FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Endormer Pty Ltd v Australian Guarantee Corporation Ltd
[2000] FCA 1669Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)
Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW)
Real Property Act 1900 (NSW)Kent v La Communauté des Soeurs de Charite de la Providence [1903] AC 220 applied
Independent Automatic Sales Ltd v Knowles & Foster [1962] 1 WLR 974 cited
Horn v York Paper Co Ltd (No. 2) (1991) 23 NSWLR 622 cited
Bibra Lake Holdings Pty Ltd (in liq) v Firmadoor Australia Pty Ltd (1992) 7 WAR 1 cited
Jeogla Pty Ltd v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1999) NSWSC 563 cited
Murphy v Overton Investments Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 801 followed
Blacker v National Australia Bank Ltd [2000] FCA 681 followed
Westpac Banking Corporation v Paterson (1999) 95 FCR 59 at 63 followed
Armor Coatings (Marketing) Pty Ltd v General Credits (Finance) Pty Ltd (1978) 17 SASR 259 distinguished
Pigot’s Case (1614) 11 Co Rep 26b; 77 ER 1177 distinguished
Farrow Mortgage Services Pty Ltd (in liq) v Slade & Nelson (1996) 38 NSWLR 636 cited
Ryde Joinery Pty Ltd v Zisti (1997) NSW Conv R 55-812 cited
Mitchelson v Mitchelson (1979) 24 ALR 522 cited
Morton v Black (1986) 4 BPR 9164 citedFisher and Lightwood, Law of Mortgage (Aust Ed) 1995 par 18.10
ENDORMER PTY LIMITED (In Liquidation), KWIKDAY PTY LIMITED, GLENN ROBERT JARRETT, DAVID COLIN PATERSON, JARRETT HOLDINGS PTY LIMITED and ALINBOW PTY LIMITED v AUSTRALIAN GUARANTEE CORPORATION LIMITED and PETER JAMES HEDGE
NG 3244 of 1995GYLES J
SYDNEY
21 NOVEMBER 2000
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NG 3244 OF 1995
BETWEEN:
ENDORMER PTY LIMITED (In Liquidation)
FIRST APPLICANTKWIKDAY PTY LIMITED
SECOND APPLICANTGLENN ROBERT JARRETT
THIRD APPLICANTDAVID COLIN PATERSON
FOURTH APPLICANTJARRETT HOLDINGS PTY LIMITED
FIFTH APPLICANTALINBOW PTY LIMITED
SIXTH APPLICANTAND:
AUSTRALIAN GUARANTEE CORPORATION LIMITED
FIRST RESPONDENTPETER JAMES HEDGE
SECOND RESPONDENTAND:
AUSTRALIAN GUARANTEE CORPORATION LIMITED
CROSS CLAIMANTAND:
KWIKDAY PTY LIMITED
FIRST CROSS DEFENDANTGLENN ROBERT JARRETT
SECOND CROSS DEFENDANTDAVID COLIN PATERSON
THIRD CROSS DEFENDANTJONNIE MACLEAN STIRLING PATERSON
FOURTH CROSS DEFENDANTDEBORAH ALLISON JARRET
FIFTH CROSS DEFENDANTTRACEY CORALIE PATERSON
SIXTH CROSS DEFENDANTJUDGE:
GYLES J
DATE:
21 NOVEMBER 2000
PLACE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The proceedings stand over to enable the respondents to bring in short minutes of order.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NG 3244 OF 1995
BETWEEN:
ENDORMER PTY LIMITED (In Liquidation)
FIRST APPLICANTKWIKDAY PTY LIMITED
SECOND APPLICANTGLENN ROBERT JARRETT
THIRD APPLICANTDAVID COLIN PATERSON
FOURTH APPLICANTJARRETT HOLDINGS PTY LIMITED
FIFTH APPLICANTALINBOW PTY LIMITED
SIXTH APPLICANTAND:
AUSTRALIAN GUARANTEE CORPORATION LIMITED
FIRST RESPONDENTPETER JAMES HEDGE
SECOND RESPONDENTAND:
AUSTRALIAN GUARANTEE CORPORATION LIMITED
CROSS CLAIMANTAND:
KWIKDAY PTY LIMITED
FIRST CROSS DEFENDANTGLENN ROBERT JARRETT
SECOND CROSS DEFENDANTDAVID COLIN PATERSON
THIRD CROSS DEFENDANTJONNIE MACLEAN STIRLING…
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- Case
- [2000] FCA 1669
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court first addressed the claim that AGC had breached the Corporations Law by improperly registering the deed of charge. The court found that Endormer had an arguable case that AGC had attempted to preserve its priority by lodging the deed for registration after the event. However, the court dismissed the claim, noting that the deed would have been void against a liquidator unless the registration requirements were met. Since the claim was brought by Endormer, and not by a liquidator, the court found the claim to be misconceived. The court also rejected the claims of negligence against AGC, as no liability had been established.
