Emanate Legal Services Pty Ltd v Hood

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Emanate Legal Services Pty Ltd v Hood & Anor [2021] QCA 94

PARTIES:

EMANATE LEGAL SERVICES PTY LTD
ACN 169 229 752
(appellant)
v
ANTHONY GORDON MICHAEL HOOD
JUNE HEATHER HOOD
(respondents)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 10855 of 2019
SC No 393 of 2018

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Rockhampton – Unreported, 10 September 2019 (Crow J)

DELIVERED ON:

7 May 2021

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

9 September 2020

JUDGES:

Fraser and McMurdo JJA and Brown J

ORDERS:

1.   Appeal dismissed.

2.   No order as to costs.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS – AMENDING, VARYING AND SETTING ASIDE JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS – where reasons for judgment were published containing background material – where the original reasons were revised to remove the background material – where the reasons were revised and the original reasons were removed from the Supreme Court Library Queensland website – where the revised reasons without the background material were not published on the Supreme Court Library Queensland website – where the original reasons were published by an online publication – where the appellant applied for an order that a warning be issued to the public generally or the online publication of risk of contempt – where the primary Judge declined to issue the warning sought – where the appellant contends the primary Judge erred in exercising his Honour’s discretion to not issue the warning – whether the warning would have constituted an interference with open justice – whether the warning had to be given contemporaneously with the ruling restricting publication – whether the primary Judge erred in taking into account as a relevant consideration the fact that the information contained in the articles could have been sourced from affidavit material on the Court file when the material had not been read or tendered– whether the refusal to make the warning was unreasonable and unjust – whether there would be a substantial injustice in not upholding the appeal

Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 (Qld), s 8
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 981

AL Powell Holdings Pty Ltd & Anor v Dick & Anor[2012] QCA 254, cited
Attorney-General v Leveller Magazine Ltd [1979] AC 440, considered
Caltabiano v Electoral Commission of Queensland (No 3) [2009] QSC 186, cited
Ex parte Queensland Law Society Incorporated [1984] 1 Qd R 166, cited
Green & Ors v Pearson[2014] QCA 110, cited
Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506; [2011] HCA 4, cited
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40, cited
J v L & A Services Pty Ltd (No 2) [1995] 2 Qd R 10; [1993] QCA 12, cited
John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd v Police Tribunal of New South Wales (1986) 5 NSWLR 465, cited
Liao v New South Wales [2014] NSWCA 71, cited
R v His…

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Details
Case
[2021] QCA 94
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Emanate Legal Services Pty Ltd v Hood, the appellant sought an order from the court to issue a warning to the public or a specific online publication regarding the risk of contempt. This appeal arose from a decision by the primary judge to decline such an application. The primary judge, in his reasons delivered on 10 September 2019, considered the principles of open justice and declined to exercise his discretion in favour of issuing the warning. The appellant argued that the primary judge erred in several respects, including his interpretation of relevant authorities and the consideration of certain factors.

The legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge's refusal to issue the warning was an error in exercising his discretion, whether the warning would have constituted an interference with open justice, and whether the primary judge erred in considering certain factors in his decision. The court had to consider the inherent power to protect the administration of justice and the balance between the principles of open justice and the need to ensure the due administration of justice. The appellant contended that the primary judge was constrained by authority and that the warning was necessary to prevent conduct that undermined the court's orders.

The court found that the primary judge's decision to decline to issue the warning was a discretionary one and that appellate intervention was only warranted if the primary judge erred in accordance with the principles of House v The King. The court examined the primary judge's reasons and found that while he correctly considered the principles of open justice, he erred in his interpretation of the authority and in considering certain factors. The court held that the primary judge's refusal to issue the warning was unreasonable and unjust, given the clear threat to the administration of justice posed by the continued publication of the restricted material.

ORDERS:
1. Appeal dismissed.
2. No order as to costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal dismissed.

