El-Tarraf v Franklins Limited

NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL

CITATION: El-Tarraf v. Franklins Limited [2001] NSWCA 463

FILE NUMBER(S):
40438/01

HEARING DATE(S): 5 Deccember 2001

JUDGMENT DATE: 10/12/2001

PARTIES:
Joe El-Tarraf - appellant
Franklins Limited - respondent

JUDGMENT OF: Hodgson JA Foster AJA Ipp AJA

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Supreme Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S): CLD 20162/99

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER: Newman AJ

COUNSEL:
Mr. L. King SC (A)
Mr. J. McIntyre SC with J. Fredman (R)

SOLICITORS:
Carroll & O'Dea, Sydney (A)
Sparke Helmore, Sydney (R)

CATCHWORDS:
COURTS AND JUDGES - Judgments - Sufficiency of reasons - Claim dismissed without finding whether or not plaintiff's evidence accepted. ND.

LEGISLATION CITED:

DECISION:
See par.44 of judgment

JUDGMENT:

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL

CA 40438/01
SC 20162/99
HODGSON JA
FOSTER AJA
IPP AJA

Monday 10th December 2001

EL-TARRAF V. FRANKLINS LIMITED
Judgment

HODGSON JA: On 22nd May 2001, Newman AJ gave a verdict for the respondent Franklins Limited in proceedings brought against it by the appellant Joe El-Tarraf, seeking damages for injury allegedly caused by a breach of the respondent’s duties as the appellant’s employer. The primary judge found that the respondent had breached its duty to the appellant as his employer, but that the relevant thresholds to obtain an award of damages for economic and non-economic loss were not reached. The appellant has appealed to this Court from that decision.
CIRCUMSTANCES
The appellant was born in Lebanon in 1952. He came to Australia in 1977, and quickly obtained employment in Huttons Meat Factory, where he worked for about one year. He then worked for about seven months in a printing operation, and about six months in a metal factory. Between 1979 and 1983, he operated a fruit shop at Lakemba with his brother. Between 1984 and 1987 he worked for Besco Batteries, and then he worked in the building industry for about eight months.
In November 1987, he started working for the respondent, initially on assembly work, and from 1988 as a loader on country trucks.
The first physical problems suffered by the appellant of which there was evidence were problems with his left foot, conceded by the appellant in cross-examination to have occurred in 1989. The appellant accepted that he went to see Dr. Kurrle, and was given a pain-killing drug.
The appellant married in 1990, and he has five children born between 1991 and 2000.
There was some cross-examination of the appellant concerning an alleged injury to his right ankle in January 1991, but the appellant said he did not remember that injury, and no evidence about it was led.
On 7th March 1995, the appellant was injured at work when he jumped off a forklift truck, and contemporary documents record lower back pain and also pain and weakness in the right leg. It seems that the appellant was off work for a week or two at that time.
There is in evidence a report dated 12th December 1995 of an x-ray of the appellant’s lumbar spine addressed to the appellant’s general practitioner Dr. Chwah. There is also in evidence a report of the respondent’s investigator, tendered by the appellant, noting strain to the appellant’s lower left back, neck and shoulder after picking up a box on 30th November 1995.
The accident with which these proceedings are concerned occurred on 4th April 1996. The appellant was then employed as a loader at the respondent’s depot at Chullora. The practice was that trucks would reverse to a loading dock, and goods would be loaded onto the trucks by the appellant and other employees. To assist in this process, the respondent provided a device known as a dock leveller, which formed a bridge between the dock and the truck, and was hinged along the edge abutting the loading dock. It appears that the dock leveller being used by the appellant on that day was faulty, and had been faulty for some time, with the result that a system had been developed whereby a person would jump on the leveller in order that it be lowered into position.
On the occasion of the accident, the appellant was standing on the leveller, and the truck driver came to help him and jumped on the leveller, causing the appellant to fall and land awkwardly on his right knee. The appellant felt pain and yelled out, and later that morning went to see the first aid employee at Franklins.
Between the time of the accident and October 1996, the appellant continued at work, doing the same work as before with some time off; but, according to the appellant’s evidence, he was having a lot of pain in his knee.
The appellant first consulted a doctor about the injury on 16th April 1996, when he saw the Franklins company doctor. He saw this doctor on a total of a further five occasions until and including 1st September 1996, when this doctor referred the appellant to a specialist.
