	Environment Protection Authority v Sydney Water Corporation [2015] NSWLEC 80	S 120(1) and s 64(1) POEO Act Polluting waters and failing to comply with the licence condition Maximum $1,000,000	Hundreds of thousands of litres of sewage effluent from Sydney Water’s Malabar Waste Water Treatment Plant was discharged into the ocean as a result of a pipe leak. Harm The Court found that the offence resulted in the pollution of waters in circumstances where the discharge should have occurred 3.6 km offshore and 80m underwater and that the harm was substantial having regard to the nature of the pollutant (being insufficiently treated sewage effluent), the number of days over which the pollutant was discharged, the volume of the pollutant, the difference in the marine environment that actually received the pollutant and the interference with public amenity and enjoyment of Malabar Beach. Objective seriousness Low to moderate	$78,750 per offence
2	Environment Protection Authority v Orica Australia Pty Ltd (the Nitric Acid Air Lift Incident) [2014] NSWLEC 103; 206 LGERA 239	S 120(1) and s 64(1) POEO Act Pollution of waters and breach of licence condition Maximum $1,000,000, and in the case of a continuing offence a further penalty of $120,000 for each day the offence continues	The subject offence in this case is related to the escape of 6 to 12 tonnes of nitric acid following the failure of a pipe. Harm The Court found that the harm arising from the offence was insubstantial.	$42,000
3	Environment Protection Authority v Orica Australia Pty Ltd (the Botany Mercury Incident) [2014] NSWLEC 110	S 64(1) POEO Act Breach of licence condition, release to the environment of mercury vapours Maximum $1,000,000	This case involved the release into the environment of mercury vapours when louvres were left open at Orica’s Former ChlorAlkali Plant Mercury Remediation Project at the Botany Industrial Park. Harm The Court found that the incident had the potential to cause harm, as mercury is a poison with high toxicity to humans in sufficient concentrations and over prolonged periods of exposure, but that the levels of mercury vapour were low.	$35,000
4	Environment Protection Authority v State of New South Wales (Department of Environment, Climate Change and Water) [2010] NSWLEC 67; 174 LGERA 19	S 64(1) POEO Act Breach of licence condition, failed to operate equipment in a proper and efficient manner Maximum $1,000,000	This case involved the discharge of supernatant (which had been removed from a waste sludge storage tank) into Perisher Creek. Harm The Court found that the likelihood of harm was low.	$80,000
5	Environment Protection Authority v Causmag Ore Company Proprietary Limited [2009] NSWLEC 164	S 64(1) POEO Act Breach of licence condition, dust emissions Maximum $1,000,000	Dust emissions occurred, landing on surrounding property. Harm The Court found that the dust emissions caused a localised nuisance, but was not substantial.	$20,000
6	Environment Protection Authority v Coastal Recycled Cooking Oils Pty Limited [2008] NSWLEC 242	S 64(1) POEO Act Breach of licence condition, all plant and equipment must be maintained in a proper and efficient condition, and must be operated in a proper and efficient manner Maximum $1,000,000	Generated wastewater which had a sewage-like odour and had failed to close a lid on the tank after cleaning it, being the tank that contained the wastewater. Harm The Court found there was actual harm to the environment, but that the harm was transitory and affected one person and possibly other persons present in the area where the incident occurred.	$18,000

204. Although I have carefully considered all of these cases, I have found those not relating to air pollution to be of little assistance.

205. Those relating to air pollution do provide some broad guidance as to how I should approach the present circumstances. It is clear, with sufficient consistency, in my view, that the sentencing approach has, in these instances, been influenced by the following factors:

• the number of people affected/number of complaints made;

• the duration of the impact on those who have been affected;

• the symptoms triggered in those exposed to the air pollution; and

• the lack of lasting long-term impacts on those affected.

206. Each of these factors has been considered, in the context of the present incident, by me in the next section of this judgment. The factual position relevant, in the present circumstances, with respect to each of these factors can be gleaned from the matters that I have earlier set out.

The appropriate sentence

207. Determining the appropriate sentence involves me undertaking an instinctive synthesis of all the objective and subjective factors to determine an appropriate description of the seriousness of the company’s conduct and then to consider where this fits, within the range up to the maximum penalty set by the Parliament, to arrive at the appropriate penalty in these circumstances and then, as the following step, to determine the extent to which the penalty so derived should be discounted for the early guilty plea.

208. I am satisfied, after consideration of the objective factors of the offence and Nulon's subjective factors (taking into particular account the company’s community activities as a positive for the company but also the negative – to a lesser extent – the impact on the schools earlier noted), that the appropriate penalty should be $160,000.

209. I am satisfied for the reasons earlier set out that I should make the maximum allowance of 25% for the utilitarian value of the company’s early guilty plea, thus resulting in a penalty of $120,000.

