EMI17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

EMI17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1080

Appeal from: EMI17 v Minister for Immigration [2018] FCCA 3975
File number(s): VID 1658 of 2018
Judge(s): O'BRYAN J
Date of judgment: 12 July 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing application for judicial review of decision of Immigration Assessment Authority affirming decision of Minister’s delegate refusing grant of protection visa – whether Immigration Assessment Authority was required to seek additional information under section 473DC Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where ground of appeal is incoherent and no appearance by appellant – where appellant given opportunity to file submissions after hearing – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Pt 7AA, Div 3, ss 473DA, 473DB, 473DC

Cases cited:

AYE16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 108

DYK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 222

Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 353 ALR 600

SZNXA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 775

WZAVW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 760

Date of hearing: 9 May 2019
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 40
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant did not appear
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T B Goodwin
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

VID 1658 of 2018
BETWEEN:

EMI17

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

O'BRYAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

12 JULY 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

O’BRYAN J:

Introduction

  1. By notice of appeal filed on 28 December 2018, the appellant appeals from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 11 December 2018 in EMI17 v Minister for Immigration [2018] FCCA 3975. The appeal is brought under s 24 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).

  2. In the decision below, the Federal Circuit Court dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the second respondent (Authority) made on 13 September 2017 under Part 7AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) affirming a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) under s 65 of the Act refusing to grant the appellant a protection visa.

  3. For the reasons that follow, I dismiss the appeal.

    Incoherent ground of appeal and no appearance from the appellant

  4. The notice of appeal states a single ground of appeal: that there was jurisdictional error “due to no following or facts presented”.  It is unclear…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1080
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of EMI17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved the appellant, a Sri Lankan citizen born on 25 July 1973, who applied for a protection visa due to his fear of harm from Mr C and his supporters for supporting Mr B in provincial council elections. The appellant alleged that he was targeted for his political activities, which led him to flee to Australia. The Minister’s delegate found that the appellant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution and refused his application for a protection visa. This decision was upheld by the Immigration Assessment Authority and subsequently by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The appellant then appealed to the High Court, challenging the decisions made by the Authority and the Federal Circuit Court.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Immigration Assessment Authority was required to seek additional information under section 473DC of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) before affirming the delegate's decision. The court also had to consider the appellant's grounds of appeal, which were found to be incoherent and un-particularised, and whether the appellant had failed to properly prosecute his appeal. The court reviewed the decisions of the Authority and the Federal Circuit Court, as well as the appellant's submissions and the Minister's responses. The court found that the appellant's claims were inconsistent and lacked credibility, and that there was no basis for the appeal. The court held that the Authority's decision was correctly made and that there was no error in law or fact.

