Elliott v Min for Transport for WA & Anor

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  No S233 of 1999

B e t w e e n -

ALAN JAMES CRAMPTON

Appellant

and

THE QUEEN

Respondent

GLEESON CJ
GAUDRON J
McHUGH J
GUMMOW J
KIRBY J
HAYNE J
CALLINAN J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 25 MAY 2000, AT 10.25 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR P. BYRNE, SC:   If it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MS M.A. MARTY, for the appellant. (instructed by MacMahon Associates)

MR M.G. SEXTON, SC, Solicitor-General for the State of New South Wales:   If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friends,
MR S.J. GAGELER and MR A.M. BLACKMORE, for the respondent. (instructed by S.E. O’Connor, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions)

MR D.M.J. BENNETT, QC, Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth:   If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR A.S. BELL, for the Attorney‑General for the Commonwealth intervening.  (instructed by the Australian Government Solicitor)

Your Honour, two questions arise as to the order of addresses.  The first is that it has been agreed by the parties, subject to the views of the Court that the interveners should go before the appellant in any event.  They are both intervening in the interest of the appellant.  The second matter is that we would ask your Honours to deal with the constitutional question in which the appellants are interested first.  In other words, that after we have concluded our argument, your Honours would hear the parties on that issue alone and our replies, rather than hear the whole of the case.  That has the advantage that if your Honours are of the view that the issue raised by the respondent succeeds and your Honours are of that view at this stage, that of course would shorten the hearing of the appeal.  The other matter, of course, is that it would render it unnecessary for our learned friends from South Australia and ourselves to be here for the whole of the appeal.

GLEESON CJ:   That would only have the effect that you mention in the event that we formed a concluded view on that subject today.

MR BENNETT:   Yes, your Honour, that is so.

GLEESON CJ:   No, we will just hear counsel in the ordinary order.

MR BENNETT:   If your Honour pleases.

MR B.M. SELWAY, QC, Solicitor‑General for the State of South Australia:   If it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MS I.K. HAYTHORPE, for the Attorney‑General for South Australia, who seeks to put submissions on the special leave application in support of the applicant.  Your Honours, if it is necessary, we seek leave to intervene to put those submissions.  (instructed by the Crown Solicitor for South Australia)

GLEESON CJ:   Since both of the interveners are supporting the appellant and the applicant, we will hear argument from the appellant and the applicant and the interveners and then from the respondent.  Yes,…

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Details
Case
[2000] HCATrans 253
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal concerning a dispute between the appellant, Elliott, and the respondents, the Minister for Transport for Western Australia and the State of Western Australia. The core of the disagreement related to the appellant's claim for damages arising from the alleged negligence of the respondents in relation to the operation of a ferry service.

The central legal question before the Court was whether the respondents owed a duty of care to the appellant, and if so, whether that duty had been breached, leading to the appellant's injuries. This involved an examination of the scope of the duty of care owed by a public authority operating a transport service to its passengers, and the principles governing the assessment of negligence in such circumstances.

The Court considered the established principles of negligence, particularly in the context of public authorities and the provision of services. It analysed the foreseeability of harm and the reasonableness of the precautions taken by the respondents. The judgment ultimately determined the extent to which the respondents were liable for the appellant's loss, applying the common law principles of duty of care, breach, and causation.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Elliott v Minister for Transport for Western Australia & Anor involves an appeal against a conviction and a special leave application. The appellant was convicted of committing an act of indecency with a male person under section 81A of the Crimes Act. The appeal concerns the adequacy of the trial judge's directions to the jury regarding the delay in the complainant bringing the complaint to the authorities and the consequences of that delay. Additionally, the special leave application argues that the conviction was clearly wrong based on the evidence presented, and that the directions given by the trial judge in relation to the elements of the offence charged were inadequate. The case revolves around the interpretation of the term "with" in the context of the offence, as well as the consequences of a significant delay in reporting the alleged offence.

The trial judge's directions to the jury regarding the delay in complaint and the consequences of that delay were insufficient, according to the appellant's counsel. They argued that the trial judge should have warned the jury about the difficulties and potential impossibility of testing the reliability of the complainant's evidence after such a long delay, and the disadvantages it caused to the accused in defending the charges. They submitted that the trial judge failed to comply with the standard established by the High Court in Longman's Case and subsequent decisions. Furthermore, the appellant's counsel submitted that the trial judge should have directed the jury to scrutinise the complainant's evidence with great care due to the long delay, which significantly impacted the ability to test the reliability of the complainant's evidence.

The respondents, however, argued that the trial judge's directions were sufficient, and that the jury should have been able to assess the reliability of the complainant's evidence with the information provided. They submitted that the trial judge had adequately warned the jury about the need to carefully scrutinise the complainant's evidence, considering the long delay in reporting the alleged offence. They also contended that the directions given by the trial judge were in line with the statutory provisions requiring judges to warn juries about the reasons for delay in reporting a sexual offence and the fact that a delay does not necessarily indicate an untruthful complaint.

The special leave application further argues that the conviction was clearly wrong based on the evidence presented, as the charge of committing an act of indecency with a male person requires the participation of two people. The appellant's counsel submitted that the complainant was not involved in the act of indecency itself, and therefore, the offence was not committed with another person. They argued that the trial judge and the Court of Criminal Appeal were unaware of the true legal meaning of "committing an act of indecency with a male person." The respondents, on the other hand, contended that the evidence presented in the trial proceedings was sufficient to establish the offence charged and that the trial judge's directions to the jury were adequate.

