Elizabeth Prain and Comcare
[2014] AATA 593
•22 August 2014
[2014] AATA 593
Division GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION File Number
2013/6327
Re
Elizabeth Prain
APPLICANT
And
Comcare
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal RM Creyke Senior Member
Date 22 August 2014 Place Canberra The decision under review is affirmed
.....................[sgd]...................................................
RM Creyke Senior Member
Catchwords
COMPENSATION – Commonwealth employee – injury to right knee travelling on public transport to Comcare-funded medical treatment - whether claim arose out of or in the course of employment – whether Comcare liable to pay compensation
Legislation
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) sections 4(1), 5A, 6, 14 and 16.
Cases
Re Connor and Australian Postal Corporation (2009) (unreported, AATA 09/0973, 18 December 2009)
Re Hughes and Comcare (2010)(unreported, AATA 10/0775, 12 October 2010)
Humphrey Earl Ltd v Speechley (1951) 84 CLR 126
Mercer v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (2000) 48 NSWLR 740
Re Perera and Comcare (2009) (unreported, AATA 09/0499, 2 July 2009)
Re Reardon and Comcare (2010) (unreported, AATA 09/342,12 February 2010)
Re Thymianos and Comcare (2009) (unreported, AATA 09/0082, 9 February 2009)
Roncevich v Repatriation Commission (2005) 222 CLR 115
Secondary Materials
Charter of Partnership between Comcare and the ACT Public Service 2011-2013
REASONS FOR DECISION
RM Creyke Senior Member
Ms Elizabeth Prain sought compensation from Comcare for conditions of dislocated right kneecap, bakers cyst, osteochrondral lesion medial femoral condyle, complex medial meniscal tear, and patella chondromalia, with a date of injury of 28 May 2013.
The claim was rejected on 22 August 2013, a decision upheld by Comcare on review on 2 October 2013.
On 10 December 2013, Ms Prain sought further review by the Tribunal. The matter was heard in Canberra on 2 July 2014.
Background
Ms Prain has an accepted injury described either as ‘aggravation of fibromyalgia’ or ‘aggravation of myalgia & myositis’, with a date of injury of 15 April 2011.
Ms Prain reported pain due to her feet from 1998, but felt she coped reasonably well and worked full-time until 2008. Ms Prain had foot surgery in 2008 which resulted in a failed fusion bilaterally. As a result ‘there is residual movement in the plates that were inserted at the time of surgery’. Since the surgery she has been diagnosed with chronic regional pain syndrome (CRPS) of the feet which, according to Ms Prain, extends to her knees, and with fibromyalgia. She ceased working in April 2011. On 26 September 2012, following a consent agreement at the Tribunal, Comcare accepted liability for ‘aggravation of fibromyalgia’, deemed to have occurred on 15 April 2011.
The fibromyalgia results in pain in both shoulders, and in her hips, knees, wrists, fingers and more recently she has begun to experience headaches. The pain is associated with sleep disturbance, fatigue, impaired concentration, and pins and needles. Her mobility and ability to function have been significantly reduced and she now does no exercise. Formerly Ms Prain had a history of being very athletic.
In April, Dr Peter Spitzer, a general practitioner in the practice Ms Prain attends, noted in his clinical notes ‘Will attend RNSH [Royal North Shore Hospital] pain clinic on 21/6/11’. Dr Spitzer had earlier made the referral to the Hospital. On 5 April 2011, Ms Prain emailed Comcare to indicate she had been approved by the RNSH Pain Research Institute to undertake the ADAPT pain management program for her fibromyalgia. The course which ran over three weeks, began on 20 May 2013. Ms Prain asked whether Comcare/Medicare should be meeting the cost. Ms Prain followed up with an email to Comcare on 11 April 2011 asking for a response to her earlier request.
On 15 April 2011, Dr Michael Cousins, Director, Pain Management and Research Centre, RNSH, sent a report to Comcare that Ms Prain had completed a multi-disciplinary assessment, and he expected her to start in the program on 20 May 2013. On 7 May 2013 Comcare accepted liability for payment for the course which commenced on 20 May 2013.
Part way through the course, Ms Prain suffered an accident on board a train taking her to the course. The pain caused her to withdraw from the course. It is the injuries suffered as a result of that accident which are the subject of this claim.
