ENJ17 v Minister for Home Affairs
[2019] FCCA 3462
•28 October 2019
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| ENJ17 v MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS & ANOR | [2019] FCCA 3462 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Protection Visa – whether Immigration Assessment authority’s decision affected by jurisdictional error – where no error established in Immigration Assessment authority’s decision – application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.473DC, 473DD, 473FB(5) |
| Cases cited: N/A |
| Applicant: | ENJ17 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS |
| Second Respondent: | IMMIGRATION ASSESMENT AUTHORITY |
| File Number: | ADG 74 of 2019 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Vasta |
| Hearing date: | 28 October 2019 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 28 October 2019 |
| Delivered at: | Adelaide |
| Delivered on: | 28 October 2019 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Ms Stanley |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Camatta Lempens |
| Counsel for the First Respondent: | Ms Milutinovic |
| Solicitors for the First Respondent: | Sparke Helmore |
ORDERS
The application filed 28 February 2019 be dismissed.
The Applicant pay the respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $7,467.00.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT ADELAIDE |
ADG 74 of 2019
| ENJ17 |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS |
First Respondent
| IMMIGRATION ASSESSMETN AUTHORITY |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Ex tempore)
On 22 February 2019, the Immigration Assessment Authority (“the IAA”) affirmed a decision of the delegate not to grant the Applicant, ENJ17, a protection visa. On 28 February 2019, the Applicant filed an originating application in this Court, asking the Court to review that decision.
The matter has a history which needs to be understood. The Applicant arrived in this country as an unauthorised maritime arrival on 14 November 2012. He launched an application for a Safe Haven Enterprise visa on 25 February 2016. The delegate refused to grant the visa on 8 March 2017. This was a fast-track decision and so was referred to the IAA.
On 14 September 2017, the IAA affirmed the decision not to grant the Applicant the protection visa. The Applicant sought judicial review in this Court on 24 January 2019. The Court remitted the matter back to the IAA for reconsideration. It does not seem that this was one where argument was heard, and simply the matter was remitted by consent. I will come a little bit later on to the terms of that remittal.
The newly constituted IAA went through the claims that were before it.
In short course, the claims of the Applicant were that he is a Tamil male from Parathuchenai in the Batticaloa District in Eastern Province of Sri Lanka. He said that he lived in a part of the country that was affected by the conflict between the Sri Lankan Army and the LTTE. He said that between 1997 and 1999 he worked with his friend, a person known as K. He trained as a tailor. He used to get stitching orders from the general public and from the LTTE. In 2000, he began working in the SLA controlled Batticaloa City. He had issues travelling between Batticaloa City and his home area, as his home area was controlled with the LTTE.
He claims that, in 2002, whilst travelling from Parathuchenai to Batticaloa, he was stopped by officers of the CID who were holding pistols. They asked if he was acting as an informer to the LTTE, given he travelled between the two areas. He claims that he told these officers that he worked at the tailor shop in Batticaloa Town and these officers threatened him and warned him that he would be shot if he was found to be an LTTE informer. Following this, he said that he was scared. He ceased working at the tailor shop and started working as a tailor from his house.
He said that between February 2007 and July 2007, he and his family were relocated to a refugee camp due to the conflict. Whilst at the camp, he said that he was taken away by some unknown persons and asked whether he had learnt tailoring from the LTTE and if he had worked as a tailor for the LTTE. He denied LTTE involvement and showed these persons his business card from his previous employer in Batticaloa City.
After he was released from the camp, he returned to Parathuchenai in July 2007 and he resumed his tailoring business. He said that he was also identified at this time, by the CID, as a person suspected of having links with the LTTE, including being a tailor for them. He was asked about the whereabouts of LTTE people and things that he knew. He was asked to sign a register twice a week at the Puthamandapafatti Special Task Force, the STF camp. He said at this time, he was threatened by CID officers that he would disappear. He was told by CID officers that they had found cloth pieces of LTTE uniforms in his house.
In May 2012, the Applicant says that he heard that his friend K had been taken away in a white van. He said that he began to fear that K may have revealed his name as a former work colleague to the authorities. He claims that, in August 2012, uniformed officers of the STF came to his house and took him to the STF camp. He was questioned for two hours by the CID and physically and verbally abused. He was asked if he had ever stitched dresses for the LTTE.
