Elias Karigiannis v Football Federation Australia Ltd

[2010] NSWSC 1454

CITATION:	Elias Karigiannis v Football Federation Australia Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1454
HEARING DATE(S):	27 April 2010
JUDGMENT DATE :	17 December 2010
JUDGMENT OF:	Hidden J
DECISION:	Summons dismissed.
CATCHWORDS:	ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - private domestic tribunal - investigation and adjudication of alleged breaches of regulations - whether complainant entitled to observance of the rules of natural justice - issues of bias, procedural fairness
CATEGORY:	Principal judgment
CASES CITED:	McClelland v Burning Palms Surf Life Saving Club [2002] NSWSC 470 Hedges v Australasian Conference Association Ltd [2003] NSWSC 1107 Sydney United Football Club v Soccer New South Wales [2005] NSWSC 474 Australian Workers' Union v Bowen [No. 2] (1948) 77 CLR 601 Cains v Jenkins (1979) 28 ALR 219 Maloney v New South Wales National Coursing Association Ltd [1978] 1 NSWLR 161 Carver v Law Society of NSW (1998) 43 NSWLR 71 Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 Public Service Board of NSW v Osmond (1985-86) 159 CLR 656
PARTIES:	Elias Karigiannis (Known as Leo Karis) (plaintiff) Football Federation Australia Limited (defendant)
FILE NUMBER(S):	SC 2009/298027
COUNSEL:	I W Raine (plaintiff) S B Lloyd SC (defendant)
SOLICITORS:	Hugh Williamson, Williamsons Solicitors Pty Limited (plaintiff) Anthony O'Reilly, Kennedys (defendant)

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COMMON LAW DIVISION

HIDDEN J

Friday 17 December 2010

2009/298027 Elias Karigiannis (Known as Leo Karis)
v
Football Federation Australia Pty Ltd

JUDGMENT

1 HIS HONOUR: The defendant, Football Federation Australia Pty Ltd, is the governing body of Association football in this country. I shall refer to it as “FFA”. The plaintiff, Elias Karigiannis, is a player agent registered with FFA. Apparently, he is better known as Leo Karis and I shall refer to him by that name. In 2009, he complained to FFA about the conduct of certain people and of a club. The complaint was dealt with by the Player Agent Licensing Committee, constituted under FFA regulations. Those regulations are part of a regulatory framework which includes FFA’s “statutes”, and FFA itself is subject to the statutes of the international body, FIFA. Mr Karis is dissatisfied with the committee’s determination of the complaint, and the process by which it was arrived at, and seeks relief in this Court.

2 On 19 December 2006, Mr Karis entered into an exclusive player agent agreement with a player, Mile (Michael) Jedinak (the “Karis contract”). In the contract Mr Karis was referred to as the “Agent” and Mr Jedinak as the “Player”. Provision was made for Mr Karis’s remuneration as a percentage of Mr Jedinak’s salary, whether as an A-league player in Australia or as a player overseas. Exclusivity was provided by the concluding words of clause 3, as follows:

“Should the Player be approached by another agent, club, someone representing a club, the Player must forward the inquiry to the Agent at once and not negotiate directly or appoint anyone else to negotiate or accept or reject any offer or contract.”

The contract was for a period of 2 years, from 13 December 2006 (the day it was negotiated) to 12 December 2008, inclusive.

3 Mr Karis secured Mr Jedinak’s engagement by Central Coast Mariners FC Pty Ltd, to which I shall refer as “CCM”. On 8 January 2008, Mr Jedinak signed a contract with CCM (the “club contract”). Special condition 1.8 of that contract provided that if Mr Jedinak were transferred to another club during the first year of the contract, the club would receive the first $180,000 of any net transfer fee. If any net amount above that sum was obtained by the club, it was to be distributed in the ratio of 50% to the club, 25% to Mr Jedinak and 25% to Mr Karis as his agent.

4 On 26 November 2008, Mr Jedinak entered into a contract with another registered player agent, Dragan Jevtic, providing for exclusivity in the territory of Turkey. That contract was to commence on 13 December 2008, following the expiry of the Karis contract at the end of the previous day. On 10 December Mr Jevtic contacted the executive chairman of CCM, Mr Lyle Gorman, to arrange a meeting to introduce himself and discuss his role as a player manager. The meeting took place at a Sydney café on 12 December. Also present on that occasion was Mr Jedinak’s father, Mr John Jedinak.