Ms Prain does not tolerate pain medication. As a consequence, if she underwent surgery for her knee or any other condition she would need a regional spinal block or spinal cord stimulation. Therefore to date she has eschewed further surgery, although she conceded this may be an option in the future.
The parties have agreed the following facts.
(a)In a Tribunal consent decision dated 26 September 2012, liability was accepted under section 14 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (the SRC Act) for an ‘aggravation of fibromyalgia’ injury sustained on 15 April 2011. The Respondent has in more recent times administratively described this accepted injury as an ‘aggravation of myalgia & myositis’ injury sustained on 15 April 2011. No dispute arises in this Application as a result of the different definitions used.
(b)In a letter for the Respondent dated 15 April 2013 (Attachment 1) Prof Michael Cousins (Director, Royal North Shore Hospital Pain Management Centre) asked for approval for the Applicant to participate in the ADAPT multi-disciplinary pain management program (ADAPT program).
(c)In a determination dated 7 May 2013 (Attachment 2) the Respondent accepted liability under section 16 of the SRC Act for payment of the costs and associated costs for the Applicant to participate in the ADAPT program, being medical treatment reasonably required in relation to her accepted injury (however, described).
(d)The Applicant commenced the ADAPT program at Royal North Shore Hospital on 20 May 2013. In order to attend the ADAPT program the Applicant’s journey involved, amongst other things, travel on a train from one of the Hyde Park Stations (Museum or St James) to St Leonards Station [in North Sydney].
(e)On Tuesday, 28 May 2013 the Applicant was aboard a train travelling to St Leonards station in order to continue participation in the ADAPT program.
(f)While aboard the train the Applicant injured her right knee when she fell. The Applicant has provided a statement dated 29 July 2013 (Attachment 3). Paragraph 14 sets out the Applicant’s statement as to how the injury occurred.
(g)At the time of the injury, the Applicant was in an interval between two discrete periods of performance of her employment duties. She was on a journey to obtain medical treatment for a work-related injury.
(h)Comcare, as the relevant authority, was responsible for the organisation of, and/or approval for, the Applicant to participate in the ADAPT program.
(i)Documents produced under summons from the Royal North Shore Hospital (attachment 4) record the Applicant attending the Emergency Department on 28 May 2013, her presenting complaint being a right knee patella dislocation. The Applicant was discharged with a recommendation that she follow-up with a GP or further imaging if there were any ongoing concerns.
(j)An MRI scan report of the right knee dated 25 July 2013 (Attachment 5) identified the Applicant as having a complex meniscal tear, an oedema suggesting a stress injury and intermediate to high grade chondromalacia in the right patella.
(k)The Applicant submitted a claim for compensation under the SRC Act dated 30 July 2013 (T7) for ‘dislocated kneecap – Rt, Bakers Cyst – MRI shows osteochrondral lesion medial femoral condyle, complex medial meniscal tear, patella chondromalacia’ sustained in a fall on a train on 28 May 2013.
(l)A determination dated 22 August 2013 (T10) denied liability under section 14 of the SRC Act for the following injuries sustained on 28 May 2013:
(i)‘dislocation of patella, closed (right)’;
(ii)‘ganglion & cyst of synovium, tendon & bursa (right)’;
(iii)‘tear of medial cartilage or meniscus of knee (right)’; and
(iv)‘chondromalacia of patella (right)’.
(m)The reviewable decision dated 2 October 2013 (T17) affirmed the determination dated 22 August 2013.
At the hearing, it was common ground that despite the agreed fact in paragraph 11(g) above, this is not a claim for an injury which arose during an interval between two discrete periods of work.
Ms Prain arranged to attend the ADAPT program on or before 18 April 2013. Ms Prain contacted Comcare on 7 May 2013 to suggest she book herself into cheaper accommodation than Comcare had arranged. She did so because she was concerned at the cost of the hotel in North Sydney, a location closer to the Royal North Shore Hospital. Ms Prain said in evidence she had an oral agreement from Comcare to the request.