He claims that following this incident, he was physically very weak due to sickness, and he was scared due to the physical abuse he suffered from the CID. He no longer stayed in his home. He did not sign the register on 11 and 12 August, and after three days, the CID officers came to his house looking for him. He claims that his mother was pushed down and she told the officers that her son had not returned home since he was taken away by the STF. He claims, following this, the CID officers continued to visit his house. He said they shot his dog and they physically abused his mother.
After this incident, his mother was scared and advised her son that it was unsafe to stay in Parathuchenai. She suggested that he escape somewhere. He claimed that he travelled 25 kilometres to Thalankudah and stayed with a friend for three months. He says that on 21 October 2012, he returned to Parathuchenai for one week, as he was preparing to travel to Australia. He says that his details are on the Sri Lankan Army and the CID watchlist, due to his suspected LTTE links.
He said that he left Sri Lanka due to suspicion by the CID that he had links to the LTTE and the harm that he and his family faced. He said that he was in fear of his life because of his ethnicity and imputed LTTE links.
He claims that he is suffering from a congenial disease and he cannot face physical abuse. He said that after arriving in Australia, he was diagnosed with factor VIII deficiency, haemophilia A. He says because of this illness, he cannot travel long distances and he needs support from family, and if he is returned to Sri Lanka, he fears he will be harmed or killed by the CID due to his name being on the SOA and CID watchlist, and his suspected links to the LTTE.
The IAA noted that in the interview, the Applicant and/or his former migration representative provided some more claims; that is, that the Applicant continued to do tailoring for the LTTE when he commenced working for himself in 2002, and he did this until 2007; that he undertook compulsory general training with the LTTE, which included how to shoot and to clean weapons; that he had cousins who were involved with the LTTE, but he does not know their level of involvement; that when he was signing the register each week, he faced physical abuse; and, that he suspects that the person K was detained by the Sri Lanka authorities and beaten.
The Applicant claimed that K performed tailoring duties for a long time and it is likely he had information about hidden LTTE weapons and assets. He suspects that K may have become an informer and revealed to the authorities that the Applicant had also performed tailoring duties for the LTTE. He suspects that K may have told the authorities that the things he (K) did for the LTTE were actually done by the Applicant.
The IAA considered all these matters. The IAA were satisfied that the Applicant had worked as a tailor, that he had travelled between his home and Batticaloa City, that he was asked if he was acting as an informer, and that he was threatened that he would be shot if it was found that he was an LTTE informer. The IAA accepted that the Applicant was actually relocated to an internally displaced persons camp for the five-month period and accepted that whilst in that camp, he was asked whether he had learned tailoring from the LTTE or worked as a tailor for the LTTE.
The IAA, though, then found that the claims as to other events that happened whilst in the camp, and following the return to the home area in 2007, were unconvincing. A number of examples were given. In the SHEV interview, the Applicant claimed that, whilst in the camp, he was told by the authorities they had taken items from his house, like uniform materials and clothes. However, in his SHEV statement, he said that he was confronted about clothes and uniform items found in his house at a later time, that is, when he was signing the register at the STF camp.
There were other inconsistencies as to when he provided stitching services to the LTTE. In his SHEV statement, he said that these were done with K between 1997 and 1999. However, in the SHEV interview, he said that he continued to assist the LTTE in this way between 2002 and 2007. In his entry interview, he said that he was employed by a company based in Batticaloa between 2002 and 2007.
In the SHEV statement, he claimed that after resettlement to his home area in 2007, he was one of several people who were identified by the CID as a person suspected of having links with the LTTE and he had to sign the register twice a week and that he was threatened by officers. In the SHEV interview, he confirmed he was required to sign the register each Saturday and Sunday up until 2012, and he believed he was doing this so that he could not work for the LTTE, who the authorities believed may have been hiding in the forest. But in the entry interview, the Applicant said he had only had to sign once a week each Sunday. There were a number of other such inconsistencies.
The IAA looked at the last aspect of his claims. In the SHEV statement, he claimed that on 21 October 2012, he returned to Parathuchenai after spending several months in hiding with a friend 25 kilometres away in Thalankudah. He said that he stayed at his sister’s house for a week where he also met his parents, before leaving Sri Lanka on 28 October 2012. In the SHEV interview, the delegate asked the Applicant whether he was worried about the authorities finding him at his sister’s house in Parathuchenai, and in response he said that during this period he did not come out of the room he was in, and if somebody knocked on the door, he would not go outside.