5 At the meeting the possibility of the transfer of Mr Jedinak to play overseas was discussed. On 13 December, Mr Jedinak provided written instructions to CCM that the Karis agreement was at an end and that he wished to remove from the club contract special condition 1.8 providing a benefit to Mr Karis from a transfer fee. In those instructions, conveyed by a letter to Mr Gorman, he asked that “the whole transfer fee” be paid to CCM, “less the FFA 20% fee”. He also agreed to be responsible for the variation and to indemnify CCM “as it may affect a third party”.

6 The club contract was varied accordingly. CCM was required, as I understand it, by one of the regulations to register that varied contract with FFA. On 23 December 2008 CCM forwarded the relevant documentation, including Mr Jedinak’s letter of 13 December, to FFA, and FFA replied to CCM by letter of the same day, confirming the variation. On 20 January 2009 CCM sold its contract rights in relation to Mr Jedinak to a sports club in Turkey. The transfer fee was paid to FFA, which retained 20% of it and paid the balance to CCM. This was in accordance with clause 10.5 of FFA’s National Registration Regulations.

7 It appears that, during the currency of the Karis agreement, Mr Jedinak did not comply with the requirement by clause 3 that he forward to Mr Karis any inquiry by a club and that he not negotiate directly with anyone else concerning an offer or a contract. Certainly, during that period Mr Karis did not give his permission, expressly or impliedly, to Mr Jevtic to discuss the transfer of Mr Jedinak or to enter into any agreement with him.

8 On 16 January 2009, through a letter from his solicitor, Mr Karis complained to FFA about the deprivation of his contractual rights. In the letter it was asserted that there was evidence that Mr Jedinak was in breach of the Karis contract and that others had induced that breach. It was said that Mr Jevtic “had well and truly approached the player who was under a contract with Mr Karis”, and that Mr Gorman and Mr John Jedinak were complicit in that behaviour. FFA was asked to investigate the matter.

9 That investigation was undertaken by the Player Agent Licensing Committee, established by the Players’ Agents Regulations. Those regulations apply to licensed player agents, clubs (and their representatives) and players: clause 1.4. By clause 8.2, if the FFA receives a written complaint about the conduct of a licensed player agent, the Committee “may” investigate that conduct. Further, clause 8.1 provides that if the Committee becomes aware of credible information that may establish a breach of the regulations by a licensed player agent, a club or a player, then it may investigate that conduct. Clause 8.6 empowers the Committee to impose sanctions for established breaches of the regulations.

10 By clause 5.29, a licensed player agent in breach of the regulations is liable to a variety of disciplinary sanctions, as well as an order to pay compensation. Similar provisions are made in respect of a breach of the regulations by a player: clause 6.7, and a club: clause 7.13. Mr Karis sought disciplinary action against Mr Jevtic, Mr Jedinak, CCM and Mr Gorman. In addition, an order was sought that CCM and Mr Gorman pay a substantial sum by way of compensation, being the amount to which Mr Karis might have been entitled under condition 1.8 of the club contract during the period that he was Mr Jedinak’s agent.

11 The Committee delivered a written determination on 29 July 2009. It found Mr Jevtic was in breach of clause 5.19 of the regulations, which provides:

“5.19 While a Player is under exclusive contract with a Licensed Player Agent, a Licensed Player Agent or any person acting on his behalf must not enter into negotiations or make any approach with a view to facilitate or effect:
(a) the transfer of that Player; or
(b) a representation agreement with that Player,
unless the existing Licensed Player Agent of the Player has provided his express written permission to do so.”

It noted that, pursuant to clause 8.5, Mr Jevtic would be invited to make submissions concerning any sanction to be imposed upon him.