In approving the payment Comcare advised on 7 May 2013 that it would pay for:
·ADAPT initial assessment and report
·ADAPT program
·Medication review by doctor on program
·Up to 5 individual psychology sessions, post program if required (included in ADAPT price)
·1 month post-ADAPT appointment (included in ADAPT price)
·6 month post-ADAPT appointment (included in ADAPT price)
·12 month post-ADAPT postal follow-up (included in ADAPT price)
·ADAPT manual ‘Manage Your Pain’
·Timer
·Accommodation at Twin Towers 19 days
·Continental breakfast daily
·3 course evening meal daily.
In addition, Comcare said it will ‘pay reasonable medical expenses in relation to your claim for compensation’. The advice also noted: ‘Please note Comcare is not liable for costs such as phone calls, pay TV, any room or meal upgrades, or non-attendance charges. These costs will be your responsibility’.
On 26 May 2013 Ms Prain had a fall at the hotel from ‘overbalancing’, leading to pain, bruising and limited sitting tolerance. Ms Prain advised of her fall to the physiotherapist (Maria), the clinical psychologist (Sarah), and the registered nurse (John) at the ADAPT program but said that ‘nothing further occurred as a result of that dialogue’. Ms Prain said that ‘by dismissing my concerns the staff compromised my optimal safety on the program’.
On 28 May 2013, Ms Prain injured her knee on the train on the way to the ADAPT program. Ms Prain’s evidence was that the movement of the train when it was coming to a relatively sudden stop caused her to lose her balance as she was attempting to get out of her seat.
Ms Prain claimed that ‘fatigue and the strict/rigid physical exercises required by the program directly contributed to the determination of balance and which, while the accident would probably not have been prevented, contributed to the extent of the injury sustained while travelling to the program’.
Dr Taylor discharged Ms Prain from the program on the same day as the accident on the train on the basis that she would be unable to complete the ‘required exercise components’. Apparently the ADAPT program had ‘required exercises’ which had to be completed as part of the program.
Legislation
The legislation is the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) (Act). Relevant provisions are section 4(1), 5A, 6, 14 and 16 of the Act.
Issues
The agreed issues are as follows:
·Whether Ms Prain’s claimed issues arose out of or in the course of her employment for the purposes of section 5A, 6(1)(c), 6(1)(f) or 6(1)(g) of the Act.
·Whether Comcare is liable to pay compensation pursuant to section 14 of the Act in respect of one or more of Ms Prain’s claimed injuries.
Consideration
The Tribunal is satisfied that the facts as agreed by the parties, subject to the comment in paragraph 12 of these reasons, are a fair and accurate representation of the events relating to Ms Prain’s claimed injuries and it so finds.
Section 5A of the Act defines an ‘injury’ for the purposes of the Act as ‘an injury that is a physical injury …. arising out of, or in the course of …. employment’. The expression ‘injury arising out of or in the course of employment’ is further defined in section 6 of the Act.
Section 6
The relevant provisions of section 6 are as follows:
6(1) Without limiting the circumstances in which an injury to an employee may be treated as having arisen out of, or in the course of … employment, an injury shall, for the purposes of this Act be treated as having so arisen if it was sustained: …
(c) while the employee was temporarily absent from the employee’s place of work undertaking an activity:
(i)Associated with the employee’s employment;
or
(f) while the employee was at a place for the purpose of:
(ii) receiving medical treatment for an injury;
or
(g) while the employee was travelling between the employee’s place of work and another place for the purpose of:
(ii) receiving medical treatment for an injury.
It is pertinent to note that, commencing in April 2007, the Act was amended to remove the ‘journey’ provisions. That means that accidents to employees which arose on journeys to and from work are not compensable under the Act. At the time of the accident Ms Prain was not on a journey to her place of work. She was on a journey to seek medical treatment for her accepted condition.
In relation to the claim under section 6(g)(ii), the Tribunal finds that on the day of her accident, Ms Prain was not ‘travelling between [her] place of work and another place’. ‘Another place’ is apt to refer to the Royal North Shore Hospital.
However, Ms Prain was not ‘travelling between [her] place of work’ and the RNSH. Ms Prain had not worked since April 2011, her residence is in Bowral, and the journey on this occasion was between her hotel in central Sydney to the RNSH in North Sydney.
The Act defines ‘place of work’ as including ‘any place at which the employee is required to attend for the purpose of carrying out the duties of … employment’.[1] ‘Place of work’ has been found to be confined to the boundary of the building in which the employee normally works.[2] Ms Prain had ceased working and hence was not travelling from her place of work at ACT Health. Accordingly she does not fall within section 6(g)(ii).