The appellant first consulted the orthopaedic surgeon Dr. Rowden on 20th September 1996. On 23rd October 1996, an arthroscopy was performed by Dr. Rowden on the appellant’s right knee. The main finding was a radial tear in the lateral meniscus in the middle third, and the portion of torn meniscus was removed. According to Dr. Rowden’s report, there was a stable rim remaining, the medial meniscus was intact, and there was no significant articular cartilage damage.
On 30th October 1996, Dr. Rowden certified that the appellant was fit to return to modified duties on 8th November 1996.
On 21st November 1996, the appellant’s general practitioner Dr. Chwah certified that the appellant was fit for suitable duties from 21st November 1996, with no heavy lifting, long standing or walking, or excessive use of his right leg.
The appellant continued on light duties with the respondent until 15th August 1997, when the respondent’s Chullora depot closed. It appears that the appellant was offered an assembly job at the respondent’s new Yennora depot, but according to the appellant he could not accept this job because he would not be able to drive for the forty or forty-five minutes required to get there. The appellant accepted redundancy, receiving a total payment of about $54,000.00, being about $23,000.00 superannuation and about $31,000.00 redundancy.
After extensive rehabilitation, the appellant took a job as a console operator in a petrol station in June 1998, working there four hours a day for six weeks. He has not been employed since that time.
In the Statement of Claim in these proceedings, the appellant alleged injuries and disabilities including pain in the right ankle, right hip, neck and lower back.
The appellant gave evidence to the effect that since the accident he had a lot of pain in his knee, which is there all the time; that because of this pain he never went back to his loading job; that when he was working four hours a day as a console operator, he was working with very bad pain and stood up as the station was not too busy; that with his pain he could do 15 to 20 hours a week light work, which had to involve both sitting down and standing up; that in early 1997 he developed pain in his lower back which he still has (having had none prior to the accident apart from a week or two in 1995); that he cannot carry his one-year old son; that he cannot drive for long with his knee pain; that he cannot look after his lawn and garden; and that neck pain came on in about 1997.
JUDGMENT OF THE PRIMARY JUDGE
The primary judge briefly recounted the circumstances of the accident, and found that the appellant had proved a breach of the respondent’s duty of care.
He noted that the assessment of damages in cases of industrial injuries such as this were governed by the Workers Compensation Act 1987, and he pointed out that s.151G(4) precluded recovery for non-economic loss if the amount of non-economic loss was assessed to be $38,850.00 or less, that being some 17% of the maximum amount which may be awarded in a most extreme case. He also noted that s.151H of the Act relevantly precluded damages for economic loss unless the injured worker had suffered a “serious injury”, the relevant test in this case being an injury for which damages for non-economic loss of not less than $51,100.00 are awarded.
The primary judge then reviewed the medical evidence in the case, firstly noting reports from treating doctors Dr. Rowden, Dr. Lewington, Dr. Patapanian, Dr. Kirsh and Dr. Rosenberg. He noted that only Dr. Kirsh related the symptoms complained about, apart from the right leg, to the accident.
The primary judge then reviewed the medico-legal reports, namely those of Dr. Seaton, Dr. Wallace, Dr. Buckely and Dr. Mahony for the appellant, and Dr. Flood, Dr. Carr, Dr. Millons and Dr. Kerenty for the respondent.
Out of all the doctors who provided reports, only Dr. Carr gave oral evidence. The primary judge noted that Dr. Carr’s assessed the plaintiff as having a 5% permanent loss of function in his right leg at or above the knee as a result of the accident, and that Dr. Carr excluded the appellant’s other complaints as being related to that incident. The primary judge noted that Dr. Carr was subjected to searching cross-examination, that he gave his evidence in a clear and persuasive fashion, and that he found Dr. Carr’s evidence to be entirely acceptable.
The primary judge continued:
