Elezi v The King
[2025] VSCA 81
•17 April 2025
| SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA COURT OF APPEAL |
| S EAPCR 2024 0183 |
| ARBEN ELEZI | Applicant |
| v | |
| THE KING | Respondent |
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| JUDGES: | BOYCE JA |
| WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
| DATE OF HEARING: | On the papers |
| DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 17 April 2025 |
| MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2025] VSCA 81 |
| JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: | DPP v Elezi [2024] VCC 1362 (Judge Dawes) |
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APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE DETERMINED BY A
SINGLE JUDGE PURSUANT TO S 315 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 2009
CRIMINAL LAW – Application for leave to appeal – Sentence – Cultivation of not less than a commercial quantity of cannabis – Cultivation of cannabis – Possession of cannabis – Theft of electricity – Total effective sentence of 4 years and 6 months’ imprisonment with non-parole period of 2 years and 8 months – Whether reasonably arguable that individual sentences on charges 1 and 2, total effective sentence and non-parole period manifestly excessive – Not reasonably arguable that sentences manifestly excessive – Application for leave to appeal refused.
Vocaj v The King [2023] VSCA 242; Le v The Queen [2021] VSCA 220; Dang v The Queen [2020] VSCA 24; Nguyen v The Queen (2021) 301 A Crim R 1, discussed.
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| Counsel for written submissions | ||
| Applicants: | Ms F Fox | |
| Respondent: | Ms K Curry-Hyde (solicitor) | |
Solicitors | ||
| Applicants: | Ellinghaus Weill Lawyers & Consultants | |
| Respondent: | Ms A Hogan, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions | |
BOYCE JA:
Introduction
The applicant applies for leave to appeal against sentence. The applicant was sentenced for having committed the offences of cultivation of not less than a commercial quantity of a narcotic plant, cultivation of a narcotic plant, theft, and possession of a drug of dependence, namely cannabis. He pleaded guilty. The applicant was sentenced in the County Court on 29 August 2024 as follows.
Charge
Offence
Maximum
Sentence
Cumulation
Indictment N10921631.1 1 Cultivation of narcotic plants – commercial quantity (namely Cannabis L)[1] 25 years 3 years and 6 months Base 2 Cultivation of narcotic plants, (namely Cannabis L)[2] 15 years 1 year and 6 months 6 months 3 Theft[3] 10 years 4 months 2 months 4 Theft[4] 10 years 6 months 4 months 5 Possession of a drug of dependence (namely Cannabis L)[5] 5 years and/or 400 penalty units 6 months Concurrent Total Effective Sentence: 4 years and 6 months’ imprisonment Non-Parole Period: 2 years and 8 months Pre-Sentence Detention Declaration pursuant to s 18(1) of the Sentencing Act 1991: 80 days Section 6AAA Statement: 6 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 4 years Other Relevant Orders: Property forfeiture order [1]Contrary to s 72A of the Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 1981 (‘Drugs Act’).
[2]Contrary to s 72B of the Drugs Act.
[3]Contrary to s 74(1) of the Crimes Act 1958.
[4]Contrary to s 74(1) of the Crimes Act 1958.
[5]Contrary to s 73(1) of the Drugs Act.
The applicant has one proposed ground of appeal. It is expressed in the following terms.
Ground 1: The individual sentences on charges 1 and 2, the orders for cumulation as between all charges, the total effective sentence and non-parole period, in the circumstances of this case, are manifestly excessive.
I would refuse the application for leave. My reasons are as follows.
The offending
On the morning of 6 April 2022, police executed a warrant at the applicant’s home in suburban Melbourne (‘the home address’). Police found a sophisticated hydroponic system in a shed at the rear of the property. The shed contained numerous cannabis plants. An electrical bypass was found in a wall cavity near the meter box. A suitcase containing three plastic bags of dried cannabis weighing 1.32 kilograms was found in the applicant’s bedroom (charge 5).[6] A total of 28 cannabis plants, at varying stages of maturity, were located in three rooms inside the shed: 18 of the plants were small; four plants had been growing for between seven to nine weeks; and six plants had been growing for between nine to 11 weeks. The total weight of the cannabis plants at the home address was 7.47 kilograms (charge 2).
