ENGWIRDA and THE OWNERS OF QUEENS RIVERSIDE STRATA PLAN 55728

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JURISDICTION     :   STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

ACT: STRATA TITLES ACT 1985 (WA)

CITATION:   ENGWIRDA and THE OWNERS OF QUEENS RIVERSIDE STRATA PLAN 55728 [2020] WASAT 91

MEMBER:   JUDGE D PARRY, DEPUTY PRESIDENT

HEARD:   27 JULY 2020

DELIVERED          :   11 AUGUST 2020

FILE NO/S:   CC 2735 of 2018

BETWEEN:   JENNIFER ENGWIRDA

Applicant

AND

THE OWNERS OF QUEENS RIVERSIDE STRATA PLAN 55728

Respondent


Catchwords:

Practice and procedure - Withdrawal - Strata Titles proceedings - Right to withdraw application without leave under enabling Act - Application withdrawn - Whether Tribunal has power to set aside 'order' that 'The application is withdrawn' where 'order' made without giving prior notice to or seeking submissions from respondent - Whether 'order' that 'The application is withdrawn' is a 'decision' amenable to review and revocation under s 84(2) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) or a decision that can be recalled and remade where there is a breach of the rules of natural justice under implied power in s 32(1) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) - Whether Tribunal denied procedural fairness to respondent in making 'order' that 'The application is withdrawn' without giving prior notice to or seeking submissions from respondent - Whether Tribunal had power to dismiss or strike out proceedings after application withdrawn - Words and phrases: 'decision', 'hearing', 'relevant hearing'

Legislation:

State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 3(1), s 5, s 32(1), s 33, s 42(3), s 46, s 46(1), s 46(2), s 46(5), s 47, s 47(2), s 49, s 84, s 84(1), s 84(2), s 84(5)
Strata Titles Act 1985 (WA) (prior to 1 May 2020), s 81(5), s 102(1)(f), Div 3, Pt VI
Strata Titles Act 1985 (WA), Sch 5, cl 30(1)
Strata Titles Amendment Act 2018 (WA), s 82(b)

Result:

The Tribunal does not have power to set aside the 'order' that 'The application is withdrawn'

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant : Ms PE Cahill SC
Respondent : Mr CP Russell

Solicitors:

Applicant : N/A
Respondent : Wotton + Kearney Lawyers

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Clark and Western Australian Planning Commission [2007] WASAT 33; (2007) 49 SR (WA) 277

Clay and The Owners of Carinya Court Rockingham Strata Plan 25819 [2018] WASAT 39

Engwirda and The Owners of Queens Riverside Strata Plan 55728 [2019] WASAT 149

Legal Profession Complaints Committee and Gandini [2013] WASAT 31

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj [2002] HCA 11; (2002) 209 CLR 597

Western Australian Planning Commission v Dungey [2010] WASC 52

REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL:

Preliminary issue

  1. Section 42(3) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act) states that '[a] proceeding before the Tribunal commences when the application is accepted by the executive officer'. On 18 December 2018, Ms Jennifer Engwirda (Ms Engwirda or applicant) filed an application in the Tribunal, which was accepted by the executive officer, commencing proceedings CC 2735 of 2018 (SAT proceedings). In the SAT proceedings, Ms Engwirda sought an order from the Tribunal appointing an…

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Details
Case
[2020] WASAT 91
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Engwirda and The Owners of Queens Riverside Strata Plan 55728, the parties engaged in a dispute relating to strata title proceedings in Western Australia. The respondent sought relief from the State Administrative Tribunal (SAT) against the applicant, who had initiated proceedings. The central issue before the court was whether the SAT had the authority to set aside an order that declared the application had been withdrawn, when the order was made without providing prior notice to or seeking submissions from the respondent. Additionally, the court needed to determine whether the order was a "decision" subject to review and revocation under section 84(2) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) or if it could be recalled due to a breach of natural justice principles under section 32(1) of the same act. Another issue was whether the SAT denied procedural fairness to the respondent by making the order without giving prior notice or seeking submissions. Lastly, the court examined whether the SAT had the power to dismiss or strike out the proceedings after the application had been withdrawn.

The court concluded that the term "decision" in the context of the SAT Act should be interpreted to include its ordinary meaning. The term "order" is not defined in the SAT Act, but its ordinary meaning is an authoritative direction or command. The court found that the order in question did not meet the criteria of an order because it was unnecessary for the withdrawal of the application and had no legal effect. The withdrawal of the application was a unilateral action of the applicant and did not require the SAT's approval. The court further held that the order did not constitute a "decision" within the ordinary meaning of the term. Consequently, the order was not a decision subject to review and revocation under section 84(2) of the SAT Act, nor could it be recalled due to a breach of natural justice principles under section 32(1) of the same act. The court also found that the SAT did not deny procedural fairness to the respondent by making the order without prior notice or seeking submissions. Finally, the court held that the SAT had the power to dismiss or strike out the proceedings after the application had been withdrawn.