[1] Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (CT) s 4(1) – definition of ‘place of work’.
[2] Re Perera and Comcare (2009) (unreported, AATA 09/0499, 2 July 2009); Re Connor and Australian Postal Corporation (2009) (unreported, AATA 09/0973, 18 December 2009); Re Hughes and Comcare (2010) (unreported, AATA 10/0775, 12 October 2010).
In relation to section 6(1)(f)(ii), Ms Prain contends that she was ‘at a place’ namely, on a train, for the purpose of receiving medical treatment for her injury. The preposition ‘at’ is defined as ‘1. A particle specifying a point occupied, attained, sought, or otherwise concerned, as in place…’.[3] In other words, when allied with ‘place’, ‘at’ refers to having occupied, having reached, or being at the specified place. In this case, that would mean, being at the RNSH. That meaning is consistent with the cases on this provision which have concluded that ‘at a place’ indicates ‘a particular location and not, as when a person is travelling, location between places’, [4] as for example, on a train.
[3] Macquarie Concise Dictionary (5th edn, 2009), 66.
[4] Re Thymianos and Comcare (2009) (unreported, AATA 09/0082, 9 February 2009); Re Reardon and Comcare (2010) (unreported, AATA 09/342,12 February 2010).
Nor was she on the train ‘for the purpose of receiving medical treatment’ except in the most tenuous sense. She was on the train for the purpose of travel to get to the place where she was to receive medical treatment, not for the purpose of receipt of medical treatment. Accordingly, he circumstances in which Ms Prain’s injury occurred do not fall within section 6(1)(f)(ii).
The final issue under section 6(1)(c)(i) is whether Ms Prain was temporarily absent from her place of work undertaking an activity associated with her employment. At first sight the words ‘associated with… employment’ are sufficiently broad to encompass an accident which arose on a journey to a hospital for medical treatment for an accepted injury. However, these words are predicated on the employee being ‘temporarily absent’ from her workplace for that purpose. As Ms Prain had not worked since April 2011 and the accident occurred in 2013, it is not possible for the circumstances of her claim to fulfil the criteria in section 6(1)(c)(i). She was not ‘temporarily’ away from her workplace. Accordingly Ms Prain cannot claim the benefit of this provision.
‘Arising out of or in the course of employment’
Although Ms Prain’s claim does not fall within the specific provisions of section 6 of the Act, it remains necessary to consider whether the claim falls within the broader expressions of ‘arising out of or in the course of employment’ (section 5A – definition of ‘injury’). There is no suggestion that Ms Prain’s injuries occurred during her employment. Hence the ‘in the course of employment’ element of the test is not relevant.
An injury which arises ‘out of employment’ covers ‘whatever is incidental to the performance of the work.’[5] That depends in turn on ‘the nature and terms of the employment, on the circumstances in which work is done and on what, as a result, the workman is reasonably required, expected or authorised to do in order to carry out … actual duties’.[6] However, ‘the connection must …. be a causal and not merely temporal one’.[7] Deciding the causation question is often a question of fact involving a matter of degree, and is one on which minds may differ. A common sense approach to the issue is taken.
[5] Roncevich v Repatriation Commission (2005) 222 CLR 115 at [17] citing the dissenting judgment of Heerey J in the Full Federal Court in the matter.
[6] Humphrey Earl Ltd v Speechley (1951) 84 CLR 126 at 133 cited with approval by the majority in Roncevichv Repatriation Commission (2005) 222 CLR 115
[7] Roncevich v Repatriation Commission (2005) 222 CLR 115 at [23] per McHugh, Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ.
The duties of employment are ‘what the worker in fact does in the employment’ and ‘what (if anything) the worker was in fact doing in his or her employment that caused or contributed to the ‘injury” as defined’.[8] The duties of employment are confined to what the workman is reasonably required, expected or authorised to do in order to carry out ‘actual duties’.[9] These principles reflect the interpretation of the expression in the leading cases concerning the expression.
[8] Mercer v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (2000) 48 NSWLR 740 at [13].
[9] Roncevichv Repatriation Commission (2005) 222 CLR 115 at [23] per McHugh, Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ.