[6]It was not disputed that the applicant’s possession of these drugs related to trafficking: see the Drugs Act, s 73(1)(b)–(c).
An amount of electricity had been stolen at the home address. This was by means of the electrical bypass circuit that had been installed. It was determined that the quantity of electricity stolen was 9,065 kilowatt hours. This was valued at $2,921.65 (charge 3).
On the same day, and at approximately the same time, a warrant was executed at a separate property in suburban Melbourne (‘the second address’). The applicant was the sole tenant of this property. Again, police located a sophisticated hydroponic system in two bedrooms located inside this residence, and in two rooms in a rear shed.
An electrical bypass system was located in the roof cavity of the dwelling at the second address. This bypass system had been supplying unmetered power for the hydroponic system. The quantity of electricity stolen here was estimated at 42,241 kilowatt hours. This stolen electricity was valued at $10,221.38 (charge 4).
A total of 49 cannabis plants were located in separate rooms at the second address. The 15 largest plants had been growing for approximately 17 to 19 weeks. Six plants had been growing for approximately 14 to 16 weeks. Four plants had been growing for approximately five to seven weeks. Three plants had been growing for approximately three to five weeks, and the remaining 21 plants were small. The total weight of the cannabis plants located at the second address was 120.61 kilograms (charge 1).
On 15 April 2022, the applicant made a ‘no comment’ record of interview with police. On 20 July 2022, the applicant arranged to see police again. On this occasion he fully admitted his offending. He told police a number of things: that he had installed the hydroponic system and electrical bypasses; that he — together with his father — had installed CCTV cameras at the second address; that he had tended the plants every day; and that he intended to sell the cannabis to cover expenses, but had yet to conclude a sale. He said that he was unemployed and had been borrowing money from friends.
Sentencing reasons
The judge, in her reasons for sentence, noted that the amount of cannabis found at the second address was ‘more than four and a half times the commercial quantity, measured by weight’.[7] Her Honour noted that the amount of cannabis cultivated at the home address was more than ‘29 times the traffickable quantity, measured by weight’.[8]
[7]DPP v Elezi [2024] VCC 1362, [8] (‘Reasons’). The Drugs Act, sch 11 pt 2 provides that a commercial quantity of Cannabis L is 25 kg or 100 plants.
[8]Reasons, [8]. The Drugs Act, sch 11 pt 2 provides that a traffickable quantity of Cannabis L is 250 grams or 10 plants.
As to the applicant’s role in the offending, the judge observed as follows:
The crops were your own venture throughout the cultivation period. Your offending was objectively serious, as you were the owner, architect and sole operator over several growing spaces at both the addresses of this criminal enterprise. You have also admitted criminal responsibility for the theft of the electricity at each address. The stolen electricity was an integral factor in servicing both sophisticated hydroponic operations for the duration of the cultivation period. It enabled the crop to be cultivated in a discrete indoor location with less risk of detection than would otherwise have been the case and was of considerable value in total. Your motive was to benefit financially. The parties agree that your offending is at a mid-range of seriousness.[9]
[9]Reasons, [12].
The judge noted that the applicant ‘deeply regret[ted]’ his offending, and that the applicant’s explanation for the offending was that his ‘mental health deteriorated during Covid’. The applicant said that he was ‘unable to find employment’ and he was ‘in debt to [his] friends’. The judge noted that there was ‘no evidence’ that the applicant was ‘financially enriched by [his] offending’. The judge considered that the applicant ‘did not appreciate the seriousness of [his] offending or the potential impact on others’.[10]
[10]Reasons, [13].
The judge found that the applicant’s plea of guilty had been entered at an ‘early opportunity and ha[d] a significant utilitarian benefit’. A trial had been avoided. As the judge put it, the utilitarian benefit of the applicant’s plea was ‘enhanced by the fact that Worboyes[11] considerations were engaged’. This resulted in a ‘further sentencing benefit’. The judge found, also, that the applicant’s plea of guilty demonstrated that he had ‘accepted responsibility’, and that he had ‘shown remorse for [his] misconduct’.[12]
[11]Worboyes v The Queen (2021) 96 MVR 344; [2021] VSCA 169.
[12]Reasons, [14].
