Eej16 v Minister for Immigration

[2019] FCCA 3359

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

EEJ16 & ORS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2019] FCCA 3359

Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Administrative Appeals Tribunal – Protection Visas – where the Tribunal assessed the Applicants’ claims against the complementary protection provisions – consideration of section 48A of the Migration Act 1958 and SGZIZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 212 FCR 235 – whether the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error in assessing the Second Applicant’s claims – consideration of a Certificate and a Notification issued pursuant to section 438 of the Act – no jurisdictional error established – Application dismissed.

Legislation:

Australian Citizenship Act 2007, s.12(1)(b)

Migration Act 1958, ss.29, 36(1), 36(2), 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 48A, 65, 438

Cases cited:

AMA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 244 FCR 131

Minister for Immigration v SZMTA; CQZ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection; BEG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 3

SZGIZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 212 FCR 235

SZGME v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 168 FCR 487

First Applicant:	EEJ16
Second Applicant:	EEK16

Third Applicant: EEL16

First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

File Number: MLG 2840 of 2016

Judgment of: Judge Blake

Hearing date: 4 and 13 September 2019

Date of Last Submission: 13 September 2019

Delivered at: Melbourne

Delivered on: 21 November 2019

REPRESENTATION

Advocate for the Applicants: The First Applicant on behalf of the Applicants

Solicitors for the Applicants: None

Advocate for the Respondents: Ms Jackson

Solicitors for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

1. The Application filed on 30 December 2016 be dismissed.

2. The Applicants pay the First Respondent’s costs of the proceeding fixed in the sum of $7,467.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT MELBOURNE

MLG 2840 of 2016

EEJ16

First Applicant

And

EEK16

Second Applicant

And

EEL16

Third Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

And

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

1. This is an application for review of a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘Tribunal’) on 6 December 2016. In that decision, the Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant the Applicants Protection Visas (‘the Visas’) pursuant to section 65 of the Migration Act 1965 (‘Act’).

2. For the reasons that follow, I have decided to dismiss the Application for review.

Background

1. The Applicants are Malaysian nationals. The First and Second Applicant arrived in Australia on 18 January 2008. The Third Applicant was born in Australia on 10 February 2009.

2. The Applicants applied for the Visas on 5 March 2008 (‘the first applications’). These applications were refused by a delegate of the Minister on 10 April 2008. This decision was affirmed by the then Refugee Review Tribunal (‘RRT’) on 15 July 2008. The First Applicant filed an application to show cause in the High Court for judicial review of the RRT’s decision on 31 July 2013. The High Court dismissed this application on 4 October 2013.

3. The Applicants then applied for the Visas the subject of these proceedings on 31 October 2013. A delegate of the Minister (‘delegate’) refused to grant the Visas on 13 May 2015. The Applicants sought review of this decision on 18 May 2015. 

4. On 6 December 2016, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the Applicants the Visas.

5. The Applicants lodged an application in this Court for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision on 30 December 2016.

6. Orders were subsequently made for the preparation of a Court Book and for each party to file and serve written submissions.  Written submissions were received from the Minister.  The Minister also, on 20 August 2019, caused to be filed an affidavit of Ms Melinda Jackson in support of his submissions (‘the first affidavit’). A further affidavit of Melinda Jackson was subsequently filed on 11 September 2019 (‘the second affidavit’). The Applicants failed to file any written submissions.  They are unrepresented. At the hearing, the First Applicant spoke for himself and on behalf of the Second and Third Applicants.

The Application for Review

The position of the Third Applicant

1. The Third Applicant is the daughter of the First and Second Applicants.  She was born in Australia on 10 February 2009.

2. The first affidavit of Melinda Jackson filed with the Court indicates that the Third Applicant has acquired Australian citizenship.  The application for Australian citizenship was approved on 3 June 2019 and attached to the affidavit.  Australian citizenship for the Third Applicant was acquired having regard to section 12(1)(b) of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007.