Further, the court examined the claims against the Receiver, appointed by AGC, focusing on the validity of the appointment, the manner in which the sale of assets was conducted, and the profit made by the purchaser on resale. The court found that the claims against the Receiver were dependent on the invalidity of the charge, which had already been rejected. The court did not find merit in the claims regarding the speed of the sale, the association between the purchaser and AGC officers, or the profit made by the purchaser.
The court concluded that there was no liability on the part of AGC, either under the Trade Practices Act, for negligence, or under the Corporations Law. As such, the court dismissed all claims against AGC and ordered the proceedings to stand over to allow the respondents to bring in short minutes of order.
Orders
Orders of the court
The proceedings stand over to enable the respondents to bring in short minutes of order.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: GYLES J
I therefore reject the claim against AGC based upon the TP Act and negligence.REGISTRATION OF DEED OF CHARGE (paras 37-47 of third amended statement of claim) It is alleged that the deed of charge, pursuant to which the Receiver was appointed, was actually created in July 1993 but was dated 18 March 1994 on behalf of AGC, and lodged for registration with the Australian Securities Commission (“ASC”) on or about 31 March 1994, in order to appear to comply with s 263 of the Corporations Law (which required notice within 45 days of creation of the charge). It is said that by these means the priority of AGC as chargee against an administrator or liquidator of Endormer was preserved in circumstances where it was known to AGC at the time of the dating of the deed that an administrator or liquidator would probably be appointed in the near future. The applicants have an arguable case so far. The argument then proceeds to allege invalidity of the deed, the appointment of the Receiver and all that was done to enforce the charge. It is submitted on behalf of AGC that the argument irretrievably breaks down at that point. This is correct. The effect of s 266 is that the charge would have been void as against the liquidator of Endormer unless s 263 had been complied with. This, however, is not an action by the liquidator of Endormer. The distinction between an action by a liquidator and an action by a company in liquidation has been clear since at least Kent v La Communauté des Soeurs de Charite de la Providence [1903] AC 220. See also Independent Automatic Sales Ltd v Knowles & Foster [1962] 1 WLR 974; Horn v York Paper Co Ltd (No. 2) (1991) 23 NSWLR 622 and Bibra Lake Holdings Pty Ltd (in liq) v Firmadoor Australia Pty Ltd (1992) 7 WAR 1. These claims are misconceived and will be dismissed.DAMAGES As I have found no liability, I do not need to consider damages. In case that issue needs to be considered on appeal, I should say that, having considered the evidence of Mr Li (and the Hilliard report) on the one hand, and the evidence of Mr Bryant on the other, I accept the evidence of Mr Bryant and agree with his criticisms of the methodology of the Hilliard report and with his comments on the reliability of the data upon which it was based.CLAIMS AGAINST THE RECEIVER (paras 49-54 of third amended statement of claim)Invalidity of appointment The first set of claims depend upon the invalidity of the charge, and the consequent invalidity of his appointment thereunder. They fall with the rejection of the allegation of invalidity of the charge.Sale of assets The second claim is that the Receiver failed to take all reasonable care to sell the property of Endormer for its market value, or, alternatively, the best price that was reasonably obtainable when the said property was sold. Out of the various criticisms of the Receiver on behalf of the applicants, in my opinion, only three require closer examination. The first is the speed with which the sale took place, the second is the previous association between the purchaser of the principal assets and officers of AGC, taken with indications of favourable assessment of that bid as compared with others, and the third is the substantial profit made by the purchaser on resale less than 19 months later.