The judge was prepared to take into account, in the applicant’s favour, that ‘the delay in finalising [the] case [was] a mitigating factor’.[13] The overall delay of ‘more than two years’ had been a ‘source of stress and anxiety’ for the applicant. The applicant had carried a ‘burden of uncertainty of [his] future over an extended period’. The applicant had not offended whilst on bail ‘for more than two years’. The judge accepted that this delay required a ‘level of moderate mitigation’.[14]
[13]Reasons, [15]. It appears that the plea hearing was initially listed in July 2023, and then in February 2024. Both hearings were adjourned because the applicant had difficulties with funding. The plea did not commence until 11 June 2024.
[14]Reasons, [15].
The judge then turned to the applicant’s prior criminal history. The judge summarised this history. It comprised
seven previous appearances in the summary jurisdiction between November 2008 and May 2021.[15]
[15]Reasons, [16].
As the judge put it:
[The applicant has] prior convictions for numerous driving offences including alcohol related matters. [The applicant has] previously received two community corrections orders which have both included therapeutic treatment for alcohol abuse, one of which was not complied with. [The applicant has] not previously committed any drug related offences.[16]
[16]Reasons, [16].
The judge considered that the ‘current incident’ demonstrated an ‘escalation in the seriousness of [the applicant’s] offending’.[17]
[17]Reasons, [16].
The judge took into account that the applicant was born in Kosovo in 1985 and was, at the time of sentence, 39 years of age.[18] It was noted that when, in 1998, war erupted in Kosovo, this marked ‘the start of a tumultuous period’ for the applicant. As the judge described it:
As a teenager [the applicant] witnessed brutal atrocities and [he] saw a lot of people who were killed, including some that [the applicant] knew. [The applicant] recall[ed] an incident where [his] family was at risk, although they fortunately survived. [The applicant’s] family all fled to a refugee camp in Macedonia and remained there for 12 months. In 1999 [the applicant’s] family relocated to Australia. [The applicant] spent one year at an army camp in Wodonga, then relocated to Perth for one year before [he] returned to Melbourne where [the applicant has] remained.[19]
[18]Reasons, [17].
[19]Reasons, [18].
The judge noted that the applicant ‘felt a sense of alienation’ upon his arrival in Australia. He experienced difficulty adjusting. The applicant had been an ‘inattentive student and left school at Year 10’. Although the applicant had a history of work, he had been unemployed for ‘around the last six years’; he had been ‘in receipt of Centrelink benefits’; and he had ‘borrowed money from friends’.[20]
[20]Reasons, [19]–[20].
The applicant had a ‘longstanding history of problematic alcohol use’. This had ‘escalated to 40–50 beers per day during the COVID lockdown period’. Such abuse of alcohol had continued up until the time of the plea. The applicant denied any link between his consumption of alcohol and his offending behaviour.[21] The applicant had experienced symptoms of withdrawal from alcohol upon his reception in prison.[22]
[21]Reasons, [21].
[22]Reasons, [22].
The applicant had a supportive family. He had expressed ‘genuine remorse’ for his ‘criminal actions’. The judge accepted that such remorse was ‘consistent with [the applicant’s] plea of guilty’. The applicant’s desire to undergo a second interview with police, during which he made admissions, was ‘also indicative of remorse’. The judge was ‘prepared to moderate [the applicant’s] sentence to reflect that’.[23]
[23]Reasons, [24]–[25].
At the plea hearing, the judge ordered a Forensicare report. Extensive reference was made by the judge, in her sentencing reasons, to the content of a Forensicare report authored by Dr Caitlyn Robertson. The judge noted that the report’s author had opined that the applicant ‘did not appear to fully appreciate the seriousness of [his] offending and provided little insight into [his] reasons’.[24]
[24]Reasons, [27].
Nevertheless, Dr Roberston described that the applicant had been exposed to potentially traumatic events after war had broken out in Kosovo. The applicant had experienced a level of difficulty fitting into Australian life; he presented with a ‘lifelong tendency towards avoidant coping’; he sought solace in alcohol to ‘suppress discomfort’ which likely caused a ‘deterioration in [the applicant’s] cognitive capacities’; the applicant met the criteria for a ‘severe alcohol use disorder’; he did not meet the ‘diagnostic criteria for a mental illness or post-traumatic stress disorder’; and Dr Robertson considered that ‘there is little to suggest [the applicant] would experience a prison sentence as more burdensome than [his] peers’.[25]
[25]Reasons, [28].