30 On the evidence before me I conclude that the plaintiff's disability as a consequence of the incident of 4 April 1996 is confined to his right leg. It may be seen that many practitioners have been unable to ascribe any disability to his back. neck or other parts of his body to that incident. Those who do, would seem to stand quite apart in their views from the majority of doctors who have seen him whether by way of treatment or on behalf of either of the parties on a medico-legal basis. It is for this reason that I am of the view that the plaintiff has not been able to establish on a balance of probabilities that he has a disability related to the injury of 4 April 1996 other than in his right leg. I accept the view that the injury suffered to his right leg was, in fact, one of a not severe type. That being so it is my view that the plaintiff has failed to establish: (a), that he has a serious injury for the purposes of Section 150H(2A) of the Workers Compensation Act and, (b), that he has failed to prove that he has established a claim for damages for non-economic loss of at least $38,850, that is 17% of the maximum amount which may be awarded under the Act under this head. I am also of the view that the plaintiff has failed to establish that he has a need to have domestic assistance of the type he claims. In this regard I have found Dr Carr's views to be persuasive. It follows that as the plaintiff's medical expenses have been already paid under the Workers Compensation Act that the plaintiff's claim for damages, even though he has established a breach of duty, must fail. In my view, therefore, there must be a verdict for the defendant I shall defer making any order as to costs until after the delivery of these reasons.
GROUNDS OF APPEAL
The appellant relied on the following grounds of appeal:
1.            Having found that the Appellant had made out a case on liability, His Honour failed to consider the evidence of the Appellant in any or any sufficient detail in determining whether the Appellant would surmount the relevant thresholds to obtain awards of damages for economic loss and non-economic loss.
2.            His Honour failed to provide adequate reasons for deciding that the Appellant was not entitled to recover damages.
3.            His Honour failed to adequately or properly consider the effect of the Appellant’s injuries and disabilities upon the Appellant, preferring instead to review the medical evidence particularly with regard to assessments of permanent impairment.
4.            His Honour erred in failed to consider adequately or at all the evidence as to the Respondent’s attempts to rehabilitate the Appellant into the workforce and the fact that the Respondent did not continue to provide employment suitable to the Appellant’s disabilities.
5.            His Honour erred in failing to make any findings as to the credit of the Appellant or the acceptability of his evidence as to the level of his disability.
SUBMISSIONS
For the appellant, the following written submissions were provided to the Court:
1. The Appellant suffered injury at work due to the negligence of his employer, the Respondent. Newman AJ entered a verdict for the Respondent as the Appellant had failed to surmount thresholds for damages for non-economic loss and economic loss under the Workers’ Compensation Act. However the decision below was based entirely upon a review of medical evidence. His Honour completely failed to consider or make findings as to the evidence, virtually unchallenged in cross-examination, concerning the effect of the injuries and disabilities upon the Plaintiff. The judgment also failed to provide any sufficient reasons for the conclusion which must have involved rejection of the medical evidence in support of the Appellant's case.
2. The material as to the Appellant's injuries and disabilities was contained in his evidence (T 1-45, 54), the chronology (exhibit C) and histories contained in various medical reports (exhibit D). In short, it painted a picture of a man who had worked diligently in physical occupations since arriving in Australia in 1977 until the time of his accident at Franklins on 4 April 1996.
3. Following the injury the Appellant had been unable to return to full physical duties. The contrary was never suggested to the Appellant in cross-examination. The only tentative challenge to the Appellant's evidence comprised the following propositions, all of which were rejected and were without foundation:
(a) that he did not tell Doctors the truth (T 35.15);
(b) that he had some previous medical problems which were in some specified way relevant, but that the Appellant did not tell any Doctors about such "pre-existing problems" (T36 -38.25);
(c) that the Appellant took a redundancy payment in August 1997 so that he could buy a house (T39, 42);
(d) that the Appellant was not genuine in seeking employment since leaving Franklins (T42.40) and that he had no desire to go back to work because he was receiving Workers' Compensation or Social Security benefits (T43.10).
4. It was never suggested to the Appellant:
(a) that he was fit for his former duties or any work outside that prescribed by his Doctors;
(b) that his complaints of pain and disability were not genuine;
(c) that he could do more physical activity than he said he could.
5. Particularly in the absence of:
(a) any mention of, or finding as to, the Appellant's demeanour or credit, or the acceptability of his evidence; and
(b) any reason for rejecting the Appellant's medical case (with the exception of the guarded statements about Dr Kirsh not being called - see paragraph 15 - and the reference to Dr Mahony's assessments of permanent impairment being different from other doctors )
there was no basis for His Honour to enter a judgment which effectively involved complete rejection of the Appellant's lay and medical evidence.
