EGA19 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

EGA19 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 614

File number(s): SYG 2795 of 2019
Judgment of: JUDGE MCCABE
Date of judgment: 1 May 2025
Catchwords: MIGRATION – review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – protection visa – exercise of the discretion to proceed under s 426A(1A)(a) of the Migration Act1958 after the applicant failed to appear – application dismissed.
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 425, 425A, 426A, 441A, 441C, 441G

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 4.35D

Cases cited:

AMU19 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 423

DNK17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 975

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 47
Date of hearing: 26 March 2025
Place: Sydney
Applicant: The applicant appeared in person
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms K Evans, Sparke Helmore Lawyers
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Submitting appearance save as to costs

ORDERS

SYG 2795 of 2019

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

EGA19

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE MCCABE

DATE OF ORDER:

1 MAY 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for judicial review is dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs in the fixed amount of $5,000.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE MCCABE:

  1. Mr EGA19 seeks a protection visa. After a delegate of the first respondent (the minister) refused the application for a protection visa in 2016, Mr EGA19 asked the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to review the decision. The Tribunal sent a hearing invitation to Mr EGA19 at the email address of the person he had nominated as his authorised recipient of communications. The hearing invitation said the Tribunal was unable to make a decision that was favourable to the applicant without more information. It identified the time and date of the hearing and explained the matter might be dismissed or a decision might be made in the applicant’s absence if he did not appear. Mr EGA19 says his authorised recipient did not pass on the hearing invitation and he did not attend the hearing.

  2. The Tribunal decided to make to a decision on the application in the absence of Mr EGA19. Not surprisingly, given the hearing invitation had foreshadowed the Tribunal was not satisfied it could make a favourable decision on the information available, the Tribunal affirmed the decision under review. In its reasons for decision,…

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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 614
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of EGA19 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the applicant, a citizen of China, sought judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) to dismiss his application for a protection visa. The applicant, who had entered Australia on a visitor visa and subsequently applied for a protection visa, claimed that he faced persecution if he returned to China due to his involvement with an underground Christian church. The Tribunal dismissed his application, finding that his claims were not substantiated by the evidence provided.

The central legal issue was whether the Tribunal’s decision to proceed with making a final determination in the applicant’s absence was justified and reasonable. The applicant argued that the Tribunal should have either adjourned the hearing or dismissed the application for non-appearance, allowing for potential reinstatement. The Tribunal did not explicitly address its choice to proceed under s 426A(1A)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), which authorises the Tribunal to make a decision in the absence of the applicant. Instead, the Tribunal evaluated the merits of the applicant’s claims and concluded that he had not met the criteria for a protection visa.

The Court found that while the Tribunal’s reasons for decision did not explicitly discuss the alternatives available under s 426A(1A), the decision was not unreasonable. The Tribunal’s assessment of the applicant’s claims was thorough and considered all the available evidence, ultimately determining that the applicant had not provided sufficient evidence to support his claims of persecution. The Court noted that the Tribunal is not required to accept uncritically the applicant’s assertions and must independently assess the credibility and sufficiency of the evidence.