In conclusion, the court determined that the SAT did not have the power to set aside the order that declared the application had been withdrawn, as the order was unnecessary and had no legal effect. The order did not constitute a "decision" subject to review and revocation or recall due to a breach of natural justice principles. The court found that the SAT did not deny procedural fairness to the respondent by making the order without prior notice or seeking submissions. Finally, the court held that the SAT had the power to dismiss or strike out the proceedings after the application had been withdrawn.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Engwirda and The Owners of Queens Riverside Strata Plan 55728 revolves around the procedural aspects of strata title proceedings in Western Australia. Ms Engwirda, a property owner within the strata plan, initiated proceedings against the Owners of Queens Riverside Strata Plan 55728, seeking relief under the Strata Titles Act 1985 (WA). The proceedings were ultimately withdrawn by Ms Engwirda, but the circumstances surrounding the withdrawal and the subsequent actions of the State Administrative Tribunal (SAT) have raised significant legal questions.

Ms Engwirda formally commenced the SAT proceedings on 17 September 2019. After various hearings, Ms Engwirda emailed the Tribunal on 4 December 2019, effectively withdrawing the application. The Tribunal, however, proceeded to make an order on 5 December 2019, stating that "The application is withdrawn." This order was made without prior notice to or submissions from the respondent, the Owners of Queens Riverside Strata Plan 55728. Following the withdrawal, the Tribunal dismissed the proceedings and struck out the application. The Owners of Queens Riverside Strata Plan 55728 subsequently sought a review of the Tribunal's actions, arguing that the Tribunal had denied them procedural fairness and had no power to set aside or dismiss the proceedings after the application had been withdrawn.

The central issue in this case is whether the Tribunal had the authority to make an order stating that "The application is withdrawn" without adhering to procedural fairness, and whether the Tribunal could dismiss or strike out the proceedings after the application had already been withdrawn. The Owners of Queens Riverside Strata Plan 55728 argue that the Tribunal's order was not a true decision as it did not involve any substantive determination, and that the Tribunal's subsequent actions were beyond its power and in breach of natural justice principles. The case thus presents a critical examination of the scope of the Tribunal's procedural powers and the legal implications of the application withdrawal process under the Strata Titles Act 1985 (WA).

The matter before the court involves proceedings under the Strata Titles Act, specifically concerning the withdrawal of an application by the applicant, Ms Engwirda, from the State Administrative Tribunal (SAT). The proceedings originated when Ms Engwirda commenced SAT proceedings against the Owners of Queens Riverside Strata Plan 55728. Ms Engwirda subsequently sought to withdraw her application under section 81(5) of the Strata Titles Act. The procedural history of the case is centred on the manner in which the application was withdrawn and the subsequent orders made by the Tribunal regarding the withdrawal. Ms Engwirda emailed the Tribunal to withdraw her application, which was received on 4 December 2019. Despite this, the Tribunal made an order on 5 December 2019 stating that "The application is withdrawn." This case now before the court questions the Tribunal's power to make such an order without prior notice to or submissions from the respondent, as well as whether the order constitutes a 'decision' that can be reviewed or revoked under the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA). The court must determine if the Tribunal denied procedural fairness to the respondent and whether it had the authority to dismiss or strike out the proceedings after the application had been withdrawn.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Because the term 'decision' is non-exhaustively defined in s 3(1) of the SAT Act, it bears its ordinary apposite meaning in addition to 'an order, direction, or determination of the Tribunal' in terms of the inclusive (or extended) part of the definition of the term. The ordinary meaning of the noun 'decision' is as follows:[31]decision 1. the act of deciding; determination (of a question or doubt). 2. a judgement, as one formally pronounced by a court. 3. a making up of one's mind. 4. that which is decided; a resolution. 5. the quality of being decided; firmness, as of character.[31] Macquarie Dictionary (6th ed, 2013) page 388 (original emphasis). The term 'order' is not defined in the SAT Act. The ordinary apposite meaning of the noun 'order' is 'an authoritative direction, injunction, command or mandate' and 'a direction given by a court, judge, or minister of the crown'.[32][32] Macquarie Dictionary (6th ed, 2013) page 1035. Although 'order' 1 is expressed to be an 'order' of the Tribunal, it is, in substance and effect, not an order at all, because it was unnecessary to effect the withdrawal of the application and, indeed, is of no legal effect or consequence. 'Order' 1 is not an authoritative direction, injunction, command or mandate by the Tribunal. It is simply otiose. As Ms PE Cahill SC, who appeared on behalf of Ms Engwirda, submits, s 81(5) of the pre-amendment ST Act was 'not prescriptive about the form of withdrawal'[33] and '[t]he withdrawal of an application pursuant to s 81(5) is a unilateral action of the applicant and does not require the imprimatur of the Tribunal in order to take effect'.[34] Furthermore, as Ms Cahill submits, '[w]hether or not it was necessary or, indeed, correct for [Senior] Member Aitken to make the order he did[,] the withdrawal of the application took effect in any event'.[35] In particular, Ms Engwirda effectively withdrew the application by which she had commenced the SAT proceedings when she emailed the Tribunal (copied to the respondent and its legal representative) at 1.43 pm on 4 December 2019. As the Tribunal had not made an order under Div 3 of Pt VI of the pre-amendment ST Act before that time, the application by which Ms Engwirda had commenced the SAT proceedings was withdrawn by the applicant, under s 81(5) of the pre-amendment ST Act, at the instant that the withdrawal was emailed to and received by the Tribunal at 1.43 pm on 4 December 2019. Thus, the application was withdrawn and the SAT proceedings were at an end at 1.43 pm on the day prior to the making of 'order' 1 and 'order' 1 was therefore unnecessary and, indeed, of no legal effect or consequence. [33] Applicant's outline of submissions as to preliminary questions dated 8 June 2020 [5].[34] Applicant's outline of submissions as to preliminary questions dated 8 June 2020 [6].[35] Applicant's outline of submissions as to preliminary questions dated 8 June 2020 [9]. Although 'order' 1 is expressed to be a '[d]ecision' of the Tribunal, it is not, in substance and effect, a decision, because, for the reasons given above, it is not, in substance and effect, an 'order' of the Tribunal, and is not a 'decision' within the ordinary meaning of that word. In particular, when 'order' 1 was made, there was no question or doubt to be decided or determined, no judgment to be pronounced, and nothing to be decided or resolved by the Tribunal, in relation to or to effect the withdrawal of the application.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The State Administrative Tribunal (SAT) was called upon to determine the scope of its powers in setting aside an order that records the withdrawal of an application. The issue of whether the SAT has the power to set aside such an order when it is made without prior notice to the respondent or seeking submissions from the respondent was central to the case. The court explored the definition of the term 'decision' under s 3(1) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) and its ordinary meaning. The court concluded that the term 'decision' bears its ordinary meaning in addition to the definition provided in the statute. The ordinary meaning of 'decision' includes the act of deciding, a judgement, a resolution, or a making up of one's mind. The court held that an order that records the withdrawal of an application does not fit within the ordinary meaning of 'decision' because it does not involve any act of deciding or determining by the Tribunal.