6. Against this background of the Appellant's evidence being left virtually untouched by any challenge in cross-examination, His Honour's judgment fails to contain the three fundamental elements set out in Beale v GIO (1997) 48 NSWLR 430:
(a) a Judge should refer to relevant evidence;
(b ) a Judge should set out any material findings of fact and any conclusions or ultimate findings of fact;
(c) a Judge should provide reasons for making the relevant findings of fact and reasons in applying the law to the facts found.
The result of this failure is sufficient to lead to a real sense of grievance, in that there is no clear explanation of why the Appellant was unsuccessful at trial.
7. Some of the principal points emerging from the Appellant's evidence were:
(a) the Appellant had an excellent work record in physically demanding jobs (T2-8) and had never made a compensation claim before the present claim (T45.35);
(b) after the accident in April 1996 the Appellant continued at work for six months with a lot of pain, seeing the Franklins' Doctors just about every week and having physiotherapy and pain killers (TI4);
(c) after an operation to repair a torn lateral meniscus in October 1996 the Appellant resumed work on light duties, and never went back to his former heavy duties (T14 -15);
(d) he took redundancy at a time when he was on light duties in August 1997 (T41.l5 -35, T44.40), when the Franklins' depot at Chullora closed down, as he could not do his former job assembling at the new Yennora depot and he could not drive the distance from his home (T15, 17);
(e) after extensive rehabilitation he was given a job as a console operator in a petrol station working four hours a day in June 1998 but he had bad knee pain (T15 -16);
(f) he has continued looking for work, and could do 15 to 20 hours’ light work per week (TI6);
(g) he is unable to attend to his lawns and garden (T19.50) and an Occupational Therapist, Glynis Flanagan, prescribed three hours per week for garden and household maintenance tasks and 1.5 hours per week for household tasks as being a reasonable need;
(h) back pain came on in early 1997 because of problems with his gait (T20.45 and the report of Dr Seaton dated 2 September 1998);
(i) the knee pain interferes with his social and family activities (T21.50 - 22.35);
(j) the Appellant was certified fit only for modified or light duties by his treating Doctors at all times after the initial incident and subsequent surgery.
8. Dr Flood, Consultant Surgeon, reported to Franklins on several occasions. He found the Appellant's symptoms to be genuine, that he was not fit for full duties and should be monitored by a rehabilitation nurse. The Appellant underwent extensive rehabilitation under the care of CRS from October 1997 to January 1999 by which time the rehabilitation consultant still only certified the Appellant fit for part-time work as a console-operator. On 23 December 1998 the rehabilitation consultant reported three episodes of increasing pain each time the Appellant attempted to upgrade his activity level.
9. Dr Buckley stated that in view of the deterioration of osteo arthritis in the right knee, the Appellant would require a total knee replacement at an earlier stage than would have been the case but for the accident. Dr Buckley's statement about the Appellant's capacity to work as a storeman until retirement age was not based upon a complete history of the Appellant's progress since the initial accident.
10. His Honour found that the Appellant had only a disability relating to the right leg (paragraph 30). Yet His Honour failed to:
(a) make any finding as to the extent of the effect of that disability upon the Appellant's enjoyment of the amenities of life and his ability to engage in employment. All the medical reports, with the exception of Dr Carr , conceded that the Appellant was not fit for his former physical duties, and even Dr Carr appeared to concede as much in evidence (T51.5, 53.30).
(b ) assess the extent of non-economic loss in percentage terms;
(c) undertake the exercise of determining whether the Appellant satisfied either threshold test under section 151H Workers' Compensation Act for an award of damages for economic loss;
(d) give any reason as to why the Appellant had not established a need for domestic assistance, when even Dr Millons, in the Respondent's case, conceded a need for two hours per week domestic assistance.
11. The appropriate findings on the evidence should have led to the conclusion that the Appellant had satisfied the tests for obtaining damages for non-economic loss (ie greater than 17% of a most extreme case) and damages for economic loss (ie greater than 23% of a most extreme case for non-economic loss, or greater than 25% of the maximum amount pursuant to section 66(1)). Such findings would have led to an award of damages in terms of the attached Schedule, and it is submitted that the Court could assess damages on the present material rather than return the matter for a new trial.