12 The Committee found that, on the evidence before it, the complaint was not made out against CCM or Mr Gorman. The relevant regulation concerning CCM was clause 7.2, providing that a club that wished to transfer the registration of a player must not deal with any person on behalf of the player other than the player himself or a licensed player agent with whom the player has entered into a representation agreement. The Committee found that at the meeting on 12 December 2008, when discussion turned specifically to Mr Jedinak, Mr Gorman had “adopted proper protocols”, asking Mr Jevtic to inform the club in writing if and when he had in place a representation agreement with any player contracted to the club.

13 As to Mr Jedinak himself, the Committee noted that the duties of a player were to be found in clause 6.1 – 6.6 of the regulations and that he was not in breach of any of those provisions. Certainly, nothing in that clause could apply to his apparent breach of his contract with Mr Karis. Finally, the Committee noted that Mr Jedinak’s father, John Jedinak, was not subject to the regulations, and that no investigation of him or action against him was to be undertaken.

14 The Committee recorded that Mr Karis had also lodged an application under the National Grievance Resolution Regulations, which was not a matter which it had jurisdiction to determine. Having dismissed the complaint against CCM and Mr Gorman, it added that any relief sought against them was “properly the domain” of those regulations. To this matter I shall return.

15 By summons in this Court, Mr Karis seeks a declaration that the Committee’s decision is “null and void, for want of natural justice”. He alleges that the Committee was biased against him and that he was denied procedural fairness. He also contends that the Committee failed to provide adequate reasons for its decision. He asks that the determination be quashed, and seeks an order that FFA appoint a retired judicial officer as an independent tribunal to determine his complaint ab initio.

16 By clause 3.2 of the Players’ Agents Regulations, the Licensing Committee is to be constituted by three employees of FFA, being the Football Regulations Manager, Head of Football Operations and Head of Legal and Business Affairs, “and/or such other persons as the Chief Executive Officer of FFA may determine from time to time”. In the present case the Committee was composed of the Head of Legal and Business Affairs, the Head of Game Development and a solicitor, Mr John Didulica, who held the position of Legal Counsel (Regulatory). All were FFA employees. Much of the correspondence about the matter was between Mr Williamson, Mr Karis’s solicitor, and Mr Didulica.

17 Because the complaint involved the conduct of CCM and Mr Gorman, Mr Karis at an early stage raised the issue of bias, contending that it was inappropriate for employees of FFA to investigate and determine the matter. At the relevant time FFA was a shareholder in CCM. It registered the varied club contract. It received and dispersed the transfer fee, retaining 20% for itself. In written submissions in this Court, FFA was described as “an historical actor in the factual matrix of the complaint”, and in “a position of conflict of interest”.

18 Mr Karis had sought the appointment of an independent person to investigate the complaint. The Committee rejected this, noting that it was “expressly charged with the determination of matters which arise under the regulations”. This was a reference to the functions and responsibilities of the Licensing Committee set out in clause 3.3, which include:

“(b) to investigate, or cause to be investigated, any written complaint concerning a Licensed Player Agent;
(c) to monitor the performance of all Licensed Player Agents and ensure their compliance with the Code of Professional Conduct;
(d) to make decisions regarding the suspension or cancellation of the licence of any Licensed Player Agent; and
(e) any other matter relevant to the implementation and administration of these regulations.”

Mr Karis’s response to this is that the power of the Chief Executive Officer under clause 3.2 to determine the composition of a committee is broad enough to encompass persons who are not FFA employees.

19 The Committee also asserted in this context that any determination it made “is subject to appeal to the Players’ Status Committee of FIFA”. However, Mr Karis would have no such appeal. Relevantly for present purposes, the effect of clauses 3.4 and 8.13 of the regulations is that such a right of appeal is confined to a person upon whom the Committee has imposed a sanction or a player agent whose licence is suspended or cancelled. Otherwise, the discharge by the Licensing Committee of any of its functions and responsibilities, or the exercise of any of the powers and authorities conferred upon it, “shall be final and conclusive …”: clause 3.4.

20 The Committee did not conduct a hearing at which the parties attended. Rather, it received background material and letters by way of submissions from Mr Karis, CCM and Mr Gorman, through their solicitors, as well as from Mr Jevtic. It arrived at its determination upon examination of this material.