The court also addressed the question of whether an order that records the withdrawal of an application is a 'decision' that is amenable to review and revocation under s 84(2) of the SAT Act. The court found that such an order is not a decision that is amenable to review and revocation. This conclusion was based on the court's finding that the order was not, in substance and effect, a decision of the Tribunal. The court further held that the order was not an authoritative direction, injunction, command, or mandate by the Tribunal, and, as such, it was unnecessary and of no legal effect or consequence.

The court examined whether an order that records the withdrawal of an application can be recalled and remade where there is a breach of the rules of natural justice under the implied power in s 32(1) of the SAT Act. The court held that such an order cannot be recalled and remade because it is not, in substance and effect, a decision of the Tribunal. The court reasoned that the implied power under s 32(1) of the SAT Act is intended to ensure that the Tribunal acts in accordance with the rules of natural justice. However, since the order was not, in substance and effect, a decision of the Tribunal, there was no breach of the rules of natural justice to warrant the recall and remake of the order.

The court considered whether the SAT denied procedural fairness to the respondent by making the order that records the withdrawal of the application without giving prior notice or seeking submissions from the respondent. The court found that there was no denial of procedural fairness because the withdrawal of the application was a unilateral action of the applicant, and it did not require the imprimatur of the Tribunal in order to take effect. The court held that the withdrawal of the application took effect at the moment the applicant emailed the Tribunal, and the making of the order by the Tribunal was, in substance and effect, unnecessary and of no legal effect or consequence.

The court also addressed the issue of whether the SAT has the power to dismiss or strike out proceedings after the application has been withdrawn. The court held that the SAT does not have the power to dismiss or strike out proceedings after the application has been withdrawn because the proceedings are at an end once the application is withdrawn. The court reasoned that once the application is withdrawn, there are no proceedings left for the SAT to dismiss or strike out.

Finally, the court considered whether the term 'decision' in s 3(1) of the SAT Act includes an order that records the withdrawal of an application. The court held that the term 'decision' does not include such an order because it does not fit within the ordinary meaning of 'decision'. Similarly, the court held that the term 'order' in the context of the SAT Act does not include an order that records the withdrawal of an application because such an order is not, in substance and effect, an order of the Tribunal.

In summary, the court held that the SAT does not have the power to set aside an order that records the withdrawal of an application when it is made without prior notice to the respondent or seeking submissions from the respondent. The court also held that such an order is not a 'decision' that is amenable to review and revocation under s 84(2) of the SAT Act or a decision that can be recalled and remade where there is a breach of the rules of natural justice under the implied power in s 32(1) of the SAT Act. The court further held that the SAT does not have the power to dismiss or strike out proceedings after the application has been withdrawn, and that the terms 'decision' and 'order' in the SAT Act do not include an order that records the withdrawal of an application. The ratio decidendi of the case is that an order that records the withdrawal of an application is not, in substance and effect, a decision or an order of the SAT and, as such, it is not amenable to review, revocation, recall, or remake under the provisions of the SAT Act.