Ms Prain’s employment was with the IT section of ACT Health. She was a Senior Officer, Grade B, working four days a week at The Canberra Hospital. Her start date for the position was 31 January 2011, and her contract was due to conclude in June 2011. Ms Prain has asserted that she was never given a position description during her employment. However, the evidence before the Tribunal does establish that her duties involved reviewing ACT Health’s scanning practices for clinical records, and deciding whether they should be replaced.
Counsel for Ms Prain had argued that the provisions in the Act relating to compensation to employees for incapacity payments, medical treatments, or to assist with rehabilitation measures give rise to obligations on the part of the employee which fall within the ambit of the expression ‘duties of employment’. These, it was suggested, are obligations under the Act to ensure employees seeking compensation comply with certain provisions before that compensation is forthcoming or to enable compensation to continue.
However, the obligations are ones over which Comcare has control and are for the purpose of compensation. They are not the employees’ duties to their employer in the fulfilment of their contract of employment. They do not fall within the narrower meaning of ‘duties of employment’ arising in the cases.
Nor more generally can the duties Ms Prain owed to Comcare be equated with the duties owed to Ms Prain’s employer. Even if Ms Prain owed a duty to Comcare to attend the Royal North Shore Hospital because Comcare was funding the treatment, Ms Prain had no such obligation to her employer, ACT Health. Indeed ACT Health may not even have known of her attendance. The arrangement to pay for the course was made with Comcare, not ACT Health. Ms Prain’s attendance at RNSH was for rehabilitation and had only a tenuous connection with advice on IT systems. Her rehabilitation was a function or goal of Comcare as part of its role to encourage injured employees to return to work and was not a specific matter within Ms Prain’s duty statement or contract of employment.
In any event, there is little evidence that Ms Prain shared Comcare’s goal even if it was also, in an extended sense, a goal of ACT Health. Ms Prain had not been at work since April 2011, over two years’ earlier, and her evidence was that when she went to the pain management course she thought it was unlikely that she was going to return to work. Her attendance was to achieve personal goals, namely, better pain management, and to improve her lifestyle. So even if it could be argued that she was on a journey to the RNSH for the purpose of receiving medical treatment for an injury, an obligation she owed to Comcare or even to ACT Health, the proposed course was not seen by Ms Prain as a means of returning her to the workplace. So her attendance was not fulfilling the objectives of either Comcare (other than perhaps relieving them of future compensation payments) nor of her employers, ACT Health.
As part of his contention about the extent of ‘duties of employment’, counsel for Ms Prain also argued that ‘employment’ had an extended meaning. He said that the term ‘employment’ included all aspects of the obligations, rights and duties to which government officials are subject. These include not breaching the Australian Public Service Code of Conduct, privacy and secrecy requirements, the obligations imposed by work, health and safety legislation, as well as obligations under workers compensation legislation. Counsel for Comcare rejected this contention.
The Tribunal also does not accept the contention. In the first instance, it is not supported by the relationship between Comcare and ACT Health including the broader ACT Public Service. The Charter of Partnership between Comcare and the ACT Public Service (ACTPS) 2011-2013 includes a statement requiring ‘a cooperative approach between Comcare and the ACTPS in effectively managing work-related injuries’.[10] That clause recognised a need for cooperation, but did not make Comcare synonymous with ACT Health for the purposes of managing Ms Prain. There is clearly a separation of functions and goals between Comcare and ACTPS.
[10] Charter of Partnership between Comcare and the ACT Public Service 2011-2013 cl 1, at para 7.
Even if Comcare and ACTPS were to cooperate, the preceding paragraph in clause 1 of the Charter states ‘Comcare and the ACTPS must fulfil their statutory responsibilities independently and each will not seek to improperly influence the other in meeting their responsibilities’. That statement does not indicate that the goals or functions of each are the same. It follows that the goals of Comcare concerning medical treatment or rehabilitation are not the goals of the ACTPS. In other words, Comcare has responsibilities relating to Ms Prain’s workers compensation claim, while ACT Health has a role to manage the duties she performs in the workplace. The two bodies have separate statutory responsibilities concerning Ms Prain and this is recognised in clause 1 of the Charter. They are not a single entity akin to a self-insurer.