The Court concluded that the Tribunal’s decision was not affected by jurisdictional error and was therefore valid. The Tribunal was entitled to proceed under s 426A(1A)(a) and make a final determination in the applicant’s absence. The application for judicial review was dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Having said that, the Tribunal’s election to proceed to make a final determination when Mr EGA19 failed to appear at the hearing requires careful scrutiny in light of the Federal Court’s decision in DNK17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 975; see also AMU19 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 423. The reasons for decision did not expressly address why the Tribunal chose to proceed under s 426A(1A)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) when it could have decided to adjourn the matter or dismiss the application for non‑appearance under s 426A(1A)(b). A matter dismissed under s 426A(1A)(b) can be the subject of a reinstatement application, whereas a decision under s 426A(1A)(a) renders the Tribunal functus officio. The Tribunal’s election to proceed in this case raises a question over whether the decision which resulted was unreasonable. As it happens, I am not satisfied the decision is unreasonable. I explain my reasons belowBackground Mr EGA19 is a citizen of China. He entered Australia on a visitor visa in December 2015. That visa was valid until 28 March 2016. On 22 March 2016 – just a few days before his visitor visa was due to expire – Mr EGA19 applied for a Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visa (the protection visa which lies at the heart of these proceedings). His application for a visa is reproduced in exhibit one (the court book) at pp 1ff. Mr EGA19 attached a statement to his application (at pp 41ff) which said he had joined an underground Christian church in China in January 2013. His statement said the Chinese government did not approve of underground Christian churches. He claimed the police had learned of his membership in the church. They told him to stop attending. Mr EGA19’s statement said he recalled the police saying they would arrest and imprison him if he was caught attending meetings. In his application, he said he feared persecution or harm if he remained in China on account of his Christian faith. He said he came to Australia to escape all that. The delegate asked the applicant to attend an interview and answer questions about his claim. The applicant attended but the delegate was not satisfied with the evidence provided. The delegate’s concerns were set out in the statement of reasons which accompanied the delegate’s decision to refuse the application for a protection visa. That decision is dated 4 November 2016. A copy of the decision is reproduced in the court book at pp 65ff. Mr EGA19 thereafter sought review of that decision in the Tribunal.The Tribunal’s review The application for review form is reproduced in the court book at pp 85‑86. The form includes an invitation to nominate an authorised recipient of correspondence with the Tribunal. The form lodged by (or on behalf of) Mr EGA19 asks that correspondence with the Tribunal be directed to Ms Mengmeng Fu. The form records her postal address, her email address at a Gmail account, and her mobile phone number. The Tribunal’s letter acknowledging receipt of the application was addressed to the applicant and sent to Ms Fu’s email address on 6 December 2016: court book at pp 88ff.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Tribunal did not refer to s 426A(1A)) of the Act, and did not otherwise explain why it chose to proceed under s 426A(1A)(a) which authorised the Tribunal to proceed to make a decision in the applicant’s absence. It did not mention the alternatives of adjourning the hearing or dismissing the proceedings for non-appearance under s 426A(1A)(b). Adjourning the hearing or dismissing under s 426A(1A)(b) would not have foreclosed the possibility of further engagement with the Tribunal. I will return to this issue below.The substantive reasons for decision The Tribunal’s assessment of Mr EGA19’s claims commenced at [24] of its reasons for decision. At the outset of that discussion, the Tribunal noted:The mere fact that an applicant claims to fear harm for a particular reason does not establish either the genuineness of the asserted fear or that it is ‘well-founded’ or that it is for the reason/s claimed. Further, the Tribunal is not required to accept uncritically any and all the allegations made by an applicant (Randhawa v MIEA (1994) 52 FCR 437, p.451). The Tribunal then pointed out at [25]: “The only information before the Tribunal is the applicant’s own assertion of the facts which are outlined in his written application and statement.” Subsequently, the Tribunal observed (at [32]) an applicant was responsible for providing all the information required to establish they satisfy the criteria for the grant of a protection visa. In the six paragraphs that followed, the Tribunal explained that “[o]n the available evidence” the Tribunal was not satisfied Mr EGA19:·would be persecuted if he returned to China because he was part of an underground church (at [33]);·joined the church because of a family breakdown or because a relative said she was cured of an ailment through divine intervention (at [34]);·was visited by the police in October 2015 who warned him against involvement with the underground church (at [35]);·was baptised in Australia or regularly attended church in this country after he arrived here (at [36]); and·would be unable to relocate to another area in China where membership of churches was allowed (at [38]). The Tribunal also said (at [37]):On the available evidence the Tribunal does not accept that the Chinese government’s attitude to underground religious beliefs or “the existence of underground Christians” necessarily means that that the applicant faces a real chance or real risk of serious or significant harm if he were to return to China in the reasonably foreseeable future. [Emphasis added] On the basis of those factual findings, the Tribunal concluded it was not satisfied Mr EGA19 met the criteria for a protection visa in s 36(2)(a) or the alternative criteria in s 36(2)(aa). The application for judicial review At the outset of the hearing, I explained the concept of jurisdictional error to Mr EGA19. I emphasised to Mr EGA19 that the Court’s role was limited to scrutinising the Tribunal’s decision to determine if it was affected by an error that was such that the decision under review should be quashed and remitted to the Tribunal so the Tribunal could decide the matter again according to law. I referred to examples of jurisdictional error that might derail the Tribunal’s decision, including:·Unreasonableness – because the decision under review was illogical or lacked evident or intelligible justification having regard to the facts.·The Tribunal misunderstood or misapplied the relevant law.·The Tribunal failed to engage appropriately with relevant evidence or submissions.·There was a denial of procedural fairness or an apprehension of bias.