In his entry interview, he said that apart from his sister’s house and his family home, which are both in Parathuchenai, he never lived anywhere else in Sri Lanka. His evidence there also was that he stayed at his sister’s house from August 2012 until 28 September 2012 and that he was living in his family home for the month of October.
He also had two letters, one from a supposed Member of Parliament and another from a bishop. The IAA looked at the details of those letters and, because they were inconsistent with things that the Applicant himself had said, did not put any weight on those letters.
The IAA was willing to accept the Applicant’s broadly consistent evidence that he came to the adverse attention of the CID for several hours, in August 2012, due to suspicion he had provided tailoring services to the LTTE during the conflict. The IAA was prepared to accept the central claim that he did provide stitching services to the LTTE during 2002 to 2007 and that he was required to periodically sign a register between 2007 and 2012 and was questioned about his activities, But the IAA did not accept that he was physically harmed when doing so. The IAA did not accept that he was questioned about clothes or uniform material whilst he was at the camp or at any other time.
The IAA was prepared to accept that the Applicant undertook compulsory general training with the LTTE, which included learning how to shoot and clean weapons, as this was consistent with country information about the forced recruitment of Tamils at that time, but there was no claim that the authorities were aware of the Applicant’s involvement with the LTTE in this regard. Nor was there any claim advanced that the Applicant feared harm on return to Sri Lanka on that basis. If he did fear harm, the IAA was of the view that the Applicant would have mentioned that in his written claims or in the SHEV interview.
Having accepted a number of the claims, at paragraph 43 the IAA said this:
43. However, I have difficulty accepting the Applicant continued to be a person of adverse interest to the Sri Lankan authorities beyond August 2012. I consider he was released after questioning for two to three hours, not supportive of his claim that he was of high-profile interest. Country information indicates that since the end of the conflict, thousands of LTTE members have been arrested and detained in rehabilitation centres, which includes low-profile former members who provided non-military support to the LTTE during the conflict. On the evidence before me, I am not satisfied that the Applicant was a person of high-profile interest to the Sri Lankan authorities in late 2012 due to LTTE links or for any other reasons. I consider that if he was considered a person of interest in respect of LTTE links, that he would have been arrested and detained during the period that he reported to the CID up until August 2012.
The IAA then talked about the lack of faith they had in his evidence as to what occurred after that.
The IAA spoke of the Applicant’s claim of fearing persecution as a Tamil and the suspicion that he had links with the LTTE. The IAA had found that the Applicant does not face a real chance of harm in Sri Lanka in relation to any LTTE links. The IAA then said, at paragraph 48, although not expressly raised as claims for protection, that the delegate also considered whether he faced harm on return to Sri Lanka due to his illegal departure or as a failed asylum seeker. The IAA noted that the Applicant’s former representative provided a letter about the Applicant’s health because of his haemophilia.
The IAA then looked at quite a deal of country information, including recent country information from DFAT, and found that the outlook for Tamils in Sri Lanka has improved considerably since the election of the Sirisena government and that life as a Tamil is such that anything that would happen to the Applicant would not amount to serious harm. The IAA looked at the Applicant’s medical condition and was satisfied that the Applicant can access health services and cope with the situation of his illness.
The IAA also looked at the situation in Sri Lanka as far as people coming back from overseas where they have been failed asylum seekers and looked at a DFAT report which says that there is some social stigma or societal discrimination because of people being returnee asylum seekers but that such treatment would not constitute serious harm as defined by the Act. The IAA also looked at the penalties that could be given to the Applicant because of his leaving Sri Lanka illegally.
Having looked at all of those matters, the IAA was satisfied that the Applicant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution and so therefore does not meet the requirements of the definition of refugee.
The IAA then looked at the complementary protection criteria and was concerned especially about the Applicant’s haemophilia but, in the end, concluded that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being returned from Australia to Sri Lanka, there was no real risk that the Applicant would suffer significant harm.
The grounds of this application are that,
1. The decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (“the IAA”) to determine the applicant’s review application without permitting him an opportunity to provider further submissions and information was legally unreasonable.
2. The decision of the IAA failed to decide the applicant’s application according to law as directed by the Court on 24 January 2019.