The court dismissed the appeal, noting that the appellant's grounds of appeal were incoherent and did not provide any basis for overturning the previous decisions. The court found that the appellant's claims were inconsistent and lacked credibility, and that the Authority had properly considered the evidence before it. The court also noted that the appellant had not properly prosecuted his appeal, as he failed to provide coherent submissions and did not appear at the hearing. The court ordered that the appeal be dismissed and that the appellant pay the Minister's costs of the appeal. This decision upheld the previous findings that the appellant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution and that he was not eligible for a protection visa.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant’s email of 17 May 2019 did not shed any further light on the basis of the appellant’s appeal or the nature of the error alleged. The email merely recites the appellant’s claim for protection which was put to the Department. As such, the position remains that the appellant’s notice of appeal contains an un-particularised and incoherent allegation of error. The appeal can be dismissed on that basis alone: SZNXA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 775 at [21]; WZAVW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 760 at [35]; AYE16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 108 at [37]. Nevertheless, I have reviewed the decisions of the Authority and the Federal Circuit Court. I have had regard to the appellant’s notice of appeal, such as it is, and the appellant’s email of 17 May 2019 and I have considered the Minister’s submissions. I consider that there is no basis to the appeal. My reasons follow. Background The appellant was born on 25 July 1973 and is a citizen of Sri Lanka. On 17 March 2016, the appellant was invited to apply and applied for a protection visa. The appellant stated in his visa application that he feared harm from a Mr C and his supporters for supporting a Mr B, both being members of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), in provincial council elections. The appellant detailed his claims in a written statement as follows:(a)The appellant ran a tailor shop in Anuradhapura and had operated the shop for five years prior to leaving Sri Lanka.(b)During the provincial elections, the appellant had supported Mr B and encouraged his customers to do the same. Mr C's supporters were angry and threatened to kill the appellant.(c)A week after the election, 15 of Mr C's supporters came to the appellant's house and threatened to kill him. A month later, he was stopped again at gunpoint by Mr C's supporters. Further, on nearly a daily basis, Mr C's supporters threw stones at the appellant's house.(d)After this, the appellant and his family moved away for ten months and stayed at a friend's house. While the appellant complained to police, they did nothing. Finally, when Mr C's supporters found out where the appellant was, he went into hiding in Colombo and Wellawaya (the latter being where his parents lived) for one and a half years. In the meantime, the appellant's house was burnt down.(e)When the appellant tried to leave to go to Cyprus in 2012, he was recognised by Mr C's supporters as Mr C operated the airport car park, so he couldn't leave. Eventually, the appellant left for Australia. The Minister’s delegate conducted an interview on 8 December 2016. On 25 January 2017, the delegate found that the appellant was only a low level supporter of Mr B and there was no evidence that supported the appellant's assertion that any attacks on him were politically motivated. While the delegate accepted that the appellant might have been subject to general threats and violence at the time of elections, it did not accept that this would continue in the future six years later, particularly as Mr B had passed away. On this basis, the delegate found that the appellant would not face a real chance of serious harm in the reasonably foreseeable future.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Accordingly, the delegate found that the appellant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution based on his political views, as an illegal departee or a failed asylum seeker. The delegate relied substantially on her assessment of the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a) of the Act in finding that the appellant did not meet the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act.Authority decision The delegate's decision was referred to the Authority on 30 January 2017 for review under Part 7AA of the Act. On 22 July 2017, the appellant’s representatives provided the Authority with the statement of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism dated 14 July 2017 following his official visit to Sri Lanka. On 13 September 2017, the Authority affirmed the delegate's decision not to grant the appellant a protection visa. As a preliminary matter, the Authority determined not to have regard to the information provided by the appellant's representatives pursuant to s 473DD of the Act (Authority reasons at [3] to [4]). While the information was new information for the purposes of the Act, the Authority found that there was no explanation as to why the information constituted credible, personal information about the appellant or if there were any exceptional circumstances that justified its consideration. The Authority went on to set out the background to the appellant's claims (Authority reasons at [5]). The Authority made a number of credibility findings adverse to the appellant based on problems with and inconsistencies in his evidence.(a)While the Authority accepted that the appellant was a member and supporter of the SLFP, his evidence about why and what he did did not appear to be based on his own personal experience and his evidence was inconsistent about when threats commenced against him. Further, although he stated Mr B had lost an election in 2008, in fact he had won and been re-elected as Chief Minister of the relevant province (Authority reasons at [13] to [16]).(b)The appellant was unable to indicate why he, out of all of Mr B’s supporters, was targeted other than pointing to the allegation that two of his friends who supported Mr B had been murdered by Mr C's supporters (Authority reasons at [17]).(c)There were a number of inconsistencies regarding what the appellant stated about the death threats he allegedly received between his written statement and the record of his interview with the delegate (Authority reasons at [18] to [19]).(d)There were inconsistencies in the appellant's evidence about whether he moved away and went into hiding, where he went and for how long, and whether he shut down his tailoring business or not (Authority reasons at [20] to [22]). The Authority also did not accept that the appellant's house was burnt down by Mr C's supporters. Based on these findings, the Authority found that the appellant had fabricated the death threats he claimed to have received in 2008, 2010 and 2012 (Authority reasons at [23]). In relation to the appellant's two friends, the Authority considered it implausible that the appellant would not have more information about the circumstances of their deaths and found that there was no link between their deaths and Mr C on this basis (Authority reasons at [24] to [25]). Further, the Authority found the appellant's evidence about Mr C operating the car park at Colombo airport was “far-fetched and lacking credibility” (Authority reasons at [26]).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court commenced by noting that the appellant's email of 17 May 2019 did not clarify the basis of the appeal or the nature of the alleged error. This led to the conclusion that the appeal could be dismissed on the grounds of the incoherent allegation of error. The court referenced several prior cases to support this decision. The court then reviewed the decisions of the Immigration Assessment Authority and the Federal Circuit Court, considering the appellant's notice of appeal, the email of 17 May 2019, and the Minister's submissions. It was determined that there was no basis for the appeal. The court found that the Immigration Assessment Authority was not required to seek additional information under section 473DC of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) as the appellant did not provide a clear or coherent allegation of error. The incoherent nature of the allegation, coupled with the lack of further submissions or appearance at the hearing, led the court to dismiss the appeal. The court also held that the appellant must pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal. The decision underscores the necessity for clear and coherent allegations in appeals and the importance of following through with the hearing process. The court did not find it necessary to delve into the specific credibility findings of the Immigration Assessment Authority or the Federal Circuit Court, as the primary issue was the lack of a coherent basis for the appeal. The ratio decidendi here is that an incoherent allegation of error, combined with the absence of further submissions or appearance at the hearing, can result in the dismissal of an appeal.