EMILY LOUISE SLAWSON v DAMIEN KINNANE
[2013] ACTSC 3 (14 January 2013)
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – jurisdiction, practice and procedure – appeal from Magistrates Court – appeal against conviction – where appellant entered plea of guilty –
R v Forde [1923] 2 KB 400 – no deliberate withholding of issue for appeal.
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – appeal against conviction – offences of driving while licence suspended – Aziz v Saliba [2013] ACTSC 2 – section 32(2) not applicable to breach of immediate suspension notice – appeal upheld.
TRAFFIC LAW – offences – where alternative offences available for driving contrary to an immediate suspension notice – implied repeal of general provision.
Legislation Act 2001 (ACT), s 191
Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT), pt 3.10, s 208(1)(b)
Road Transport (Alcohol and Drugs) Act 1977 (ACT), s 35
Road Transport (Alcohol and Drugs) Legislation Amendment Act 2010 (ACT)
Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1999 (ACT), s 32
Road Transport (General) Act 1999 (ACT), ss 61B, 61C, 64, 69
Aziz v Saliba [2013] ACTSC 2
Gee v Hulbert [2002] ACTSC 118
Liberti v The Queen (1991) 55 A Crim R 120
Meiklejohn v Central Norseman Gold Corporation Ltd (1998) 19 WAR 298
Mitchell v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 95
R v Coffey (2003) 6 VR 543
R v Ditroia [1981] VR 247
R v Forde [1923] 2 KB 400
Theodorelos v Nexus Projects Pty Ltd [2009] ACTSC 149
Travini v Starczewski (2009) 169 ACTR 1
ON APPEAL FROM THE MAGISTRATES COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
No. SCA 50 of 2012
Judge: Refshauge J
Supreme Court of the ACT
Date: 14 January 2013
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE )
) No. SCA 50 of 2012
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY )
ON APPEAL FROM THE MAGISTRATES COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
EMILY LOUISE SLAWSON
Appellant
v
DAMIEN KINNANE
Respondent
ORDER
Judge: Refshauge J
Date: 14 January 2013
Place: Canberra
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The appeal is upheld.
The conviction and sentence imposed on Emily Louise Slawson on 27 June 2012 are set aside.
A verdict of acquittal is entered on the charge of, as a first offender, driving on 18 April 2012 while her licence was suspended by law.
These proceedings involve an important point of statutory interpretation in the context of the regulation of driving on Territory roads.
THE FACTS
On 21 January 2012, Ms Emily Louise Slawson was issued with a notice under s 61B of the Road Transport (General) Act 1999 (ACT) (the General Act); the notice is commonly referred to as an “immediate suspension notice”. The notice, inter alia, prohibits the recipient from driving a motor vehicle during the currency of the notice. In this case, the notice remained current until 20 April 2012.
On 18 April 2012, Ms Slawson was driving along Morshead Drive, Duntroon, when she was stopped by police. She was unable to produce a driver licence as, when the immediate suspension notice was issued, she was required to, and did, surrender her licence…
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- Case
- [2013] ACTSC 3
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that there was no deliberate withholding of an issue for appeal as Ms Slawson had pleaded guilty in the Magistrates Court and the outcome had to be adverse. The court also found that there was no double punishment as the different lengths of disqualification or suspension did not amount to punishment twice for the same acts. However, the court concluded that the particular section of the Driver Licensing Act did not apply to breaches of an immediate suspension notice, as previously held in Aziz v Saliba [2013] ACTSC 2. As a result, the conviction should be set aside and a verdict of acquittal entered instead.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory upheld the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence imposed on Ms Slawson, and entered a verdict of acquittal on the charge of driving while her licence was suspended by law. The decision highlights the importance of statutory interpretation in the context of the regulation of driving on Territory roads and the need to ensure that the appropriate legislation is applied in each case.
Background
Background to the litigation
Subsequently, Slawson appealed against her conviction and sentence on the grounds that she had been exposed to a penalty greater than that specifically enacted by the legislature, effectively facing double punishment. She also argued that the Director of Public Prosecutions had acted unlawfully by bringing a charge that was incompatible with her human rights and that the sentence was manifestly excessive. Slawson contended that the prosecution under section 32 of the Driver Licensing Act should not have been pursued as it resulted in her facing additional disqualification periods that were not intended by the legislature. The appeal was heard in the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory.