Both of those grounds follow upon the decision by this Court to remit the matter. The Court, in remitting the matter, noted, by consent, the following:
THE COURT NOTES, BY CONSENT, THAT:
The first respondent accepts that the second respondent failed to consider an integer of the applicant’s claim, namely that he undertook training with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and therefore constructively failed to exercise the “review” jurisdiction conferred upon it by section 473CC(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The first respondent also accepts that the second respondent made an illogical finding of fact by finding, at paragraph 20 of its decision, that the applicant first raised the claim that he was on a wanted list at his Safe Haven Enterprise visa (SHEV) interview and that this claim was a fabrication, when the applicant raised this claim in his SHEV application form and the accompanying written statement.
That order, occurring on 24 January 2019, meant that the matter was referred back to the IAA. The IAA wrote to the Applicant in a letter, or email, which is reproduced at page 174 of the Court Book. I will read it into the record:
Dear ENJ17
RECONSIDERATION OF YOUR CASE.
I am writing to you in relation to your application for protection visa and the review conducted by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA).
On 24 January 2019, a court remitted your case back to us for reconsideration. We will now proceed to reconsider your case.
It is important that you:
·use your new reference number (omitted) whenever you contact us;
·advise us in writing if you wish to appoint a person to receive correspondence on your behalf or act as your representative (to do this, visit and obtain form F2);
·act quickly in your dealings with us (as we aim to complete the review within six weeks of the case being remitted to us); and
·tell us immediately if you change your contact details such as your email address, residential address, mailing address or telephone number.
If you have any questions, please email [email protected] or telephone 1800 205 919. For language assistance, please contact the Translating and Interpreting Services or telephone 1800 205 919. You may find information in your own language on our website.
Yours sincerely
Immigration Assessment Authority.
The project coordinator or registered migration agent from an organisation known as RASSA, Mr Edel Arvin Chang, wrote back to the IAA, by email, some eight days later. The email, at page 177 of the court book, reads:
Dear Sir/Madam,
We act for ENJ17, who has recently sought RASSA's assistance with submitting a further response to the IAA. Please find attached a signed Form F2 on behalf of our client.
We note your letter dated 5 February 2019, which informs the review applicant that you aim to finalise his case within six (6) weeks.
Noting that
1. RASSA has not previously assisted the applicant and requires time to gather information and documents;
and
2. RASSA has limited resources with part-time staff only; and
3. the review applicant has a history of complex medical issues which make it difficult for him to engage with the legal process;
We ask that you please provide us with the following:
1. The exact date on which the remittance from the Federal Circuit Court was received by your office; and
2. A date by which we can provide submissions and additional evidence on behalf of the applicant, without your office first finalising the matter. We ask you to please consider setting this date to be no earlier than four (4) weeks from the date of this email.
Thank you for consideration of our request.
Yours sincerely
Edel Arvin Chang
The IAA replied later that day, and the reply is at page 180 of the court book:
Dear Edel Arvin Chang,
As stated in the IAA letter dated 5 February 2019, a court remitted the applicant’s case back to the IAA for reconsideration on 24 January 2019.
We have considered your correspondence of 13 February 2019 requesting additional time to provide submissions and further information.
We have taken into account that the applicant’s case was referred to the IAA on 10 March 2017. Under the Practice Direction for Applicants, Representatives and Authorised Recipients any new information must be given to the IAA within21 days of the date on which the case was referred to us by the Department. The Direction also states that any submission on why the delegate’s decision may be wrong should be given within that period. The 21 day period ended on31 March 2017.
We also note that the applicant previously provided a submission on 3 April 2017 that is before the IAA.
Please note that a decision may be made at any time.
Yours sincerely
Immigration Assessment Authority
In the decision, the IAA considered the material that had been given to it by the former representative on 3 April 2017. Though the IAA referred to that as being on 31 March 2017, it really does not concern what the actual date was. But the IAA accepted some of the material and rejected other parts of the material. At paragraph 11, the IAA says:
11. On 13 February 2019, the IAA received an email from the Applicant’s IAA representative, requesting a date by which they could provide submissions and additional evidence on behalf of the Applicant. A date of no earlier than four weeks from the date of the email was requested. An attached F2 form indicated the Applicant had engaged a representative on 11 February 2019, about two and a half weeks after the Court’s decision and about one week after the IAA informed the Applicant his case was being reconsidered by the IAA.