Accordingly, the broader kinds of duties to which counsel referred which would generally be owed to the ACT Public Service would not fall with the duties of employment as that expression has been interpreted by the courts.
Counsel for Ms Prain had also argued that this case is on all fours with Lee v Transpacific Industries Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 1322. That was a matter in which the employer was also the licensee for the purposes of workers compensation legislation. In other words, the employer was self-insured. In those circumstances, the two sets of management responsibilities are merged, unlike the position in the ACT. For that reason alone, Lee cannot be relied on in the manner suggested.
In addition, the facts in Lee are significantly different from those in Ms Prain’s case. In Lee the employer/licensee organised for Mr Lee to seek medical treatment, gave his wife a day off work to drive him to the medical appointment some distance away, and lent the couple a car to travel to the appointment.
Finally Lee is an ‘interval’ case, in that Mr Lee was undertaking medical treatment at the instigation of the employer/licensee while he was still in active employment and the journey took place between two periods of work. That was not the situation with Ms Prain who by her own admission considered it unlikely that she would return to work, an admission which accords with her lengthy absence from the workforce at that time. This is also consistent with the concession made by Ms Prain’s counsel that this was not an ‘interval’ case.
Finally, the steps taken by Comcare were not akin to those taken by the employer/licensee in Lee. In Ms Prain’s case it was Ms Prain and her general practitioner who took the initiative to enrol her in the course. She only contacted Comcare subsequently to see if it was willing to fund the course. Nor did Comcare take control of the arrangements for the medical attendance in the manner of the employer/licensee in Lee. All Comcare did was to notify Ms Prain that it would fund the course, and arrange a hotel, an arrangement which Ms Prain subsequently changed.
Moreover, although Comcare agreed to fund the course, it limited its financial liability to ‘reasonable medical treatment’ as defined in section 16 of the Act, and specifically denied liability for any personal expenses of Ms Prain. The items Comcare said it would fund did not include travel costs. ‘Reasonable medical treatment’ does not normally cover travel costs. It is only when an employee is required to travel more than 50 km to seek medical treatment that Comcare will fund such costs.[11] The journey on which Ms Prain was injured was only from central Sydney to north Sydney and did not come within the 50km exception.
[11] Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) s 16(7).
In any event, it is not travel costs that Ms Prain is seeking, but compensation for her injuries. The only relevance of travel costs is that their exclusion indicates that Comcare was regarding travel and anything that happened to Ms Prain during that travel as within her personal sphere and not something Comcare would fund under reasonable medical expenses.
Accordingly the Tribunal finds that Ms Prain’s circumstances are not akin to those in Lee. She was not at a place, namely, on the train for the purpose of receiving medical treatment for an injury, her presence on the train had not been arranged by her employer, and the travel was not reasonable medical treatment. Nor are Comcare and ACT Health symbiotic like the employer/licensee in Lee.
Lastly, Ms Prain had argued that the tiredness and fatigue she experienced from undertaking the exercises as part of the ADAPT program had played a part in her awkwardness in exiting her seat on the train, leading to her injury. She also raised a contention that the failure of medical staff at the ADAPT program to respond in a more positive way to her reporting to them that she had experienced a fall in the hotel one evening, may also have contributed to her injury on the train. The Tribunal, as a matter of common sense, does not accept these arguments. The connections posited are too tenuous to be credible. Nor was there any medical or other evidence corroborating these suggestions.
In summary, this means the Tribunal is not satisfied that in all the circumstances, Ms Prain’s injuries on the train on her way to the Royal North Shore Hospital were injuries which arose ‘out of her employment’. Accordingly they were not ‘injuries’ for the purposes of section 5A of the Act, and Comcare is not liable under section 14 to compensate her for those injuries.
The decision under review is affirmed.
I certify that the preceding 53 (fifty-three) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of RM Creyke, Senior Member ....................[sgd]....................................................
Associate: Sarah Wardell
22 August 2014
Date of hearing 2 July 2014 Counsel for the Applicant Allan Anforth Advocate for the Applicant Geoff Wilson Solicitors for the Applicant Maurice Blackburn Lawyers Counsel for the Respondent Andrew Burger Advocate for the Respondent Stuart Marris Solicitors for the Respondent Sparke Helmore
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