21 Of course, Mr Karis had no direct knowledge of what transpired at the meeting of 12 December 2008. However, his submission to the Committee was that it could be inferred that Mr Gorman and, through him, CCM were involved in negotiations for the transfer of Mr Jedinak to the Turkish club before the expiry of the Karis contract. He relied on the fact that on the day after the expiry of that contract, 13 December, arrangements were in place to effect that transfer. As I have said, it was on that day that Mr Jedinak’s contract with Mr Jevtic came into effect and on the same day Mr Jedinak instructed CCM to vary the club contract so as to deprive Mr Karis of the benefit he might have received if the transfer had taken place while he was still Mr Jedinak’s agent. Obviously, it was against the possibility of a claim by Mr Karis that Mr Jedinak agreed to indemnify CCM.

22 In concluding that the complaint was not made out against CCM or Mr Gorman, the Committee found that, on the basis of the evidence accepted by it, CCM “did not initiate discussions regarding the Player and properly considered the meeting with Mr Jevtic to be general discussions … .” It also found that the “timeframe of the subsequent transfer does not of itself establish that discussion between the Club and Mr Jevtic had commenced well in advance of 12 December 2008.” It added that the international transfer of players “can occur within this timeframe”. The Committee found “no objective evidence to suggest that on balance the Club or Mr Gorman, acted in breach of clause 7.2 or otherwise in breach of FFA Statutes.”

23 Given the view I have formed of the matter, it is unnecessary to recite in detail the submissions on behalf of Mr Karis in this Court. He noted that the Committee’s determination made no reference to the variation of the club contract and Mr Jedinak’s offer of indemnity. Nor was there any examination of his claim for compensation. He argued that the Committee’s investigation of the meeting of 12 December and the circumstances of the variation of the contract was inadequate, noting the Committee’s power under clause 8.4 of the regulations to require the production of documents by a player agent, a club or a player. He complained that the Committee accepted uncritically the account of the 12 December meeting and the background to it by CCM, Mr Gorman and Mr Jevtic, and that it failed to test that account or to give him the opportunity to do so.

24 These matters, it was put, pointed to actual bias on the part of the Committee, as well as a denial of procedural fairness. They were also the foundation of the complaint that the Committee failed to give adequate reasons for its determination.

25 The assertion of actual bias was put more bluntly in supplementary submissions for Mr Karis. It was noted that the letter from FFA to CCM on 23 December 2008, confirming the variation of the club contract, was signed by Mr Didulica. Thus, it was said, Mr Didulica knew that the variation of the club contract removed a benefit which Mr Karis might have received and directed it to CCM, and was aware that Mr Jedinak had agreed to indemnify CCM in the event of any claim by Mr Karis. It was argued that Mr Didulica and the Committee, “by failing to consider the indemnity letter …, in effect suppressed the document and demonstrated actual bias” towards CCM.

26 The Licensing Committee is a private domestic tribunal. This is not the occasion to examine in any depth the authorities on the circumstances in which, and the extent to which, such a tribunal is required to observe the principles of natural justice. That examination was undertaken, with reference to Australian and English authority, by Campbell J (as he then was) in McClelland v Burning Palms Surf Life Saving Club [2002] NSWSC 470 at [81] – [102]. At [97] his Honour concluded:

“In Australia, the preferable view is that natural justice comes to operate in private clubs and associations by the rules of those private organisations being construed on the basis that fair procedures are intended, but recognising the possibility that express words or necessary implication in the rules could exclude natural justice in whole or part.”

27 Clause 8.7 of the Players’ Agents Regulations provides that the Licensing Committee, if it proposes to impose a substantial sanction on a person, may hold a hearing at which that person has the opportunity to be heard. Such a hearing must comply with the rules of natural justice. However, the regulations are silent about the application of those rules when determining whether a breach of the regulations has been established. Whether that amounts to a “necessary implication” that they do not apply at that stage is not a matter I need to decide. It was not argued on behalf of FFA that they did not. As will be seen, the crucial question in this case is whether any requirement to observe the rules of natural justice extended to Mr Karis.