Given the difficulties experienced by the applicant during his upbringing, the judge ‘accept[ed] that the principles of Bugmy[26] are applicable to the overall sentencing process here’. As the judge observed:
I accept that your moral culpability is reduced. The principles of deterrence, denunciation and just punishment should also be moderated, although they are still relevant and should not be eliminated entirely.[27]
[26]Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571; [2013] HCA 37.
[27]Reasons, [30].
The judge remarked, however, that ‘[t]his is counterbalanced … by the principle of community protection which remains a relevant sentencing consideration’.[28] The judge observed that
[The applicant] was assessed by Dr Robertson as a high risk of re-offending. [The applicant] require[d] a high degree of intervention and support to address [his] criminogenic needs and to mitigate [his] risk for future offending. [The applicant’s] prospects are linked to [his] capacity to avoid relapse into alcoholism and to deal with [his] issues, which would benefit both [him] and the community.[29]
[28]Reasons, [30].
[29]Reasons, [31].
The judge was prepared to accept that the applicant’s ‘prospects are not unreasonable’.[30]
[30]Reasons, [32].
Nevertheless, the judge considered that a term of imprisonment was ‘the only appropriate disposition for this offence’. But the judge ‘intend[ed] to impose a longer period on parole that will allow [the applicant’s] monitoring and supervision, to facilitate [his] rehabilitation’.[31]
[31]Reasons, [33].
The judge recorded that cannabis can cause ‘great harm’ to those who use it, and that the impact of cannabis use can spread to the users’ ‘families and the wider community’. The judge considered that the ‘potential financial benefit to be gained by a commercial level of cultivation is relevant’. As the judge observed:
The amount of cannabis involved here significantly exceeded the threshold of a commercial quantity. [The applicant’s] offending was objectively serious, having regard to the sophisticated set up, [his] role in the enterprise and the duration of [his] offending. [The applicant] admit[s] that [he was] the principal offender. Notwithstanding [the applicant’s] mitigating factors, I consider that a term of imprisonment for each count is the only appropriate disposition.[32]
[32]Reasons, [34].
The judge noted that ‘[g]eneral deterrence must be recognised as the principal sentencing consideration’ and that it ‘remains at the forefront of sentencing here, notwithstanding the application of Bugmy’.[33] The judge quoted from a passage found in Nguyen v The Queen.[34] The judge took into account the applicable maximum penalties, current sentencing practice, totality and the fact that the applicant was not to be doubly punished. The judge said that she had ‘endeavoured to tailor [the applicant’s] sentence to ensure that it is proportionate to [his] overall criminal conduct’.[35]
[33]Reasons, [35].
[34](2021) 301 A Crim R 1; [2021] VSCA 211 (‘Nguyen’). Ngyuen was a case where this Court (at 9–10 [44]–[46]) remarked that sentencing practices for commercial quantity cannabis cultivation needed to increase.
[35]Reasons, [36].
The judge then imposed the sentences referred to above.
Ground 1
Submissions
In submitting that the sentences imposed were ‘manifestly too much’ the applicant emphasised the following matters. They were: that while the offending occurred across two premises, it was ‘all conducted in a similar way, and involved only the offender’; that the pleas of guilty were early and were entered during the COVID-19 pandemic; that the applicant had a ‘disadvantaged background’; that the applicant had made ‘significant admissions’ indicative of remorse which ‘formed part of the prosecution case in proof of the charges’; that the theft on charge 3 ‘involved a more modest value of electricity’; that the orders for cumulation on the theft sentences represented a significant proportion of those individual sentences; that the theft sentences were manifestly excessive because the ‘thefts were intrinsically linked to the cultivation’; and that the applicant did not possess any ‘relevant criminal history’.
The applicant sought to contrast the sentence imposed upon the applicant for the commercial cultivation charge (charge 1) with a sentence for this offence that was upheld by this Court in Vocaj v The King.[36] In Vocaj, a sentence of 3 years and 3 months’ imprisonment was imposed in respect of one ‘rolled-up’ charge of commercial cultivation after a plea of guilty. This charge related to 68 plants weighing a total of 110.5 kilograms. The offender in Vocaj was — objectively speaking — performing a role of lesser importance than the role played by the applicant. The role of the offender in Vocaj was described as being ‘at a lower level than the true organisers and entrepreneurs’.[37]
[36][2023] VSCA 242 (‘Vocaj’).