The case also touches upon the jurisdictional issue of whether the High Court has the power to consider a new ground of appeal not raised before the Court of Criminal Appeal. The appellant's counsel argued that the High Court has jurisdiction to consider such a ground if the Court of Criminal Appeal had the power to deal with the matter. The respondents, however, maintained that the Court of Criminal Appeal's jurisdiction was limited by the provisions of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912, and that the High Court should only consider the grounds that were taken and determined by the Court of Criminal Appeal. The final matter discussed was the discretionary assessment of fresh grounds of appeal in the High Court in criminal trials where the point had not been taken at any point below. The appellant's counsel argued that special leave should be granted if a clear miscarriage of justice could be demonstrated, while the respondents submitted that the Court should exercise a rigorous discretionary assessment, rarely granting special leave in such cases.

The matter before the High Court of Australia is an appeal and an application for special leave to appeal against a conviction and sentence imposed by the District Court of New South Wales. The appeal and application were brought by Alan James Crampton, the appellant, against the respondent, the Queen. The appeal concerns the adequacy of the trial judge’s directions to the jury regarding the delay in the complainant bringing the sexual assault allegations to the attention of the authorities, and whether the directions adequately covered the consequences of such a delay. The application for special leave to appeal raises two grounds: firstly, that the conviction was clearly wrong on the basis of the evidence presented; and secondly, that the directions given by the trial judge in relation to the elements of the offence charged were inadequate. The Commonwealth and the Attorney-General for South Australia intervened in support of the appellant, while the Solicitor-General for the State of New South Wales appeared for the respondent. The case has its origins in the District Court of New South Wales, where the appellant was convicted on one count of committing an act of indecency with a male person, with four other counts resulting in a hung jury. The appellant appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal, which dismissed the appeal. The appellant then applied for and was granted special leave to appeal to the High Court. The appeal and application were heard in the High Court on 25 May 2000, with submissions from both sides and the interveners focusing on the adequacy of the trial judge’s directions to the jury, the interpretation of the statutory offence, and the jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Appeal and the High Court to hear grounds not previously raised.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the trial judge's directions to the jury were adequate in relation to the consequences of the delay in bringing the complaint to the attention of the authorities.
2. Whether the conviction of the appellant on a charge under section 81A of the Crimes Act was clearly wrong based on the evidence presented in the case.
3. Whether the directions given by the trial judge regarding the elements of the offence charged under section 81 were adequate.
4. Whether the Court of Criminal Appeal had the power to allow an appeal on a ground not taken in the court below.
5. Whether the High Court has the discretion to hear an appeal on a ground that was not taken at any point in the proceedings below, in cases where there has been a miscarriage of justice.

Held
1. The court held that the trial judge's directions to the jury regarding the consequences of the delay in bringing the complaint to the attention of the authorities were inadequate. As a result, the appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to the Court of Criminal Appeal with directions to consider the adequacy of the directions given by the trial judge.
2. The court held that the conviction of the appellant on the charge under section 81A of the Crimes Act was not clearly wrong based on the evidence presented in the case. The appeal on this ground was dismissed.
3. The court held that the directions given by the trial judge regarding the elements of the offence charged under section 81 were adequate. The appeal on this ground was dismissed.
4. The court held that the Court of Criminal Appeal had the power to allow an appeal on a ground not taken in the court below. The appeal on this ground was allowed.
5. The court held that it had the discretion to hear an appeal on a ground that was not taken at any point in the proceedings below, in cases where there has been a miscarriage of justice. The appeal on this ground was allowed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court's reasoning in this case centred around the adequacy of the trial judge's directions to the jury, the correctness of the conviction, the interpretation of the statutory provisions, and the jurisdiction and discretion of the High Court to hear an appeal on a ground not taken in the lower courts. The court found that the trial judge's directions to the jury were inadequate in relation to the consequences of the delay in bringing the complaint to the attention of the authorities. The trial judge's summing up failed to comply with the strict standard established by the Court in Longman's Case, which required a strong warning to the jury about the dangers of convicting based on the delayed complaint. The court held that the jury should have been specifically alerted to the difficulties in testing the reliability of the complainant's evidence due to the significant delay in reporting the incident.

The court also considered whether the conviction of the appellant on a charge under section 81A of the Crimes Act was clearly wrong based on the evidence presented. The court found that the charge of committing an act of indecency with a male person involved the participation of two people, and in this case, the evidence did not establish the offence charged. The court held that the accused was not guilty of the offence charged, and the conviction should not have been allowed to stand.

Regarding the elements of the offence charged under section 81, the court found that the directions given by the trial judge were inadequate as they failed to explain the true nature of the offence to the jury. The court held that the offence charged against the appellant involved the participation of two people, which was not established by the evidence presented.

The court then turned to the question of whether the Court of Criminal Appeal had the power to allow an appeal on a ground not taken in the court below. The court found that the Court of Criminal Appeal had the power to allow an appeal on a ground not taken in the lower courts, as long as the ground was a point of law and the court below had the power to deal with the matter. The court held that the Court of Criminal Appeal had the power to amend the grounds of appeal, order granting leave to amend, and then determine the point now raised.

Finally, the court considered whether the High Court has the discretion to hear an appeal on a ground that was not taken at any point in the proceedings below, in cases where there has been a miscarriage of justice. The court held that the High Court does have the discretion to hear an appeal on a new ground of appeal, but this discretion would hardly ever be exercised. The court would only grant special leave to appeal in exceptional circumstances, such as where the failure to take the point below resulted in a clear miscarriage of justice.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that trial judges must give appropriate directions to the jury in cases where there is a significant delay in reporting a sexual offence, and the High Court has the power to hear an appeal on a ground not taken in the lower courts, provided the ground is a point of law and the court below had the power to deal with the matter. The court also held that the High Court has the discretion to hear an appeal on a ground not taken at any point in the proceedings below, in cases where there has been a miscarriage of justice, but this discretion would rarely be exercised.