FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Enano v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 426
MIGRATION – special need relative – reference to events after the date of application – whether assistance reasonably available from the nominator’s perspective
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg 1.03
Judiciary Act 1908 (Cth), s 39BXiang v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 64, referred to
Biyiksiz v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 814, discussed
Truong vMinister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1035, referred to
Zahid v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 670, referred to
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259, referred to
Koulaxazov v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 75, referred to
VWST v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 286, referred toMERLINA ENANO v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS AND MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
VID 1172 OF 2004
KENNY J
21 APRIL 2006
MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VID 1172 OF 2004
BETWEEN:
MERLINA ENANO
APPELLANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
FIRST RESPONDENTMIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
SECOND RESPONDENTJUDGE:
KENNY J
DATE OF ORDER:
21 APRIL 2006
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Migration Review Tribunal be joined as a respondent to the appeal.
2.The appeal be dismissed.
3.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VID 1172 OF 2004
BETWEEN:
MERLINA ENANO
APPELLANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
FIRST RESPONDENTMIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
SECOND RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
KENNY J
DATE:
21 APRIL 2006
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The appellant, a citizen of The Philippines, entered Australia on 31 January 1998 on a Short-Stay (Visitor) (Class TR) visa valid until 31 April 1998. On 17 April 1998 the appellant applied for a Family (Residence) (Class AO), subclass 806, on the basis that she was a “special need relative” of her father, the nominator.
“Special need relative” was then defined in reg 1.03 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the “Regulations”). The criteria for the grant of the visa included a requirement that appellant satisfy the definition of ‘special need relative’ both at the time of the application and at the time of the decision: cll 806.213 and 806.221 of Sch 2 to the Regulations.
The definition of ‘special need relative’ at the relevant time was as follows:
“… ‘special need relative’ in relation to an Australian citizen usually resident in Australia … means a relative who is willing and able to provide substantial and continuing assistance to the citizen or resident if:
(a) the citizen … has a permanent or long-term need for assistance because of death, disability, prolonged illness…
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- Case
- [2006] FCA 426
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues the court had to address included whether the MRT properly applied the relevant criteria in assessing the availability and obtainability of assistance for the nominator. The appellant argued that the MRT failed to consider the subjective element of the regulation and only focused on the availability of assistance rather than its obtainability from the nominator's perspective. The court was required to determine if this was an error and whether it affected the outcome of the visa application.
The court found that the MRT's decision was consistent with previous jurisprudence and correctly considered the availability and obtainability of assistance. Unlike in the case of Biyiksiz, where the nominator faced language barriers, the nominator in this case was living with other family members and had access to transportation and other support. The court concluded that the MRT was plainly open to finding that the requisite assistance could reasonably be obtained from other family members or public services. Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal and found that the MRT's decision was correct.
ORDERS:
1. The Migration Review Tribunal be joined as a respondent to the appeal.
2. The appeal be dismissed.
3. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The Migration Review Tribunal be joined as a respondent to the appeal.
2. The appeal be dismissed.
3. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the court as an appeal against the decision of the MRT. The appellant filed an appeal against the MRT's decision to refuse her visa application. The appellant's grounds of appeal include that the MRT failed to consider the subjective element of the regulation and that the MRT's decision was plainly wrong. The Migration Review Tribunal has been joined as a respondent to the appeal.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Did the MRT fail to have regard to the subjective element of the regulation when considering the availability and obtainability of assistance for the nominator?
2. Was the MRT's conclusion plainly open to it on the factual findings that it had made?
Held
1. The court held that the Migration Review Tribunal (MRT) did not fail to have regard to the subjective element of the regulation when considering the availability and obtainability of assistance for the nominator. The court found that the MRT's decision was consistent with the reasoning in Biyiksiz and Xiang.
2. The court concluded that the MRT's conclusion was plainly open to it on the factual findings that it had made. The court found that it was open to the MRT to not be satisfied that the requisite assistance could not reasonably be obtained from one or more of the nominator's other children in Australia or public services.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: KENNY J
With respect to the second ground of appeal, the first respondent submitted that there is no indication that the MRT did not consider the “reasonable obtainability” of assistance by the nominator as opposed to the “reasonable availability” of such assistance. Further, the MRT’s conclusion was plainly open to it on the factual findings that it had made.Consideration In order to succeed on this appeal, the appellant must succeed on both the grounds that she advanced. This is because the appellant must satisfy each requirement of the visa to be eligible: see, e.g, Zahid v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 670 at [29] per Sackville J. First, I reject the appellant’s submission that the MRT failed to have regard to the subjective element of the regulation. In particular, fairly read, the MRT’s decision is consistent with the reasoning of Gray J in Biyiksiz and the Full Court’s decision in Xiang. In Biyiksiz, the nominator was an elderly woman of a Kurdish Alevi background. She spoke no English, speaking Kurdish and a rare dialect of Turkish. The visa applicant had raised the concern that, if her mother was placed in a nursing home, her mother would be unable to communicate with the staff or other residents. The MRT had found that, regardless of these potential difficulties, places were available in nursing home facilities: see Biyiksiz at [14]. Gray J found (at [22]) that the MRT fell into error because it “considered the question whether assistance could reasonably be obtained from welfare, hospital, nursing or community services from the point of view of the availability of assistance from those services, and did not consider whether the assistance was reasonably obtainable by the applicant’s mother from those services”. His Honour noted (at [17]) that, in Australia health and welfare services are highly developed. As a result, if the mere availability of assistance from those services meant that assistance was reasonably obtainable, then “there would be very few, if any, [special need] visas granted”. Accordingly, Gray J held that the MRT should consider not simply whether other sources of assistance were available, but whether it was reasonable for the nominator to obtain such assistance. The facts of this case can be distinguished from those in Biyiksiz and there is nothing in Xiang that would suggest error here. In this case, the MRT focussed on the availability of assistance from other family members. Importantly, the MRT noted that, at the time of application, the nominator was living with one of her other children and other children lived nearby. The appellant did not hold a driver’s licence and thus another child transported the nominator by car. Also, one of the nominator’s other daughters had recently sponsored him for an aged parent visa. In these circumstances, it was plainly open to the MRT not to be satisfied that the requisite assistance could not reasonably be obtained from one or more of his other children in Australia or public services.