EEP20 v MICMSMA

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

EER20 v Minster for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCCA 114

File number(s): SYG 2187 of 2020
Judgment of: JUDGE DRIVER
Date of judgment: 28 January 2021
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Review of Immigration Assessment Authority decision – refusal of an extension of time for judicial review application.   
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 473DD, 477

High Court Rules 2004 (Cth)

Cases cited:

AUS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] HCA 37

BGV19 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2020] FCCA 3014

CLS15 v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2017] FCA 577

Commonwealth; ex parte Marks (2000) 177 ALR 491

Vella v Minister for Immigration [2015] HCA 42

Number of paragraphs: 41
Date of hearing: 28 January 2021
Place: Sydney
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr R Chia
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr T Reilly
Solicitor for the Respondents: Sparke Helmore
Table of Corrections
4 February 2021 Order 2 – “applicant” and “first respondent” have been transposed

INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS

SYG 2187 of 2020
BETWEEN:

EER20

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE DRIVER

DATE OF ORDER:

28 JANUARY 2021

INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS:

1.The application for an extension of time is refused.

2.The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs and disbursements of and incidental to the application, fixed in the sum of $7,000.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE DRIVER

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

  1. On 28 January 2021 I refused to grant an extension of time in this matter and also made a costs order against the applicant.  The following are my reasons for those orders.

  2. The applicant is a male of Turkish ethnicity and Shia Muslim faith, accepted to have been born in 1994 in Tehran, Iran.

  3. The applicant arrived in Australia on 27 May 2013 as an “unauthorised maritime arrival” and, on or about 27 September 2017, applied for a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (SHEV).

  4. In his statutory declaration dated 22 September 2017,[1] the applicant stated that in Iran his brother converted to Christianity and tried to convert him and his sister.  He stated that, since arriving in Australia with his sister, they attended church services but had not himself decided to convert.

    [1] Court Book (CB) at 65.

  5. The applicant stated that in Iran his brother had been arrested with ten other people at a Christian house gathering and that two of those people had subsequently been executed.  He stated that his brother had been interrogated by the Sepah, that he and his sister had been placed on a watch list and that, if they returned to Iran, they would be arrested.

  6. On 10 January 2018, the applicant attended a protection visa interview and responded to questions from the Minister’s delegate (delegate) with the assistance of an interpreter in the Persian and English languages.

  7. Following the protection visa interview, the applicant’s representative provided to the Minister’s Department a letter of support[2] from a senior pastor at…

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Details
Case
[2021] FCCA 154
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter came before Judge Driver of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia concerning an application for an extension of time to seek judicial review of a decision made by the Immigration Assessment Authority. The applicant, EEP20, sought to challenge the Authority's decision, but the application for judicial review was filed significantly out of time. The first respondent was the Minister for Immigration.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether to grant the applicant an extension of time to file his application for judicial review. This required the Court to consider the length of the delay, the applicant's explanation for that delay, and the merits of the proposed grounds of review. The Court also had to determine if the interests of the administration of justice warranted granting the extension.

Judge Driver refused the application for an extension of time. The Court noted that the application was filed approximately one year and ten months after the relevant decision, a delay considered very significant. The applicant's explanation for the delay, which involved periods of detention and an asserted mental condition, was found to lack clarity and credibility, particularly as he had legal representation and was aware of the Authority's decision. While the Minister would not suffer prejudice, this alone was insufficient to justify an extension. Furthermore, the Court found that the proposed grounds of review, concerning the Authority's consideration of voluntary return and compliance with section 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), did not possess sufficient merit to outweigh the concerns regarding the substantial delay and the inadequate explanation provided.

Consequently, the Court ordered that the application for an extension of time be refused. The applicant was also ordered to pay the first respondent's costs and disbursements, fixed at $7,000. As a result of the refusal, the judicial review application was deemed incompetent.

Orders

Orders of the court

INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS:

1. The application for an extension of time is refused.

2. The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs and disbursements of and incidental to the application, fixed in the sum of $7,000.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The third ground when read with the applicant’s submissions claims the Authority failed to comply with s 473DD in relation to the applicant’s claims concerning the criminal charges and the data breach. This is not a fair reading of the Authority’s reasons at [5], which in substance find neither paragraph of s 473DD(b) is satisfied in relation to the claim that the applicant could be harmed by the community in Iran because of his Australian charges,[16] before considering s 473DD(a). The Authority’s reasons at [5] are thus in accordance with AUS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection[17] at [11]-[12]. The data breach claim was not “new information” as it was before the delegate,[18] and was considered by the Authority at [31] and [38]. [16] CB 210.[17] [2020] HCA 37.[18] CB 243 at [16].CONCLUSION The interests of the administration of justice do not require the granting of an extension of time for the judicial review application in this matter. The consequence of the refusal of the extension of time is that the judicial review application is incompetent. The Minister sought an order for costs fixed in the sum of $7,000. The applicant did not wish to be heard on costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Both the applicant and the Minister filed pre-hearing written submissions and made oral submissions through their counsel at the hearing.CONSIDERATIONThe request for an extension of time The proposed judicial review application was filed approximately one year and 10 months out of time. That is a very significant delay. In Commonwealth; ex parte Marks[11] the High Court stated that the periods in the High Court Rules2004 (Cth) for seeking certiorari and mandamus should be rigidly applied in all but the most exceptional cases where more than one year has elapsed between the decision and the commencement of the proceedings.[12] [11] (2000) 177 ALR 491 per McHugh J at [16].[12] see also Vella v Minister for Immigration [2015] HCA 42 at [3], [20]. The applicant’s explanation for his delay in coming to court lacks clarity. He states that he was in prison at the time of the Authority’s decision and subsequently in immigration detention. He does not state when he was convicted. At the time of his interview with the Minister’s Department he was on remand. At the time of the applicant’s interview with the Minister’s Department, he anticipated his criminal trial would take place in about seven months, meaning in around July 2018.[13] In the 28 June 2018 submissions, the applicant’s representatives state that the applicant was still at that time on remand. Accepting that the applicant was in some form of detention throughout the process of review of his protection visa decision and following, it does not follow that he was under some special disability. He was legally represented before the Authority and the suggestion made at the hearing before me that he was unaware of the Authority decision lacks credibility. [13] Transcript, page 27, line 13. The applicant also asserts a mental condition but there is no medical evidence of it and the nature of the mental condition is not specified, apart from a reference to asserted symptoms. While the Minister would not suffer any prejudice from the granting of an extension of time, the absence of prejudice is not in itself a reason to extend time. The grounds of review proposed to be advanced by the applicant, while not wholly without merit, do not have sufficient merit to outweigh my concerns regarding the length of the delay and the explanation of it. The applicant’s first complaint that the Authority considered his risk of harm if returning to Iran voluntarily in circumstances where he said he would not return voluntarily does not, in my view, point to jurisdictional error. The Authority did not misunderstand the applicant’s claims concerning voluntary return.[14] Having regard to the fact that the applicant could not be returned to Iran involuntarily, there is in my view no error in the Authority posing the only hypothetical available to place the applicant in Iran for the purposes of considering the degree of risk he would face there.[15] In that regard, it would have been better if the Authority had referred specifically to the Memorandum of Understanding entered into between Australia and Iran on 19 March 2018, which defines the class of persons who can be involuntarily returned to Iran under that bilateral agreement, which class of persons does not include the applicant.[14] cf CLS15 v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2017] FCA 577 at [60].[15] cf BGV19 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2020] FCCA 3014.