3. Applicants for visas must be non-citizens: section 29 of the Act.  The Third Applicant is therefore not able to be granted a Visa under the Act.  Furthermore, it would be futile to grant the Third Applicant a Visa as she already enjoys the benefits of Australian citizenship.

4. For the reasons stated above, the Court does not grant relief in respect of the Application insofar as it relates to the Third Applicant.

The Grounds of Review in the Application documents

1. The Application for review (‘Application’) in this matter was filed on 30 December 2016.  Attached to the Application (or forming part of it) is a single page headed ‘Affidavit’.  Eleven separate sub points are listed on that page.

2. In addition to filing the Application, the Applicants filed an affidavit of the First Applicant.  The content of that affidavit contains the same 11 paragraphs that are set out in the Application. Additionally, the affidavit annexes the decision of the Tribunal.

3. The 11 points raised in the Application and the supporting affidavit are as follows:

   1. I [the First Applicant] is a Malaysian citizen came to Australia in January 2008 with my wife [the Second Applicant] who is Malaysian citizen by birth.

   2. My daughter [the Third Applicant] born in Australia and doesn't have any countries citizenship.  We went to Malaysian High Commission in 2013 to get [the Third Applicant’s] passport to leave country but her citizenship was not guaranteed. Malaysian Indian always hard to get citizenship and more than 300,000 of them who born in Malaysia fail to get citizenship.

   3. I have planned to return to Malaysia in November 2008 and organised mine and [the Second Applicant’s] travel documents to leave Australia in thought of the problem should be ease by then.

   4. Just before we leave, my friend [Mr A] has been killed cruelly by the same Malay group who was targeting me. He has been killed at my sister-in-law's place and my wife was on the phone during the incident. We have provided original media report.

   5. My brother-in-law [Mr B] also injured during the incident.

   6. Even the incident was fully covered by media, police and authorities didn't take further action after [Mr B] identified some of the attackers. He also was threatened.

   7. Tribunal member was referring to the website of Malaysian High Commission for my daughter Form W for her citizenship but in reality nothing work because we don't have all the required documents.

   8. As per Tribunal member the incident might be varied after 6 or 7 years. I am more than happy to go back to Malaysia but my mother [Ms C] visited me twice last year December and this year November with my sisters [Ms D] and [Ms E] advised me not to come back as the situation hasn't change at all.

   9. My wife's health condition and my daughter's [the Third Applicant’s] future stop me to tae the risk.

   10. I was not stable mentally and its get worse after my father's death. My family member's hide it from me because they scared I will come back.

   11. I ask this Honourable Court to review the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. (errors in original)

4. When the matter was called on for hearing, I went through the relevant contents of the Court file and then asked the Applicants whether there was any other material I should have.  I was handed a one page document entitled ‘Affidavit’.  This document was not sworn or affirmed and was not in the form of an affidavit.  It is five paragraphs in length.  It sets out some alleged facts and contentions in relation the present proceeding.

5. In addition to the document above, I was handed other documents from the Applicants during the hearing.  Those documents were:

   a)a page of an undated letter from the Department of Home Affairs confirming the citizenship of the Third Applicant;

   b)a letter from the Department of Home Affairs relating to a bridging Visa given to the Second Applicant dated 2 May 2019;

   c)a Bridging Visa Grant Notice from the Department of Home Affairs for the Third Applicant dated 2 May 2019;

   d)a copy of a Birth Certificate for the Third Applicant;

   e)a copy of a Malaysian Identity Card;

   f)a copy of a Marriage Register Extract;

   g)a copy of an Origin Electricity Account addressed to the Second Applicant covering the period 9 May 2019 to 8 August 2019;

   h)a Commonwealth Bank of Australia bank statement for a Smart Access account number 1070 0983 for the period of 1 November 2018 to 30 April 2019, and a printed online statement for the same account for the period of 18 July 2019 to 23 August 2019.

6. An examination of the ‘Affidavit’ referred to at paragraph [16] above indicates that the documents set out above at paragraph [17] are referenced within the document entitled ‘Affidavit’ and appear to have been tendered to support some of the statements and contentions set out in the document entitled ‘Affidavit’.