Application of the penalty monies to the Environmental Trust Fund

210. As earlier set out, the parties have agreed that the sum that I fix as the appropriate penalty to be applied to Nulon should be made as a payment to the Environmental Trust established under the Environmental Trust Act1998 to be applied for general environmental purposes. They propose this as an alternative to the imposition of a fine, a process that would have the monies paid into Consolidated Revenue. The power to make an order requiring payment of monies to the Environmental Trust is contained in s 250(1)(e) of the POEO Act. The provision is in the following terms:

250 Additional Orders

(1) Orders

…

(e) order the offender to pay a specified amount to the Environmental Trust established under the Environmental Trust Act 1998, or a specified organisation, for the purposes of a specified project for the restoration or enhancement of the environment or for general environmental purposes,

211. It should be noted that this power is expressly described as being one able to be exercised whether or not there is a decision to impose a fine (s 244(3) of the POEO Act).

212. I am aware of the basis for the original establishment of the environmental trust scheme in 1989 and its evolution from the original three Environmental Trusts to the now single, consolidated Environmental Trust as providing funding for environmentally beneficial programs. I am satisfied that it is appropriate to give effect to the agreement between the parties and require the payment of the totality of the amount that I determine is the appropriate financial impost on the company (this being, in effect, the penalty to the company) but to do so in the fashion proposed, thus enabling contribution to the broader environmental good to come from this pollution incident.

General publication and specific apology orders

213. I have earlier noted the agreement between the parties to the publication of a general culpability statement by the company. The terms of the agreed wording of such a statement, incorporating the date of conviction into the draft settled by the parties, appears as Annexure B to this judgment. Similarly, the letter proposed to be sent by Nulon's CEO to the affected employees of Sphere Healthcare offering a specific apology for the impact of the incident on them is also reproduced as settled by the parties (but with the date of conviction inserted).

214. I have earlier set out the statutory provisions enabling me to incorporate requirements for these general and specific publications in orders of the Court. I am satisfied that the settled terms of both the general media publication and the specific letter of apology to the affected employees of Sphere Healthcare are in appropriate terms and the orders made below embody the requirement for giving effect to these.

Orders

215. It follows that, as a consequence of all the foregoing, the orders of the Court are that:

1. The Defendant is convicted of the offence as charged;

2. Pursuant to s 250(1)(e) of the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997, the Defendant is to pay the amount of $120,000 to the Environmental Trust established under the Environmental Trust Act 1998 for general environmental purposes;

3. Pursuant to s 250(1)(b) of the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997, the Defendant is to take specified action to provide a written apology in the terms set out at Annexure A to those persons employed by Sphere Healthcare, as referred to in Exhibit A Tab F affected by the incident;

4. Pursuant to s 257B of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, the Defendant is to pay the Prosecutor’s legal costs of $64,530;

5. Pursuant to s 248(1) of the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997, the Defendant is to pay the Environment Protection Authority’s investigation costs of $674.82; and

6. Pursuant to s 250(1)(a) of the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997, the Defendant will:

1. Within 28 days of the date of this order, at its expense, cause a notice in the form of Annexure B at a minimum size of 10 cm x 18 cm to be placed in:

1. The Liverpool Leader;

2. The Sydney Morning Herald; and

3. PACE Process Control & Engineering.

2. Within 35 days of the date of this order, provide to the Prosecutor a complete copy of the page of the publications in which the notice appears.

Annexures

Annexure A

Dear [INSERT]

On [INSERT DATE] Nulon Products Australia Pty Limited was convicted in the Land and Environment Court under Section 64 of the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 for breaching a condition of its Environment Protection Licence. Nulon Products Australia Pty Limited, located in Moorebank, engages in oil and lubricant production.

On 4–5 February 2014, you may recall that an environmental incident occurred at our factory in Moorebank. A heater inside a blending tank was left switched on and the gear oil in the tank overheated.

Nulon Products Australia Pty Limited unreservedly apologises to you for this incident. We have now put in place numerous controls to ensure that this incident does not happen again.

Again, please accept our sincere apologies.

Yours faithfully

Greg Simons

CEO, Nulon Products Australia Pty Limited

Annexure B

Nulon Products convicted of licence breach in Moorebank

Nulon Products Australia Pty Ltd (the Company) has been convicted in the Land and Environment Court of NSW under section 64 of the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 for breaching a condition of its environment protection licence.

The Company, located in Moorebank, engages in oil and lubricant production.

On 4–5 February 2014, an environmental incident occurred at the Company’s factory in Moorebank. A heater inside a blending tank was left switched on and the gear oil in the tank overheated. This led to some employees at nearby premises temporarily falling sick, and complaints being made by community members.

The Company was prosecuted by the NSW Environment Protection Authority in relation to the offence and pleaded guilty to the charge.

On [date of sentence], the Company was ordered to pay a total of $120,000 to the Environmental Trust for general environmental purposes. The Company was ordered to pay the EPA’s legal costs in the amount of $64,530 and investigation costs of $674.82.

This notice was paid for by the Company as a result of an order of the Land and Environment Court of NSW.

Annexure C

Amendments

11 May 2016 - Correct typographic error in "Cases cited".

Decision last updated: 11 May 2016