[37]Ibid [28] (Walker and Macaulay JJA), quoting DPP v Vocaj [2022] VCC 1659, [6] (Judge Mullaly).
The applicant also drew attention to the 6 months’ cumulation ordered in respect of the charge 2 sentence, as well as the fact that the orders for cumulation on both theft charges (charges 3 and 4) represented a proportion of 50% — or more — of the length of each individual theft sentence. The applicant submitted that these orders for cumulation produced a total effective sentence that was manifestly excessive.
It was submitted that the sentences imposed failed properly to reflect the applicant’s pleas as well as the ‘palpable’ discount that those pleas ought to have attracted in light of the backlog of cases caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.[38] It was submitted that it was relevant, in this regard, that the applicant had ultimately made extensive admissions; that these admissions were relied on by the prosecution; and that the matter had resolved at an ‘early stage’. It was submitted, also, that the sentences imposed did not reflect the applicant’s difficult background; nor did the sentences reflect the judge’s appreciation of the fact that the High Court’s Bugmy decision had a role to play in the sentencing calculus.
[38]The applicant sought to contrast the present charge 1 and 2 sentences with the sentences that had been imposed in Le v The Queen [2021] VSCA 220 (‘Le’); Dang v The Queen [2020] VSCA 24 (‘Dang’); and Nguyen (2021) 301 A Crim R 1; [2021] VSCA 211. These cases will be returned to below.
The respondent submitted that the sentencing judge had taken into account all relevant matters, and had not imposed sentences that were manifestly excessive. Indeed, the respondent submitted that the cases referred to by the applicant[39] — including Vocaj — supported the conclusion that the sentences imposed for the cultivation offences in this case were unremarkable.
[39]Le, Dang and Nguyen.
Analysis
As Niall JA and Weinberg JA observed in Dang; in order for the applicant to succeed on a proposed ground of appeal alleging manifest excess:
[T]he applicant must show that the sentence ordered was wholly outside the permissible range having regard to the quantity of the drugs, the role of the applicant and his personal circumstances. It is plainly necessary to have regard to comparable sentences, especially given that these types of offences are often conducted in a similar way and the offenders may have few distinguishing features that they can call on in aid in mitigation.[40]
[40]Dang [2020] VSCA 24, [19].
I am not persuaded that the applicant’s proposed ground 1 is reasonably arguable. It is not reasonably arguable that the sentences imposed on charges 1 and 2, the orders for cumulation, the total effective sentence and non-parole period are manifestly excessive.
The charge 1 sentence, I consider, properly reflects all relevant sentencing considerations that arose in the present case, including those matters that were mitigatory. Indeed, the judge’s reasons for sentence contend with all relevant features of the case. And the sentence imposed of 3 years and 6 months’ imprisonment for charge 1, to my mind, sits comfortably alongside current sentencing practice for offending of this nature.
The maximum penalty of 25 years reflects the Legislature’s view that offending of this type is considered very serious. As the judge recognised, the cannabis cultivated at the second address, by weight, stood at almost five times the relevant commercial quantity. A relatively sophisticated hydroponic system had been constructed, and — importantly — the applicant had assumed the role of principal offender: it was his crop; he planted and tended it; and it was the applicant who stood to reap financial rewards consequent upon any sale.
In Vocaj, this Court gave consideration to whether a sentence of 3 years and 3 months’ imprisonment imposed for a ‘rolled-up’ charge of commercial cultivation was excessive.[41] The Court noted that in Dang and Nguyen (where there were pleas of guilty) it had been shown that ‘sentences above 3 years and 6 months’ imprisonment are not unusual for people who play a low-level functionary role, and a range of sentences for comparable amounts of cannabis’.[42] Of course, the applicant’s role in this case was not that of a ‘low-level functionary’.
[41]See [32] above.
[42]Vocaj [2023] VSCA 242, [45].
The Court in Vocaj also offered the following summary of the other authorities upon which the applicant relied in this case, namely, Le, Dang and Nguyen.