7. During the hearing, I asked the Applicants why they felt the decision of the Tribunal was wrong.  The First Applicant stated that his application for protection had been refused, that he cannot return to his country, and that his life and the life of his wife and child were at risk if he were to return.

8. I have considered all of the information above including, but not limited to, the Application, the affidavit of the First Applicant, the document entitled ‘Affidavit’, various documents handed to me by the First Applicant and the First Applicant’s statements during the hearing. Understandably, the Applicants do not wish to return to Malaysia, particularly when one has regard to the status of the Third Applicant. The Applicants raise in their material various factual matters or reasons why the Court should grant the relief claimed. While I understand the importance of those concerns to the Applicants, to examine them would be to engage in an exercise in merits review, something the Court is not able to entertain. Ultimately, this Court, in an application of this nature, may only act if it is able to identify a jurisdictional error committed by the Tribunal.

9. In the present proceedings, the Applicants have not identified any jurisdictional error, much less particularised it. None of the matters raised by the Applicants are able to be characterised as jurisdictional errors of the Tribunal.  Accordingly I find, insofar as the matters set out above are concerned, that the Tribunal has not committed an error as to jurisdiction.

Other matters

1. A review of the decision of the Tribunal discloses a further two matters which it might be said give rise to jurisdictional error. I deal with each one below.

The application of section 48A of the Act

1. A review of the Tribunal’s decision discloses that the Tribunal only dealt with the application for the Visas on the basis of whether the Applicants satisfied the complementary protection criteria in section 36(2)(aa) of the Act.  Consideration was not given as to whether the Applicants met the refugee criterion in section 36(2)(a) of the Act.  A potential issue is whether this was the correct approach in relation to both the First Applicant and the Second Applicant.

2. In order to assess this issue, it is necessary to set out some of the relevant background.

3. As noted earlier, the Applicants made the first applications in 2008. The first applications were made by the First Applicant for protection. The Second Applicant, at that time, did not advance her own application for a protection visa. Rather, her application was on the basis of her membership of the First Applicant’s family. This was how the RRT approached the first applications in 2008 (see Court Book page 69, paragraph 42).  The first applications were ultimately unsuccessful.

4. The present applications were made in 2013.  The present applications are, relevantly:

   a)an application by the First Applicant for a protection visa under section 36 of the Act (CB 855); and

   b)an application by the Second Applicant for a protection visa on the basis of her being of the same family unit as the First Applicant (CB 900). 

5. As at the date the present visa applications were filed in 2013, section 36(1) and 36(2) of the Act provided as follows:

   Section 36. Protection Visas

   (1)  There is a class of visas to be known as protection visas.

   Note:  See also Subdivision AL.

   (2)  A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is: 

   (a) a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol; or

   (aa) a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or

   (b) a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who: 

   (i) is mentioned in paragraph (a); and

   (ii) holds a protection visa; or

   (c) a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who: 

   (i) is mentioned in paragraph (aa); and

   (ii) holds a protection visa.

6. The First Applicant’s claims for protection are set out in the application form for the visa (CB 855). One of the claims advanced by the First Applicant is the following (set out at CB 862): ‘my wife not well educated and discrimination against women in (sic) known agenda in Malaysia.  Especially Tamil Women’. I will refer to this claim as the ‘Discrimination Claim’. The Second Applicant did not advance the Discrimination Claim on her own behalf. Nor did the Second Applicant advance any other claim, other than her claim to be a member of the First Applicant’s family unit. 

7. Section 48A of the Act deals with further applications by applicants for protection visas after, inter-alia, a refusal to grant a visa has been determined. The purpose of section 48A of the Act is to prevent repeated applications for protection visas: SZGME v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 168 FCR 487.