12. In its response the same day, the IAA informed the representative that a decision would be made at any time. As outlined in the response, the IAA practice direction states that submissions should be provided within 21 days of the case being referred to the IAA by the department, in this case 31 March 2017. The Applicant and his former representative have provided submissions and new information previously, which I have considered. There is no indication in the IAAs representative’s email as to what additional information is being sought and, as noted above, I am satisfied the Applicant has had ample opportunity to present his case. I consider it is reasonable to proceed to make a decision.
The submission made to me, by the Applicant, is that it was unreasonable to proceed to make a decision, which in this case means that it was simply not open to the IAA to proceed in the way in which it had. The Applicant submits that the first email that was sent was, in effect, a request to provide more information in accordance with s.473DC of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”). That section allows the IAA, in its discretion, to consider new evidence.
The legislative scheme of a fast-track decision is that there will be a review of a delegate’s decision on the papers by someone who is not part of the department and is otherwise independent. It is a fast-track decision because it will be done, in most cases, on exactly the same material that the delegate had before them. That is why it is incumbent upon the secretary to deliver to the IAA as soon as possible all of that relevant material that was before the delegate. The legislature did allow a process by which there could be new information submitted to the IAA and that, even if that material is submitted, it still had to then pass a test under s.473DD as to whether it would be received.
There is a further section, s.473FB(5), which allows the IAA to not accept any evidence given to it because it had not been given to it pursuant to the practice direction. The Applicant submits that, inferentially, this must be the power that was used by the Tribunal to not accept any new information from the Applicant.
I am not sure that this inference is a correct one. That section contemplates there actually having been given to the Tribunal new information. There was no new information given in this case, nor in the letter of 13 February was there any indication of what this new material would be. So there has not been, as it were, information given and rejected for that reason.
What has happened is simply the IAA has said that the information it has already received was in accordance with the practice direction and it was simply going to go ahead and make its decision. And all it has said is that it will make a decision at any time and noted that there had already been new material put before the IAA by the Applicant and that the matter would proceed. In effect, it was not so much that there was additional time to provide submissions and further information but, rather, a courtesy to inform the Applicant as to what was occurring.
The Applicant has said that there were four aspects to this.
The first is that, by remitting the matter back to the IAA, it was as if there was no decision in the first place. It was submitted that the IAA should have acted as if the remittal was a referral, which would mean that everything would start again. Later in the submissions, the legal representative for the Applicant backtracked on that because, if the Court accepted that submission, it would mean that it was mandated that any remittal act as if it were a referral and that the process start again. The Applicant instead said that, in this particular case, the matter should have started again.
The second aspect is that the IAA itself utilised new material; that is, it used a new DFAT report. It was submitted that fairness dictated that if the IAA was using new material, the Applicant should have been given the opportunity to do so as well.
The third part of the matter is that it was submitted that part of the reason that the application was not allowed was that the organisation RASSA had not told the IAA what material it was going to submit to it;
Lastly, it was submitted that the IAA had found that the Applicant had had ample time to put in material.
To find that the IAA had been legally unreasonable, it is submitted that the IAA, in these circumstances, could not have made any decision, other than to adjourn their proceedings for four weeks to allow the Applicant to put in material.
It seems to me that this cannot be said to be any legal unreasonableness in relation to this decision. Whilst it may have been that other people, using a discretion, may have exercised it in a different way in these circumstances, where the remittal was because of the non-engagement with one aspect of the claim, and a finding that was simply not open on the evidence before that particular IAA, there was no requirement for the whole matter to start again.
The order of the Court was to decide the matter according to law. The material, upon which the Court was ordering the IAA to decide the matter according to law, was material that the IAA already had before it. There was nothing in the Court remittal that mandated that there needed to be more material, or another opportunity, or any other matter to be considered, other than the material that was already before the Court.
But whilst it may be that some people, another decision-maker in the place of the IAA, may have acceded to the submission that the Applicant made, that does not mean that they were absolutely bound to do so. In the circumstances of this matter, it was open to the IAA to proceed as they did. Because of that, there can be no jurisdictional error with regard to that action. Therefore ground 1 fails.
With regard to ground 2, the Applicant said this in the particulars:
2.1 In the orders of the Court dated 24 January 2019, the Court noted by consent that the IAA failed to consider an integer of the Applicant’s claim, namely that he undertook training with the LTTE, and therefore constructively failed to exercise the ‘review’ jurisdiction conferred upon it by section 473CC(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
2.2 At paragraph [39] of the IAA’s decision, the IAA accepts that the Applicant undertook compulsory general training with the LTTE, but finds that the Applicant did not claim to fear harm on return to Sri Lanka on this basis.