Mr. King SC for the appellant in oral submissions put that it was a surprising decision to hold that the non-economic loss of the appellant should not be assessed at 17% of a most extreme case, where the appellant had undergone a knee operation, had given evidence of considerable pain and considerable disability, and had been the subject of no adverse credit finding. Even on the least favourable view of the case, the knee injury and disability alone would pass the threshold; and in any event the judge had given no reasons for approaching the case on that least favourable basis.
The primary judge had decided the case entirely on the basis of acceptance of Dr. Carr’s evidence: yet this evidence was incompatible with full acceptance of the appellant’s evidence, involved unsatisfactory and inconsistent evidence about rehabilitation, acknowledged that not all information had been read, and did not provide any reasoned response to the opinion of the treating surgeon Dr. Rowden.
In written submissions for the respondent, the following was put:
9. There were reasons for his Honour to find that the immediate effect of the right knee injury could not be severe. Apart from first aid the appellant did not consult his general practitioner until about five weeks later (TP26.56).
10. The real problems complained about were not limited to the appellant's right knee - the appellant saw a number of doctors (TP27.24-28.35) and complained of aches and pains all around his body (TP28.48). These problems included:
(a) neck pain which came on in about 1997 (TP28.55)
(b) pain that radiates from the neck into each arm (TP29.16-30.25)
(c) bilateral elbow pain (TP30.33-.50)
(d) pain radiating in to each forearm (TP30.55)
(e) pain and numbness in both hands (TP31.2)
(f) lower back pain which radiated in to both legs and which commenced in early 1997 (TP20.17-.42, 33.47-34.6)
(g) left knee pain similar to that felt on the right side (TP34.8-14)
(h) pain [in] the right ankle (TP34.18).
11. A large number of medical reports were tendered. There was a great deal of conflict between the various doctors.
12. Dr Gregory Carr, a consultant rheumatologist with 20 years’ experience, was called to give evidence. His Honour found that Dr Carr was subjected to a "searching cross-examination" (Red 20P). Dr Carr's evidence established the following:
(a) there was no medical nor scientific means of causally connecting the widespread muscular skeletal complaints of pain with the incident on 4 April 1996 (TP47.56-48.3);
(b) any problem in the right knee was not severe (TP49.11-17).
The judgment below
13. Newman AJ recognised the real issue in the first paragraph of his judgment when he referred to the question of the liability to pay damages under the Workers Compensation Act 1987 being the subject of "strong contest" (Red 17P).
14. The simple facts of the matter where then recounted by his Honour in a way about which no complaint is made (Red 17Q-X). Newman AJ then carefully set out relevant parts of the medical evidence, including those parts which did and did not support the appellant's case (Red 18G-20Q). In this respect Newman AJ explicitly accepted the evidence of Dr Carr (Red 20P; 20U).
15. It is on this basis that Newman AJ concluded that the injury was not severe (Red 20S) and that as such the appellant failed to establish:
(a) that he had passed the threshold to obtain economic loss, that is, a serious injury for the purposes of s150H(2A) of the 1987 Act; and
(b) that he has passed the threshold so [as] to qualify to obtain damages for non-economic loss (Red 20T); and
(c) that he had a need for domestic assistance (Red 20U).
16. As the medical expenses had already been paid by Franklins, Newman AJ found a verdict for the defendant.
Respondent's submissions
17. The real substance of the appellant's submissions seem to be directed at a failure by Newman AJ to give reasons. With respect, that cannot be so: it is a judgment expressed with admirable clarity and concision; the appellant would, if he read the judgment, be under no misapprehension as to why his case failed; there are no internal inconsistencies or illogicalities. The judgment reflects a typical example of a common law trial requiring the tribunal of fact to make determinations in the face of conflicting evidence.
In oral submissions, Mr. McIntyre SC for the respondent submitted that Dr. Carr had dealt adequately with views put by other doctors.
He submitted that the primary judge decided the case on the assumption that the appellant was genuine in his evidence about the pain he suffered and about what he could not do, and he did not submit that the pain actually felt and distress caused to the plaintiff could not be taken into account for the purposes of determining whether the s.151G threshold was passed. However, he submitted, the determination of the percentage of a most extreme case was an objective one, and the primary judge’s determination was properly based upon the medical evidence, in particular that of Dr. Carr.
He submitted that, in so far as the appellant claimed to have suffered pain and disabilities in relation to matters other than his right knee, it was open to the primary judge to find that those matters were not caused by the accident. Even accepting the appellant fully, the primary judge could have accepted Dr. Carr’s evidence that these other symptoms were “somatoform”, and then proceeded on the basis that no claim was made by the appellant on the basis of psycho-somatic injury and no psychiatric evidence was called by the appellant, so that these other symptoms could be disregarded.