8. In SZGIZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 212 FCR 235 (‘SZGIZ’) at [38], the Full Court of the Federal Court held that the operation of the bar in section 48A was confined to a further application which duplicated the same essential criterion for the grant of the Visa as in the earlier unsuccessful application. The consequence of this decision[1] is that non-citizens who had previously made a valid application on the basis of the refugee criterion set out in section 36(2)(a) of the Act were not prevented from making a further application on the basis of the complementary protection criterion set out in section 36(2)(aa) of the Act.

   [1]     The effect of SZGIZ has now been overcome by the introduction of Schedule 2 of the Migration Amendment Act 2014, however those amendments did not commence until after the applicants had lodged their present applications for visas, and therefore has no application in this case.

9. When the Tribunal came to considering these matters, it determined having regard to section 48A of the Act that it was required to assess the Applicants only against the complementary protection provisions in the Act. As I have noted above, a question that arises is whether this is the correct approach having regard to the history and content of the applications made by the Applicants.

10. I deal firstly with the First Applicant. He made a claim for protection in 2008 on the basis of being a refugee under section 36(2)(a) of the Act that was ultimately not accepted. He then submitted another claim for a protection visa in 2013 on the basis of the complementary protection scheme under section 36(2)(aa) of the Act. The bar in section 48A of the Act (considered in light of the decision in SZGIZ) had the effect that the First Applicant was prevented from having his claim assessed again on the basis of the criterion set out in section 36(2)(a) of the Act.   However, on the basis of the reasoning in SGZIZ, the First Applicant remained entitled to have his claims assessed under section 36(2)(aa) of the Act. That is the approach the Tribunal ultimately adopted and is one it was entitled to adopt: AMA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 244 FCR 131 at [48].

11. Having regard to the above, I can discern no error in the Tribunal limiting itself to considering the First Applicant’s claims only on the basis of the criterion set out in section 36(2)(aa) of the Act. Section 48A of the Act operated to prevent the First Applicant’s claims from being considered under section 36(2)(a) given his earlier application for a protection visa.

12. I turn then to deal with the position of the Second Applicant.

13. As I have noted at paragraph [28] above, there was one claim in the First Applicant’s present claim for a protection visa that expressly concerned the Second Applicant. This was the Discrimination Claim. The Discrimination Claim was ultimately dealt with by the Tribunal in paragraph [42] of its reasons, having regard to the complementary protection criteria. The issue raised by the Minister for consideration is whether the Tribunal erred in not assessing the Discrimination Claim under the refugee protection criteria set out in section 36(2)(a) of the Act on the basis that the Second Applicant was not subject to the operation of the bar set out in section 48A of the Act.

14. In my view, the Tribunal did not fall into error when it assessed the Discrimination Claim only against the criteria specified in section 36(2)(aa) of the Act. My reasons for this view are as follows:

    a)Section 36(2) of the Act sets out some of the criterion for the grant of a protection visa.  A person may apply for a protection visa if they fall within any of the categories set out in subparagraphs (a) to (c) of section 36(2) of the Act.

    b)In this matter, the First Applicant was, for reasons set out earlier in this decision, effectively an applicant for a visa under section 36(2)(aa) of the Act. Whatever claims he had were required to be assessed having regard to, inter alia, the criteria set out under section 36(2)(aa). This included the Discrimination Claim which formed part of the claims that he made.

    c)The position of the Second Applicant was quite different.  She was an applicant under section 36(2)(c). That is, the Second Applicant was, at all material times, an applicant who was ‘a non – citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who’ was relevantly, a person ‘mentioned in subparagraph (aa)’. 

    d)It can be seen from the text and structure of section 36(2) that a person who makes an application for a protection visa under section 36(2)(c) does so only on the basis that he or she is a member of the same family unit as a person mentioned in either subparagraph (a) or (aa). A person who makes a claim for protection on the basis of section 36(2)(c) of the Act will have their claims assessed according to firstly, whether the claims advanced by an applicant under subparagraphs (a) or (aa) succeed, and secondly, whether such a person is or is not a member of the same family unit as the persons making the claim under paragraph (a) or (aa).