In [Le], Niall JA, with whom Priest JA agreed, upheld a sentence of 5 years’ imprisonment for cultivation of just less than twice the commercial quantity of cannabis where the offender pleaded guilty. That case may be distinguished from the present case in some respects: the applicant there had prior convictions for trafficking in heroin; and the applicant was entirely responsible for the undertaking and stood to gain whatever rewards accrued from the activity. Those matters may explain why the offender in that matter received a significantly greater sentence than the appellant in this matter. But Le supports a conclusion that the sentence imposed on the appellant was not manifestly excessive.
In [Dang] a sentence of 3 years and 4 months’ imprisonment was imposed on a person whose role was ‘slightly above’ that of a crop-sitter, for cultivation of just over twice the commercial quantity of cannabis. In [Nguyen] a sentence of 5 years and 6 months’ imprisonment was imposed for cultivation of 10 times the commercial quantity.[43]
[43]Ibid [43]–[44].
The Court in Vocaj considered that these authorities established that the sentence of 3 years and 3 months’ imprisonment in that case was consistent with current sentencing practice.[44] I consider that the same might be said of the sentence imposed on charge 1. Whilst the offenders in Le, Dang and Nguyen might not have been entitled to a Worboyes discount, the offender in Vocaj did enjoy such a benefit. And — in that respect — as this Court observed, further, in Vocaj:
[C]omparable cases are not to be treated as precedents. While conformity with principle and consistency in approach will often result in comparable outcomes across different cases, the outcome in one case cannot dictate the outcome in another. Even where there is a discernible pattern, current sentencing practice does not set the limits of the sentencing discretion.[45]
[44]Ibid [43].
[45]Ibid [47].
Having determined that it is not reasonably arguable that the sentence imposed on charge 1 is manifestly excessive, attention naturally then focuses upon the orders for cumulation which produce the total effective sentence.[46] The applicant’s submission is that the order of 6 months’ cumulation on the charge 2 sentence, and the orders of 2 months’ and 4 months’ cumulation imposed respectively in connection with the charge 3 and 4 sentences, are all manifestly excessive. To repeat, the applicant here places specific reliance on the fact that the orders cumulating 2 months and 4 months of each theft sentence are significant, especially given the length of each individual theft sentence.
[46]For, even if the charge 2 sentence was manifestly excessive, the Court of Appeal may refuse an application for leave to appeal if ‘there is no reasonable prospect that the Court of Appeal would reduce the total effective sentence despite there being an error in the sentence first imposed’: Criminal Procedure Act 2009, s 280(1)(b). For completeness, and in view of the matters that were of relevance to the charge 1 sentence; when those same matters are appropriately considered in assessing the charge 2 sentence, again, I cannot conclude that it is reasonably arguable that the charge 2 sentence is manifestly excessive.
I am not persuaded that it is reasonably arguable that the order of 6 months’ cumulation on the charge 2 sentence is manifestly excessive. This measure of cumulation appropriately reflects the existence of an entirely separate hydroponic endeavour taking place at a different address. Again, the applicant assumed the role of principal offender. In these circumstances, I consider that it was well open to the sentencing judge to order the level of cumulation that she did on charge 2.
Whilst it is true that, as a proportion of the individual sentences imposed on the two theft charges, the level of cumulation ordered in respect of these sentences stands at 50% or above; I am not persuaded that it is reasonably arguable that the 2 months’ cumulation ordered on charge 3, and the 4 months’ cumulation ordered on charge 4, are manifestly excessive. As the sentencing judge noted, the theft the subject of charge 4 stood at a value of $10,221.38. I consider that it was well open to the sentencing judge to register that separate offending by means of an order for cumulation of 4 months’ duration.
Thus, I am not persuaded — all things considered — that it is reasonably arguable that the total effective sentence imposed in this case was manifestly excessive. The non-parole period of 2 years and 8 months represents just below 60% of the total effective term. The minimum term ordered properly reflects, therefore, the judge’s desire to impose a period on parole that permits the applicant to be monitored and supervised so that his rehabilitation may best be facilitated. By no means, I consider, is it reasonably arguable that this non-parole period is manifestly excessive.
Conclusion
The application for leave to appeal against sentence must be refused.
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