2. No order as to costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellant seeks an order from this Court that a notice be issued in similar terms.The decision to refuse the application for the warning The primary Judge declined to issue the warning sought by Emanate, providing his reasons ex tempore on 10 September 2019. The primary judge carefully considered the cases placed before his Honour. His Honour acknowledged the principle of open justice, which underlies the administration of justice. In concluding that he would not exercise his discretion in favour of issuing the warning, his Honour:(a)considered that, consistent with the principles of open justice, nothing should be done to discourage press or public scrutiny, and that only cases where it is absolutely necessary to facilitate the due administration of justice justify a departure from proceedings being public and available to the press. His Honour recognised, quite correctly, that an order can be made only when it is in the public interest or the interests of justice;(b)considered that there was no suggestion in the seminal authority of Attorney-General v Leveller Magazine Ltd,[12] (Leveller Magazine) that a warning of the nature sought could be made after the orders restricting access or ordering material be confidential;(c)stated by reference to McPherson J in Ex parte Queensland Law Society Incorporated,[13] that it is not a contempt of court to publish a report of such proceedings provided that the report is fair and accurate and further, that even though a publication may be harmful to a person’s reputation, that generally doesn’t justify an order limiting publication;(d)stated that the portions of the Magpie’s Nest reports, the subject of complaint, were accepted as being an accurate report of the Original Reasons with respect to the Omitted Paragraphs from the revised judgement. The primary Judge also stated that if the reports “are based upon affidavit material which is publicly available and remains publicly available” then in his Honour’s view it could not amount to contempt of court to publish reports based on that affidavit material;(e)took the view that there was no interference with the administration of justice by the Magpie’s Nest publication because at the time, the Omitted Paragraphs were in fact published in the Original Reasons prior to the revision and secondly, the evidential basis for the Omitted Paragraphs remain publicly available on the Court file; and(f)considered that public interest and the interests of justice require that proceedings be conducted in open court and a warning to the public generally or the proprietor of the Magpie’s Nest in the form provided was neither necessary nor proper in the interest of the due administration of justice.[12][1979] AC 440.[13][1984] 1 Qd R 166.Appellant’s contentions The appellant contends that the primary Judge erred in five respects in the exercise of his Honour’s discretion:(a)first, a warning would not have constituted an interference with open justice given that access to the Original Reasons had been restricted to the parties and there was utility in giving such a warning when conduct, which was undermining and frustrating the orders of the Court, had occurred and was continuing to occur;(b)secondly, that the primary Judge erred in suggesting that on the basis of Leveller Magazine, the warning had to be given contemporaneously with the ruling restricting publication when there was no principled reason why that had to be the case;(c)thirdly, that the primary Judge erred in taking into account as a relevant consideration the fact that the information contained in the articles could have been sourced from affidavit material on the Court file when that affidavit had not been read or tendered;(d)fourthly, that the primary Judge erred in relying on the fact that the reasons were delivered in open Court when in fact they had not been; and(e)fifthly, that the primary Judge’s refusal to make the warning was unreasonable and unjust.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Consistent with the Court’s inherent power to protect the administration of justice there is power for the Court to order that such a warning be issued in the nature of what was discussed in Leveller Magazine. Given that such a warning will potentially inhibit the publication of proceedings and the better view is that given that the Court cannot make an order restricting publication upon the world at large, it will only be in clear cases where the due administration of justice is threatened by conduct that would undermine a court’s orders, that such a warning will be issued by a court in the interests of justice.Consideration As the decision of the primary Judge to decline to issue a warning is a discretionary one, it must be shown that the primary Judge erred in accordance with the principles of House v The King.[32] In the context of an interlocutory discretionary decision, Barret J neatly summarised the approach of an appeal court in Liao v New South Wales:[33]“The discretionary nature of the decisions means that appellate intervention is warranted only on grounds identified in House v R including that the decision is affected by extraneous or irrelevant matters or the judge mistakes the facts, acts on a wrong principle or does not take into account a material consideration or the decision is unreasonable or plainly unjust. The fact that matters of practice and procedure only are involved means that the appellate court should exercise the ‘added restraint’ that that circumstance attracts (Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc) and ‘be extremely reluctant to interfere’ (In the Will of FB Gilbert (dec)).” (citations omitted)[32](1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505.[33][2014] NSWCA 71 at [155], referred to by Jackson J in Green & Ors v Pearson [2014] QCA 110 at [4]. As set out above, there were essentially three errors identified by the appellant, which were focussed on at the hearing. The appellant contends that the primary Judge was in error insofar as his Honour felt constrained by authority which his Honour construed as providing that such a warning, as was sought by the appellant, could not be issued after the time of the order the subject of the warning. The appellant relies on his Honour’s statement that “there is no suggestion in Lord Edmund-Davies reasons, nor of any other of the House of Lords’ reasons of the ability or desirability of a post-judgment warning.”[34][34]Appeal Record Book (volume 1), page 34. The primary Judge carefully considered the judgments in Leveller Magazine, and the observation the primary Judge made was strictly speaking true, however the converse is not true, namely that a post-judgment warning could not be issued. None of the Law Lords in Leveller Magazine, however, considered the question of whether there could be a post-judgement warning. While the issuing of the warning was discussed in the context of the relevant order or ruling being made by the Court, none of the Law Lords suggested that such a warning could only be issued contemporaneously with the order the subject of the warning.[35][35]Cf Appeal Record Book (volume 1), pages 34 to 35.