    e)In the present matter, the Discrimination Claim was advanced by the First Applicant. For the reasons previously articulated, his claims were properly assessed as being limited to claims under section 36(2)(aa) of the Act. Given the operation of section 48A of the Act, there was no scope for the Tribunal to assess the First Applicant’s claims (including the Discrimination Claim) on any basis other than the criteria applicable under section 36(2)(aa) of the Act. The Tribunal ultimately assessed the First Applicant’s claims under section 36(2)(aa) of the Act, and dealt with the Discrimination Claim at paragraph [42] of its reasons.

    f)The Second Applicant did not advance the Discrimination Claim as an individual applicant under section 36(2)(a). Had she done so, the Tribunal would have been required to assess the Discrimination Claim under section 36(2)(a). Her election not to advance the Discrimination Claim herself under section 36(2)(a), and instead advance her claim on the basis of section 36(2)(c), meant that the Discrimination Claim could only be assessed by the Tribunal under section 36(2)(aa) of the Act.

1. For completeness, I note that the Discrimination Claim was considered and dealt with by the Tribunal. So much is apparent from paragraph [42] of the Tribunal’s reasons, which is as follows:

   ‘Discrimination against Tamil Women

   42. The applicants claim that Tamil women are discriminated against. As I am considering only Complementary Protection and there being no evidence provided of a risk of significant harm as exhaustively defined in s.36(2A) for being a Tamil woman in Malaysia nor having found any country information which suggests that Tamil women face significant harm I do not pursue this claim further.’

2. For the above reasons, I am satisfied that the Tribunal correctly applied the bar in section 48A to the Applicants.

The certificates and notices under section 438 of the Act

1. The Minister raised for consideration by the Court, the issue of a certificate and a notice by a delegate of the Minister under section 438 of the Act.

2. In this matter, two documents were issued.  The first document dated 13 May 2015 is a document described as a ‘certificate and notification’ under section 438(1)(a) of the Act (‘Certificate’) (Court Book page 316).  The Certificate purports to cover information that would be contrary to the public interest because it contains ‘internal working documents’.

3. The second document also dated 13 May 2015 is a document that is described solely as a ‘notification’ (‘Notification’) under section 438(1)(b) of the Act (Court Book page 985). The Notification purports to cover information ‘affecting the personal privacy of third parties’.

4. The Tribunal’s approach to the Certificate and the Notification is dealt with in paragraph [13] of its reasons.  I set out that paragraph in full below:

   ‘13. Section 438(1)(a) and 438(1)(b) certificates were attached to the Departmental file. This matter was raised at the hearing and explained in detail including providing the following information. Guided by MZAFZ v MIBP [2016] FCA 1081 the Tribunal found the s.438(1)(a) certificate to be invalid because it provided no reasoning other than 'internal working documents'. As this does not suffice to explain how the documents' release would not be in the public interest the Tribunal found that this did not constitute a valid s.438 certificate. As such I explained to the applicants that the material contained within the identified folios related to internal decision making processes for attaining approval of the applicants' travel to Canberra to access a temporary travel document from the Malaysia Embassy as well as the Minister's decision related to the request for ministerial intervention, the outcome of which was known to the applicants. As this had no bearing on the matters before the Tribunal I have taken no regard to these internal documents. The s.438(1)(b) document I find to be valid. It covers the second applicant's brother's protection visa decision record and that of another travel companion. It is valid because the information contained within was provided to the Department in confidence and the certificate states as such. As the applicant's knew of the two protection visa applications I acknowledged their existence but chose not to share the contents. As the content of the material does not relate to the matters being considered in this case I have not taking (sic) regard of either decision record.’

5. As can be seen from the paragraph above, the existence of both the Certificate and the Notification was disclosed to the Applicants.  As a result, there was no denial of procedural fairness to the Applicants of the type contemplated in Minister for Immigration v SZMTA; CQZ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection; BEG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 3.

6. The remaining issues in respect of the Certificate and the Notification relate to, firstly, the validity (or otherwise) of each document, and secondly the decisions made by the Tribunal in relation to the disclosure (or non-disclosure) of the material covered by the Certificate and the Notification.

