EHA19 v Minister for Immigration and Anor (No.2)

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

EHA19 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR (No.2) [2020] FCCA 1648
Catchwords:
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application in a case for suppression orders in respect of a judgement delivered in open Court – where application sought non-publication at a high level – where judgement does not identify the name of the applicant or publish the applicant’s name contrary to s 91X of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where proposed consent orders sent to Court without identifying statutory basis for orders – significance of the term ‘publish’ – application in a case dismissed.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s. 91X

Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) s. 75

Cases cited:

ELA18 v Minister for Home Affairs (No 2) [2020] FCA 782

Applicant: EHA19
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Second Respondent: IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
File Number: SYG 2813 of 2019
Judgment of: Judge Street
Hearing date: 19 June 2020
Date of Last Submission: 19 June 2020
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 19 June 2020

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr G Schipp of counsel
Solicitors for the Applicant: Sydney West Legal and Migration
Solicitors for the Respondents: Ms S Sangha, Mills Oakley

ORDERS

  1. The application in a case filed on 9 June 2020 is dismissed.

DATE OF ORDER: 19 June 2020

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 2813 of 2019

EHA19

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application for suppression orders under Pt 6A of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) in respect of a judgment that has been delivered by this Court on 13 February 2020. 

  2. The application in a case identified the seeking, at a high level, of the judgment being the subject of non-publication orders. That high level was not an appropriate formulation as would be required in respect of the making of suppression orders, and should have been identified with sufficient particularity and precision to permit the Court to apply the statutory considerations that the Court must take into account in determining whether or not that criteria is met. The criteria has been usefully analysed in the recent decision of the learned Abraham J in ELA18 v Minister for Home Affairs (No 2) [2020] FCA 782.

  3. Following the filing of that application, there were sent up to the Court proposed consent orders. Those proposed consent orders included a proposition to the following effect:

    The substantive judgment handed down on 13 February 2020 and published on 23 April 2020 be recalled and the judgment be re-published using the applicant’s new pseudonym and the new proceeding number.

  4. The basis, in terms of a statutory power to do so, has not been identified. Mr Schipp, counsel on behalf of the applicant, has candidly acknowledged that the judgement does not identify the name of the applicant or publish the applicant’s name contrary to s…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCCA 1648
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In EHA19 v Minister for Immigration and Anor (No.2), the applicant sought suppression orders in relation to a judgment delivered in open court. The application was made to Judge Street of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The core of the dispute concerned the applicant's desire for non-publication of the judgment at a high level, despite the judgment itself not identifying the applicant by name or publishing their name in contravention of section 91X of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth). The proposed consent orders were submitted to the Court without specifying the statutory basis upon which they were sought.

The Court was required to determine the significance of the term 'publish' in the context of court judgments and the Court's powers regarding the publication of its decisions. This involved considering the statutory framework governing the publication of judgments and reasons, particularly in light of the applicant's request for suppression.

Judge Street dismissed the application, reasoning that the Court's powers concerning the publication of judgments and reasons are primarily governed by section 75 of the *Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999* (Cth). This provision outlines the circumstances under which reserved judgments and reasons may be made public by a judge, emphasising the public interest in the efficient administration of justice through the publication of oral and written reasons in open court. The Court noted that once reasons have been published, there is no power to republish them. The decision underscored the distinction between publishing orders and publishing reasons, and the statutory encouragement for efficiency through the publication of oral reasons in open court.

The application in a case filed on 9 June 2020 was dismissed by order of the Court on 19 June 2020.

Orders

Orders of the court

ORDERS

1. The application in a case filed on 9 June 2020 is dismissed.

DATE OF ORDER: 19 June 2020

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

There is a specific statutory provision that identifies the power of this Court in relation to the publication of reasons and a number of principles to be derived from s 75 of the Federal Circuit of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) which is set out as follows:75 Reserved judgments etc. (1) If: (a) the Federal Circuit Court of Australia reserves judgment in a proceeding; and (b) the Judge who heard the proceeding subsequently prepares orders and reasons, but is not available to publish those orders and reasons;those orders and reasons may be made public by another Judge on behalf of the Judge who heard the proceeding. (2) If: (a) the Federal Circuit Court of Australia reserves reasons for its decision in a proceeding; and (b) the Judge who heard the proceeding has prepared reasons, but is not available to publish those reasons;those reasons may be made public by another Judge on behalf of the Judge who heard the proceeding. The first principle is that there must be reasons and orders that are made public for quelling a controversy contested in proceedings. The second principle is that there is a statutory power to publish oral reasons by pronouncing those oral reasons in open Court. The third principle is that there is a statutory power to publish written reasons in open Court. The fourth principle is that provision makes clear that the Court does not have a power to publish oral reasons and then publish written reasons. The fifth principle is that once reasons have been published, be it oral reasons or written reasons, there is no power to republish oral reasons or to republish written reasons. The sixth principle is that there is a difference between publishing orders and publishing reasons. The seventh principle is that a judge may make orders and reserve reasons to be published at a later date in writing. The eighth principle is that a judge may reserve and then publish oral reasons in open Court. There is of course also a difference between these powers to publish oral or written reasons and the entry of the orders made by the Court. It is evident that the provision recognises the public interest in the efficient administration of justice in the exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction by the publishing of oral reasons in open Court. This is a statutory encouragement for the Court to be efficient given the volume of matters filed in the Court and, where consistent with the interests of the administration of justice, to publish oral reasons in open Court. The publishing of oral reasons will often occur on the same day as the hearing or may occur on another listed date. There is a public interest evident in the alternate statutory powers in the ability to avoid or reduce the need for the additional time, listing and judicial resources involved in preparing and publishing written reasons. The benefit of that public interest to permit the efficient use of judicial resources is not advanced if judicial resources are always deployed to settle the transcript of all oral published reasons.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established