28 It was submitted on behalf of Mr Karis that, if I did not find that the Committee’s determination was affected by actual bias, I would find the reasonable apprehension of it. It was acknowledged that the reasonable apprehension of bias was normally insufficient to invalidate the decision of a private domestic tribunal. I shall refer later to authority for that proposition. However, it was argued that it was a sufficient ground for intervention in the present case because of the size and geographical reach of the enterprise controlled by FFA, the large sums of money involved in professional football, what was said to be the potential effect of the Committee’s decision on Mr Karis’s livelihood and earnings, and the absence of any avenue of appeal by him.

29 It was also noted that, when dealing with a complaint, the Committee is both investigator and adjudicator. Reference was made to the decision of Young CJ in Eq (as he then was) in Hedges v Australasian Conference Association Ltd [2003] NSWSC 1107, in which at [100] his Honour noted that the disciplinary tribunal whose decision was challenged in that case “acted both as the authority which authorised the investigation and also the adjudicator.” His Honour continued:

“This is bad practice and usually this fact alone will amount to a denial of natural justice as a person whose ability to earn a living is jeopardised by an adjudication is entitled to have that adjudication performed by an independent group of people: Carver v Law Society of NSW (1998) 43 NSWLR 71.”

30 Finally, Mr Karis complained that not all the material received by the Committee had been made available to him, in particular, the material from Mr Gorman and Mr Jevtic concerning the events of 12 December 2008 and the circumstances surrounding them. He argued that the Committee’s finding that there was “no objective evidence” of relevant misconduct by CCM or Mr Gorman effectively placed an onus of proof upon him, converting what should have been an inquisitorial process into an adversarial one. He referred to the judgment of McDougall J in Sydney United Football Club v Soccer New South Wales [2005] NSWSC 474, a case in which the plaintiff club sought relief against its suspension by the defendant from a number of matches. The suspension followed an investigation of relevant events by a Panel set up by the defendant. At [55] McDougall J observed:

“This was an inquisitorial, not an adversarial, process. It was for the plaintiff, having been apprised of the issues, to put what it wished in response. This it did. There was no ‘case’ that the Panel was required to put to, or against, the plaintiff … .”

It was submitted for Mr Karis that an onus of proof was imposed upon him, while at the same time his involvement in an inquisitorial procedure was restricted.

31 Other matters were raised in the submissions, both written and oral, on behalf of Mr Karis which I do not find it necessary to ventilate. They were of no significance, or of no more than peripheral significance, to the issues which I must decide. In so saying I mean no criticism of Mr Karis’s solicitor and counsel, who articulated and presented his case firmly and thoroughly.

32 In response to the allegation of actual bias, FFA did not deny its shareholding in CCM. However, in an affidavit of its solicitor, Mr O’Reilly, it was explained that FFA had a financial interest in a number of clubs because of its provision of financial assistance to teams participating in the A-league competition. Sometimes this involved direct funding, but on other occasions it involved “taking equity ownership stakes in the teams”. CCM was not the only club in which it had held shares over the years of the A-league competition.

33 Nor did FFA deny its role in registering the varied club contract and in distributing the transfer fee paid by the Turkish club to CCM and itself. As observed above, that distribution was in accordance with clause 10.5 of the National Registration Regulations and, as I understand it, the 20% retained by FFA is to be devoted to the promotion and development of the sport.

34 The fact that the body which sets up a domestic tribunal, or any member of the tribunal, may have been “an historical actor in the factual matrix” of a complaint is commonplace and is also, of itself, no basis for an assertion of bias. It is here that the law distinguishes between decisions of courts and other public tribunals, which must be devoid not only of actual bias but also of the appearance of it, and those of domestic tribunals, which are invalidated only by actual bias. So much emerges from passages in the judgment of Dixon J (as he then was) in Australian Workers’ Union v Bowen [No. 2] (1948) 77 CLR 601:

“It is important to keep steadily in mind that we are dealing with a domestic forum acting under rules resting upon a consensual basis.” (at 628)
“Domestic tribunals are often constituted of persons who may, or even must, have taken some part in the matters concerning which they are called upon to exercise their quasi-judicial function.” (at 630)

However, his Honour added (at 631):

“It is not in accordance with the principles of natural justice to have present as a member of the tribunal a person who has promoted the charge and supports it as the prosecutor or one who is invincibly biassed against the accused as a result of his participation in the controversy … .”