2.3 That finding is in direct contrast to the orders of the Court, that the general training with the LTTE is in fact an integer in the claimed fear of harm from the Sri Lankan authorities.
2.4 The orders of the Court also indicated that the IAA made an illogical finding of fact with respect to the Applicant’s claim he was on a wanted list being a fabrication. The IAA have not addressed this crucial fact at all within its reason, again demonstrating a lack of regard for the Court orders.
One then does have to go through the IAA decision. The IAA, at paragraph 15, noted that the Applicant claimed, in his SHEV interview, that he undertook compulsory general training with the LTTE, which included how to shoot and clean weapons. Therefore the IAA, in this particular review, has been seized of the fact that this was a claim that the Applicant had made. At paragraph 39, the IAA said this:
39. I am also prepared to accept that the Applicant undertook compulsory general training with the LTTE, which included learning how to shoot and clean weapons. Country information confirms that the LTTE supported its administration through the forced recruitment of Tamils at the relevant time. However, there is no claim that the Sri Lankan authorities are aware of the Applicant’s involvement with the LTTE in this regard, nor is there any claim advanced that the Applicant fears harm on return to Sri Lanka on this basis. I also consider that if the Applicant did previously face difficulty in Sri Lanka in relation to this, or if he feared harm on that basis, he would have mentioned this in his written claims or in the SHEV interview.
Such a finding is open on the evidence, and is, in fact, correct. There was no claim advanced that the Applicant feared harm on return to Sri Lanka because he had undertaken compulsory general training with the LTTE, which included learning how to shoot and clean weapons. It was simply a claim he made to show that he had those links with the LTTE that would have caused the Sri Lankan authorities to view him with suspicion.
The problem with the submission made by the Applicant, is that there was no claim that the Sri Lankan authorities were aware of that involvement with the LTTE in this regard, and the Applicant did not advance a claim that the authorities did know about this aspect of his previous interaction with the LTTE.
The manner in which the IAA has dealt with this aspect is proper, and is in accordance with the evidence. It has considered the integer of his claim, and has exercised its review function. It has also taken that fact into account when, at paragraphs 42, 43, 44 and 45, it looked at all of the aspects of the Applicant’s connection to the LTTE. At paragraph 45, the IAA said:
45. As noted above, I also accepted the Applicant underwent compulsory general training with the LTTE, and that he had two cousins involved with the LTTE, and that one cousin remains missing since 2009. For the reasons outlined above, including the country information cited, I am not satisfied the Applicant faces a real chance of harm in connection with these events on return to Sri Lanka now or in the foreseeable future.
Such a finding is open to the IAA, and it has exercised the review jurisdiction.
As far as the Applicant’s being on a watch list is concerned, the IAA, after going through all of the evidence as to the LTTE links that the Applicant has, said this, at paragraph 46:
46. According to expert testimony provided to a hearing of the UK’s Upper Tribunal on Immigration and Asylum, Sri Lankan authorities collect and maintain sophisticated intelligence on former LTTE members and supporters, including stop and watch electronic databases. Stop lists include the names of those individuals that have an extant court order, arrest warrant, or order to impound their Sri Lankan passport. Watch lists include the name of those individuals that the Sri Lankan security services consider to be of interest, including due to separatist or criminal activities. In light of the evidence discussed, I am not satisfied the Applicant’s details are on an SLA and CID watch list due to his suspected LTTE links, or for any other reason.
The Applicant claimed that he was on a watch list because of a photograph that had been, as it were, shopped around to a number of people. The photo apparently depicted three people with sunglasses, and the Applicant claimed that he was being represented by the CID as being the third one of those three people, showing that therefore he must be a person on such a watch list. It was a claim that had been made, and it was a claim that was looked at by the IAA.
The IAA has said, at paragraph 46, that the reason people are on watch lists or stop lists are for the particular reasons I have already read out. Given the IAA’s findings as to the Applicant’s LTTE links, he does not fit that bill, and that is the reason the IAA was not satisfied that his details are on any SLA or CID watch list. It seems to me, then, that there is no merit in ground 2, and it also fails.
Having looked at the matter as I have, I find there has been no jurisdictional error illustrated.
I certify that the preceding sixty-one (61) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Vasta
Date: 5 December 2019
0
2