The matter of Emily Louise Slawson v Damien Kinnane came before the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory as an appeal from the Magistrates Court. Ms Slawson had pleaded guilty to an offence under the Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1999 (ACT) and was convicted and fined in the Magistrates Court. Dissatisfied with the conviction and sentence, Ms Slawson filed an appeal on 3 July 2012, arguing that there had been a miscarriage of justice, and that the Director of Public Prosecutions had acted unlawfully by bringing a charge that was incompatible with her Human Rights. The appeal was heard on 17 September 2012, and on 14 January 2013, Justice Refshauge delivered the judgment, allowing the appeal, setting aside the conviction and sentence, and entering a verdict of acquittal. The appeal raised important questions of statutory interpretation regarding the regulation of driving on Territory roads, specifically in relation to immediate suspension notices and the prohibition on double punishment.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does the appeal against conviction following a plea of guilty lie within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the ACT?
2. Was there a miscarriage of justice in the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant?
3. Does the prosecution of the appellant under s 32 of the Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1999 (ACT) expose her to double punishment in violation of s 191 of the Legislation Act 2001 (ACT)?
4. Does the prosecution of the appellant under s 32 of the Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1999 (ACT) amount to an abuse of process?
5. Does the imposition of the sentence on the appellant constitute a manifestly excessive punishment?
6. Does s 61C of the Road Transport (General) Act 1999 (ACT) imply a repeal of s 32(2) of the Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1999 (ACT) when it comes to prosecutions for driving contrary to an immediate suspension notice?
7. If s 32(2) is not applicable, is the conviction under that section valid, or should a verdict of acquittal be entered instead?
Held
1. Does the appeal against conviction following a plea of guilty lie within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the ACT?
The court concluded that the appeal does lie within its jurisdiction, as the appeal was not deliberately withheld and there was a potential miscarriage of justice.
2. Was there a miscarriage of justice in the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant?
The court concluded that there was indeed a miscarriage of justice, leading to the appeal being allowed and the conviction being set aside.
3. Does the prosecution of the appellant under s 32 of the Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1999 (ACT) expose her to double punishment in violation of s 191 of the Legislation Act 2001 (ACT)?
The court concluded that there was no double punishment, only a longer punishment, as the disqualifications were not for the same acts.
4. Does the prosecution of the appellant under s 32 of the Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1999 (ACT) amount to an abuse of process?
The court did not directly answer this question but focused on the issue of implied repeal instead.
5. Does the imposition of the sentence on the appellant constitute a manifestly excessive punishment?
The court did not directly answer this question but found a miscarriage of justice based on the issue of implied repeal.
6. Does s 61C of the Road Transport (General) Act 1999 (ACT) imply a repeal of s 32(2) of the Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1999 (ACT) when it comes to prosecutions for driving contrary to an immediate suspension notice?
The court concluded that s 61C does imply a repeal of s 32(2) in this context, and therefore, the conviction under s 32(2) is not valid.
7. If s 32(2) is not applicable, is the conviction under that section valid, or should a verdict of acquittal be entered instead?
The court concluded that the conviction under s 32(2) is not valid and a verdict of acquittal should be entered instead.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) held that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal against the conviction and sentence imposed on Ms Emily Louise Slawson following her plea of guilty in the Magistrates Court. The court found that the appeal did not lie within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court unless it appeared that the appellant did not appreciate the nature of the charge or did not intend to admit she was guilty of it, or that upon the admitted facts she could not in law have been convicted of the offence charged. The court also found that the appeal did not involve a deliberate withholding of an issue for appeal, as Ms Slawson had pleaded guilty and the outcome had been inevitable. The court considered the matter on the basis that there might have been a miscarriage of justice.
The court held that there was no miscarriage of justice in the conviction and sentence imposed on Ms Slawson. The court found that the prosecution of Ms Slawson under s 32 of the Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1999 (ACT) did not expose her to double punishment in violation of s 191 of the Legislation Act 2001 (ACT). The court found that the prosecution of Ms Slawson under s 32 of the Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1999 (ACT) did not amount to an abuse of process. The court found that the imposition of the sentence on Ms Slawson did not constitute a manifestly excessive punishment.
The court held that s 61C of the Road Transport (General) Act 1999 (ACT) impliedly repealed s 32(2) of the Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1999 (ACT) when it came to prosecutions for driving contrary to an immediate suspension notice. The court found that if s 32(2) was not applicable, the conviction under that section was not valid, and a verdict of acquittal should be entered instead. The court noted that the enactment of s 61C had created a specific offence for driving contrary to an immediate suspension notice, and it was contrary to the legislature's intention to prosecute such conduct under s 32(2) of the Driver Licensing Act.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the prosecution of a person for driving contrary to an immediate suspension notice under s 32(2) of the Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1999 (ACT) is not valid if s 61C of the Road Transport (General) Act 1999 (ACT) applies to the conduct. The court distinguished the decision in Aziz v Saliba [2013] ACTSC 2, in which it had held that s 32(2) of the Driver Licensing Act did not apply to the driving of a motor vehicle in breach of a suspension of a person's right to drive contrary to an immediate suspension notice. The court did not depart from prior authority but applied the principles of statutory interpretation to the facts of the case.