35 In Cains v Jenkins (1979) 28 ALR 219, Sweeney and St John JJ, referring to that last passage from the judgment of Dixon J, said (at 227):

“ ‘Invincible’ must, in the circumstances, mean a bias that is incapable of being remedied by reason or argument during the period up to the making of the tribunal’s decision.”

36 In Maloney v New South Wales National Coursing Association Ltd [1978] 1 NSWLR 161, Glass JA, with whom Hope and Hutley JJA agreed, explained the principle, by reference to Australian Workers’ Union v Bowen and some English authority, as follows: (at 170 – 1):

“The passages I have quoted from these various decisions furnish, in my view, adequate support for the proposition that the requirements of natural justice are in some respects different where domestic tribunals are concerned. They also adumbrate the reasons why this is so. In the administration of justice by courts proper, and those acting in a similar capacity, public policy requires that there should be no doubt about the purity of that administration … . The rules being enforced have no consensual basis. The parties have not chosen the tribunal. The judges and those being judged are drawn from two groups of people so numerous and so placed in relation to each other that it is not only desirable, but also eminently feasible, to insist that the former should be purged of all bias towards the latter, whether real or apprehended. Domestic tribunals are usually established in circumstances which are radically different. The members, generally speaking, have agreed to abide by a set of rules and the authority of a committee to enforce them, if necessary by expulsion. The committee members cannot, in the nature of things, divest themselves of the manifold predilections and prejudices resulting from past associations with members. Apprehension of bias could be generated in all kinds of ways. If it was a disqualifying consideration, the enforcement of the consensual rules would be largely unworkable. There may be some circumstances where a suspicion of bias would operate to disqualify a member of a domestic tribunal. But generally speaking it does not so operate … .”

37 Glass JA added (at 172):

“Where the executive body of a private organization is also the adjudicating body, the implication is irresistible that facts which might lead to a suspicion of bias against a member of the committee do not disqualify him as an adjudicator. By conferring these two sets of authorities upon the committee, the members of such a body have agreed to accept all the risks involved in drawing its judges from among those likely to have been in the centre of any factional strife. The beliefs and feelings which may be inherited from past conflicts do not prevent the members sitting in judgment upon each other. The only qualification upon that implication is that the members have not agreed to subject themselves to the adjudication of those who have developed an actual bias which no evidence or argument is likely to overcome.


This line of authority was cited, and the same principle was expressed, in the joint judgment of Cains v Jenkins (supra) at 226 – 7.

38 In my view, nothing in the background to this matter, or in the manner in which the Committee dealt with it, provides a basis for a finding of actual bias by FFA or any member of the Committee, including Mr Didulica. It must be remembered that the Committee was dealing with questions of a disciplinary nature, within the framework of the Players’ Agents Regulations. In doing so, it was exercising the function entrusted to it by clause 3.3 of those regulations.

39 Its focus was not upon any breach of contract or tort alleged to have been perpetrated by CCM or Mr Gorman. As the Committee itself observed, matters of that kind were properly the province of the Grievance Resolution process, which I shall explain shortly. No doubt, for that reason, the variation of the club contract and Mr Jedinak’s indemnity were not perceived to be relevant to its task. Mr Karis’s complaint, against Mr Didulica in particular, that there was actual bias to the extent of suppression of Mr Jedinak’s letter of 13 December 2008 is without foundation.

40 Clearly, the submission by Mr Karis that in the circumstances of this case the perception of bias would be sufficient to set aside the Committee’s decision flies in the face of established authority. Whether the observation of Young CJ in Eq in Hedges v Australasian Conference Association, to which I have referred, sits easily with that authority is not a matter which I need to determine. That case involved a sanction imposed by a tribunal which affected the plaintiff’s ability to earn his livelihood. That was a very different case from the present case, as was Carver v Law Society of NSW, to which his Honour referred.