He submitted that the primary judge was not required to do more than he did: it is not necessary to set out every last detail of the reasoning: Soulemezis v. Dudley (Holdings) Pty. Limited (1987) 10 NSWLR 247.
In reply, Mr. King submitted that the appellant in the Statement of Claim did particularise the injuries and disabilities other than those relating to his right knee, and the circumstance that the causation of these injuries and disabilities may have been psycho-somatic would not put the matter outside the pleading and particulars. It was not necessary to have evidence from a psychiatrist to prove that kind of causation: it would have been open to the primary judge to find causation proved from the lay evidence and the evidence of Dr. Carr and Dr. Lewington. Accordingly, if the primary judge accepted or assumed the genuineness of the appellant’s evidence, he should have addressed the question of causation of these injuries and disabilities.
If the primary judge had decided the case on the basis that the appellant’s complaints were genuine, then, Mr. King submitted, the primary judge should have said so, and explained how that view could be consistent with the opinion of Dr. Carr.
DECISION
In my opinion, the decision of the primary judge was one which was well available on the evidence, but the reasons given were inadequate.
In the first place, the primary judge made no explicit finding as to the extent, if any, to which he accepted the evidence of the appellant as to the pain which he has suffered following the accident and as to the things which he could do and the things which he could not do. There may be some cases in which it is possible to make a finding sufficient to decide the case without coming to any decision on such matters, but in my opinion, this was not such a case.
Mr. McIntyre submitted that, where the primary judge gave no indication that he did not accept the evidence of the plaintiff and, beyond discussing the medical evidence, gave no reasons for not doing so, the proper conclusion was that the primary judge decided the case on the assumption that the appellant was genuine in his evidence about the pain he suffered and about his disabilities. If that were the case, in my opinion the primary judge should have said so, particularly because it is difficult to reconcile such an approach with other findings made by the primary judge. In particular, one important aspect of Dr. Carr’s evidence was the following:
He is fit in my opinion for pre-injury employment, including full duties, including fork lift driving. This is taking into account his right knee condition only.
I believe he is fit for employment taking into the account the entirety of his symptoms as well.
It may be possible to reconcile that opinion with full acceptance of the appellant’s evidence about his pain and his disabilities, but it is difficult to do so, and would in my opinion require explanation by some process of reasoning.
An associated problem is the connection between the primary judge’s statement that he accepted “the view that the injury suffered to his right leg was, in fact, one of a not severe type”, and his giving that as the basis for his conclusion that the relevant thresholds had not been crossed. If the primary judge was proceeding on the assumption that the appellant’s evidence about his pain and his disabilities was genuine, that process of reasoning left out of account altogether the possibility that the injury, albeit not itself of a severe type, had a very severe impact on the appellant, whether the causation of this impact be entirely physical or not.
In the result, I am left with no understanding of whether in fact the primary judge accepted or did not accept the appellant’s evidence concerning his pain and his disabilities, or, if the primary judge did either accept that evidence or assume it to be correct, how he reconciled that acceptance with his total acceptance of Dr. Carr’s evidence. Certainly, the primary judge did not say he rejected the appellant’s evidence or, apart from his acceptance of Dr. Carr’s evidence, give any reasons for not accepting it.
In my opinion, that amounts to a deficiency of reasons in this case sufficient to justify the order of a new trial.
For those reason, in my opinion the following orders should be made:
1.Appeal allowed with costs.
2.Respondent to have a Suitors Fund certificate if otherwise entitled in respect of those costs.
3.Orders of primary judge set aside.
4.Matter remitted to the Common Law Division for a new trial, on the basis that breach of duty has been established.
5.Costs of the trial before the primary judge to be in the discretion of the judge hearing the new trial.
FOSTER AJA: I agree with Hodgson JA.
IPP AJA: I agree with Hodgson JA.

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LAST UPDATED: 10/12/2001

[2001] NSWCA 463

10 December 2001

Key Legal Topics

Areas of Law

Negligence & Tort

Employment Law

Civil Procedure

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Appeal

Breach

Damages

Duty of Care

Negligence

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