7. The Tribunal found that the Certificate was not valid because it purported to cover ‘internal working documents’. On reaching that conclusion, the Tribunal then indicated that it explained to the Applicants what was contained within the documents sought to be covered by the Certificate. The Tribunal then stated it did not have regard to the material in relation to the matters before it.

8. The Minister properly concedes the Certificate was invalid on the grounds that internal working documents do not attract public interest immunity. The question that then arises is, given the documents were not shown to the Applicants and given the Tribunal did not take them into account, whether there is a realistic possibility that the Tribunal’s decision could have been different if it had taken the information into account.

9. The second affidavit of Melinda Jackson annexed a copy of the documents the subject of the Certificate (annexure MAJ-2).  The Court therefore had an opportunity to review the documents the subject of the Certificate.  The Applicants also had an opportunity to make submissions in relation to the documents the subject of the Certificate.

10. The Minister submitted that there was no realistic possibility that the Tribunal’s decision could have been different if it had taken the documents the subject of the Certificate into account in arriving at its conclusion. The Minister submitted that this was the case for two reasons. First, the material was irrelevant. Second, because in any event, the material had been discussed with the Applicants during the hearing and they had been given the opportunity to make submissions in respect of it.

11. Having reviewed the material the subject of the Certificate, I am satisfied that it was not relevant to the questions before the Tribunal. The Applicants were aware of the subject matter of the documents.  It was explained to them by the Tribunal.  Moreover, it concerned arrangements that related, among other things, to their bridging visas, travel documents and housing arrangements – matters that they were familiar with.  Further, the documents covered the period 2009 – 2010 which was the period of time relating to the first application for a protection Visa, and not the present application for the visas.  When these matters are taken into account, I am satisfied that the documents the subject of the Certificate were not relevant to the matters that were considered by the Tribunal. Furthermore, I am satisfied that the Applicants had the opportunity to address any issues rising from the documents given the matters recited above. 

12. There is then the issue of the Notice.  The documents the subject of the Notice were also annexed to the Further Affidavit, although they were made available for viewing by the Court only. 

13. Dealing firstly with validity, the Tribunal found the Notification was valid because it contained information provided to the Minister, or an officer of the Department, in confidence. In SZMTA, the Justices Bell, Gageler and Keane at [20] held that the ‘circumstances in which the document, matter or information was given need not be such as would give rise to an equitable obligation on the part of the recipient to keep the document, matter or information confidential’.

14. I have had the opportunity to view the documents the subject of the Notification.  It is plain that the documents the subject of the Notification concern other individuals. In particular, the documents concern protection visa decision records of other people which will have been provided to the Department in confidence.  In view of this, I am satisfied that the Notification was properly issued and that the Tribunal was correct to find that the Notification was valid.

15. The next issue concerned the decision of the Tribunal not to have any regard to the material the subject of the Notification in relation to the matters before it.

16. The Minister submits that the Tribunal made no error in relation to the approach it took in relation to these documents.  This is because, it is submitted, that firstly, the material is irrelevant to the Applicants’ claims and secondly, in any event, the Applicants were not denied procedural fairness.

17. As I have indicated, the material the subject of the Notification relates to protection claims made by a third party.  The information contained within the documents relates to the facts and circumstances of those claims.  The information does not bear upon the claims advanced by the Applicants. 

18. Secondly, and importantly, there is nothing in the material covered by the Notification that is adverse to the Applicants’ claims which may require the Applicants to be given an opportunity to respond to the material.  For this reason, and because the documents are irrelevant, in my view, it cannot be said that the Applicants have been denied procedural fairness

19. Having regard to the matters above, I am unable to discern any error relating to the manner in which the Tribunal dealt with the Certificate, the Notification or the material under each of the Certification and the Notification.

20. In light of the above matters, I dismiss the application for review with costs.

I certify that the preceding fifty-eight (58) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Blake

Associate: 

Date: 21 November 2019