41 That brings me, then, to the basal question in this case upon which Mr Karis’s entitlement to relief depends. If the Committee was obliged to observe the rules of natural justice, to whom was that obligation owed? Clearly enough, it was owed to those who might be the subject of disciplinary sanction, that is, CCM, Mr Gorman, Mr Jevtic and Mr Jedinak. Mr Karis, however, was the complainant. In that capacity he was not in jeopardy of any sanction. None of the cases referred to on his behalf dealt with the position of a complainant. All of them were concerned with people who were the subject of complaint and who faced the prospect of some administrative action being taken against them. I was referred to no authority that a complainant is entitled to natural justice.

42 Mr Karis relied upon the following statement of Mason J (as he then was), made in a very different context, in Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 at 582:

“It is a fundamental rule of the common law doctrine of natural justice expressed in traditional terms that, generally speaking, when an order is to be made which will deprive a person of some right or interest or the legitimate expectation of a benefit, he is entitled to know the case sought to be made against him and to be given an opportunity of replying to it … .”

For Mr Karis it was submitted that he had a legitimate expectation of a benefit, that is, an order for compensation.

43 The place of the power to order compensation in the disciplinary framework of the regulations was not explored in argument before me. However that may be, it cannot be said that the Committee’s determination deprived Mr Karis of any compensation to which he might be entitled as a result of these events. Clause 9.1 of the regulations provides:

“9.1 In the event of a dispute between a:
(a) Licensed Player Agent and a Player;
(b) Licensed Player Agent and a Club;
(c) Licensed Player Agent and another Licensed Player Agent,
all of whom are licensed or registered with FFA, then such a dispute will be referred to FFA to be resolved pursuant to the FFA Grievance Resolution Regulations.”

It is necessary to examine briefly the Grievance Resolution process.

44 Put shortly, the Grievance Resolution Regulations establish a system of arbitration of disputes such as that arising in the present case. The objective of the regulations is to enable grievances to be heard and determined by a “Judicial Body”, which is independent and impartial and which must apply the rules of natural justice: clauses 3 and 10. It has the power to impose certain disciplinary sanctions and, in contractual matters, to award damages: clause 12.

45 As I have said, Mr Karis lodged an application under those regulations. As I understand it, that application has been in abeyance while these proceedings have been on foot but there is no procedural barrier to its now being pursued. Mr Karis questioned whether there is jurisdiction for the matter to be dealt with in this way because of a definition of “grievance” in clause 1.2 of the regulations which would appear to be inapplicable to the present case. That, however, is expressed to be an inclusive definition and it does not exhaust the types of matters which might be dealt with under the Grievance process. The power to deal with Mr Karis’s dispute through that process clearly emerges from clause 9.1 of the Players’ Agents Regulations.

46 Nor is there any substance in the fear expressed on Mr Karis’s behalf that the Committee’s determination would enable CCM and Mr Gorman to “raise an issue analogous to estoppel in any further grievance procedure”. The Committee arrived at its decision, exercising its jurisdiction under the relevant regulations, upon the material before it, acknowledging Mr Karis’s right to pursue his application under the Grievance Resolution Regulations. He was not relevantly a party to the proceedings before the Committee. In no way could its determination prejudice his right to pursue a remedy through the Grievance process or, indeed, any other avenue which might be available to him at law.

47 Mr Karis made a complaint to FFA which put in train an investigation by the Licensing Committee. The regulations did not require the Committee to conduct that investigation, but it elected to do so. Mr Karis was entitled to put before the Committee any material which he considered relevant, and he did. However, the conduct of the investigation was a matter for the Committee. It was not obliged to keep him informed of its progress and to acquaint him with any additional material it received, so that he might respond to it. There is no substance in Mr Karis’s complaint that a burden of proof was placed upon him. The Committee arrived at findings of fact upon the material it had, after the appropriate pursuit of an inquisitorial process.

48 There is force in the observation, expressed in supplementary written submissions on behalf of FFA, that effectively Mr Karis is inviting this Court to consider the merits of the Committee’s investigation. That, of course, is not the Court’s function in cases such as these. Putting aside the question whether the Committee was bound to give reasons for its decision: cf Public Service Board of NSW v Osmond (1985-86) 159 CLR 656, it is apparent from all I have said that the reasons expressed in the determination are adequate.

49 Accordingly, Mr Karis has not made out a case for relief. The summons is dismissed. If necessary, I shall hear the parties on costs.

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